DDI Environment Justice K

1NC

Apocalyptic representations of climate change are an ineffective rhetorical strategy that produces a self-fulfilling prophecy

Hulme (Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia, and Director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research) **6**
(Mike, Chaotic world of climate truth, 4 November,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6115644.stm)

> The language of catastrophe is not the language of science. It will not be visible in next year's global assessment from the world authority of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). To state that climate change will be "catastrophic" hides a cascade of value-laden assumptions which do not emerge from empirical or theoretical science. Is any amount of climate change catastrophic? Catastrophic for whom, for where, and by when? What index is being used to measure the catastrophe? The language of fear and terror operates as an ever-weakening vehicle for effective communication or inducement for behavioural change. This has been seen in other areas of public health risk. Empirical work in relation to climate change communication and public perception shows that it operates here too. Framing climate change as an issue which evokes fear and personal stress **becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy**. By "sexing it up" we exacerbate, through psychological amplifiers, the very risks we are trying to ward off. The careless (or conspiratorial?) translation of concern about Saddam Hussein's putative military threat into the case for WMD has had major geopolitical repercussions. We need to make sure the agents and agencies in our society which would seek to amplify climate change risks do not lead us down a similar counter-productive pathway. The IPCC scenarios of future climate change - warming somewhere between 1.4 and 5.8 Celsius by 2100 - are significant enough without invoking catastrophe and chaos as unguided weapons with which forlornly to threaten society into behavioural change. I believe climate change is real, must be faced and action taken. But **the discourse of catastrophe is in danger of tipping society onto a negative, depressive and reactionary trajectory.**

And, if successful, apocalyptic representations of climate change lead to great power war – regional interventions and arms races

Brzoska (Inst. for Peace Research and Security Policy @ Hamburg) **8**
(Micahel, "The Securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security" ISA Convention Paper)

> In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round 'exceptionalism' in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards 'security experts' (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on 'what to do'. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus **leading to arms races**. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection, as well as more soldiers and arms, is expensive, the financial means compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas emission

and adapting to climate change will be reduced. Global military expenditure is again at the level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2°C by 2050) and adaptation are speculative at the moment,1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy areas are in competition for scarce resources.

Our alternative is to reject the Aff's representations of climate catastrophe

As communication scholars we have an obligation to determine effective rhetorical strategies for our policy proposals – apocalyptic reps of climate change must be rejected as an utter failure

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change.The apocalyptic frame, particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions. Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. Together, we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity.

Climate Apocalypse Rhetoric

enviro apocalypse

The framing of apocalyptic climate change ensures bureaucratic, short-term interventionism—discourse shapes policymaking

Detraz 11 (Nicole, Assistant Prof of Political Science @ the Univ. of Memphis, *Threats or Vulnerabilities? Assessing the Link between Climate Change and Security*, Global Environmental Politics Vol. 11.3, August 2011, pgs 104-120)//mm

Discourse is a powerful concept animating much academic research and a **powerful force within policy debates.** Hajer de fines discourse as the "**specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorization that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities**."9 This definition suggests that discourses are constantly-evolving entities that are shaped by society over time. Simultaneously, **discourses are entities that actors** can **draw on strategically in order to gain attention for a particular issue, or frame an issue in a specific way.** The process of discourse analysis involves tracking the storylines that make up a larger dis- course. A storyline is a set of concepts, ideas, or themes that are repeated and combine to form a discourse.10 In this section, I outline two distinct discourses (environmental conflict and environmental security11), which focus on particular framings of the relationship between security and the environment. In line with arguments that **discourses can guide debate and policy-making in distinct ways**, **each of these distinct discursive frames are likely to yield unique policy recommendations.** For example, **Stern de fines discourse as "the production and representation of meaning, which delimit the realm of understanding, action, and imagination within a certain framework**."12 The environmental conflict discourse links the environment and environ- mental problems to traditional security concerns, including a general concern for state security. **Most authors who use an environmental conflict discourse focus on the possibility that groups within society will engage in violent conflict over natural resources.** These conflicts can be the product of scarcity13, abundance14, or dependence15 on natural resources and are typically understood to threaten the stability of the state. **The primary challenge is to identify those most immediately at risk of conflict and design policy interventions to avoid conflict and ensure state stability. This is largely understood to be the responsibility of state institutions**. **Due to the sense of urgency embedded in this dis- course, policies are** likely to **be aimed at short-term adaptation strategies as a means of avoiding violent conflict. The environmental security discourse is concerned with the negative impacts of environmental degradation for human beings**. While environmental conflict is largely state-centric and can still directly be linked to military security, **environmental security is much more closely linked to notions of security at an individual level, or human security**.16 It is important to note, however, that the concerns embedded in environmental security are more specific than the general concept of human security, which can refer to anything that negatively impacts the safety and survival of humans. **In this discourse, the threat is located in negative consequences of environmental damage and those who are vulnerable are all human beings.**17 This concept of human vulnerability is widely used in general discussions of global environmental change, and climate change in par- ticular.18 According to Gaillard, much of the literature on vulnerability focuses on "the susceptibility to suffer damage in a potentially dangerous event, either natural, economic or political."19 **In the context of these debates, vulnerability stresses the condition of humans being susceptible to individual and collective harm because of environmental change**. In general, environmental security is broader than environmental conflict because of the former's interest in issues concerning all of humanity and the latter's more focused concern with those susceptible to resource conflict. That being said, environmental security does include a concern about the

potential for conflict over resources—however, this is not the only concern. **The de fining characteristic of the environmental security discourse is that all authors who use it address the negative impact of environmental degradation for human beings**. This environmental degradation can come from natural processes or from human behaviors, but there is some negative aspect of the change for humans. **Policymaking based on an environmental security discourse will be directed at vulnerable populations, and may require a range of governance mechanisms at different scales, ranging from the local to the global, and involving both state and nonstate actors**. While there is overlap between these discourses, **each focuses on particular elements of security and its relationship to the environment**. In other words, each discourse has its own set of storylines for discussing security and environ- ment connections. These storylines determine how broadly or narrowly key ideas and terms are conceptualized. Additionally, **each produces distinct under- standings of the security implications of environmental degradation, and yields unique policy recommendations**. The Climate Change and Security Debate **In the past few years there has been a flurry of** books, journal **articles, policy documents and** media **reports linking climate change to security issues. Some understand this trend as a way to grant additional attention and resources to cli- mate change**, **and to get the public to take it seriously**. Campbell and Parthemore claim that the reason for linking nontraditional issues to security "is to reorient leaders and the established bureaucracy toward seeking and considering a broader array of solutions."20 Additionally Liotta and Shearer claim that "to better understand impacts of climate change on human needs, we focus them throughtheconceptuallensofsecurity."21 Both of these statements illustrate the strategic usage of security discourses to raise awareness of environmental issues, and climate change in particular. It seems logical that the very reasons that people started linking environ- mental issues to security discourses, namely to gain attention to their issues from both scholars and policymakers, is the same reason that people get on the climate change bandwagon. In terms of making connections between environment and security, Raleigh and Urdal argue that **there was "an interest among Western national security establishments to identify potential threats that could legitimize their continued existence" in a post-Cold War world**.22 **Actors create, maintain, and use linkages to exercise influence in a particular realm.**23 There is significant evidence that actors have linked a variety of issues to security dis- courses in order to draw attention to them. For example, several scholars have linked health issues like HIV/AIDS to security discourses to "raise international awareness and generate more resources to combat the disease."24 This is a similar tactic that is used by those who wish to raise the salience of environmental issues. While for some this takes the form of strategically linking issues like land use25 and biodiversity26 to the climate regime, for others it takes the form of linking the climate regime to security discourses.

1nc pik alt

Alt is cyborg consumption—affirms squo practices without their reps of the environmental future as a domesticated animal to control—only the alt ensures sustainability

Stoekl 13 (Allan, prof of French and comparative literature @ Penn State, University Park and Bataille's biggest fan, *"After the Sublime," After the Apocalypse: Two Versions of Sustainability in Light of Climate Change*, Diacritics, Vol 41. 3, 2013, pgs 40-57)//mm

Now **we can easily transpose this discussion to that of global climate change**. **Climate change,** perhaps even more than mutually assured destruction in its day, **has the aura of the slow-moving apocalypse, the vibe of total inevitability and total inconceivability**. As Fredric Jameson remarked, it's become easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.12 But **I would argue that the (ecological) end of the world, the (popularly imagined) slow apocalypse of climate change, is today no more conceivable than the end of capitalism.** In one case (**climate change) sublime awe takes over from comprehension**; in the other (capitalism) we have simply a void of comprehension and will: **we can imagine nothing other than the current model, flawed as it is**. **Trembling before** not only **the prospect of the destruction of the world as we know it**—the world in all its ecological finitude nevertheless more contingent than an artificially contrived economic model—**but above all the** fundamental **incalculable nature of externalities, we can affirm only our own consciousness**. **We revel in the thought of apocalypse, of the fate of the earth both in our hands and somehow out of them**. Ferguson hints that **the real problem of apocalypse is claustrophobia: the subject wishes to free itself of the hell that is**, as Sartre famously wrote, **other people**. **In 1984 that hell was the oppressive threat of nuclear holocaust; today it is the pressure of seven billion consumers**, ever **multiplying, pumping and dumping, and** always **churning out more and more greenhouse gases**. Freedom from climate change, one can easily imagine, from the perspective of the sublime is freedom from the massive pressure of so much consumption, by so many people. **What's left, after the** sublime **contemplation of the roasting of the earth, the dizzying play of unthinkable calculations** and representations, **is just me, alone in a garden of pristine earthly consumption-delight,** fully, somehow, magically, sustainable. **My radical negation of the earth in its fallenness is the affirmation of my freedom** and the separation of the moral law from the vicissitudes and representation of nature (in its destruction). **This is not so far-fetched.** After all, "deep ecology" posits as an ideal a pristine earth, unsullied by human presence. **This is a post-apocalyptic earth, cleansed of the human stain.** Only the freedom and the reason—and moral law—of the eco-critic remain. Even a "light green" ecology, usually opposed to "deep ecology," imagines an earth cleansed of people as we know them today; it's a world populated only by consumers (and not that many of them) careful never to leave a carbon footprint bigger than that minuscule one provided by just one earth. Either way, an implicit and all-pervasive sublime has created a world just for me—**I'll be the last one in the forest, the last one to enter a perfect world of calibrated consumption and population and slam the door**. The perfect world, after all, isn't even natural—it's my freedom, my law affirming a universal law, which can exist solely in me. And after me, nothing—I'm the only one to grasp this very spacious (if not empty) world at the end of the world. Sartrean bad-faith analysis has, however, its limits. I **want to suggest another way of considering the sublime of externalities, and with it another way of thinking about** what I would call first-order **sustainability**, a sustainability after the sublime. >> I think that there are two ways of repositioning subjectivity in relation to the sublime, especially as it has to do with the "apocalypse" (or lack thereof). These entail two different versions of the post-human and of sustainability. **The** first **post-human recognizes its otherness as the cyborg, the mutant**. (**I use** the term **"post-human" here to differentiate a future subjectivity not bound to present patterns** of subjective dominance: of ecosystems, of "nature," of material accoutrements. **Such a**

subjectivity will necessarily entail a recognition that the social, if not the human [in its modernist sense], **has always been inseparable from**, imbricated in, **animality** and technics.) There are still generally anthropomorphic creatures in this model: they interact with the world, but they do not presume to dominate it or use it as a mere "standing reserve," a source of quantified raw materials. They are defined not by their humanity (which they have survived), but by their inescapable sociality. The **sublime is involved here to the extent that** these **post-human cyborgs swoon before the representation of the "drowned world," or the desertified world that may very well be their lot**. This world is best grasped through an understanding of the withdrawal of the possibility of calculation of external costs: **in their absence, we foresee the likely desert of a world where externalities** have not, **cannot, be calculated. But cyborgs pass beyond this sublime**, **which divorces the self** (and the moral law) **from the senses and any associated aesthetics**, **and arrive at** a narrative-grounded aesthetics, **one that affirms the story line, but not** necessarily **the representational truth** (since truth is no longer representable or calculable), **of sustainability. Here one could** perhaps **note the model of Sartre**, in What Is Literature? (1967), **who grounds human freedom in the relations between the free author and the free reader**. Sartre implicitly revises Kantian aesthetics by stressing that his aesthetics are literary, and above all linguistic: the word, rather than being directly tied to sense-data (as, say, color would be), is instead a "transparent" view onto the world, a sheer representation. One could certainly find fault with this model, but nevertheless Sartre has indicated a point where a narrative aesthetics is situated not in relation to sensory experience, but in its narrative representation, which is, we might add, inevitably fictional, faux, no matter the verisimilitude. At a certain point the ultimate veracity of the representation—which Sartre took for granted, in the negotiation between author and reader—can be questioned, but not its possibility, desirability, or charge. This fiction is distinguished from the phantasm of the perfect calculation of hidden costs by the willingness of its author-figures at least to envisage and dramatize those costs, even if they can be envisaged only on an ever-withdrawing horizon of meaning. I would argue **that it is through this** Kantian-Sartrean **conjunction that we can formulate** what I would call **fictional sustainability**13 **as modes and strategies of** (inevitably ethical) **representation**. To characterize it in this way is not to demean it; given the sublime of externalities, **any other strategy (any** putative **certitude concerning the future and the balancing of accounts needed to ensure it) is more an example of human arrogance than anything else**. >> **The cyborg thus depends on representation**, fiction; **the recounted representation of the (recognized) unrepresentable**.14 There is a post-human social, if not a Cartesian individual human; there is a problematic, even an imperative, of aesthetics and representation, even if matter and its calculation are just beyond our grasp—base—and fundamentally unrepresentable. After this, a zero or even negative discount rate concerning the future becomes desirable. By this I mean that **in order to forestall** and eventually deny **the eventuality of the horrific representation of the future, post-human cyborgs will** have to **effectively reduce the discounting of the future in relation to the past,** so that they will be willing to put off expenditure now, for their pleasure, in order to "save" the future (if only by narrating it as sustainable). A bizarre version of the pleasure principle . . . **Simply rejecting the sublime of externalities,** on the other hand, **would result in a complete discounting of the future, and life in the present. If we can't easily calculate the necessary inputs guaranteeing "flourishing" in the future, why bother?** Such a reaction, while as logical as any that fully discounts the future, celebrates only the self and the somewhat perverse rationality of its survival in isolation, at the end of history, or apocalypse. **A survival,** on the other hand, **that recognizes the other as an end**—in its freedom—**will also recognize a narration of its, and all others', continuation: sustainability versus apocalypse**. In this sense we pass from rejection of the sublime to aesthetic representation: we want a certain world, a certain climate, a certain human population, a certain ecology with certain animals. This future will presumably resemble the ecology of the present (minus the continuous degradation). **The demand of the future, for the future, cannot be justified on purely practical grounds—it is more practical to discount the future and spend for the present**—or calculable ones, given the delirium of external costs, but it can be to the extent that a certain

recognition of culture, grounded in aesthetics, can be linked to morality, and to the construction and affirmation of the community. This is the role of fiction: the sustainable future entails representation in a Kantian regime of the recognition of the freedom of the other. But since this other is, precisely, free—we can never simply know it or categorize it or represent it—sustainability will only be posited in possible scenarios. Life in and as (science) fiction: **where Brundtland assumed we knew what th**e human, the **future, and development were, and we knew how to calculate it, in this** (second-order) **model of sustainability the world as fiction consists of contestations**, in practice, **of these very notions.**15 Thus a sublime subjectivity—our recoil before the destruction of the earth—morphs into an aesthetics grounding community. The work of art—the narration of sustainability in all its guises—opens the possibility of an individual culture that recognizes the other not as a means, but as an end. **Sustainable personal culture is a discipline that affirms individual freedom**, and specifically, in our era, freedom not to consume (since consumerism posits a subjectivity that is a mere means to the end of consuming physical and energetic inputs).16 **Such freedom is what can serve as a larger morality for a post- consumerist society.** This aesthetic transformation, which is thus also a moral transformation, is inseparable from a strategy of recycling. Since there can be no discounting of the future, all the goods that up to now have been produced, and all the energy that has been expended, for the purpose of pleasure in the here and now, will be recycled and projected into a necessarily fictional futurity. In this way the subversive gesture of gleaning—so brilliantly depicted by Agnès Varda in the film The Gleaners and I—will reveal itself as a strategy of an aesthetics of the future. The openness of the cyborg will be linked through the human prosthesis of trash, of the ritual of the found object recycled as sacred totem, to the possibility of community after the death of Man. The formlessness of the sublime—and of the post-human "mind"—reappears as the base matter of refuse. The world will be "saved" for the post- human through the recycling not of raw materials, but of fragments, objets a, transgressive remains that refuse simple disposal-as-completion.17 A world of junk is the dogged fictionalized calculation of matter as incalculable. Retrofit in this model—reuse and restitution, deconstruction and reconstruction of city structure and dwelling—is linked to the demise of landfill. The post-human will no longer be identified with the burial of trash that in some way remains mine. (No one else has the right to my trash; this is why I consign it to the landfill.) The eternal human possession of landfill waste will be resituated as the situational post-human—and sociable— giving of fragments in sacred bricolage. The bad-faith self of Ferguson's sublime will be repurposed as the communitarian death-bound Being of scavengers. The city will be reconfigured as a retrofit field where the strategic "vision" of a future of fossil fuel contentment—with a 100 percent discount rate—is rewritten as a field of cultural insubordination and anarchic, ecstatic transport ("bikes not bombs"). City "planning" in this light is the occupation of (as André Breton put it in Nadja18) "poles of attraction," highly charged urban cathexis points, like Liberty Park, which serve as spaces of a futurity that ultimately opens a utopian, unrepresentable time. Associated with this time is a certain sustainability—that of the marshaling of re sources, the perversion-recycling of materials and spaces, the speculative and ultimately fictional (though for that reason highly seductive) quantification of the elements that go into the "carbon footprint." Rituals of austerity are enacted with striking drama: Jean Genet meets E. F. Schumacher. The (phantasmic) precision of the engineer, **formulating an exact reckoning that would allow the earth to continue on course and its inhabitants to "flourish," is accompanied by the imperative of the recycler, whose material—the detritus of a civilization in decline—is charged with a sacred, an end in itself, that ultimately (and parodically) grounds both morality and aesthetics**. I would argue that **this is the only sustainability we can live in, but it is a life stripped of all illusions concerning that** very **sustainability. This second-order sustainability does not pretend to anticipate** perfectly **the future—only to write it—and thus is bereft of the apocalypse.**

1nc do nothing

The aff's reps become a desire for posthumous partying—rejection invests in the contradiction of enjoying the thrill of perceiving oneself dead

Klein 13 (Richard, prof emeritus in the Dept of Romance Studies @ Cornell University, *Climate Change Through The Lens Of Nuclear Criticism*, Diacritics, Vol 41.3, 2013, pgs 82-87)//mm

If after climate catastrophe organized society were somehow able, after many years, **to reconstitute itself in another ecology, what will have been lost?** With the destruction of the archive would be lost all the institutions that depend in part or entirely on its existence—like law or mathematics, history or philosophy. But the most vulnerable (not necessarily the most precious) institution of all is literature, which has no real referent and which depends as an institution exclusively on the archive for existence. **Science might revive or perhaps archeology,** to the extent that their referents are material things in the world. **Poetry, song, and epic might once again be emitted**. But that institution we call literature, which, for our purposes, began sometime at the end of the seventeenth century in Europe, with its conventions, its reading public, its critics and merchants, editors and printers, with all the effects of intersexuality, I mean intertexuality, that its history makes possible—all that could never be revived. **The fiction of climate catastrophe invites what** Frances **Ferguson called the nuclear sublime**. She demonstrates that t**o speak in the future perfect about the termination of organized existence fulfills the conditions with which Kant**, in the third Critique, **defines the sublime aesthetic experience. It is a mode of speech that is imagined**, in a fiction, **to be posthumous**—**as if one could see one's past from** some perspective **beyond the grave, a past life to which one is present only as a spectator—a ghost**, as it were, **viewing its past life**. **It's what Kant evokes describing the walker in the Alps who turns a corner and** suddenly **confronts an immense abyss. The first moment of his experience is one of awe and terror** before the enormity of the void, **a first negative moment of non-pleasure**, in which death looms. **But in a second time**, **when the walker sees that he is safe on the edge, he can enjoy the spectacle** of seeming infinite nothingness that opens at his feet before his astonished eyes. That second moment brings a feeling of what Kant calls aes- thetic well-being, **an immense pleasure of confronting the greatest forces**, the vastest distances in the universe, **and surviving, quite deliciously, unharmed. Nothing protects better from death than having died**. **That is why the posthumous perspective of the sub- lime is so enticing**. Ferguson reminds us that Schiller says that suicide is the highest form of the sublime, for it requires that you imagine yourself dead.5 Nothing more perfectly illustrates the illusion of the nuclear sublime than the posthumous perspective presup- posed by the cheery slogan of the Gaia Liberation Front's Church of Euthanasia: "Save the planet, kill yourself."6 **The ultimate catastrophe is therefore a fiction, but it** nevertheless **is one that has very material consequences in the present.** That is what distinguished it from fables that are mere inventions. **It is a necessary postulation** in order **to recognize the symptoms and dangers of climate change, and that recognition,** however muted politically, **is already at work in the phantasms and dreams of people today**, all over the world—from the population of Beijing to Islanders in the Pacific, to the shores of New Jersey, the coasts of Australia, the plains of Africa, etc. **In our unconscious the worst may have already happened**. **And yet whenever we try to imagine what lies beyond our own death**, or beyond the human species, **after the ultimate apocalyptic disaster, we assume the condition of ghosts**, **between life and death, able to view in retrospective the world from which we are absent**. **That explains why it may be always an error**, and the sign of an error, **to speak apocalyptically about climate changes in tones of sublime terror and delicious awe**. Indeed, **if engagement in the politics of climate change doesn't feel funny, even ridiculous—struggling to save the whole of organized life—you are taking yourself**

too seriously. Dwelling on the tragedy that awaits us, you have been seduced into the error of the nuclear sublime. And **whenever you hear a climate change speaker adopt some** lurid, **mournful**, or pious **tone, you should ask yourself**, since its standpoint is in a fiction of posthumous existence, **where exactly is the speaker actually standing?** And what profit is to be gained in standing there? **The dolorous tones of the nuclear sublime, when they are heard in the language of climate change, are the sign that a buck is being made.**

Small 1NC

Apocalyptic representations of climate change are an ineffective rhetorical strategy that produces a self-fulfilling prophecy

Hulme (Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia, and Director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research) **6**
(Mike, Chaotic world of climate truth, 4 November,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6115644.stm)

> The language of catastrophe is not the language of science. It will not be visible in next year's global assessment from the world authority of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). To state that climate change will be "catastrophic" hides a cascade of value-laden assumptions which do not emerge from empirical or theoretical science. Is any amount of climate change catastrophic? Catastrophic for whom, for where, and by when? What index is being used to measure the catastrophe? The language of fear and terror operates as an ever-weakening vehicle for effective communication or inducement for behavioural change. This has been seen in other areas of public health risk. Empirical work in relation to climate change communication and public perception shows that it operates here too. Framing climate change as an issue which evokes fear and personal stress **becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy**. By "sexing it up" we exacerbate, through psychological amplifiers, the very risks we are trying to ward off. The careless (or conspiratorial?) translation of concern about Saddam Hussein's putative military threat into the case for WMD has had major geopolitical repercussions. We need to make sure the agents and agencies in our society which would seek to amplify climate change risks do not lead us down a similar counter-productive pathway. The IPCC scenarios of future climate change - warming somewhere between 1.4 and 5.8 Celsius by 2100 - are significant enough without invoking catastrophe and chaos as unguided weapons with which forlornly to threaten society into behavioural change. I believe climate change is real, must be faced and action taken. But **the discourse of catastrophe is in danger of tipping society onto a negative, depressive and reactionary trajectory.**

AIK 1NC

Apocalyptic representations of climate change are an ineffective rhetorical strategy that produces a self-fulfilling prophecy

Hulme (Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia, and Director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research) **6**
(Mike, Chaotic world of climate truth, 4 November,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6115644.stm)

> The language of catastrophe is not the language of science. It will not be visible in next year's global assessment from the world authority of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). To state that climate change will be "catastrophic" hides a cascade of value-laden assumptions which do not emerge from empirical or theoretical science. Is any amount of climate change catastrophic? Catastrophic for whom, for where, and by when? What index is being used to measure the catastrophe? The language of fear and terror operates as an ever-weakening vehicle for effective communication or inducement for behavioural change. This has been seen in other areas of public health risk. Empirical work in relation to climate change communication and public perception shows

that it operates here too. Framing climate change as an issue which evokes fear and personal stress **becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy**. By "sexing it up" we exacerbate, through psychological amplifiers, the very risks we are trying to ward off. The careless (or conspiratorial?) translation of concern about Saddam Hussein's putative military threat into the case for WMD has had major geopolitical repercussions. We need to make sure the agents and agencies in our society which would seek to amplify climate change risks do not lead us down a similar counter-productive pathway. The IPCC scenarios of future climate change - warming somewhere between 1.4 and 5.8 Celsius by 2100 - are significant enough without invoking catastrophe and chaos as unguided weapons with which forlornly to threaten society into behavioural change. I believe climate change is real, must be faced and action taken. But **the discourse of catastrophe is in danger of tipping society onto a negative, depressive and reactionary trajectory.**

Apocalyptic reps of climate change trades off with focus on ongoing environmental structural violence
Crist (Prof in Department of Science and Technology in Society @ Virginia Tech) **7**
(Eileen, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, Telos 4 (Winter 2007): 29–55)

Besides coddling humanity's proclivity for self-centered concern, apocalyptic thinking directs attention toward some future Hollywood- style cataclysm, while dimming awareness of the present and real suffering of nonhumans, disempowered and impoverished people, and consumers beleaguered by clutter and malaise. Life's ongoing devastation, and humanity's pathological imbalance with wild nature and schisms within itself, are the predicaments that we are called to face—not the preemption of some imagined crash in some imagined future.

This North/South inequality creates multiple structural trends towards extinction
Szentes '8
Tamás Szentes, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. "Globalisation and prospects of the world society" 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf

It' s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many "invisible wars" are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the "war against Nature", i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and "invisible wars" we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and "visible" wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of "invisible wars", of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after

or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. "Sustainability of development" (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any "zero-sum-games", in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the "negative-sum-games" tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about "sustainability of development" but rather about the "sustainability of human life", i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former "socialist" countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) "development studies" we must speak about and make "survival studies". While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for **the final, last catastrophe**. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be "negative-sum-games") can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and "invisible wars", as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, **transformation of the world order** by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

Our alternative is to reject the Aff's representations of climate catastrophe

As communication scholars we have an obligation to determine effective rhetorical strategies for our policy proposals – apocalyptic reps of climate change must be rejected as an utter failure

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. We

echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change.The apocalyptic frame, particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions. Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. Together, we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity.

2NC Turns Case/Kills Action

Ecosecurity leads to ineffective solutions, justifies violence against those that are thought as threats to the environment, as well as makes view environmental problems as too large to overcome and unsolvable.

Buell, Frederick. From apocalypse to way of life: Environmental crisis in the American century. Routledge, 20**03**.

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse thus suffers from a number of liabilities**. First, it seems to have become a political liability almost as much as an asset. **It calls up a fierce and effective opposition with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, con**cern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a "total solution"** to the problems involved— **a phrase that**, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it**, is** all too **reminiscent of the Third Reich's** infamous "**final solution**."55 **A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however**, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place.** Itthus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56At the same time **it depoliticizes people**, **inducing them to accept their impotence** as individuals; t**his is something that has made many people today feel,** ironically and/or passively, **that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it**. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: **the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one's back on the environment**. **This means, preeminently, turning one's back on "nature"**—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism**. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, people need to delink from natureand live in postnature**—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. **Explorations of how deeply "nature" has been wounded and how**

intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to further indifference to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only **if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and** with (often, though not always) **the need for immediate "total solution."** Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode;eco-authoritarianism was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal "nature."

Environmental security creates a self-fulfilling prophecy because their epistemology only evaluates the problems separately and not as one unified ecosystem

Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq. "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society." Global Change, Peace & Security 23.3 (20**11**): 335-355. Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict

The twenty-first century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises –climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While **the structure of global economic activity is driving the unsustainable depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming**. Both global **warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on** global industrial **food production**, as well ason global financial and economic instability. **Conventional policy responses toward the intensification of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes**. Yet increasing evidence shows **they are** deeply **interwoven** manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded. In this context, orthodoxIR's **flawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their 'securitisation', reifying the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conflicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the 'Otherisation' of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy**. Yetthisrelationship between global crises and conflict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a widerepistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes. In 2009, the UK government's chief scientific adviser Sir John Beddington warned that **without mitigating and preventive action 'drivers' of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a 'perfect storm' of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030**. 1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of **the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social**

and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics. While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, '**most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or failed to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.**' 2 Underlying t**his problem is the lack of a holistic systems approach to thinking about not only global crises, but their causal origins in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures**of the contemporary international system. Indeed, **it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be 'secured' and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the first place.** Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing systemic and structural obstacles to the implementation of desired reforms.In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identified by Brauch, this paper begins with an empirically-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration of the best available data on four major global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global financial instability – illustrating the systemic interconnections between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. **This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and polic**y. This critique argues principally that **orthodox IR reifies a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a reductionist, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises**. Consequently, **rather than global crises being understood causally and holistically in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are 'securitised' as amplifiers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations**. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously exacerbates the danger of reactionary violence, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. **This moves us away from the debate over whether resource 'shortages' or 'abundance' causes conflicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in violent conflict.**

The way the aff constructs other countries as threats make solvency impossible because we are unable to cooperate with them. It views not cooperating as a rational choice to become better than other contries.

Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq. "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society." Global Change, Peace & Security 23.3 (20**11**): 335-355. Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the¶ manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological,¶ energy and economic crises (critical security studies**) in the context of the historically-specific¶ socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted,¶ and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises** (historical sociology and¶historical materialism).¶ Instead, both **realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches** focus on

different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but ea**ch lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system** concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. **They are**, in other words, **unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crise**s. **They** simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84 Hence, they **neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security**.85 In Cox's words, **because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying** it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason –thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, **the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.**87 By the same token, **the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis** acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-**led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.**88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them – and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military–police measures in purported response to an existential danger **The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges'**, and are thus entirely disproportionate.**90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes** by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. **The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms**.

Apocalyptic representations of climate change kill environmental movements
a. Fatalism

b. Psychological Studies – a large body of studies have shown that dire descriptions of climate change reduce people's willingness to engage in behaviors aimed at combating global warming. And we control the uniqueness apocalyptic reps are the dominant mode of global warming rhetoric but belief and action

against global warming is actually declining

Feinberg and Willer (Psychology Dept and Sociology Dept, UC Berkeley) **11**

(Matthew and Robb, Apocalypse Soon? Dire Messages Reduce Belief in Global Warming by Contradicting Just-World Beliefs, Psychological Science January 2011 vol. 22 no. 1 34-38)

> Though scientific evidence for the existence of global warming continues to mount, in the United States and other countries belief in global warming has stagnated or even decreased in recent years. One possible explanation for this pattern is that information about the potentially dire consequences of global warming threatens deeply held beliefs that the world is just, orderly, and stable. Individuals overcome this threat by denying or discounting the existence of global warming, and this process ultimately results in decreased willingness to counteract climate change. Two experiments provide support for this explanation of the dynamics of belief in global warming, suggesting that less dire messaging could be more effective for promoting public understanding of climate-change research. Although scientific evidence attests to the existence and severity of global warming, high percentages of people in the United States and elsewhere increasingly see global warming as nonexistent, exaggerated, or unrelated to human activity (BBC Climate Change Poll, 2010; Gallup Poll, 2009, 2010; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2009). Because scientists agree that large-scale action will be necessary to counteract the effects of global warming, environmental advocates often engage in public appeals designed to increase rates of proenvironmental behaviors and promote support for initiatives aimed at counteracting climate change. These appeals often emphasize the severity of potential consequences, relying on messages that highlight the dire risks associated with unchecked global warming (Kerr, 2007). But what if these appeals are in fact counterproductive? We contend that one cause of skepticism concerning global warming may be that such dire messages threaten individuals' need to believe that the world is just, orderly, and stable, a motive that is widely held and deeply ingrained in many people (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Research shows that many individuals have a strong need to perceive the world as just, believing that rewards will be bestowed on individuals who judiciously strive for them and punishments will be meted out to those who deserve them (Dalbert, 2001; Furnham, 2003). Research on just-world theory has demonstrated that when individuals' need to believe in a just world is threatened, they commonly employ defensive responses, such as dismissal or rationalization of the information that threatened their just-world beliefs (for reviews, see Furnham, 2003; Hafer & Bégue, 2005). Information regarding the potentially severe and arbitrary effects of global warming should constitute a significant threat to belief in a just world, and discrediting or denying global warming's existence could serve as a means of resolving the resulting threat. Many dire messages aimed at stopping global warming make salient the impending chaos and unpredictable catastrophe that global warming will bring with it. Moreover, these messages often emphasize the harm that will be done to children and future generations who have done nothing themselves to cause global warming. Such messages contradict the belief that the world is predictable and fair by suggesting that good people will suffer and that the innocent will be the primary victims. Because these messages contradict just-world beliefs, individuals who most strongly hold such beliefs should be the most threatened. When such people are exposed to dire messages concerning global warming, they are thus likely to discount the evidence. By increasing skepticism about global warming, these dire messages should, in turn, also reduce people's willingness to engage in behaviors aimed at combating global warming. We conducted two experiments testing these claims. In the first, we measured participants' tendencies to hold just-world beliefs, varied the type of global-warming message participants were exposed to, and then measured their levels of skepticism regarding global warming. In the second study, we investigated the role of just-world beliefs more directly, manipulating the salience of these beliefs before exposing participants to a dire global-warming message. We then measured both levels of skepticism and participants' willingness to curb their daily carbon emissions.

c. Polarization

Apocalytptic reps lead to it

Nordhas and Shellberger (authors of Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility and a recent collection of energy and climate writings, The Emerging Climate Consensus) **9**

(Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, Apocalypse Fatigue: Losing the Public on Climate Change, Yale Environemnt 360, 11/18/09, http://www.e360.yale.edu/content/print.msp?id=2210)

> Americans typically give less credit to expert opinion than do the educated elites. Combine these two psychological phenomena — a low sense of imminent threat (what psychologists call low-threat salience) and system justification — and

what you get is public opinion that is highly resistant to education or persuasion. Most Americans aren't alarmed enough to pay much attention, and efforts to raise the volume simply trigger system- justifying responses. The lesson of recent years would appear to be that apocalyptic threats — when their impacts are relatively far off in the future, difficult to imagine or visualize, and emanate from everyday activities, not an external and hostile source — are not easily acknowledged and are unlikely to become priority concerns for most people. In fact, the louder and more alarmed climate advocates become in these efforts, the more they polarize the issue, driving away a conservative or moderate for every liberal they recruit to the cause. These same efforts to increase salience through offering increasingly dire prognosis about the fate of the planet (and humanity) have also probably undermined public confidence in climate science. Rather than galvanizing public demand for difficult and far-reaching action, apocalyptic visions of global warming disaster have led many Americans to question the science. Having been told that climate science demands that we fundamentally change our way of life, many Americans have, not surprisingly, concluded that the problem is not with their lifestyles but with what they've been told about the science. And in this they are not entirely wrong, insofar as some prominent climate advocates, in their zeal to promote action, have made representations about the state of climate science that go well beyond any established scientific consensus on the subject, hyping the most dire scenarios and most extreme recent studies, which are often at odds with the consensus of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

That makes warming inevitable

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

A second implication of the tragic apocalyptic frame is that it invites naysayers to discredit scientists as false prophets and label environmentalists as alarmists. As Gleiberman (2006) notes: "The right-wing strategy, which has been to paint global warming as a lofty hypothetical-an alarmist scenario pushed by pesky Chicken Littles-is a way of relegating it back to the era of '60s paranoia" (p. 65). Apocalyptic framing serves as fodder for naysayers to continue portraying global warming as "overblown" or arguing "that it may not exist" (Stevens, 1997, p. F1). Ultimately, such a discourse polarizes readers, who are forced to choose sides because they were not given more nuanced options for addressing the issue.

But if not through a tragic apocalypse, how might the narrative of global warming be framed to promote political action? Participants in a recent Environmental Communication forum speak to this question, in light of Schwarze's discussion of melodrama (Kinsella, 2008). As Schwarze (2006) argues, the polarizing structure of melodrama may inspire action: "Promoting division and drawing sharp moral distinctions can be a fitting response to situations in which identification and consensus have obscured recognition of damaging material conditions and social injustices" (p. 242). Though melodrama and apocalyptic tragedy differ, they share a tendency to divide audiences, for instance, into heroes against villains (Schwarze, 2006) or believers against non-believers (Brummett, 1991).

Perhaps the polarizing rhetoric of melodrama may shift the ground of the climate change debate away from economic costs and benefits, to the moral stakes of decimating the earth, as Peterson suggests (Kinsella, 2008). Drawing clear distinctions between heroes and villains could motivate identifications to mitigate emissions. As Check counters, the complex issue of climate change may not lend itself to divisive, melodramatic structure, for it does not have a single clear "rhetorical devil that is powerful, ubiquitous, deceitful, and identifiable" (Kinsella, 2008, p. 98). We, too, worry that divisive rhetoric, particularly in the form of tragic apocalypse, **has precluded and will continue to suffocate opportunities for a widespread collective will to form**. If we accept the view advocated by a number of experts-that global warming represents a challenge to every aspect of modern development-it is imperative for as many different sectors of society as possible to contribute to positive change. Polarizing the community while denying the potential for action, as in apocalyptic tragedy, seems an untenable rhetorical strategy for encouraging the public to become active participants in climate change mitigation.

c. Expertism – apocalyptic discourse creates it and makes common people feel either helpless or complacent, killing action

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

> Along with supporting diverse sites of human agency, rhetors may want to avoid the inherent conservatism of apocalyptic discourse. Apocalyptic rhetoric suggests that received sense-making systems (i.e., common sense) cannot explain great changes, but that various prophets can (Brummett, 1991). In the case of climate change, apocalyptic framing endows an array of experts and elites (including scientists, actuaries, politicians, and journalists) with the power to understand, frame, and perhaps resolve the issue; helping fuel the common sentiment that ordinary people cannot do anything to reduce global warming (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), or that they will not need to because "'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem" (Gregg Easterbrook, quoted in Nocera, 2007, p. C1). Perhaps by linking climate change solutions to common sense-especially Americans' notions of sacrifice, conservation, community, and family (Moser & Dilling, 2004)-we may free scientists from their role as controversial prophets, while expanding agency beyond Fate. As our analysis suggests, simply creating awareness of an issue is not enough to create an active public. Rather, that awareness needs to work toward arousing the public toward action (Hallahan, 2001).

e. Tradeoff – total environmental collapse is inevitable even if warming is solved. Even if they do spur action it will be narrowly focused to only technical, short terms solutions which tradeoff with broader protection

Crist (Prof in Department of Science and Technology in Society @ Virginia Tech) **7**
(Eileen, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, Telos 4 (Winter 2007): 29–55)

> While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet's ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the lime- light for the one issue that trumps all others.
>
> Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve "the problem." Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun's rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by "changing our whole style of living."_6 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, "the one lifeline we can use immediately."_7 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. "The Montreal protocol," he submits, "marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem."_8 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem.
>
> Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet's pre- dicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforesee- able) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, **the root cause** of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consump-

tion, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet._9 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what tech- nological means can save it from impending tipping points.2_

The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine dis- ruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with "dangerous anthropogenic inter- ference" with the climate system.

In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiver- sity,23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the cli- mate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—**the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.**

2NC Structural Violence Module

Apocalyptic thinking trades off with focus on ongoing environmental structural violence

Crist (Prof in Department of Science and Technology in Society @ Virginia Tech) **7**
(Eileen, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, Telos 4 (Winter 2007): 29–55)

Besides coddling humanity's proclivity for self-centered concern, apocalyptic thinking directs attention toward some future Hollywood- style cataclysm, while dimming awareness of the present and real suffering of nonhumans, disempowered and impoverished people, and consumers beleaguered by clutter and malaise. Life's ongoing devastation, and humanity's pathological imbalance with wild nature and schisms within itself, are the predicaments that we are called to face—not the preemption of some imagined crash in some imagined future.

This North/South inequality creates multiple structural trends towards extinction

Szentes '8
Tamás Szentes, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. "Globalisation and prospects of the world society" 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf

It' s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many "invisible wars" are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness,

starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the "war against Nature", i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and "invisible wars" we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and "visible" wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of "invisible wars", of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. "Sustainability of development" (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any "zero-sum-games", in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the "negative-sum-games" tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about "sustainability of development" but rather about the "sustainability of human life", i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former "socialist" countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) "development studies" we must speak about and make "survival studies". While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for **the final, last catastrophe**. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be "negative-sum-games") can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global

interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and "invisible wars", as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, **transformation of the world order** by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

2NC Uniqueness/FW/Alt

(this is the 1NC Alt Card in the long shell)

As communication scholars we have an obligation to fight the apocalyptic frame at every turn – ten years as the dominant frame for warming discussion has proved it is an utter failure

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change.The apocalyptic frame, particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions. Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. Together, we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity.

2NC A2: FW/AIKs Bad

Must evaluate reps of global warming first if we have any hope of solving

Boykoff et al. 9
(Max Boykoff (University Of Oxford), Mike Goodman (King's College London), Ian Curtis (University Of Oxford), Environment, Cultural Politics of Climate Change: Interactions in the Spaces of Everyday, Politics and Development Working Paper Series, Department of Geography, King's College London http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/geography/research/epd/working.html)

Further, the many 'actors' in this theatre of discursive and material structuration – from climate scientists to business industry interest and ENGO activists to artists, television and movie stars – are ultimately all members of the 'public citizenry'. So, responses to media messaging thereby feed back to varying degrees into ongoing environmental science and policy formulations. In other words, the cultural politics of climate change are situated, power-laden, media-ted and recursive and should be conceptualised as such. And, much like many of the growing list of 'climate change celebrities', those who have power, access and influence are those who have the advantage in this battlefield of

knowledges, understandings and interpretations. Here, mass media representations of climate change actors, action, predicaments and progress remain key influences that shape discourses and bounding considerations for possible climate action. These elements may be as important as formal climate governance architectures – such as those currently being constructed in the lead up to COP15 in Copenhagen – to the long-term success or failure of efforts to take carbon out of the atmosphere or keep it out. To the extent that we fail to examine how these representations and symbols are negotiated through relations of dominance, subordination, and inequalities of access and resources, we miss out on important components of the "scope of [climate] politics" (Rosati 2007, p. 996) and/or the spectrum of possibilities for future climate mitigation and/or adaptation action.

Be skeptical of their truth claims—they are determined by a statist discourse of the environment which evaluates truth and creates meaning through techniques of control
Luke 95 ('On Environmentality: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge in the Discourses of Contemporary Environmentalism' Cultural Critique, No. 31, The Politics of Systems and Environments, Part II p.57-81Autumn,1995)

Foucault invites social theorists not to reduce all ensembles of modernizing development to the "**statalization**" of society wherein "**the state" becomes an expansive set of managerial functions**, dis-charging its effects in the development of productive forces, the reproduction of relations of production, or the organization of ideological superstructures. Instead he argues in favor of investigating the "**governmentalization" of the economy and society whereby individuals and groups are enmeshed within the tactics and strategies of a complex form of power whose institutions, procedures, analyses, and techniques loosely manage mass popula-tions and their surroundings in a highly politicized symbolic and material economy (103). Because governmental techniques are the central focus of political struggle and contestation, the interactions of populations with their natural surroundings in highly politi-cized economies compel states constantly to redefine what is within their competence throughout the modernizing process**. To survive after the 1960s in a world marked by decolonization, global industrialization, and nuclear military confrontation, it **is not enough for states merely to maintain legal jurisdiction over their allegedly sovereign territories**. As ecological limits to growth are either dis-covered or defined, **states are forced to guarantee their populations' fecundity and productivity in the total setting of the global political economy by becoming "environmental protection agencies."** Governmental discourses methodically mobilize particular assumptions, codes, and procedures in enforcing specific under-standings about the economy and society. As a result, **they generate "truths" or "knowledges" that also constitute forms of power with significant reserves of legitimacy and effectiveness.** Inasmuch as they classify, organize, and vet larger understandings of reality, such discourses can authorize or invalidate the possibilities for c**on-structing particular institutions, practices, or concepts in society at large.** They simultaneously frame the emergence of collective subjectivities (nations as dynamic populations) and collections of subjects (individuals) as units in such nations. **Individual subjects** as well as collective subjects **can be reevaluated as "the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power"** (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 29). Therefore, **an environmentalizing regime must advance ecoknowledges to activate its command over geopower as well** as to re-operationalize many of its notions of governmentality as environmentality. Like governmen-tality, **the disciplinary articulations of environmentality must cen-ter upon establishing and enforcing "the right disposition of things."**

2NC A2: But it's true/science good

Their extinction claims are scientifically false and produce fatalism
Costello et al (Institute for Global Health, University College London) **11**
(Anthony Costello, Mark Maslin, Hugh Montgomery, Anne M. Johnson, Paul Ekins, Global health and climate change: moving from denial and catastrophic fatalism to positive action, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 13 May 2011 vol. 369 no. 1942)

At the other end of the scale are doom-mongers who predict catastrophic population collapse and the end of civilization. In the early nineteenth century, the French palaeontologist Georges Cuvier first addressed catastrophism and explained patterns of extinction observed in the fossil record through catastrophic natural events [10].
We know now of five major extinctions: the Ordovician–Silurian extinction (439 million years ago), the Late Devonian extinction (about 364 million years ago), the Permian–Triassic extinction (about 251 million years ago), the End Triassic extinction (roughly 199 million to 214 million years ago) and the Cretaceous–Tertiary extinction (about 65 million years ago). These mass extinctions were caused by a combination of plate tectonics, supervolcanism and asteroid impacts. The understanding of the mass extinctions led Gould & Eldredge [11] to update Darwin's theory of evolution with their own theory of punctuated equilibrium. Many scientists have suggested that the current human-induced extinction rates could be as fast as those during these mass extinctions [12,13]. For example, one study predicted that 58 per cent of species may be committed to extinction by 2050 due to climate change alone [14], though this paper has been criticized [15,16].
Some people have even suggested that human extinction may not be a remote risk [17–19]. Sherwood & Huber [7] point to continued heating effects that could make the world largely uninhabitable by humans and mammals within 300 years. Peak heat stress, quantified by the wet-bulb temperature (used because it reflects both the ambient temperature and relative humidity of the site), is surprisingly similar across diverse climates and never exceeds 31°C. They suggest that if it rose to 35°C, which never happens now but would at a warming of 7°C, hyperthermia in humans and other mammals would occur as dissipation of metabolic heat becomes impossible, therefore making many environments uninhabitable. However, these studies do not take account of geological reconstructions. We know that during the Eocene some 50 million years ago global temperature was at least 5°C higher than today, with forests on Antarctica and rainforest extending as far north as Canada and as far south as Patagonia [20]. Some scientists argue that this was the golden age of life, as there could have been at least twice as much living biomass on the Earth as today. At the beginning of this period, there was an extreme period of global warming called the Paleocene–Eocene thermal maximum when global temperatures were at least another 5°C warmer [21,22]. This did lead to some extinction in the oceans but it was not the end of life on the planet nor did mammals suffer mass extinctions. So, while history suggests **that imminent catastrophe is as false as climate change denial, it could be as big a threat to action**. Catastrophic speculation, especially when based on limited evidence and without specific time frames, may induce an unnecessary sense of fatalism and helplessness when, in the shorter term, there is a huge scope for positive action.

But even if they win that their claim is true, the question of communication strategy has to come first. Science centered attempts at spuring activism are failing now

Brace and Geohegan (Profs at University of Exeter) **11**
(Catherine Brace and Hilary Geoghegan, Human geographies of climate change: Landscape, temporality, and lay knowledges, Prog Hum Geogr 2011 35: 284 online 20 August 2)

The paradox is a tricky one. Following Cerezo and Garcia (1996: 54), we would suggest that the social context of scientific knowledge about climate change has not provided it with 'an epistemic excellence which renders it self-sufficient' for dealing with a given technological or environmental problem – that is, communicating the science of climate change and possi- ble routes to adaptation and mitigation (see also Ingold and Kurttila, 2000, on the way indi- genous knowledges are constructed and appro- priated by 'science'). The problem is reflected in work by, for example, Lorenzoni et al. (2007) who demonstrate that the quality of climate change science and consensus have not been enough to compel people to change their behaviour (see also Lowe et al., 2006; Ockwell et al., 2009; O'Connor et al., 1999). Indeed, the 'provision of scientifically sound information as a means to educate the public, change behaviour and gain support for policy' has not succeeded precisely because 'interpretations of science by the public are mediated by societal values, per- sonal experience, and other contextual factors' (Lorenzoni et al., 2007: 446; see also Kahlor and Rosenthal, 2009, for a review of models of public engagement and scientific literacy). Dickinson (2009: unpaginated) confirms Loren- zoni et al.'s assessment by questioning whether an increased knowledge of the dangers of cli- mate change would generate a 'sustained rational response'. On the other side of this problem, lay knowl- edges of climate change have also not achieved the rhetorical power of scientific knowledges despite their potential to contribute in the long run to 'an effective (not merely legitimate) solu- tion of the problems currently tackled by exper- tise' (Cerezo and Garcia, 1996: 55). According to DEFRA, only 1% of the English public have not heard of climate change, global warming or the greenhouse effect (DEFRA, 2009). Thus, it seems likely that lay understandings of climate change shape, and are shaped by, the associations of the climate in everyday lives and familiar landscapes. However, these associations have failed to inspire behavioural change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), hinting at the problems with the def- icit model that we alluded to earlier in this paper. The

failings of the deficit model are neatly illustrated by Cabecinhas et al. (2006: 504) who insist 'that having an accurate knowledge of cli- mate change is a requirement for displaying atti- tudes and behaviours aiming at the resolution of the problem and for being able to engage in informed discussions on scientific and policy dimensions', but then go on to present research which amply demonstrates the ambiguities, complexities and contingencies of people's lay understandings of climate change. They admit that engaging the public is a very demanding and challenging task (Cabecinhas et al., 2006), which starts to beg the question of whether this is the right task at all. They are not alone in their unwavering insistence that if only the 'public' had 'a correct understanding of the causes of global warming' (Bord et al., 2000: 205, emphasis added), changes in behaviour that would benefit both adaptation and mitigation would immediately and unproblematically fol- low. This assertion is shared, for example, by Bostrom et al. (1994: 959, emphasis added) who boldly state that 'in order to educate the citi- zenry, we must start by educating ourselves about what they already know and believe and how it differs from what they need to know in order to make effective decisions'. This senti- ment is echoed by Maibach and Hornig Priest (2009) who suggest that researchers must think more carefully about the knowledge they choose to communicate to the public and moreover how this will be interpreted (see also Whatmore, 2009, on knowledge controversies). So why is it necessary to know what a scientist knows in order to take a view on climate change? In their study of public participation in Integrated Assessment (IA),15 Darier et al. (1999: 351) argue that 'it is unclear why the public should – or even want to – approach issues (such as climate change) from the epistemologically privileged expert-framed perspectives of IA'. Their analysis of lay knowledges reveals the 'already existing, always context-dependent complexity, diversity, richness and ambiguity of lay knowledge' (Darier et al., 1999: 351; Whatmore, 2009).

2NC A2 Discourse not security

9) Security is a speech act – an aff ballot ensures security perpetuation

Burke 7| AsSociate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony "What security makes possible," Working Paper 2007 p.11-12)

This formulation is consistent with the argument I make that **security** historically **has taken 'the form** and promise **of a metaphysical discourse**: an overarching political goal and practice that guarantees existence itself, that makes the possibility of the world possible'.39 What seems especially clear in Wæver's work is that such a space of possibility is limited to the nation- state, precluding the emergence of alternative conceptualisations of political community and existence such as cosmopolitanism or what we might call 'non-ontologies' of primally interconnected being, such as can be found in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Buber.40 Wæver's claim here sets up a strange tension with his argument that **security is a 'speech act' that 'does not refer to something more real; the utterance is the act.**'41 In turn he argues, after Jef Huysmans, that successful **securitisation only occurs when an audience accepts it as such.**42 In this formulation, security's meaning is contingent, contested and subject to the play of power: '**something is a security problem when elites declare it to be so**'.43 And, in a somewhat Foucauldian vein, he argues that 'the way to study securitisation is to study discourse and political constellations. The relevant question is: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve a sufficient effect'?44 This contradiction may explain Booth's characterisation of the Copenhagen School as 'a curious

2NC A2: Environmental Security Good

First, this isn't offense – the alt does not preclude viewing environmental destruction as threat, the question is the type and scope of that threat. They have to win that extinction level reps are good and necessary.

But environmental security has been tried and failed – comprehensive studies prove

Oels (University of Hamburg, Grindelberg) **11**

(Angela, Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability to contingency, Geoforum, 25 November 2011, ScienceDirect)

> Existing research on climate change as a security issue **has not been able to identify policy changes as a result of the discursive shift**. The Copenhagen School has investigated if climate change has been articulated as an existential threat by political elites, if these securitizing moves have been accepted by relevant audiences, and if they have enabled extraordinary measures to address the threat ([Buzan et al., 1998] and [Waever, 1995]). Extraordinary measures imply a political state of exception where democratic procedures may be circumvented and the law suspended. The Copenhagen School criticises successful securitization as 'failure' of the political elites to deal with an issue by 'normal' democratic politics (Waever, 1995). In the case of climate change, successful securitization could "legitimate extraordinary and costly measures that require a progressive increase in energy efficiency and a decarbonisation of the energy system by increasing renewable energy sources" (Brauch, 2009) or even "**military action against polluting factories**" (Trombetta, 2008, p. 599). Those who use the Copenhagen framework have concluded that the securitization of climate change (as defined above) has failed, **and that there is no evidence of such extraordinary measures** (Stripple, 2002; Oels, 2011; Trombetta, 2008). While those drawing on the Copenhagen School support decisive climate mitigation action, the political price paid for 'extraordinary measures' is considered too high. From the perspective of discourse theory, Swyngedouw (2010) argues that the articulation of climate change as a climate apocalypse in public discourse is marked by populism that evacuates 'the political' from climate change debates. The threat of climate change is constructed as an aberration to an otherwise unproblematic capitalist system: "CO2 stands here as the classic example of a fetishized and externalised foe that requires dealing with if sustainable climate futures are to be attained" (Swyngedouw 2010, p. 222). From Swyngedouw's perspective, the securitization of climate change has the primary function of producing "a socio-ecological fix to make sure nothing really changes" (Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 222).

And securitization of climate change leads to arms build ups that cause war and trade off with efforts to solve warming

Brzoska (Inst. for Peace Research and Security Policy @ Hamburg) **8**

(Micahel, "The Securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security" ISA Convention Paper)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round 'exceptionalism' in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards 'security experts' (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on 'what to do'. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus **leading to arms races**. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection, as well as more soldiers and arms, is expensive, the financial means compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas emission and adapting to climate change will be reduced. Global military expenditure is again at the level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2°C by 2050) and adaptation are speculative at the moment,1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy areas are in competition for scarce resources.

Links

General

1) Fear perpetuation is a tactic that allows officials to bolster the bio-political campaign of the State – rejecting the affirmative's apocalyptic enframing is the only way out

Sasso 12| Brendan Sasso is a technology correspondent for *National Journal.* He previously covered technology policy issues for *The Hill*and was a researcher and contributing writer for the 2012 edition of the Almanac of American Politics. He grew up in the San Francisco Bay Area and graduated from Claremont McKenna College. http://thehill.com/policy/technology/216519-alarming-rhetoric-used-in-push-for-cybersecurity-bills

Lawmakers and administration **officials have warned of potentially catastrophic consequences if Congress doesn't pass cybersecurity legislation this year, but some observers question whether the rhetoric is overblown.¶ "Think about how many people could die if a cyber te rrorist attacked our air traffic control system and planes slammed into one another," Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.) testified at a Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee hearing last month. "Or if rail-switching networks were hacked — causing trains carrying people, or hazardous materials — to derail and collide in the midst of some of our most populated urban areas, like Chicago, New York, San Francisco or Washington**."¶ADVERTISEMENT¶**At the hearing, committee Chairman Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) said he feels like it's Sept. 10 2001, on the eve of a devastating terrorist attack.¶ "The system is blinking red – again. Yet, we are failing to connect the dots – again**," Lieberman said.¶ Senior administration officials, including Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and FBI Director Robert Mueller, performed a classified demonstration of how the government would respond to a cyber attack on the New York City electrical grid in front of dozens of senators earlier this month.¶ "The simulation was realistic and illustrated just how dangerous inaction on cybersecurity legislation can be," Rockefeller said. "If we don't take these steps now, we'll be back at this again at some point in the future, only it won't be an exercise."¶ The hearing and demonstration were part of a push for Congress to pass the Cybersecurity Act, a bill authored by Sens. Lieberman and Susan Collins (R-Maine) that would give the Homeland Security Department the authority to require that critical private computer systems meet certain security standards. **The bill would also encourage private companies to share information about cyber threats with the government.¶** Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) agrees about the threat of a cyber attack, but says the Lieberman-Collins bill would impose burdensome regulations on businesses. He has introduced an alternative bill, the Secure IT Act, that focuses on information sharing.¶ Jerry Brito, director of the Technology Policy Program at George Mason University, said the "**rhetoric does not match the reality**" on cybersecurity.¶ "**When members of Congress talk about [cybersecurity] they conflate the different threat**s," Brito said.¶ He explained that cyber espionage is a "very real" problem that is "happening right now." Companies and foreign governments are hacking into the computer systems of American companies to steal their trade secrets and gain a competitive advantage.¶ But Brito said **the likelihood of a cyber attack having a major "kinetic effect"—meaning significant physical destruction—is low.¶** He said he doubts that terrorist groups or hacker collectives like Anonymous have the sophistication to takedown critical infrastructure systems.¶ Foreign governments, such as Russia or China, could probably wreak havoc with a cyber attack, Brito said, but **they would likely only employ that tactic if the U.S. was already engaged in all-out war with them.¶** Brito said **comparing a potential cyber attack to Sept. 11 or Pearl Harbor is "totally hyperbolic."¶** "**We should be wary of people who are trying to make us afraid**," he added.¶

Heg Links

10) Hegemony is only made possible by security – the aff engages in a mutually constituting relationship

Kaygusuz 7| Ozlem Kaygusuz is an Assistant professor at Mersin University, Department of International Relations

Therefore, any securitization does not take place in a vacuum**. To¶ define something as a security problem is possible only within a wider¶ political framework of ideas, norms and values which give it a meaning and¶ legitimacy all referring to the cognitive content of the structure**. In this¶ respect, as an act performed both at the state and interstate levels,¶ securitization –definition and legitimation of security issues- needs to be¶ framed with a cognitive as well as material structure. Here, the interest in the¶ cognitive content of the structure takes us to the concept of Gramscian¶ hegemony, as the locus, the structure end of the mutually constituting agentstructure¶ conundrum. **In the analytical framework of this study, therefore the¶ concept of securitization will be drawn into the Gramscian concept of¶ hegemony**. In other words, securitization will be evaluated as a multi-lateral¶ and multi-functional process that actively reproduces the hegemonic security¶ structure within which **securitization itself is possible. Gramscian hegemony¶ well suits such an understanding of security since it is basically a power¶ relationship, not a unilateral power imposition**. The hegemonic structure as¶ an order of international security both qualifies the securitization of¶ particular units that are under hegemony and in return it is reproduced and¶ sustained on a continuous basis through the acts of those securitizing units.¶ **Therefore, the concepts of hegemony and securitization allow us to analyze¶ the mutually constituting agent-structure relationship in world politics par¶ excellence**.¶ With this analytical framework which will be outlined more in detail¶ below, the objective of this study is to analyze the formation of national¶ security conception, in other words the basic characteristics of securitization¶ process of the Turkish Republic in relation to the US hegemony. In other¶ words the issue is to understand the features of securitization in Turkey which problems have been defined as security problems by the ruling elite¶ and how they have been accepted by the people of Turkish Republic- in¶ relation to US led global hegemonic security order. The study will reveal¶ that the formation of national security priorities and the security identity of¶ Turkish Republic at the international level were marked by specific turning¶ points in US-Turkey relations; each affected the ways those priorities, in¶ other words the internal and external securitizations of Turkish state were¶ defined and carried out. The study will account for briefly that in some¶ specific turning points of US-Turkish relations, the formation of national¶ security priorities in other words the internal and external securitizations in¶ Turkey took place along with the rhetoric and material guidance of US¶ hegemony. In this respect, the basic argument of the study is that what drives¶ the content and the logic of existing securitizations of the Turkish Republic¶ cannot be decoded without figuring out Turkey's place in the context of¶ global hegemonic networks led by the US.

Energy Links

11)Energy has developed into a security threat - it is no longer a question of the resources but instead a question of existentiality

- **Ozcan 13|** Sezer Ozcan is a PhD candidate in Political Science, Bielefeld University. He has finished his B.A. at International¶ Relations, Uludag University (2007). He has obtained his MA degree in the field of Political Science/Security-¶ Defense, Catholic University of Portugal (2010). His main interest areas are Security Studies, Theory of¶ Securitization, Copenhagen School, Energy Security, the EU, and Foreign Policies of Turkey.

Energy has been a very essential dimension for the survival of the states since the end of the Cold War, used in ¶ almost every sector and thus having become the most important element influencing global politics and economics in ¶ our current international system. As highlighted by Roberts: "**we live today in a world completely dominated by ¶ energy**."56 It is predominantly believed that sufficient energy resources translate into economic and political strength ¶ in the international arena. **Therefore, their absence** (particularly oil and gas) **causes an existential threat for the ¶ survival of the global actors in terms of their economy, transport and military needs**. Besides, the issue of energy ¶ represents a highly significant tool in states maintaining their sustainable economic development and using it as ¶ political influence towards other states. Furthermore, energy issues have gained particular importance due to the ¶ various difficulties occurring within the energy market, including limited sources of supply, high energy demand ¶ among global actors (China, India and the US), energy dependency of the states (the EU), increasing energy prices, ¶ instability of energy-producing regions (the Middle East), and using energy as a political tool against the consumer ¶ countries (Russia). Accordingly, the International Energy Agency's (IEA) World Energy Outlook of 2007 highlights ¶ that: "the current trends in the world energy system, with increasing global demand especially in developing ¶ countries, underinvestment in the energy industry, and instability in oil and gas producing regions, are unsustainable ¶ if one is to avoid an energy gap."57 For that reason, **increasing attention is being paid to the issue of energy security ¶ within the agendas of national governments** and international organizations, **and thus policy-makers and scholars ¶ have predominantly ascribed that the issue of energy has been taken out of the agenda of normal politics**. ¶ Moreover, given that gaining control over energy reserves is very challenging, the rate of dependency on such ¶ resources is very high. **Energy has increasingly gained the status of major concern at the global level, gradually ¶ viewed as a threat to security**. Owing to increasing conflict within energy regions, limited sources of supply, and the ¶ large degree of state intervention into energy markets, the issue of energy has become gradually connected to ¶ security considerations and considered as an existential threat to the state sovereignty. As highlighted by Barroso: "Energy is not an issue in itself; it has impact on other sectors: If I am asked today what is the most important issue ¶ for global security and development, the issue with the highest potential for solutions but also for serious problems if ¶ we do not act in the right way, it is energy and climate change. Energy today is not only considered as a major ¶ challenge from an economic point of view but precisely for its implications for environment and climate. Because of ¶ increased competition for scarce resources, it poses serious concerns for global security… It is the great challenge of ¶ our generation."58 For instance, discourse from the EU **institutions and member states (securitizing actors) has ¶ transformed the issue of energy security into the form of existential threat towards European people's standards of ¶ living and the EU's stability**. As a non-traditional security issue and one of the most vital contemporary security ¶ problems, the issue of energy security has emerged in the international system, thus reflecting a significant effort in ¶ deepening and broadening security studies. In terms of the emergence of energy security, Walt underscores that: "the ¶ '60s was the 'golden age' of security studies, and it gained its resurgence during the 1970s. Initially, a change ¶ occurred in the label, from 'strategic studies' to 'security studies'. The concept of security was broadened in the ¶ 1970s to include economic concerns, while a further redefinition in the 1990s included the issue of environment. ¶ Moreover, it can be argued that the issue of energy has started to be regarded in this realm since the turn of the new ¶ millennium."59 However, the issue of energy security is not an entirely new phenomenon, rather it is largely believed ¶ that the issue started with the 1973 Oil Crisis. Following the energy crisis, the link between energy and security has ¶ been progressively explored, and thus the concept of energy security entered the political agenda of international ¶ actors in the 21st century, become in parallel a fundamental aspect of security studies. Considering the existing ¶ literature on energy security, it stands as very confusing due to the various definitions of the concept. In its most ¶ fundamental sense**, energy security relates to how one can be secure in energy issues**, and it is sometimes connected ¶ to the concept of security of supply, which involves providing the safe and secure transfer of energy from producer ¶ to consumer countries. **However, energy security is no longer merely a question of protecting existing energy ¶ supplies; it is largely defined as the guarantee of the ability to access the needed energy resources**, with most energy ¶ security definitions commonly based on this definition. Furthermore, the European Commission has defined energy ¶ security as ensuring that future essential energy needs are satisfied by means of sharing internal energy resources and ¶ strategic reserves under acceptable economic conditions and making use of diversified and stable, externally ¶ accessible sources.60 The most significant challenge here is that if one comes from the energy sector, energy security ¶ can be understood as security of supply, which is essentially linked with the technical questions. It doesn't ¶ necessarily imply high politics for a state, but also relates to security of demand, and this is where the ¶ interdependence with suppliers is at stake. **Moreover, there is another way of linking energy and security in which ¶ energy becomes a security issue.**

Satellites Links

Dependence on satellites creates a sense of security – satellites allow for calc thought

Havercroft 7| I am a Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR at the University of Southampton. My research lies at the intersections of international relations and political theory. I have published work on the historical development and transformation of state sovereignty, 17th century and 20th century political philosophy, space weaponization and security, global dimensions of indigenous politics and hermeneutics. My current research projects include work on the ethical dimensions of international norms, theories of political affect, and the role of agreement in democratic theory and practice. My book Captives of Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 2011) looks at the historical origins of state sovereignty, critiques its philosophical assumptions and offers a way to move contemporary critiques of sovereignty beyond their current impasse.

China's apparent success on January 11, 2007 **in destroying one of its own satellites with a ballistic missile is a rubicon moment in the weaponization of space**. The technology used in the test is not new. The U.S. tested similar systems in the 1980s and the Soviet Union tested anti-satellite technology in the 1960s. What is significant about China's test is its timing. It comes just months after the Bush Administration released a new National Space Policy that opposed any international arms control agreements that would limit "the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests." **Within this context China's anti-satellite weapons test marks the first salvo in a space arms race**.¶ While the U.S. has had military assets in space for decades, **these have been satellites that have assisted the military in the surveillance and targeting of battlefields on earth**. Space weaponization changes how militaries use space from simply assisting war fighting on the ground to actually waging war in, through and from space. China's test demonstrates its intention to the international community to begin developing weapons systems that can target enemy satellites. The U.S. has been conducting research and development into space weapons systems for decades. The most recent Pentagon Budget committed more than five hundred million dollars in public earmarks for space weapons systems. Most experts agree, however, that the classified portion of the budget pushes total spending on space weapons development well past the billion-dollar mark.¶ With China's anti-satellite test, **this race for military control of space can now go one of three ways**. **The first possibility would be a classical arms race with the U.S., China, Russia, and possibly other space powers such as Europe and Japan each developing space weapons to protect their assets and threaten the assets of their rivals.** The risk with **this scenario**, as with all arms races, is that the cycle of escalation **will eventually lead to a shooting war.** The destruction of even one satellite could cause complications for all the other satellites in its orbital path. Debris from destroyed satellites could collide with other satellites damaging or even destroying them.¶ The second scenario would see the U.S. respond to China's test by escalating its space weapons programs. The immediate beneficiaries of China's test may be the space hawks in Washington's defence establishment who have been calling for the U.S. to weaponize space for decades now. China's test gives these hawks evidence that the possibility of a space war is no longer confined to the domain of science fiction. By seizing military control of space the hawks reason that the U.S. would enhance its ability to project force to any point on earth on very short notice. Furthermore, space control – as the hawks call this strategy – would give the U.S. the power to decide which states could and could not have access to space. While the U.S. currently enjoys a significant advantage in space technologies, China's test demonstrates that this gap may be closing. As such space hawks will be pushing the Bush Administration to weaponize space now, while the U.S . still enjoys technological superiority in the area of space weapons.¶ The third scenario would involve both China and the U.S. taking a step back and realizing that a space arms race is in nobody's interest. All the space powers have scientific, commercial and military assets in space that would be seriously compromised by a space arms race. China's test demonstrates that any state with a reasonably sophisticated ballistic missile system could destroy a satellite. **The state that has the most to lose from such an arms race is the U.S. as it has the most commercial satellites in orbit and its conventional military forces are most dependent upon satellites to wage war**. China's test could provide the opportunity for states to begin work on a serious arms control agreement that would ban all weapons from space. Existing international law only prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.¶ China's test raises serious questions for Canadian policy makers given Canada's assets in space range from telecommunications to weather to military satellites. While it is unlikely that Canada would ever become a major participant in a space arms race, such a race threatens these satellites. As such, the best possible scenario for Canada would be the development of a comprehensive space arms control treaty. With its history of leadership in arms control, Canada could play an important role in developing such a treaty. The question of course, is whether or not there is the political will in Ottawa to fight to keep space weapons free.

Satellites exemplify a violent securitized logic

Warf 2005 (Barney, prof of Geography, Florida State University) GEOPOLITICS OF THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY. http://www2.ku.edu/~geography/Docs/Barney%20papers/satellite%20geopolitics.pdf

Third, **the paper invokes post-structural analyses of spatial discourses and representations** (Wood 1992; Gregory 1994; Cosgrove 2001; Pickles 2003), which underscore the multiple, complex and contingent ways in which spatial knowledge is simultaneously reflective and constitutive of social formations. **Because the producers and users of satellite technology are concentrated in Europe and North America, the industry is inescapably intertwined with the Western domination of the global information infrastructur**e. For example, the world's largest **media companies rely heavily on communications satellites to provide a largely standardised diet of**

television and video programmes around the world (Myers 1999), what Appadurai (1990) calls a global 'mediascape'. Clark (1997, p. 126) maintains that globalised satellite broadcasting of television homogenises the viewing options of consumers: Irrespective of where they live, audiences around the world are fed a broadly similar diet of television. The same kind of programmes are scheduled at the same times of the day . . . Soap operas and quiz shows account for most of the daytime slots while children's programmes predominate in the early evening. These are followed by family viewing, the mid-evening news, drama, sport and adult television. The significance of this standard format is that it generates demand for particular types of programming, much of which is international in origin. **Satellites images comprise what Lefebvre (1974) famously calls representations of space through which dominant ideologies are expressed and naturalised**. Cosgrove (1994) argued that far from comprising politically neutral representations, satellite photography legitimated and sustained a discourse of 'one earth' effectively encompassed by one country, the United States. Finally, Litfin (1997) maintains satellites are inherently masculinist in sustaining the view of a single, dispassionate, all-knowing Cartesian observer.

Econ link

The quest for economic security is an excuse for individuals to securitize the state

Neocleous, Mark. "From social to national security: On the fabrication of economic order." Security Dialogue 37.3 (20**06**): 363-384. Professor of the Critique of Political Economy ¶ PhD Philosophy (Middlesex) ¶ MSc Politics and Sociology (Birkbeck)¶ BSc Philosophy and Sociology (City)¶

I have been arguing, then, that **a commitment to understanding security and¶ the process through which the world has become increasingly securitized¶ requires us to focus some attention on the history of 'economic security'**. To¶ say this is not just to argue for a more sustained cross-referencing, overlap or¶ even a reuniting of international political economy and security studies.¶ Much as there is of value in recent innovations along these lines (for example,¶ Ripsman, 2000; Kirshner, 1998; Mastanduno, 1998; Dombrowski, 2005), such¶ developments have all too often omitted the *domestic* links between political¶ economy and security. As I have tried to show**, in the space of 15 years the¶ concept 'economic security' moved from being a key ideological trope for¶ reorienting individuals, classes and corporations around a new form of capitalist¶ order, under the rubric of 'social security', to being a key factor in the¶ US attempt to shape the world in an anti-communist fashion, under the¶ rubric of 'national security'**. It has constantly shifted between these two¶ registers ever since, being a crucial tool for fabricating a particular vision of¶ economic order. On the one hand, **the power politics of both domestic and¶ international life became securitized, and the common thread underpinning¶ such securitization was a vision of a certain kind of economic order.** To¶ achieve such an order, the concept of 'economic security' was of paramount¶ importance. On the other hand, we might also say that it has been through¶ the *combined* effect of social and national security that security per se has come to be one of the major mechanisms for the fabrication of the political¶ order of capitalist modernity. '**Economic security', in this sense, has been far¶ more than a question of politicians trying to be electorally persuasive.** And its¶ importance requires us to go beyond even the conjunction between international¶ political economy and security studies. **Rather, economic security¶ has been integral to the theory and practice of both social and national security,¶ uniting the domestic and international, the inside and the outside: it has¶ been the foundation stone of the project of security**.

Environmental Security Links

2) Turn – Apocalyptic rhetoric warming reduces motivation to help solve warming. We access their solvency.

Foust and Murphy 9| Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O'Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167

Apocalyptic rhetoric, we argue, **represents a mediating frame in global warming discourse**. **Certain versions** of this frame **may stifle individual and collective agency**, **due to their persistent placement of** "natural**" events as catastrophic**, inevitable, **and outside of** "human" **control**. Analyzing them could help explain why some individuals take a fatalistic attitude toward, or consider their agency very small in comparison to, the challenge of climate change (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). Moreover, apocalyptic framing helps us understand two vocal minorities who might well stand in the way of building a collective will-the alarmists, who believe global warming's "catastrophic consequences" are veritably unstoppable, and the naysayers, who view global warming as a conspiracy created by environmentalists and the media (Leiserowitz, 2005, p. 1440). In the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, the apocalypse refers to prophesying, revealing, or visioning the imminent destruction of the world (Zamora, 1982). Common connotations of apocalypse are influenced by pre-millennial theology, which foregrounds the world-ending moment that precedes the second coming of Jesus Christ. Brummett (1991) and O'Leary (1993) argue that apocalypse is so prevalent in secular as well as sacred discourse that it constitutes its own unique genre of rhetoric.

Apocalyptic rhetoric typically takes shape in narrative form, emphasizing a catastrophic telos (end-point) **somewhere in the future** (Brummett, 1991). A cosmic or natural force drives the linear temporality in apocalyptic rhetoric, such that "**certain events** and experiences are inevitable, unalterable, and determined by external forces **beyond human control**" (Wojcik, 1996, p. 298). The narrative in apocalyptic discourse typically posits a tragic ending-"a date or temporal horizon beyond which human choice is superfluous, a final Judgment that forecloses all individual judgments" (O'Leary, 1993, p. 409). **Apocalyptic rhetoric prophesies** (directly or implicitly) **a new world order,** often accompanied by spectacular, (melo)dramatic, or fantastical images of the destruction of the current order (Brummett, 1984). Common apocalyptic discourses suggest that the social order is beyond repair. Given the "unrecuperably evil world" and "bankrupt society on the verge of imminent" collapse-as well as the cosmic force driving apocalyptic events-there is seemingly no reason to attempt social change once an issue is framed apocalyptically (Wojcik, 1996, p. 312). Like God's wrath or nuclear war, **the apocalyptic scenario is so much greater than humanity** (let alone individual human efforts**), that there seems little hope for intervention.**

3) The climate change community is a market that embodies the great hyperbolizing tendencies of the State

Lomborg 13| Bjorn Lomborg is an adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School and director of the Copenhagen Consensus Centre. http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/climate-change-apocalyptic-rhetoric-is-blinding-us-1.1241374

Bad news sells — that is why we hear so much of it. But **it can leave us with a panicked sense** that the world is full of problems that urgently need to be fixed. **And panic is rarely a good basis for smart policy**. **MPs on the House of Commons' Environmental Audit Committee released a report on Tuesday arguing that the UK needs strong climate policies, otherwise it will face "dangerous destabilisation of the global climate".¶ Yet, such scary statements simply underpin expensive policies that offer little benefit**. **Remember the Millennium Bug? The world was likely to crash, since computers couldn't handle the switch from 1999 to 2000. It was a great story, but we ended up spending billions to tackle an almost non-existent problem**. Similiarly, in 1997-98, the weather pattern known as El Nino made itself felt in the US and elsewhere. On TV and in the newspapers, it was blamed for everything — wrecking tourism, causing more allergies, melting ski slopes, creating snowstorms, even causing a dip in Disney's share price. But economic research provides a fuller picture.¶ A peer-reviewed article tallied, in financial terms, all the problems and all the benefits from El Nino in the US. Yes, the weather pattern caused storm damage, but it raised winter temperatures, which lowered heating bills and cut the number of people who died from the cold. It also reduced flood damage in the spring, created fewer transportation delays and diminished the number of hurricanes in the Atlantic.¶ While the total damage in the US was estimated at $4 billion (Dh14.71 billion), the total benefits were estimated at $19 billion. We need the same kind of analysis today, particularly about fracking. Drilling for shale gas, we are told, could pollute drinking water. But the US has drilled more than 40,000 wells and the regulator there has not found "any proven case where the fracking process itself has affected water". So, **while there is reason to be cautious, we should focus on better regulation**.¶ Also, by highlighting the bad news, shale's opponents play down the potential benefits. Natural gas is much more environmentally friendly than coal, which still powers a huge chunk of electricity production. Gas emits less than half the CO_2 to generate the same amount of energy and much lower quantities of nitrogen oxides, sodium dioxide, black carbon, carbon monoxide, mercury and particulates. If the UK engaged in large-scale fracking of the Bowland Shale, it could reduce air pollution and eliminate around a third of its carbon emissions. This feeds into climate policy. **Despite the moderate predictions of the United Nations Climate Panel, many people,**

not least the MPs on the Environmental Audit Committee, have tried to spin the issue as threatening Armageddon.¶ The reality is that, by 2020, the cost of promised climate policies to the UK economy will be £21 billion (Dh123.27 billion) **annually. The net effect over the century — after spending more than £1.5 trillion — will be to reduce temperature rises by a pitiful 0.005 degrees Celsius.** Compare this to increased shale gas production, which will generate more than £6 billion annually in tax revenues and reduce carbon emissions by about 10 times more than the current plan. We deserve better than to have bad news drive bad decisions. That is why I asked 21 of the world's top economists to look at some of our biggest problems — hunger, health, global warming and pollution — and tell us the bad and the good news.¶ The results are contained in a new book that I have edited, How Much have Global Problems Cost the World? A Scorecard from 1900 to 2050. When you look at these issues properly, the results are surprising. **Climate change, for example, has had a net benefit for the world. From 1900 to 2025, it has increased global welfare by up to 1.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) per year**. Why? Because it has mixed effects — and when warming is moderate, the benefits prevail (even if they are unevenly distributed between nations).¶ Increased levels of atmospheric CO2 have improved agriculture, because the gas works as a fertiliser; we have avoided more deaths from cold than have been caused by extra heat; and we have saved more from lower heating bills than we have lost to an increased need for air conditioning. Does that mean global warming is "good"? Not in the long run. As temperatures rise, the costs will rise and the benefits decline — and the balance will tip sooner in some places than others. **From 2070, global warming will become a net cost to the world, justifying cost-effective climate action now and in the decades to come**.¶ If we truly want to make a difference, the world's biggest environmental problem is air pollution, caused by using dirty fuels in indoor cooking and heating. In the 20th Century, 260 million people in the Third World died from this. The good news is that things are getting better. As poverty has receded and clean fuels have become cheaper, the risk has fallen eightfold. It is set to decline further.¶ But indoor air pollution still kills more than three million people a year and costs around 3 per cent of global GDP. **Only if we dare to step away from the torrent of bad news can we see where the future needs us to focus our attention — on boring indoor air pollution rather than scary global warming**. Such clear analysis will also help us realise that, on most accounts, **the world is getting to be a better place.**

4) Warming is not a threat multiplier – the combination of security and climate change directly causes instability

Scott 12| Shirley V. Scott - Associate Professor BMus BA(Hons) Qld., MHEd. NSW, PhD Qld, A.Mus.A., GAICD School of Social Sciences. She studies international politics

The first step in the process of securitization is referred to as a'securitizing move'.**In the case of climate change, this means climate security being introduced into the discourse of international policy making and the framing of climate change as a threat to human, national and international security**. This move can be dated from 2006 when British Foreign Secretary Mar- garet Beckett assumed a leadership role in promoting the association of climate change with international security in global policy discourse. During the United Kingdom Presidency, the G8 in 2006 accepted the fun- damental links between energy, security, climate change and sustainable development, and in October 2006 Beckett emphasized the importance of 'climate security' in a major foreign policy speech in Berlin.11 After considerable lobbying, the United Kingdom chaired the first UN Security Council debate on climate change on 17 April 2007. **A common theme in the debate was that of climate change as a 'threat multi- plier'.**12 It is not that increasing temperatures as such threaten human security, although they may well do so in certain situations, but rather that the physical effect triggered by the increased temperatures could be expected in many instances to exacerbate existing tensions. A considerable literature emerged at about this time through scholarly writing and reports of non govern- mental organizations (NGOs). Writing in the Washing- ton Quarterly in 2007, for example, Podesta and Ogden emphasized the extent to which all the threats and risks are interrelated, and hence, from a policy perspective, why it is important to prevent anyone from manifesting. **Their fear is that the onset of one problem may lead to a downward spiral in which it is increasingly difficult to preven the next problem and the result may be instabil- ity,a failed State and/or new safe havens for terrorists**.13 **Riedel argued in 2007 that Bangladesh is one of the places most likely to become a haven for al Qaeda because of the combination of deteriorating socioeco- nomic conditions,** radical Islamic political groups and environmental insecurity brought on by climate change. Although initially an issue of intra-State insecurity, the ramifications could potentially be global.14 A few **ana- lysts had, for at least a decade, drawn links between climate change and security**, 15but this had typically been in relation to worst case scenarios and security organi- zations would at that stage have regarded the implica- tions of climate change 'as an issue lurking somewhere over the horizon'.16 Numerous studies and reports by think tanks, NGOs and governments were to follow.17

5) The government uses apocalyptic rhetoric to push their agenda and adopt a managerial attitude towards the environment

Chris **Methmann** Research Associate Poli Sci Inst. @ Hamburg **and** Delf **Rothe** IR PhD Candidate @ Hamburg **'12** "Politics for the day after tomorrow: The logic of apocalypse in global climate politics" *Security Dialogue* 43 p. 327-330

The **recent global climate change discourse is a prominent example of a securitization of environmental issues.** While the problem is often framed in the language of existentialism, crisis or even apocalypse, **climate**

discourses **rarely result in exceptional or extraordinary measures**, **but rather put forth a governmental scheme of piecemeal and technocratic solutions often associated with risk MANAGEMENT.** This article argues that this seeming paradox is no accident but follows from a politics of apocalypse that combines two logics – those of security and risk – which in critical security studies are often treated as two different animals. Drawing on the hegemony theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, however, this article shows that the two are inherently connected. In the same way as the Christian pastorate could not do without apocalyptic imageries, **today's micro-politics of risk depends on a series of macro-securitizations that enable and legitimize the governmental machinery**. **This claim is backed up by an inquiry into current global discourses of global climate change regarding mitigation, adaptation and security implication**s. Although **these discourses** are often framed through the use of apocalyptic images, they rarely result in exceptional or extraordinary measures, but rather **advance a governmental scheme of risk management**. Tracing the relationship between security and risk in these discourses, we use the case of climate change to highlight the relevance of our theoretical argument.

6) The plan fails even if they win that their plan is a good idea – using apocalyptic rhetoric empirically mobilizes movement to solve global warming

Barrett & Gilles 12 -- *nonprofit director and consultant for over a decade, her writing has appeared in newspapers, magazines, and blogs nationwide AND **consulted for numerous political campaigns, advocacy organizations, and global NGOs, and has been profiled in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Boston Globe, and Fast Company (Mel and Metthew Barrett, 4/23/12, "How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action," http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-taking-political-action/255758/)

Flip through the cable channels for long enough, and you'll inevitably find the apocalypse. On Discovery or National Geographic or History you'll find shows like MegaDisasters, Doomsday Preppers, or The Last Days on Earth chronicling, in an hour of programming, dozens of ways the world might end: a gamma ray burst from a nearby star peeling away the Earth's ozone layer like an onion; a mega-volcano erupting and plunging our planet into a new ice age; the magnetic poles reversing. **Turn to a news channel, and the headlines appear** equally **apocalyptic,** declaring that the "UN Warns of Rapid Decay in Environment" or that "Humanity's Very Survival" is at risk. On another station, you'll find people arguing that the true apocalyptic threat to our way of life is not the impending collapse of ecosystems and biodiversity but the collapse of the dollar as the world's global currency. Change the channel again, and you'll see still others insisting that malarial mosquitoes, drunk on West Nile virus, are the looming specter of apocalypse darkening our nation's horizon. How to make sense of it all? After all, not every scenario can be an apocalyptic threat to our way of life -- can it? For many, the tendency is to dismiss all the potential crises we are facing as overblown: perhaps cap and trade is just a smoke screen designed to earn Al Gore billions from his clean-energy investments; perhaps terrorism is just an excuse to increase the power and reach of the government. For others, the panoply of potential disasters becomes overwhelming, leading to a distorted and paranoid vision of reality and the threats facing our world -- as seen on shows like Doomsday Preppers. Will an epidemic wipe out humanity, or could a meteor destroy all life on earth? By the time you're done watching Armageddon Week on the History Channel, even a rapid reversal of the world's magnetic poles might seem terrifyingly likely and imminent. The Culture Report bug Dispatches About Planet Earth. See full coverage The last time apocalyptic anxiety spilled into the mainstream to the extent that it altered the course of history -- during the Reformation -- it relied on a revolutionary new communications technology: the printing press. In a similar way, could the current surge in apocalyptic anxiety be attributed in part to our own revolution in communications technology? The media, of course, have long mastered the formula of packaging remote possibilities as urgent threats, as sociologist Barry Glassner pointed out in his bestseller The Culture of Fear. We're all familiar with the formula: "It's worse than you think," the anchor intones before delivering an alarming report on date-rape drugs, stalking pedophiles, flesh-eating bacteria, the Ebola virus (née avian flu cum swine flu). You name it (or rename it): if a threat has even a remote chance of materializing, it is treated as an imminent inevitability by television news. It's not just that if it bleeds, it leads. If it might bleed, it still leads. **Such sensationalist speculation attracts eyeballs and sells advertising, because fear sells** -- and it can sell everything from pharmaceuticals to handguns to duct tape to insurance policies. "**People react to fear, not love,"** Richard Nixon once said. "They don't teach that in Sunday school, but it's true." **Nothing inspires fear like the end of the world**, and ever since Y2K, **the media's tendency toward** overwrought **speculation has been increasingly married to the rhetoric of apocalypse**. Today, nearly **any event can be explained through apocalyptic language**, from birds falling out of the sky (the Birdocalypse?) to a major nor'easter (Snowmageddon!) to a double-dip recession (Barackalypse! Obamageddon!). Armageddon is here at last -- and your local news team is live on the scene! We've seen the equivalent of grade inflation (A for Apocalypse!) for every social, political, or ecological challenge before us, an escalating game of one-upmanship to gain the public's attention. Why worry about global warming and rising sea levels when the collapse of the housing bubble has already put your mortgage underwater? Why worry that **i**ncreasing droughts will threaten the supply of drinking water in America's major cities when a far greater threat lies in the possibility of an Arab terrorist poisoning that drinking supply, resulting in millions of casualties? **Yet not all of the crises or potential threats before us are** equal, nor are they equally **probable** -- a fact that gets glossed over when the media equate the remote threat of a possible event, like epidemics, with real trends like global warming. Over the last decade, the 24-hour news cycle and the proliferation of media channels has created ever-more apocalyptic content that is readily available to us, from images of the Twin Towers falling in 2001 to images of the Japanese tsunami in 2011. So, too, have cable channels like Discovery and History married advances in computer-generated imagery with emerging scientific understanding of our planet and universe to give visual validity to the rare and catastrophic events that have occurred in the past or that may take place in the distant future. Using dramatic, animated images and the language of apocalypse to peddle such varied scenarios, however, has the effect of leveling the apocalyptic playing field, leaving the viewer with the impression that terrorism, bird flu, global warming, and asteroids are all equally probable. But **not all of these apocalyptic scenarios** are equally likely, and they're **certainly not equally likely to occur within our lifetimes** -- or in our neighborhoods. For example, after millions of Americans witnessed the attacks of 9/11 on television, our collective fear of terrorism was much higher than its actual probability; in 2001, terrorists killed one-twelfth as many Americans as did the flu and one-fifteenth as many Americans as did car accidents. Throughout the first

decade of the 21st century, the odds of an American being killed by a terrorist were about 1 in 88,000 -- compared to a 1 in 10,010 chance of dying from falling off a ladder. The fears of an outbreak of SARS, avian flu, or swine flu also never lived up to their media hype. Over-reliance on the apocalyptic narrative causes us to fear the wrong things and to mistakenly equate potential future events with current and observable trends. This over-reliance on the apocalyptic narrative causes us to fear the wrong things and to mistakenly equate potential future events with current and observable trends. How to discern the difference between so many apocalyptic options? If we ask ourselves three basic questions about the many threats portrayed apocalyptically in the media, we are able to separate the apocalyptic wheat from the chaff. Which scenarios are probable? Which are preventable? And what is the likely impact of the worst-case model of any given threat? In answering these questions, it becomes clear that much of what the media portrays as apocalyptic is not. The apocalyptic scenarios involving global disaster -- from meteor impacts to supervolcanic eruptions -- are extraordinarily rare. An asteroid could hit the Earth and lead to the extinction of all mammals, including us, but the geologic record tells us that such massive strikes are unlikely, and logic tells us that there is little we can do to prevent one. Nor are terrorist attacks or an outbreak of avian flu likely to destroy humanity; their impact is relatively small and usually localized, because we can be prepared for such threats and can contain and mitigate their effects. The apocalyptic storyline tells us that most of these events are probable, largely unpreventable, and destined to be catastrophic. But none of this is true -- their probability is either low or can be made lower through preventive means, or their impact is containable. The danger of the media's conflation of apocalyptic scenarios is that it leads us to believe that our existential threats come exclusively from events that are beyond our control and that await us in the future -- and that a moment of universal recognition of such threats will be obvious to everyone when they arrive. No one, after all, would ever confuse a meteor barreling toward Earth as anything other than apocalyptic. Yet tangled up in such Hollywood scenarios and sci-fi nightmares are actual threats like global warming that aren't arriving in an instant of universal recognition; instead, they are arriving amid much denial and continued partisan debate. For example, annual climate-related disasters such as droughts, storms, and floods rose dramatically during the last decade, increasing an average 75 percent compared to the 1990s -- just as many climate models predicted they would if global warming were left unchecked. Yet this rise in natural disasters hasn't produced a moment of universal recognition of the dangers of climate change; instead, belief in climate change is actually on the decline as we adjust to the "new normal" of ever-weirder weather or convince ourselves that our perception of this increased frequency is a magnifying trick of more readily available cable and Internet coverage. To understand why fewer people believe in climate change even as evidence mounts, we must look beyond the industry-funded movement to deny the reality and effects of climate change. Perhaps equally important -- if not quite equally culpable -- has been the extent to which both the proponents and opponents of human-made climate change have led us down a cul-de-sac of conversation by exploiting the apocalyptic metaphor to make their case. Whether by design or by accident, the initial warnings of environmentalists -- of oceans rising to engulf our most beloved metropolises, of amber waves of grain scorched into a desert landscape -- activated the apocalyptic impulse. The focus on disastrous repercussions for our behavior at some point in the future echoed the warnings of the Israelite priests to wayward Jews in Babylon or, later, to those who submitted too willingly to Alexander's process of Hellenization. It was a familiar story: change, and change radically, or face hell on earth. **Perhaps there was no other way to sound the alarm about the devastating threat presented by global climate change, but that echo of apocalyptic warning was quickly seized upon by the naysayers to dismiss the evidence out of hand**. We've heard this story before, the deniers insisted, and throughout history those who have declared the end of the world was near have always been proven wrong. As early as 1989, the industry front man Patrick Michaels, a climatologist and global warming skeptic, was warning in the op-ed pages of the Washington Post of this new brand of "apocalyptic environmentalism," which represented "the most popular new religion to come along since Marxism." That the solutions to global warming (a less carbon-intensive economy, a more localized trade system, a greater respect for nature's power) parallel so perfectly the dream of environmentalists, and that the causes of global warming (an unrestrained industrial capitalism reliant on the continued and accelerating consumption of fossil fuels) parallel the economic dream of conservatives, has simply exacerbated the fact that global warming has now become just another front in the culture wars. By seizing upon and mocking the apocalyptic imagery and rhetoric of those sounding the alarm, the industry front groups succeeded in framing the debate about global warming into a question about what one believes. Thus, entangled with the myth of apocalypse -- and its attendant hold on our own sense of belief and self-identity -- the debate about anthropogenic climate change has reached an impasse. You believe in the Rapture; I believe in global warming -- and so the conversation stops. **But global climate change is not an apocalyptic event that will take place in the future; it is a human-caused trend that is occurring now. And as we expend more time either fearfully imagining or vehemently denying whether that trend will bring about a future apocalypse, scientists tell us that the trend is accelerating.** thelastmyth.jpg **Talking about climate change or peak oil through the rhetoric of apocalypse may make for good television and attention-grabbing editorials, but such apocalyptic framing hasn't mobilized the world into action**. Most of us are familiar with the platitude "When the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." In a similar way, our over-reliance on the apocalyptic storyline stands between us and our ability to properly assess the problems before us. Some see the looming crises of global warming and resource and energy depletion and conclude that inaction will bring about the end of civilization: only through a radical shift toward clean energy and conservation, those on the Left argue, can we continue the way of life that we have known. Those on the Right dismiss the apocalyptic threats altogether, because the proposed solutions to peak oil, global warming, and overpopulation conflict with core conservative beliefs about deregulation and the free-market economy, or with a religious worldview that believes humanity is not powerful enough to alter something as large as our climate. Still others dismiss the catalog of doom and gloom as mere apocalypticism itself. Surely, we convince ourselves, all the dire warnings about the effects of global warming aren't that different from the world-ending expectations of the Rapturists? **The result is that the energy we could expend addressing the problems before us is instead consumed by our efforts to either dismiss the threat of apocalypse or to prove it real**. Ultimately, the question becomes not what to do about the threats before us but whether you believe in the threats before us. **By allowing the challenges of the 21st century to be hijacked by the apocalyptic storyline, we find ourselves awaiting a moment of clarity when the problems we must confront will become apparent to all** -- or when those challenges will magically disappear, like other failed prophecies about the end of the world. Yet the real challenges we must face are not future events that we imagine or dismiss through apocalyptic scenarios of collapse -- they are existing trends. The evidence suggests that much of what we fear in the future -- the collapse of the economy, the arrival of peak oil and global warming and resource wars -- has already begun. We can wait forever, while the world unravels before our very eyes, for an apocalypse that won't come. The apocalyptic storyline becomes a form of daydreaming escape: the threat of global warming becomes a fantasy to one day live off the grid, or buy a farm, or grow our own food; economic collapse becomes like a prison break from the drudgery of meaningless and increasingly underpaid work

in a soul-crushing cubicle; peak oil promises the chance to finally form a community with the neighbors to whom you've never spoken. Yet despite the fantasia peddled by Hollywood and numerous writers, a world battered by natural disasters and global warming, facing declining natural resources and civic unrest, without adequate water or energy or food, with gross inequalities between the rich and the poor, is not a setting for a picaresque adventure, nor is it the ideal place to start living in accord with your dreams. The deeper we entangle the challenges of the 21st century with apocalyptic fantasy, the more likely we are to paralyze ourselves with inaction -- or with the wrong course of action. We react to the idea of the apocalypse -- rather than to the underlying issues activating the apocalyptic storyline to begin with -- by either denying its reality ("global warming isn't real") or by despairing at its inevitability ("why bother recycling when the whole world is burning up?"). We react to apocalyptic threats by either partying (assuaging our apocalyptic anxiety through increased consumerism, reasoning that if it all may be gone tomorrow, **we might as well enjoy** it today), **praying** (in hopes that divine intervention or mere time will allow us to avoid confronting the challenges before us), or preparing (packing "bugout" packs for a quick escape or stocking up on gold, guns, and canned food, as though the transformative moment we anticipate will be but a brief interlude, a bad winter storm that might trap us indoors for a few days or weeks but that will eventually melt away). **None of these responses avert, nor even mitigate, the very threats that have elicited our apocalyptic anxiety in the first place.** Buying an electric car doesn't solve the problem of a culture dependent on endless growth in a finite world; building a bunker to defend against the zombie hordes doesn't solve the growing inequities between the rich and poor; praying for deliverance from the trials of history doesn't change that we must live in the times in which we were born. Indeed, neither partying, nor preparing, nor praying achieves what should be the natural goal when we perceive a threat on the horizon: we should not seek to ignore it, or simply brace for it, but to avert it.

7) Environmental Security leads to organized violence

Krause and Williams 96| Keith Krause is Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, Director of its Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), and Programme Director of the Small Arms Survey, an internationally-recognised research centre NGO he founded in 2001.
The Small Arms Survey has produces annual volumes on issues of small arms proliferation, stockpiles, transfers, misuse and effects, as well as numerous field-based and issue-based studies. It serves as the main source of information and analysis for international public policy on small arms issues. Professor Krause's research interests also include concepts of security, the changing character of contemporary armed violence, and multilateral security cooperation. He has published Arms and the State(Cambridge) and edited or co-edited Critical Security Studies (Minnesota), and Culture and Security, and authored many journal articles and BOOK chapters. Professor Krause is Canadian, and received his MPhil and DPhil from Balliol College, Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He has been a consultant for various international agencies and governments, comments frequently on international issues for the local and international media, and speaks regularly at scholarly and policy meetings and conferences. Keith Krause is Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, Director of its Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), and Programme Director of the Small Arms Survey, an internationally-recognised research centre NGO he founded in 2001. The Small Arms Survey has produces annual volumes on issues of small arms proliferation, stockpiles, transfers, misuse and effects, as well as numerous field-based and issue-based studies. It serves as the main source of information and analysis for international public policy on small arms issues. Professor Krause's research interests also include concepts of security, the changing character of contemporary armed violence, and multilateral security cooperation. He has published Arms and the State(Cambridge) and edited or co-edited Critical Security Studies (Minnesota), and Culture and Security, and authored many journal articles and BOOK chapters. Professor Krause is Canadian, and received his MPhil and DPhil from Balliol College, Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He has been a consultant for various international agencies and governments, comments frequently on international issues for the local and international media, and speaks regularly at scholarly and policy meetings and conferences.
Perhaps **the most widespread call to redefine security has emerged from the claim that environmental degradation poses a threat to** the ecosystem or to **human well-being that transcends particular states and conceptions of national security.** The severe consequences of continued **environmental degradation** are viewed as more urgent than external threats that **could lead to organized violence.** More- over, national interest and sovereignty are considered less important than the well-being of the individual or the species. **Such a recognition has led to a de- mand for "a redefinition of what constitutes national security"** because "the as- sumptions and institutions that have governed international relations in the postwar era are a poor fit with these new realities" (Tuchman Mathews 1989:162). Scholars making these arguments accept the neorealist claim that "**security" is reducible to an objective referent and set of threats**. **They seek to reorient secu- rity studies** (**and policies**), however, **by calling on the authority of the natural sciences to demonstrate that environmental change** "in fact" **represents a threat to human well**-being, and by asserting that what is really threatened is not an ab- straction like "the state" but the material well-being of individuals (Myers 1993:31; see also Dabelko and Dabelko 1995). According to these researchers, the con- straints imposed by traditional categories of thought have limited our grasp of this reality; our conceptions of security and our policies and institutions for pro- viding security need to change to meet the new challenges (Ullman 1983; Mische 1989).

8) They depict global warming to be state-centric which is a strictly securitized logic. The aff can't solve.

Let me conclude by returning to the example I began with, climate change and security. I am not an expert on environmental security and cannot hope to match the insights that writers like Lorraine Elliott and Simon Dalby have brought to the field.60 But **it strikes me how state-centric the Congress**, and the group of generals who wrote the CNA Corporation report, **are in their narrow concern for US national security**.61 This is consistent with the political ontology of the national security state we have inherited from Hobbes and Clausewitz. C**ertainly the US government does have to consider the likely impacts on the US and the**

demands climate change may make on their military, but the moral and political challenge is so much greater than that. It may be that a holistic, human-centred approach would be more appropriate, but even that could be too anthropocentric in its concerns. The global climatic system transcends nation-states and has no respect for borders, and it will produce impacts not merely on human societies but ecosystems we share with other species and organisms. If phenomena such as refugees, economic crisis and transnational terrorism remind us of our mutual vulnerability and depend- ence on other humans, climate change reminds us even more radically of our dependence on a borderless earth. **Climate change cannot be assimilated to realist security paradigms** based on the social contract, and we can imagine a nightmarish future in which not only are mitigation efforts stillborn but states become garrisons against the unpredictable. In this light, deconstructive critical approaches to security need to take cosmopolitan discourses and institutions more seriously, while reconstructive approaches must grapple with the unequal but shared burden of responsibility for the planet that ideas of emancipation—with their modernist overtones—fail to capture. In this way, climate change presents a profound challenge to both traditional and critical security studies

Enviromental Securitization continues the concept of the nation-state and continues geopolitical borders

Rasa **Ostrauskaite**, Third Secretary of Lithuania to the United Nations, December, **2001**

Rubikon Environmental Security as an Ambiguous Symbol: Can We Securitize the Environment?, http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/rasa2.htm

In the previous section we have seen that transboundary nature of environmental threats makes it difficult to categorize them. The task becomes even more complicated when it comes to labeling them "for securitization", especially if we try to do so in the framework of national security. As societies come to recognize the planetary scale of destruction of the environment, we increasingly realize that the traditional forms of national sovereignty are challenged by the realities of ecological interdependence. At the same time, we are not yet ready to sideline the principle of national sovereignty. Despite some calls for a complete rejection of sovereignty[29] or warnings against the privileging of national security in the face of global problems,[30] we are not ready to give up conventional political arrangements of nation states. The present-day political map of the world is a map of independent states. Notwithstanding the fact that they are merely local normative arrangements for promoting the good of humankind in the area of the world where they are located, nobody wants to challenge the principle of sovereignty - the fundamental principle on which the rest of international relations is constructed. This view has been so eloquently expressed by R.B.J. Walker, that despite its length, it is worth quoting:…[E]ven if we admit that we are all now participating in common global structures, that we are all rendered increasingly vulnerable to processes that are planetary in scale, and that our prost parochial activities are shaped by forces that encompass the world and not just particular states, it is far from clear what such an admission implies for the way we organize politically. The state is a political category in a way that the world, or the globe, or the planet, or humanity is not. The security of states is something we can comprehend in political terms in a way that, at the moment, world security cannot be understood.[31] In this context, security discourse remains entangled with state politics, and so long as conventional understanding of security prevails, states will remain the main providers of security. Thus, it seems reasonable to be conservative about national security as the security of the state, since, as Waever rightly points out, "neither individual security nor international security exists"[32].

Securing the environment validates the state defending it through military means

Waever 1998 [Ole, professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, "Securitization and Desecuritization," On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]

Still, in the final analysis, is it all to the good that problems such as environmental degradation be addressed in terms of security? After all, in spite of all the changes of the last few years, security, as with any other concept, carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape. At the heart of the concept we still find something to do with defense and the state. As a result, addressing an issue in security terms still evokes an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in addressing it. This is not always an improvement. Why not turn this procedure upside down? In place of accepting implicitly the meaning of "security" as given and then attempting to broaden its coverage, why not try instead to put a mark on the concept itself, by entering into and through its core? This means changing the tradition by taking it seriously rather than criticizing it from the outside. 2 I begin by considering security as a concept and a word. Next, I discuss security as a speech act . In the third part of the essay, I describe four cases of securitization and de-securitization . Finally, I ask whether we might not want to use "security" as it is classically understood, after all.

Public utilities link

Public utilities are the essence of securitization. It turns issues not previously thought of as a security threat into one and maintaining is vital to the global order

Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 10 (Tom Lundborg, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Nick Vaughan-Williams, University of Warwick, "There's More to Life than Biopolitics: Critical Infrastructure, Resilience Planning, and Molecular Security," Paper prepared for the SGIR Conference, Stockholm, 7-10 September, 2010)

¶ While the terrain of security studies is of course fiercely contested, what is¶ common among a range of otherwise often diverse perspectives is the core¶ premise that ''**security'' relates to a realm of activity in some sense beyond the¶ "norm" of political life**. Thus, in the language of the Copenhagen School**, a¶ securitizing move occurs when an issue not previously thought of as a security¶ threat comes to be produced as such via a speech act that declares an existential¶ threat to a referent object** (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). **A similar logic¶ can be identified in approaches to security that focus on exceptionalism**: the¶ idea, following Carl Schmitt, that **sovereign practices rely upon the decision to¶ suspend the normal state of affairs in order to produce emergency conditions¶ in which extraordinary measures**—such as martial law, for example—**are¶ legitimized**. For this reason, a tendency in security studies—even among some¶ self-styled ''critical'' approaches—is to privilege analysis of high-profile ''speech¶ acts'' of elites, ''exceptional'' responses to ''exceptional'' circumstances, and¶ events that are deemed to be ''extraordinary.'' Arguably, this leads to an emphasis¶ on what we might call the ''spectacle of **security**,'' rather than more mundane,¶ prosaic, and ''everyday'' aspects of security policy and practice. Indeed, it is precisely¶ the importance of the quotidian dimension of global security relations that¶ an IPS perspective has sought to emphasize in recent years (Bigo 2008).¶ The world of CIs **necessitates a shift in the referent object of security away¶ from the "spectacular" to the "banal**.'' Instead of high-profile speech-based acts¶ of securitization, here **we are dealing with telecommunications, transportation,¶ and financial networks, water treatment and sewage works, electricity, and so on:¶ semi-invisible phenomena that are often taken-for-granted as the fixtures and fittings¶ of society, yet nonetheless vital for the maintenance of what is considered¶ to be normal daily life.** For this reason, our subject matter calls for a re-thinking¶ of the very ''stuff'' considered to be apposite for the study of international security.¶ Indeed, analyzing the role of CIs and resilience planning in global security¶ relations adds particular resonance to existing calls within the IPS-related literature to broaden and deepen the way in which acts of securitization are conceptualized¶ (Bigo 2002, 2008; Williams 2003; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008**).¶ As well as pushing the referent object of security beyond the "spectacle" of¶ high-profile speech acts,** the study of CIs prompts **a further methodological question¶ about what resources exist for the analysis of "material" phenomena**. Arguably,¶ the prominence of the ''speech act'' as a theoretical device for studying¶ securitization is a reflection of the legacy of the so-called linguistic turn in social¶ and political theory, which came to impact upon security studies—along with the¶ broader discipline of International Relations (IR) of which it is largely a subfield—¶ from the late 1980s. Much of the literature associated with the linguistic¶ turn in IR (Shapiro 1981; Der Derian 1987; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Campbell¶ 1992; Connolly 1993) relied on ''discourse'' as a key methodological as well¶ as theoretical tool. However, ''discourse,'' for these authors, did not only¶ concern texts and words in a strictly linguistic sense. Rather, they invoked a¶ more expansive conception of discourse to include the general ''context'' in¶ which linguistic phenomena acquire their meaning.

Exploration Links

Science exploration and securitization are inherently linked

Berling(Visiting Scholar at the NATO defense college)October 21st, 2011(Trine Villumsen, "Science and securitization: Objectivation, the authority of the speaker and mobilization of scientific facts", http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/42/4-5/385.full.pdf+html)

With the formulation of what has come to be known as securitization theory, doing security science has become a dangerous endeavour. Using the word 'security' may bring about what one is trying to avoid, as Huysmans (2002a) once argued. But, how to think more systematically about the relation between science and securitization? In this article, I take a sociological point of view on securitization processes and argue that 'science' is at work in at least three distinct mechanisms of relevance for securitization theory. **First, scientific communities/explanations can come to objectify an issue to the extent where securitization – and even politicization – becomes next to impossible. Second, science co-determines the status of a securitizing actor and thus influences the authority of the speaker in specific fields. Third, scientific facts can be mobilized in securitization claims by both experts and other political actors in attempts to seek back-up in the objective, dis- interested aura of the scientific vocation.** Examples from contemporary security illustrate the points made. By focusing on the interface between securitization and science, the article zooms in on the issue of science in society and the impact of science on politics or societal processes – outside of the field of science. **The article therefore focuses primarily on how the political process of securitization is influenced – or even altered – when a science dimension is taken into account**.1 The argument presented proceeds in three sections. The first section starts with a discussion of possible sites of science mechanisms in securitization theory. It is argued that one internal and two external mechanisms might be at play. Before proceeding to flesh these out, the section reviews four attempts to bring science and securitization together in the international relations literature and concludes that further investigation can fruitfully be pursued through a reading of Pierre Bourdieu, because of his twin focus on contextual and agential factors. The **second section of the article turns to sociology of science discussions about the nature of science and the relationship between science and society. It argues that even though differences exist, social and natural science share important features – not least when viewed from the perspective of how science functions in the political domain.** The section then draws in three important insights from Pierre Bourdieu: that science objectifies its object of study; that it can co-determine the authority of the speaker in specific fields; and that scientific products can be mobilized strategically by agents. Through these insights, science materializes as three distinct mechanisms within and against securitization. These are illustrated by examples from climate change, the democratic peace thesis and the RAND Corporation's objectivation of nuclear deterrence.2 **The article's conclusion stresses that the study of science in the specific political process constituted by securitization not only directs attention to a phenomenon** largely overlooked in securitization studies, but also points to possible points of development for the theory of securitization as such. Centrally, an exclusively internal reading of securitization as a speech act does not capture the issue of science. **This brings to the fore the underdeveloped issue of the context of securitizations, while at the same time retaining an explicit focus on the grammar of securitization and the means by which agents seek success.**

Scientific exploration of the ocean will lead to military functions

DI MENTO(US naval officer, PhD in philosophy)2006(JOHN MARK, "Beyond the Water's Edge: United States National Security & the Ocean Environment", Tufts University, PDF)

Scientific study of the oceans originated in the United States essentially as a function of national security. Investigations that focused on the tactical and operational impacts of the fluid, geophysical, chemical and biological marine environment upon U.S. Navy operations successfully addressed many challenging naval requirements; but oceanographic inquiry in support of naval needs also triggered unexpected results. In many instances the knowledge of the oceans that was acquired through directed studies - and through complementary lines of inquiry that were enabled by tools developed for naval oceanographic research - further impacted national security in ways that were not anticipated and which transcended tactical and operational significance and could be considered of more strategic consequence. **Through selected case studies, the present work explores relationships between the oceans, ocean science and national security**

through almost the last two hundred years during which the study of the marine environment has held relevance for naval operations. A number of important insights are revealed in the individual case studies of Beyond the Water's Edge, and as a result of themes that repeat despite considerably different contextual parameters within and across each of the cases that are considered. As matters which address the intersection between the natural environment and security, each of these cases supports the conclusion that environmental impacts on military operations are more central to the discipline of environmental security studies than heretofore considered. In addition, a more consilient interdisciplinary viewpoint of environmental security appears necessary to appreciate how significant matters of the environment are to international security studies. **The cases also support the hypothesis that securitization of environmental parameters is an important factor for supporting research into otherwise formidable areas that might remain beyond understanding without a security imperative, and which as a result engender additional security considerations which might otherwise not have developed. And logically, when consilient viewpoints afford a better understanding of the manner in which ocean science illuminates, underpins and expands environment-security relationships,** they provide critical insights to policy makers responsible for the oversight of oceanographic research in support of national security and other national interests of the United States.

A2 Perm

Perm can't solve- the 1AC's discourse of risk secures subjects for the government

DILLON(Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Lancaster, UK)March 20, 2008(MICHAEL, "Underwriting Security", Sage Journals, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/39/2-3/309.full.pdf+html)

The history of the emergence and operationalization of risk has therefore always been situated at the intersection of capital and rule. Rule seeks to secure governability. Capital seeks to profit. Risk combines the two in posing and securing subjects of self-rule not simply in conditions of uncertainty but in terms of measuring their exposure to contingency financially. The pursuit of profit may assist the securing of governance. The securing of governance may assist the pursuit of profit. **If orders of capital accumulation and orders of governance have a history, and if those histories are closely entwined, the same applies also to contingency and risk. Contingency has a history** (Vuillemin, 1996). **Specifically, today's 'risk' is a historical, governmental phenomenon of intensively capitalized regimes of biopolitical security** (O'Malley, 2006). As Robert Deuchars (2004: 30) has also recently observed, "modern conceptions of risk calculation can in part be traced to an ontological shift that began with attempts made by the scholars and activists in Renaissance Europe to question the moral and secular power of the established Church. Niccol Machiavelli, most notably opened up a new field of thought and practice in which hitherto uncom- mon questions related to human control over nature, free will, providence, reason and progress were used to confront the orthodox thinking of the Church." The space of problematization that these developments opened up for politi- cal rationalities and governmental technologies alike was therefore also related, among other things, to that of the changing problematization of uncer- tainty or chance, as well as to the life of the species that has progressively char- acterized regimes of modernization (Deuchars, 2004; Dillon, 2007). Precisely because population is characterized by the aleatory (Foucault, 2007**), however, it is this biopolitical focus on the referent empirical object of species being in the form of population that began the process of moving the Contingent centre stage as a field of formation for modern biopoliticizing governmental tech- nologies from the late 18th on into the 20th century. In so doing, population lent itself to governmental regulation, among other things, through technolo- gies of risk.** All this, Foucault (2003, 2007, 2008) documents, was intimately connected as well with the wider circuits of circulation and production of every kind that were associated with urbanization, capitalism, the market and the evolution of economic theory. Towards the end of the 20th century, how- ever, especially with the advent of the understanding of living things in terms of emergence, contingency seems to have graduated from being one biopoliti- cal condition of biopolitical government among others to ontological pre- eminence among contemporary biopolitical security technologies. **Risk, however, is also regularly conflated these days with the occasion of danger or the threat of loss** (Beck, 1992). **This account of risk helps fuel the hyperbolicization of security and fear that seems to characterize our con- temporary politics. What is regularly omitted in such accounts of risk is nonetheless the equally important point that risk is simultaneously also asso- ciated with the occasion for gain or profit. Our entire global civilization revolves around the nexus of profit and loss that informs risk, and that sophisticated and inventive forms of risk analysis and risk packaging, in their turn, now govern. Much critical social and security analysis nonetheless continues to emphasize the threat aspect – real, manufactured or purely imagined – of risk.**

Perm still engages in the biopolitics of the 21st century. This puts us all in the box of securitization which we perceive as natural, when in fact its not.

DILLON(Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Lancaster, UK)March 20, 2008(MICHAEL, "Underwriting Security", Sage Journals, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/39/2-3/309.full.pdf+html)

The centrality that contingency has thus acquired in the life of human exist- ence understood biologically does not deny the observations of biological laws or the systematicity observed in biological organization and function. Kauffman is a biological scientist. Along with many others, he therefore understands these laws differently: **as the laws of self-organization and emergence that arise in a transactional space of emergence itself undeter- mined by any transcendental necessity. Nor is the contingent, as it emerges here, understood as mere chance. In this latest twist to the ancient**

debate over contingency and necessity (Vuillemin, 1996), **the modern account of the contingent does not simply elevate it over necessity. Contingency itself becomes a novel domain of calculability through which the taming of chance is integrally involved in a new game with time, since it is time itself, freed from transcendental goals and laws, that is the root cause of the contingent in the modern age. Thus, it may appear that, in taming chance, you may tame time. Moreover, tame time and you may tame the future. Tame the future and you may, finally, secure a being – human being – whose very existence is temporal. However much it may characterize the modern, commanding time by secur- ing the future is a longstanding human desire.** At the beginning of the 21st century, it has, however, been given a quite distinctive gloss by life scientists like Kauffman, as well as by other sciences, such as those of the managerial and complexity sciences that now share cognate understandings of the emergent character of living things. Its impact upon information and com- munication technologies, as well as on military strategic discourse, is also now well documented (Dillon & Reid, 2001; Dillon, 2004). Kauffman (2000: x), for example, maintains that we cannot 'prestate the configuration space of a biosphere'. **Complex adaption within it produces unpredictable, in princi- ple infinite, self-engendering and self-organizing diversification. It is this idea, specifically, that inspires the Unisys epigraph on security that heads this article, and the Unisys website brilliantly illustrates the spread of such thinking into the management sciences and the new sciences of security. Securing the future no long simply entails the taming of chance through the avalanche of printed numbers and technologies enabled by the rise of statis- tics** (Hacking, 1975; Bougen, 2003). **In addition to securing through simula- tion, prediction, premediation, prevention and pre-emption** (de Goede, 2008; Aradau & van Munster, 2007; Grusin, 2004**), life as emergence is increasingly now subject to an additional and quite distinctive moral and behavioural economy of existence. Here, in the biopoliticization of the securing of the life of emergent entities, virtuality is increasingly more important than actuality, the law of emergence similarly more important even than the laws of simulation and projection.** Biopolitically speaking, at the beginning of the 21st century, biological being as emergent being is enjoined to secure itself through securing its future by experimental participation in the engendering and unleashing of its own emergent potential. **While allied to other ways of taming chance, risk tech- nologies are also now deeply implicated in this novel biopoliticized securing of the life of emergent entities. 'What if?', the Unisys website, for example, goes on to say, 'What if security wasn't a cage? What if instead of keeping things out it let amazing things in? What if it made you bolder, more ambi- tious, and enabled you to accomplish more than you ever thought possible? What if security unleashed your full potential?' 'Relish Change,' it proclaims with typical commercial hyperbole. 'Get more control by controlling less.'2 Contingency thereby becomes the epistemic object for biopolitics of security in the 21st century inasmuch as it characterizes the understanding of human life as an emergent and creative entity to whose promotion and development biopolitics are now committed.** Extrapolating beyond Foucault's (1989) con-clusions in The Order of Things, it is the Contingent, together with its so-called laws of emergence, rather than Man, that draws the life sciences together today. In that respect, contingency operates as a broad field of formation for the biopolitical security practices of emergent beings, which beings are increasingly also recognized to be both post- as well as extra-human. Thus, contemporary biopolitics also displays post- and extra-human concerns with the equally emergent life said to be displayed, for example, by artificial and cybernetic, as well as animal and viral, beings (Doyle, 1997, 2003; Hayles, 1999; Hinchliffe & Bingham, 2007).

Perm still relies on solving risk, means it can't solve

DILLON(Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Lancaster, UK)March 20, 2008(MICHAEL, "Underwriting Security", Sage Journals, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/39/2-3/309.full.pdf+html)

THE TITLE OF THIS ARTICLE puns David Campbell's (1998) pioneer- ing work Writing Security. Campbell's book deftly counteracted the politics of identity and subjectivity that had dominated international relations and security studies throughout the Cold War period and beyond. **Without disputing the continuing salience of the politics of identity in the problematization and operationalization of contemporary security practices, and the continuing fixation with the politics and mythology of sovereign subjectivity, Underwriting Security seeks an additional shift in our analytical focus, and empirical field of observation, to the biopolitics of security, which take 'life' as their referent object, and especially to the ways in which the biopoliticization of security installs risk as one of its single most important devices.**

Underwriting, a term taken from the insurance industry – itself, along with financial securitization, an extensive and vitally important apparatus of biopolitical securitization (Baker & Jonathan, 2002; Clark, 1999; Ericson & Doyle, 2003; Ericson, Doyle & Dean, 2003; Ewald, 1991; O'Malley, 2006) – **captures the essence of how risk operates as an assemblage of mechanisms for measuring and commodifying exposure to contingency.** As the present article explains, since, biopolitically speaking, contingency is constitutive of what it is to be a living thing, the referent object of biopolitics – life – cannot be secured against contingency. Biopolitically, it is instead secured through contingency (Dillon, 2007). **Risk is one of the single most important devices by which this biopoliticized securitization is currently pursued. The article therefore first explores a novel problematization and theoriza- tion of security: the biopolitics of security. Since this biopoliticizing of secur- ity is also a historical phenomenon, it is a project and not an accomplishment. It is therefore a plural and changing thing, and it changes according to differ- ent accounts of what it is to be a 'living thing'.**

Perm continues to ignore or brush over biopolitics, means they can never solve

Munro(Professor of Leadership and Organization)August 18th, 2011(Iain, "The Management of Circulations: Biopolitical Variations after Foucault", International Journal of Management Reviews, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2370.2011.00320.x/full)

T**hese controversies rest upon the perceived limits of the sovereign and disciplinary conceptions of power, and an apparent reluctance to move beyond them. In these debates, the work of Foucault that deals explicitly with the apparatus of control which emerged from the dawn of the 20th century has been largely neglected.** Part of the reason for this may be that some of these writings have been published in English only recently (Foucault 2004, 2007, 2008). The above debates describe the conceptual knots that have arisen from attempting to 'fit' contemporary neo-liberal mechanisms of control into either a disciplinary or a sovereign conception of power. Ed Barratt's review of the Foucauldian scholarship within management studies has drawn a similar distinction between those who are exponents of the disciplinary framework of analysis and others – he highlights the work of Paul du Gay – who have suggested the emergence of what Barratt (2002, p. 193) terms, 'a post-disciplinary epoch'. Similarly, we argue that, while it is important to distinguish between the different apparatuses of power, as Foucault does in his original work, they are not necessarily exclusive frames of analysis. In both Discipline and Punish and Security, Territory, Population, Foucault explained that elements of older systems of power have actually continued to coexist with the development of new regimes of power. Thus, traces of the monarchic system continued to exist during the growth of the disciplinary regime, and sometimes were even fused together, as was the case during the Napoleonic era in France (Foucault 1977, p. 216). Similarly, the techniques of disciplinary power have continued to thrive even as the liberal apparatus of security began to come into being; both were key features of the early development of capitalist forms of organization (Foucault 2007, pp. 107–108). **Foucault noted that all three regimes of power, sovereign, disciplinary and the apparatus of security, have coexisted and developed together. However, each new regime had the effect of transforming the deployment of the techniques of power that were developed within the previous regimes. The emergence of new technologies of power does not entail the wholesale rejection of older disciplinary elements that still subsist in many modern techniques of management, such as accountancy, human resource management, and so on. With the emergence of the apparatus of security** and neo-liberal governmentality, **technologies of power have developed that have as their focus the control of flows rather than the discipline of bodies. In his lectures on liberalism, he described a move away from a strictly disciplinary apparatus to the 'apparatus of security' under which, it is no longer [a problem] of fixing and demarcating a territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good from the bad, ensuring they are always in movement, constantly moving around . . . in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are canceled out.** (Foucault 2007, p. 65) Foucault's interest in the control of flows has been noted by former colleagues and other commentators, including Deleuze (1995), Hardt and Negri (2000) and Terranova (2004). Rather than intervene directly on the individual person, the neo-liberal apparatus of control seeks to modify the 'milieu' or the rules of the game, in which the individual makes choices. In Table 1, a number of key differences are highlighted between the disciplinary apparatus of power and the neo-liberal regime of governmentality. This table is a simplification of two very complex concepts, and is derived specifically for the purposes of the current argument to help navigate the types of issues raised in the debates over the use of Foucault's ideas within the field of management studies discussed above. Table 1 briefly contrasts the disciplinary apparatus and its focus on centripetal forces with the system of neo-liberal governmentality and its focus on centrifugal forces. **While there is a substantial body of work within management studies that draws on the work of Foucault for its conceptual underpinning, this work has tended to focus on the concepts of disciplinary power and Panopticism and, as yet, very little attention has been**

paid to his conception of biopolitics. These findings can be usefully contextualized and elucidated by taking a look at the available bibliometric data of works published on biopolitics within the field of management studies. Existing bibliometric analyses have shown that the works of Foucault have had a significant impact upon management studies and related fields of inquiry (Cronin and Meho 2009; Gendron and Baker 2005; Usdiken and Pasadeos 1995). To undertake a bibliometric analysis of research relating to Foucault's later studies on biopolitics, a series of search protocols were employed to use the Web of Science database based on the key terms 'governmentality', 'biopolitics', 'immaterial labor/labour' and 'biocapital'.1 These search terms are Foucauldian concepts which have been highlighted as key themes by the chief exponents of the scholarship on biopolitics (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004, 2009; Miller and Rose 2008; Rajan 2006; Rose 2007). To ensure that research of an appropriate quality has been selected for review, the prime criteria for selection has been publication in refereed academic journals.2 Scholarly monographs were also included in the selection where these have been influential on authors publishing in this area.

Russia

US-Russia war is not likely

Weber 2014 (Peter, senior editor, "What would a U.S.-Russia war look like?" *The Week*, March 5, online: http://theweek.com/article/index/257406/what-would-a-us-russia-war-look-like)

¶ **The chances that the U.S. and Russia will clash militarily over Moscow's invasion of Ukraine are very, very slim. Ukraine isn't a member of NATO, and President Obama isn't likely to volunteer for another war.** But many of Ukraine's neighbors *are* NATO members, including Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary. And so are the the Baltic states — Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia — further north and right on Russia's border.¶ If any of those countries come to Ukraine's aid and find themselves in a war with Russia, NATO is obliged to intervene. That's also true if Russia comes up with some pretext to invade any of those countries, unlikely as that seems. If we learned anything from World War I, it's that huge, bloody conflicts can start with tiny skirmishes, especially in Eastern Europe.¶ Again, **the U.S. and Russia almost certainly won't come to blows over Ukraine.**

Lack of a clear objective and drastic economic consequences prevent US-Russian War

Tebin 13 (Prokhor, PhD in Political Science "Why a War With the US Is Unlikely", Russian International Affairs Council, November 19, online: http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=2709#top)

One of the key factors underlying the infinitesimally low likelihood of an armed confrontation between Russia and the U.S. is the lack of a realistic political objective for such an incident. The dispute over the Arctic Ocean, Russian-Japanese differences, and hypothetical Pacific territorial disputes between the US and Russia are effectively at the very end of the list of priorities for both countries. The top issues for both Russia and the U.S. are issues related to the domestic economy and political stability.

While actual economic links between Russia and the U.S. are insignificant, 48.4 per cent of Russian exports and 43.4 per cent of imports are with the EU countries. With this in mind, initiating an open conflict with the EU's key military and political ally is bordering on political and economic suicide. The U.S., concerned as never before with issues of sovereign debt and a range of domestic social issues, has not really indicated any desire to take up arms against any of the nuclear powers without dire necessity.

Debate, journalism, and policy-making are all centered on the notion of Russia being bad and that they have to Westernize. This encourages Russophobia.

Lieven 01 (Anatol, chair of international relations in the War Studies Department of King's College London and a senior fellow of the New America Foundation, *Against Russophobia*, World Policy Journal, January 1, online: http://carnegieendowment.org/2001/01/01/against-russophobia/iv7)

Ever since the Cold War ended, **Western officials and commentators have been telling the Russians how they need to grow** out of their Cold War attitudes **toward the West** and Western institutions, **and learn to see things in a "modern" and "normal" way.** And there is a good deal of truth in this. At the same time, it would have been good if we had subjected our own inherited attitudes toward Russia to a more rigorous scrutiny. For like any other **inherited hatred, blind, dogmatic hostility toward Russia leads to bad policies, bad journalism, and the corruption of honest debate-and there is all too much of this hatred in Western portrayals of and comments on Russia.**¶ From this point of view, an analysis of Russophobia has implications that go far beyond Russia. **Much of the U.S. foreign policy debate**, especially on the Republican side, **is structured around the belief that American policy should be rooted in a robust defense of national interest-and this is probably also the belief of most ordinary Americans**. However, this straightforward view coexists with another, equally widespread, view that dominates the media. It is, in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's words, that "the United States stands taller than other nations, and therefore sees further." The unspoken assumption here is that America is not only wise but also objective, at least in its perceptions: that U.S. policy is influenced by values, but never by national prejudices. The assumption behind much American (and Western) reporting of foreign conflicts is that the writer is morally engaged but ethnically uncommitted and able to turn a benign, all-seeing eye from above on the squabbles of humanity.¶ **It is impossible to**

exaggerate how irritating this attitude is elsewhere in the world, or how misleading and dangerous it is for Western audiences who believe it. Not only does it contribute to mistaken policies, but it renders both policymakers and ordinary citizens incapable of understanding the opposition of other nations to those policies. Concerning the Middle East, it seems likely that most Americans genuinely believe that the United States is a neutral and objective broker in relations between Israelis and Palestinians-which can only appear to an Arab as an almost fantastically bad joke. This belief makes it much more difficult for Americans to comprehend the reasons for Palestinian and Arab fury at both the United States and Israel. It encourages a **Western interpretation** of this anger as the manipulation of sheep-like masses by elites. At worst, it **can encourage a kind of racism, in which certain nations are classed as irrationally, irredeemably savage and wicked.**¶ Concerning Russia, the main thrust of the official Western rhetoric with respect to the enlargement of NATO, and Russia's response, has been that the alliance is no longer a Cold War organization or a threat to Russia, that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia, that Russia should welcome enlargement, and that Russian opposition is not merely groundless but foolish and irrational. It is of course true that Russian fears of NATO expansion have been exaggerated, and some of the rhetoric has been wild. Still, given the attitudes toward Russia reflected in much of the Western media (especially among the many supporters of NATO enlargement), a Russian would have to be a moron or a traitor to approve the expansion of NATO without demanding guarantees of Russian interests and security.1¶ This is not to deny that there has been a great deal to condemn in many aspects of Russian behavior over the past decade, the war in Chechnya being the most ghastly example. But **justifiable Western criticism has all too often been marred by attacks that have been hysterical and one-sided, and it has taken too little account of the genuine problems and threats with which Russians have had to struggle.** This has been especially true of comment on the latest Chechen war, which began in the summer of 1999.¶

The American perception of Russia is misguided

Fisher 14 (Max, staff writer at the Washington Post, *Yes, Americans hate on Russia too much. This 'Daily Show' segment proves it,* The Washington Post, February 11, online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/11/yes-americans-hate-on-russia-too-much-this-daily-show-segment-proves-it/)

The popular American treatment of the Olympic games in Sochi drives home how unsympathetic Americans can be toward Russia, and makes this a perfect moment to call attention to that habit. **Coverage tends to take frequent jabs at Russia's political corruption and weak governance**; the jabs are typically accurate, but there's often a certain glee to them. When the opening ceremony featured a song by the celebrated Russian composer Pyotr Tchaikovsky, for example, many Americans seemed eager to point out that he was gay, as if those homophobic Russians would be unaware of this fact or must all support the country's anti-gay laws.

"**There's a fine line between fair criticism and schadenfreude, and the Western press has been largely well on the side of the latter**," the New Republic's Julia Ioffe, who is not soft on Putin's Russia, wrote. "I'd also argue **that there's something chauvinistic, even Russophobic in it**." It's good to point out human rights abuses, but the commentary around Sochi could not be more different than American coverage of the 2008 games in Beijing, which typically reflected wide-eyed wonderment at China's economic growth, even though the then-ongoing crackdown on Tibetan rights activists was arguably far more severe than anything happening in Russia today. So Jones's task, of **calling attention to our misperceptions of Russia**, **is** an **important** one, but it's also a difficult one. It's likely much harder than doing the same with Iran, for reasons you can see play out in this "Daily Show" segment. First, Americans feel they have good reason to be wary of Iran – its nuclear program, its sponsorship of terrorist groups. But there's also an emerging narrative, particularly on the American left, that the U.S. is too aggressive against much-weaker Iran (the legacy of the Iraq war plays a big role here) and that Iranians themselves are captive to their own government and its misdeeds. That's partly a legacy of the 2009 Iranian protests, with which many Americans felt a sense of solidarity, but it's also a bit simplistic: the Iranian government does not appear to be deeply beloved among Iranians, but nor is it universally opposed. **There is no** such **countervailing narrative in the United States that maybe we're too hard on the Russians, or that we should at least try to hold a sympathetic view alongside the critical view.** Partly, this is a legacy of the Cold War, and the still-lingering idea that it is almost always okay to say bad things about the Russians. But it's also a product of President Vladimir Putin's own government, which after his disputed 2012 reelection and the ensuing protests has sought to whip up nationalistic sentiment, and thus popular support for the government, by heightening the idea of an ongoing clash between a proud Russia and a nefarious, American-led West. You can see this in the interview with the Duma legislator, who – like many Americans – paints a highly self-serving picture of the Cold War, in which his side championed resistance to the other side's imperialist aggression. In truth, of course, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union

played this game. When Jones brings up Afghanistan, which the Soviet Union invaded in 1979, the Duma member argues that the U.S. prevented the Soviets from solving Afghanistan's problems, and in the process "created al-Qaeda." This narrative is not just overly simplistic but outright false: the U.S. did sponsor anti-Soviet rebels, but not al-Qaeda. In fact, the most-favored U.S.-backed rebel, Ahmed Shah Massoud, was an avowed enemy of al-Qaeda, which killed him on Sept. 10, 2001. The point is that, yes, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. share responsibility for Afghanistan's slide into chaos. But **the fact that the official view in Russia is still so adversarial, and so defined by bashing the Americans as much as excusing the Soviets, drives home the degree to which it is not just Americans responsible for perpetuating the Cold War-era cultural and political antagonisms.** They might resent Americans' gleeful insistence on bashing Russia, and they have a point, but it's also a narrative they can feed into themselves. **Americans, unfortunately, are probably not ready to question their views of Russians** they same way they did toward Iranians in 2009 and have been since. But this is a start.

Western media influences perceptions of Russophobia

Australian National University 14 (The Sochi Games are Russophobia, February 20, online: http://cass.anu.edu.au/story/sochi-games-and-russophobia)

The Sochi Olympics began amid a torrent of reports from foreign journalists about Russia's unpreparedness to host the Games: pictures of unfinished hotel rooms, exposed wires and uncovered man holes quickly went viral across the internet. Aside from this rocky start, the Games have gone relatively well. But **why has Russia been getting such a bad rap from the Western media? The answer may lie in centuries-old "Russophobia".** In his 2009 book by the same name, Andrei Tsygankov defined this phenomenon as "**not merely a critique of Russia, but a critique beyond any sense of proportion, waged with the purpose of undermining the nation's political reputation." Behind Russophobia**, he says, are **US neoconservatives and unreformed Cold War warriors**, who initiate periodic campaigns against Russia in the highly partisan media. **For them**, **Russia remains the greatest threat to American global hegemony, and should be kept at bay through a decentralised political system and forced acceptance of US normative influences and foreign policy.** The winter Olympiad in Sochi has seen a massive spike of Russophobic commentary confirming Tsygankov's analysis. A brief piece published by the neocon think tank *The Jamestown Foundation* provides a handy script for journalists covering the Games. The mainstream media has reflected its claims that the Sochi Olympics will reinvigorate terrorist movements in the Caucasus, rally ordinary Russians against the dictatorship and corruption of Putin's regime, and expose Putin's megalomaniac nature to the West which, consequently, must exercise more caution in dealing with Russia on foreign policy issues.¶ Variations on the basic **Russophobe narratives** outlined above **are endless in the Western media**. Biased, sensationalist and lazy journalism pays scant respect to the reality on the ground, which is that the games are popular among the Russians who do not question the government's legitimacy in any way. Russia-bashing as a political vocation¶ The hype about security threats posed by the unstable North Caucasus to athletes and tourists in Sochi reached ridiculous proportions with stories about an impending chemical attack or toothpaste sabotage. This paranoia is not shared by the Russians. Even security-conscious China expressed a 'complete faith' in the safety of the Olympiad.¶ Russian public opinion polls also tell a story that contradicts the view that Sochi is 'Putin's games', which has become a *sui generis* truth in the Western media. On the eve of the opening ceremony, 65 percent of Russian citizens voiced a personal stake in the success of the games for reasons of patriotism and national prestige; 68 percent believed that the games would be a glorious accomplishment, and only 3 percent of the latter category ascribed this success to the personal leadership of Putin.¶ These attitudes do not differ radically from the public opinion recorded in Turin or Vancouver during previous winter games. Despite concerns about high costs and corruption, the overwhelming majority in host countries regard the Olympics as a great vehicle to promote national unity and development.¶ Another claim is that the games are a shrine to Putin's authoritarianism. In the absence of any discernable public outrage in Russia about Putin's growing dictatorship, journalists turn to any number of Russia's 'champagne liberals' who are unelectable and have little connection with ordinary Russians, but are happy to corroborate every Russophobic prejudice.¶ Corruption is a serious problem in Russia, yet the Russophobic take on it in the context of Sochi pushes the limits of credulity. The games' price tag is said to have exceeded US$50 bn, making them the most expensive ever and surpassing the US$40 billion spent by China on the much bigger 2008 Summer Olympics. Endemic graft, misappropriation and incompetence are blamed for the cost blowout. In fact, the direct cost of the games amounted to US$7 billion. The rest of the funds have gone to large scale infrastructure projects across the Russian Black Sea coast such as ports, highways and power plants.¶ The geopolitical narrative is perhaps the most outlandish aspect in Sochi-related Russophobia, especially in light of the ongoing unrest in Ukraine. A piece in the *New York Times* entitled "Don't Let Putin Grab Ukraine" unfolded a phantasmagoric vision of Putin as an imperialist aggressor who will either invade Ukraine using forces deployed around Sochi under the guise of providing security for the games, or engineer a coup there once the need of keeping up polite appearances at the Olympiad passes. The idiocy of such prediction has been aggravated by the recent revelations that it is actually the US that has been actively interfering with Ukraine's domestic politics.¶ Cultural Russophobia then and now¶ Tsygankov's **examination of Russophobia highlights political agency informed by the more or less rational fears of a geopolitical competitor.** However, Russia-bashing has a venerable cultural pedigree in the Western and particularly Anglo-Saxon tradition. Since the time of Ivan the Terrible (note the pejorative English term), **Russia has been portrayed as the West's** significant **'other', a sick and deficient world where the Enlightenment values of reason, freedom and tolerance are mirrored by obscurantism, servitude and bigotry.¶ Russia is not threatening** - merely barbaric and occasionally ridiculous. **This essentialist caricature has elicited righteous anger, an overwhelming desire to ensure conformity, and bouts of depression among prominent commentators in the West.** PG Wodehouse lampooned Russian classical literature as 'gray studies of hopeless misery'.¶

Russophobia prevents US-Russian energy cooperation. Politicians are still in a Cold War-mindset and feel threatened by Russia.

Tsygankov 09 (Andrei P., Professor of the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at San Fransico State University, Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, March, pages 141-144)

The Lobby did not see equal partnership with Russia as advantageous to American interests, viewing Russia's growing energy power as a threat rather than an opportunity for cooperation. The strongest opposition to such cooperation came from right-wing groups that included old-style conservatives such as Dick Cheney and James Woolsey, neoconservatives associated with the PNAC, and Eastern European nationalists such as Zbigniew Brzezinki and Paula Dobriansky. Although the groups disagreed on some issues**, they were united by the Cold War experience of fighting the Soviets, and shared the fundamental objective of forcing Russia to comply with U.S. hegemonic energy policies in Eurasia. Some leftist observers assisted them in undermining the U.S.-Russia partnership by castigating the revival of Russia's independent energy policy as an expression of "energo-fascism"** – a terminology that resonated with right-wing groups. **The** first prominent hegemonic **group** was associated with President Jimmy Carter's former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. A long-term member of the American establishment, Brzezinski **is known for** his **geopolitical designs to project America's power in the world,** as well as his involvement with various energy companies. A Democrat with critically important policy-making experience, Brzezinski was uniquely positioned to participate in **formulating the strategic direction of U.S. foreign policy** and to serve as a liaison between hawkish Republicans and Democrats, as well as between the policy world and the private sector.

Climate

Climate change issues lead to the process of securitization by representing the issue as an existential threat

Scott 12 (Shirley V. Scott, associate professor of International Relations and coordinator of the Master of International Law and International Relations program at the UNSW, *"The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have We Come and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?"*)

The primary stumbling block to taking more effective action to mitigate climate change has been agreement as to who is responsible for bearing the burden of taking the far-reaching action necessary. **A basic divide sepa- rates the United States, which believes that all countries should do their bit towards the solution,** particularly since the greenhouse gas emissions of the leading developing countries are increasing at a rapid rate, and the developing world. China has led the calls of the Group of 77 to adhere to the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities',4 under which those with most responsibility for the problem and with the great- est capacity to do something about it are expected to take the lead and shoulder greater responsibility for addressing the problem than the newly industrializing countries. Although the annual emissions of China have now surpassed those of the United States, on a per capita basis those of China lag far behind. Furthermore, the United States and other developed countries have contributed a great deal more historically than develop- ing countries. From this perspective, the root of the problem lies in the extravagant and materialistic lif- estyle of the West and they should be the ones suffering any pain involved in meeting the overwhelming chal- lenge with which the world is confronted.¶ **More recent than the politicization of climate change has been its framing as a threat to national, interna- tional and human security. Wæver is credited with coining the term 'securitization' to refer to the process by which an issue comes to be represented as not only a political problem, but as an existential threat to a valued referent object. Wæver** and other members of the 'Copenhagen School' **emphasize that it is 'by label- ing something as a security issue that it becomes one',5 thereby paving the way for exceptional measures to deal with the threat**.6 In the most basic sense, then, **securi- tization involves referring to an issue that has hitherto been conceptualized 'only' in political, economic, envi- ronmental or other terms as a security threat so as to heighten awareness of the issue and the urgency of taking effective action.** In Wæver's formulation of the term, however, a referent object has not been fully secu- ritized until it has been moved out of 'ordinary', 'demo- cratic' politics to be dealt with as a matter of urgency in emergency mode. This can only happen if certain facili- tating conditions have been met, including that the rel- evant 'audience' has accepted the 'securitizing move'.7

Climate change has been considered a security problem since 2006

Scott 12 (Shirley V. Scott, associate professor of International Relations and coordinator of the Master of International Law and International Relations program at the UNSW, *"The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have We Come and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?"*)

The first step in the process of securitization is referred to as a 'securitizing move'. In the case of climate change, this means climate security being introduced into the discourse of international policy making and the framing of climate change as a threat to human, national and international security. This move can be dated from 2006 when British Foreign Secretary Mar- garet Beckett assumed a leadership role in promoting the association of climate change with international security in global policy discourse. During the United Kingdom Presidency, **the G8** in 2006 **accepted the fun- damental links between energy, security, climate change and sustainable development**, and in October 2006 Beckett emphasized the importance of 'climate security' in a major foreign policy speech in Berlin.11 **After considerable lobbying, the United Kingdom chaired the first UN Security Council debate on climate change** on 17 April 2007. **A common theme in the debate was that of climate change as a 'threat multi- plier'**.12 It is not that increasing temperatures as such threaten human security, although they may well do so in certain situations, but rather that the physical effects triggered by the increased temperatures could be expected in many instances to exacerbate existing tensions.

Environment

Their descriptions of environmental castastrophe turn the environment into a security threat that needs to be contained and turn them into an excuse to expand their influence and dominance.

Mason, Michael, and Mark Zeitoun. "Questioning environmental security." The Geographical Journal 179.4 (2013): 294-297. Associate professer at London school of economics and political science.

¶ ¶ **threats to and from 'the environment' inform¶ geographical depictions of danger with widespread¶ reach in political and policy circles.¶ While these fears are partly replaying past neo-¶ Malthusian concerns about limits to growth, they are¶ also associated with a distinct millennialist anxiety¶** about the lethality made possible by collapsing conditions¶ of life. '**Dangerous climate change' is at the¶ forefront of these apocalyptic imaginaries, but existential¶ threats are seen to issue also from biodiversity¶ extinction, fossil fuel depletion and endemic water¶ shortages** (Dalby 2009; Swyngedouw 2010). **The¶ 'securitisation' of environmental processes is at once¶ both a consequence and driver of such apocalyptic¶ concerns**, and **this discursive framing is intuitively¶ straightforward for those who argue that it justifies¶ urgent,** even emergency**, measures to prevent** or mitigate**¶ serious dangers. Security** here **denotes that which¶ is evoked** or invoked when acting **to protect core¶ institutions or freedoms in the face of serious ecological¶ threats.** This is the dominant notion of environmental¶ security questioned by contributors to this¶ themed section.¶ From a geographical perspective, **environmental¶ security straddles uneasily across a territorial/postterritorial¶ axis, where tensions are immediately apparent¶ between competing spatial performances of¶ security**. This expresses contrasting claims over the¶ political subjectivity being secured. **It is not surprising¶ that state actors have invoked environmental security¶ practices and discourses according to territorial doctrines¶ of national security, whereby environmental¶ risks supplement traditional threats to the state.** Thus,¶ 'climate security', 'biosecurity' and 'energy security'¶ are employed to refer to the protection of state interests¶ with regard to the projected and perceived consequences¶ of environmental change, biotechnologies¶ and fossil fuels scarcity. Numerous think-tank and academic publications have fed these state-centred¶ imaginaries of environmental danger on the basis of¶ disputed natural and social scientific scenarios (e.g.¶ Klare 2008; Brown and Crawford 2009; Chellaney¶ 2011). In apparent opposition to statist representations¶ of security are non-territorial notions of 'human¶ security', which profess a universal concern for the¶ protection of individuals or groups from serious¶ threats to wellbeing. Constructions of human security¶ have identified environmental dangers as potential¶ threats to human welfare; for example, 'water security'¶ and 'food security' mark out areas of practical¶ application for international development and¶ humanitarian organisations (Matthew et al. 2010;¶ Cook and Bakker 2012)

The link between the environment and security has existed since 1972

Maertens 13 (Lucile Maertens, works with the UN on multilateralism, environment and security, presented at the 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, *"A Depoliticized Securitization? A Case of Environmental Securitization within the United Nations"*)

First, **the concept of environmental security comes from UN multilateralism: the link ¶ between security and the environment was made during the 1972 United Nations ¶ Conference** on the Human Environment (Buzan, Waever, De Wilde, 1998, p. 71), and ¶ **the expression of 'environmental security' was initially mentioned in the Brundtland ¶ Report of 1987** (Barnett, 2010). ¶ Secondly, the UN appears to be a privileged actor to deal with this issue. On the one ¶ hand, the UN is concerned by all the various levels implied in environment and ¶ security related issues (state security, human security, and environmental protection). ¶ On the other hand, the universality of environmental issues21, and thus the impossible ¶ exclusive national management22, put environmental security on the UN agenda ¶ responsible for collective security23. Furthermore, the UN is able to work at and to ¶ connect the global – as an arena for collective decisions and international negotiations – ¶ and the local levels, notably through the implementation of development projects and ¶ capacity building in partnership with local authorities24. Yet, the famous motto "think ¶ globally, act locally" especially concerns the environmental sector (Buzan, Waever, De ¶ Wilde, 1998, p. 87). Finally, whereas states usually base their policy on a short-term ¶

perspective – following electoral timelines for instance –, IOs are supposed to produce ¶ predictability on the international scene in order to promote international cooperation ¶ (Rittberger, Zangl, 2006, pp. 17-20). They are expected to have long-term ¶ considerations. Yet, environmental issues, especially climate change, are particularly ¶ 8 ¶ involved in long-term dynamics that require present sacrifices for future risks not ¶ necessarily noticeable today.

The environment has been increasingly considered a matter of security concern

Biswas 11 (Niloy Ranjan Biswas, PhD student at City University London, *"Is the Environment a Security Threat? Environmental Security Beyond Securitization"*, published Winter 2011 in International Affairs Review, Vol. XX No.1)

The impact of environmental degradation and consequences of environmental ¶ changes are increasingly associated with non-conventional notions of security. Considering ¶ the environment as a threat to individual, national, or global security has created a new ¶ agenda in the discourse of security studies. **The increasing scope of international security now ¶ readily includes environmental degradation, global warming, and climate change.** These ¶ issues have extended human understanding of environmental change, conflict, and ¶ vulnerability and explored the roles of conservation and sustainable development in ¶ promoting peace, stability, and human security.1¶ **This is a broad definition of environmental ¶ security, as considered by a large number of academics and proponents.** The importance of¶ understanding environmental security is two-fold. First, one has to understand the ¶ transformations in the theoretical developments of the concept of □security.' Second, one also ¶ has to envisage the link between environmental change and livelihood strategies of human ¶ beings on the local level and the broader impact of environmental changes on a society.¶ These two dimensions help define environmental issues as important factors of security.

Scholars have determined direct relations between the environment and security

NIPS 13 (Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, independent research organization focusing on national and international issues consisting of graduates and PhD holders with expertise in security and strategic studies, *"Human Security in Nepal: Concepts, Issues, and Challenges"*)

In the past three decades, many scholars and practitioners have ¶ substantially contributed to the realisation that environmental stresses ¶ and threats are security and peace issues. These **scholars have examined ¶** the relationships between the environment and intra-state and ¶ international conflict (Goodman 1996), the military and the environment ¶ (Westing 1988; Finger 1991; Deibert 1996), the role of the environment in ¶ peace building (Carius 2006; Ali 2002, 2007; Conca and Debalko 2002), the ¶ relationship between demography, security and environment (Debalko ¶ 2010), **the relationship between the environment and national security ¶** (Deudney 1990; Goodman 1996; Westing 1989), links between resources ¶ and conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999; Matthew et al. 2002; Upreti 2001, 2002, ¶ 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2010a; Mathew and Upreti 2005). Further, ¶ **Collier and Hoeffler (2002), De Soysa (2000), Gleditsch (2000) and Hartman ¶ (1998) have contributed on different dimensions of resource scarcity and ¶ environmental security, linking these issues with** resource conflict, civil ¶ war, national **security policy** and human security. Nevertheless, debate ¶ surrounding environmental security is still rudimentary in the South and ¶ mainstream security decision-makers are not yet ready to accept it as a ¶ security issue. ¶ The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)'s 1987 ¶ 'Our Common Future' report used the term 'environmental security' in ¶ the context of sustainable development (UN 1987), explicitly connecting ¶ issues of environmental security to development. **The UNDP's** 1994 ¶ Human Development **Report also linked environment and development ¶ and raised concern over environmental security** (UNDP 1994). Barnett ¶ (2007) **reveals that environmental security acquired its place in the genre ¶ of peace research and environment studies during the 1980s. Before ¶ this time, the terms 'environment' and 'security' were disconnected;** ¶ environment was in general taken to denote the surrounding atmosphere, 216¶ natural forces and living conditions and focused mainly on natural ¶ processes, whereas security was focused on safety and keeping free from ¶ threats mainly through the use of force (Upreti 2010a).

War

Fear of war causes securitization out of suspicion

Waever 11 (Ole Waever, professor of International Rleations at the Deparment of political science at the University of Copenhagen, *"Politics, Security, Theory",* Security Dialogue 2011)

Closely related to Tjalve's article, the one by Mike Williams (this issue) has a characteristic puzzling twist. Intensifying an argument he made previously (see Williams, 1998), he shows how the **relative desecuritization implied in a liberal political order rests on a kind of meta-securitization, where society institutionalizes a fear of fear in the form of a political system and culture that con- strains the eruption into society of a politics of fear**. Judith **Shklar** (1998) f**amously argued that to avoid the human worst, cruelty, a liberal society has to constrain the most corrosive force in poli- tics: fear.** This is a quintessential American insight. Already many Central European theorists at the middle of the last century – perhaps most clearly Hermann Broch ([1948] 1955), but see also Arendt (1968: 112–50) – wanted politics to be anchored not in positive values but in avoiding the largest negatives. **US political history produced a specific, systematic suspicion against forces that sought to impel (the) people to surrender power too willingly, war and fear being the most powerful of these. This suspicion ties into the 'deep structure' of securitization theory, where the causal effects of securitization parallel a logic of war** (Wæver, 1995). The contributions by Tjalve and Williams raise vexing questions about the ability of contemporary political culture to conduct such principled debates about society's own political vigour when the ever-faster flow of news keeps politics tied to events and single issues. This issue might be explored empirically through compara- tive analysis of Western societies mobilizing second thoughts a decade after 9/11 in relation to the excessive sacrifices of civil liberties made in the 'war on terror'. In what institutional form is soci- ety able to reflect on its own gestation – not on issues, threats, scandals or events, but on its own larger shape and condition?

Exploration and Development

Exploration and development into the ocean drastically increases biopolitical securitization by expanding the scope of management and manipulation by the state.
Dr. Paul **Rutherford 99**, (is an environmental politics professor at the University of Sydney, Discourses of the Environment, Edited by Eric Darier, 1999, p. 55-56, SRB)
The notion of regulatory science refers to the widespread-reliance by the state-on extensive systems of scientific advisory structures which have become an integral feature of environmental (and health) policy making in industrialized societies (Beck 1992a; Jasarioff 1990). These expert advisory groups serve not only a role of political legitimating, but more importantly a role of epistemic policing, **both by framing the definition of ecological risks and by certifying-what is to count as scientifically acceptable knowledge of the natural world. The-complexities thrown up by attempts to define environmental-societal interrelationships in terms of global systems ecology produces a high level of technical uncertainty and potential social conflict. The rapid expansion of social regulation associated with the growth-of the discourse on ecological problems** from the 1970s **produced a whole new domain for the biopolitical administration of life**. The population became the target for a-new form of ecological security and .welfare, in which environmental - agencies and the professional disciplines required by them set about the task of protecting the public against hazardous and environmentally damaging technologies, demanding 'ever more complex predictive analyses of the risks and benefits of regulation' (Jasanoff 1990: 3). As Brian Wynne has noted, the regulatory 'turn to science', as an attempt to provide greater stability and legitimacy in environmental policy, 'also in important respects... defined society, by tacitly defining the scope and nature of social intervention in public policy risk decisions' (Wynne 1992: 746-8**). The increasing importance or regulatory ecological science is therefore a particularly significant articulation of the biopolitical character of modern governmental rationality. It is clearly linked to the growth of big science.** Indeed, a notable feature of regulatory science is the role of the state and industrial interests (especially transnational corporations) in the manufacture, negotiation and certification of knowledge: that is, the central role these institutions play in the normative constitution of ecological knowledge (ibid. 754). **Regulatory ecological science does not so much describe the environment, as both actively constitute it as an object of knowledge and, through various modes of positive intervention, manage and police it.**

Feedback Loop Link

Framing warming in terms of feedback loops creates fatalism and passivity
Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

> The combination of tragic telos, deterministic linear temporality, and an extra-human force guiding history appear most dramatically in discussions of feedback loops, self-perpetuating cycles that exacerbate warming and its effects. Homer-Dixon (2007b) describes feedback loops as "a vicious circle ... in our global climate [that] could determine humankind's future prosperity and even survival" (p. A29). Here, the end-point of global climate change is cast completely outside of human agency, for "nature takes over." Though Herbert (2002) mixes a variety of caveats and verbs (for example, in the above excerpt he uses "could," rather than "would" or "will") in his discussion of feedback loops, the tragic implication is clear: It is likely that surface temperature will rise "between 3 and 10.5 degrees Fahrenheit. That is a level of warming that could initiate the disintegration of the ice sheet. And stopping that disintegration, once the planet gets that warm, may be impossible" (p. A25). With the loss of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, "Tremendous amounts of housing, wetlands and farming areas around the world would vanish. Large portions of a country like Bangladesh ... would disappear" (p. A25). Once a feedback loop becomes instantiated, there is little (if anything) humans can do but witness the (apparently rapid) disappearance of entire nations. The argumentative force of the tragic apocalypse also appears through analogies, especially those between current climate change and ancient climate catastrophes, or fictional weather apocalypses, as in The Day After Tomorrow (Bowles, 2004; Scott, 2004). For instance, Gugliotta (2005) lures readers with the headline, "Extinction Tied to Global Warming; Greenhouse Effect Cited in Mass Decline 250 Million Years Ago" (p. A3). Volcanoes releasing "Huge amounts of carbon dioxide ... trigger[ed] a greenhouse effect that warmed the earth and depleted oxygen from the atmosphere, causing environmental deterioration and finally collapse" (p. A3). Stories about analogous events function as enthymemes where global warming's worst effects are fated, outside of human capacity to mitigate or

adapt to them. Through the harrowing images of fictitious or ancient catastrophes, audiences may draw their own conclusions concerning the fate of humanity, and life itself.

Certainty Link

Certainty doesn't produce resoluteness but rather fatalism

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

A close reading of the discourse reveals important differences in the verbs, "is," "will," and "could," which call attention to variations in human agency. Predicting global warming through the word could frees space for human action, including adaptation and mitigation. Asserting that the catastrophic telos of climate change is happening or will occur, however, may reduce the potential for human intervention. As Revkin (2006a) quotes British chemist James E. Lovelock, a 14-degree temperature rise "means roughly that most of life on the planet will have to move up to the Arctic basin, to the few islands that are still habitable and to oases on the continent. It will be a much-diminished world" (p. F2). Declaring with certainty that these negative impacts of global warming will happen suggests that a cosmic, extra-human force determines the outcome of events. Tragic discourse may even describe predicted events through present-tense verbs, heightening the deterministic effect: "As the Arctic ice melts and ice shelves collapse in the Southern Ocean, vast areas of open water are exposed. The water absorbs heat from the sun that until now was reflected by the ice" (Struck, 2007, p. A10). Struck (2007) qualifies that a warmer ocean "is expected" to reduce ocean circulation; but he concludes with a tragic analogy: "The previous time" the oceanic conveyor-belt current stopped "15,000 years ago, the Northern Hemisphere was plunged into a brief but brutal ice age, apparently within decades" (p. A10).

Tipping Point Link

Focus on tipping points destroys action against warming – fatalism, uncertainty

Russill (Assistant Professor in the School of Journalism and Communication at Carleton University) **8**
(Chris, Tipping Point Forewarnings in Climate Change Communication: Some Implications of an Emerging Trend, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, 2008)

Finally, there is the fact that Hansen's use of "tipping points" does not simply reflect the primary science. I replicated the methodology used by Naomi Oreskes' (2004) to survey the climate change research literature and found no uses of "tipping point" between 1993 and 2003. I then extended the search through the end of 2006 and broadened the parameters. This resulted in two research articles. The dearth of tipping point references in the scientific literature prompts questions regarding its accuracy as a description of climate change. In addressing this question for Nature, Gabrielle Walker (2006) reviewed the scientific literature and interviewed IPCC climate scientists to conclude there are several "danger zones that may deserve to be called tipping points" (p. 802). In particular, the elements of threshold crossing, irreversibility, and positive feedback appear to characterize key climatic mechanisms quite well. It is odd, however, that Walker's non-committal conclusion suggests the popularity of the concept, while failing to observe its very rare use in the primary research literature (p. 802). In fact, both Walker and an accompanying Nature editorial are unclear on this point. As the Editor's Summary (2006) puts it, The idea that passing a hidden threshold could drastically worsen man-made climate change has been current in the scientific literature for many years. Now it has a new name, a "tipping point," and suddenly the news magazines and other media have picked up on it. (¶ 1) This is an important point. If tipping point warnings do not simply reflect advancing scientific understanding, then why is it now preferred? There are other functionally equivalent and more clearly elaborated conceptions of change available, both in the scientific literature and in popular environmental writing. For example, Al Gore's (1992) Earth in the Balance attempts to revise received views of causality in a way very similar to Gladwell's perspective, enrolling ideas of non-linearity from chaos theory (p. 34, pp. 361–363). Walker does not say it is an inaccurate description of climate systems and the editors of Nature suggest its use is akin to old wine in new bottles. The perspective is almost nominalist in its conclusion regarding the appropriateness of tipping points. Climate systems might be described in a variety of manners, either using tipping points or other concepts. Its importance derives not from better describing climate systems but in making available an image of crisis useful for registering public concern and opening avenues for response. It is on this point that advocates and critics of

tipping point forewarnings disagree. The editors of Nature, for example, believe "there are three dangers attendant on focusing humanity's response to the climate crisis too much on tipping points" (p. 785). They believe such warnings underplay the uncertainties inherent to climate science, that they distort human responses by focusing on avoidance rather than adaptation, and that "can induce fatalism," since tipping points, "may encourage a belief that a complete solution is the only worthwhile one, as any other course may allow the climate system to tumble past the crucial threshold" (p. 785). It is easier to discuss the meaning of tipping point warnings more fully if the problem motivating Hansen's usage of tipping points is better understood. A central dilemma facing climate change communication is the incommensurability between problem formulations and available solutions. Most warnings emphasize the scale, scope and magnitude of the problem in a manner that devalues conventional ways of responding to environmental concern. This observation has produced various responses. Some claim this situation requires the death of environmentalism since conventional environmentalist responses rule out the kinds of change needed (cf. Schellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004). Others claim the situation is the result of "climate porn," where alarmists and their audiences respond to the "secretly thrilling" experience of crisis in a detached manner (Ereaut & Segnit, 2006). The "climate porn" manner of dismissing environmental concern resembles the charges of environmental hysteria outlined by Killingworth and Palmer (1995), especially in the worry that alarmist warnings might spread like an epidemic (p. 2). A perverse human desire outstrips rational judgment in motivating such alarmist warnings and, as a result, the scenarios promoting urgency are vivified and exaggerated to the point that any possible human response seems inadequate. Society, as a result, "**tips" into a defeatist or fatalist trajectory**.

Climate Change Links

Climate discourse controls action on climate?

Hayes and Knox-Hayes, 2014
(Jarrod, PhD in polysci from U Southern Cal and IR prof @ GIT, Janelle, assistant prof of economic geography @ GIT, "Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between UES and EU Approaches to Policy," May 2014, *Global Environmental Politics,* vol 14 no 2, muse, accessed 7/16/14 bh @ ddi)

Rational institutionalist frameworks lie at the heart of theoretical discussions of environmental problems within international relations theory.5 Underlying these studies is the assumption that rational, economically oriented calculations are the primary motivations for the relevant actors.6 Yet, climate change and the human behaviors that drive it are complex phenomena, spanning levels of analysis as well as social and cultural boundaries. Sociologically focused perspectives hold the potential for important insights on the forces behind and responses to climate change. Applying securitization theory to the issue of climate change, we stress the importance of speech in constructing climate change. Many studies address climate change policy in the EU7 and the US8, but few explicitly compare EU and US climate change policy.9 Much of the literature focuses on states as uni[a]ed actors,10 although scholars have begun to take more seriously sub-state and regional aspects.11 Where studies do make explicit comparisons, the focus and [a]ndings are divergent and dif[a]cult to categorize. Harrison and Sundstrom's two studies created a three-fold framework.12 First, Jarrod Hayes and Janelle Knox-Hayes • 83 5. Keohane and Victor 2011, Luterbacher and Sprinz 2001, MacNeil and Paterson 2012, Paterson 1996. 6. Cass 2006, 1. 7. Harris 2007, Jordan et al. 2012, Ringius 1999, Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007. 8. Bryner 2008, Harrison 2010, Lisowski 2002, Steurer 2003. 9. Sandvik 2008, 334. 10. Harrison and Sundstrom 2007, 2. 11. Below 2007, Selin and VanDeveer 2011, Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012. 12. Harrison and Sundstrom 2007, Harrison and Sundstrom 2010. economic costs in[o]uence policy—echoing the focus of much of the literature on cost-bene[a]t calculations. Second, environmental values in[o]uence climate policy either by changing the electoral incentives or personal beliefs of politicians. Third, political institutions can enable minority voices to push the climate change agenda or diffuse policy-making authority, thus creating multiple veto points for those opposed to climate change policy.13 Similarly, Cass's analysis of US, EU, British, and German climate policy documents how international climate change norms interact with domestic political contexts.14 Busby and Ochs argue that the American political system allows parties opposed to climate change policy to impede the process, while in Europe policy-makers instead confront politically well-organized environmental movements.15 These studies show how and why Europe and the US have diverged on the issue of climate change, but they provide an incomplete account. For example, Harrison and Sundstrom's framework points to the importance of public attention to the subject of climate change but does not address how public attention is generated or channeled nor how climate change is understood in different political contexts.16 Climate change construction has important implications for all elements of their framework, from the willingness of the public to engage on the issue, to calculations of cost and benefit, to the ability of actors to block policy. Cass's analysis provides important insights on comparative responses to climate change and focuses on maneuverings of political elites, but likewise leaves aside questions of broader political audiences and structures within polities.17 **Discursive constructions are crucial to understanding how international prerogatives get translated into domestic socio-political systems.** We identi[a]ed an opportunity to explore discursive constructions of climate change and their political effects, and the relationships between political institutions, society, and climate change policy.

Securitized climate discourse fails to solve climate change, reinforces the power of traditional technocratic actors and hinders necessary structural change

Hayes and Knox-Hayes, 2014
(Jarrod, PhD in polysci from U Southern Cal and IR prof @ GIT, Janelle, assistant prof of economic geography @ GIT, "Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between UES and EU Approaches to Policy," May 2014, *Global Environmental Politics,* vol 14 no 2, muse, accessed 7/16/14 bh @ ddi)

Securitization involves the manifestation of both agency and structure. Political agents use security to achieve political objectives, for example, to delegitimize opposition or to access the power-centralizing aspect of securitization. Weber and Stern point to the importance of framing in climate change policies.19 However, **securitization takes place within a social space that gives it power**. For example, the EU is not constituted as an actor that can "speak" security. Conversely, the US president is an actor clearly constituted to speak security, and "very important" issues are discursively constructed as security, making the issues worthy of concentrated political attention. **Differences in discourse are a product of how Americans assign**

meaning to important issues as compared to Europeans. Neither agency nor structure alone explains the emergence of security discourses. Instead they interact to create both the space in which security exists and how security is used.20 Here, we emphasize the agential aspects of securitization as a means of exposing the structural factors that shape policy. Securitization theory also highlights structural problems, in that **securitization may enable action on environmental problems without producing beneficial outcomes. Securitization of development policy has** decreased aid to Africa,21 and securitization of HIV/AIDS has **increased the authority of traditional security actors vis-à-vis civil society.**22 In the US, there are indications that a similar empowerment of the military has taken place.23 The US military has also been an important securitizing and responding actor to climate change.24 **Given the pervasiveness of the economic activities that generate climate change, the traditional beneficiaries of securitization may be least capable of dealing with the issue.** 25 Relying on **securitization, with its logic of imminent threat and immediate response, to generate action may result in short-term** Jarrod Hayes and Janelle Knox-Hayes • 85 19. Weber and Stern 2011. 20. Hayes 2013. 21. Abrahamsen 2005. 22. Elbe 2006. 23. Floyd 2010. 24. CNA Corporation 2007; Suzanne Goldenberg. US military warned to prepare for consequences of climate change. The Guardian, November 9, 2012. 25. Deudney 1990, Homer-Dixon 1991. **policies that lack long-term public support.** Because of the power centralizing and debate marginalizing characteristics of security, securitization has the potential to disempower skeptics as well as many members of Congress to speak on climate change. Securitizing climate change also sheds light on socio-political differences between states. Scholars have highlighted the dangers securitization poses to democracies, 26 so understanding how states approach issues like climate change has the potential to increase our understanding of the adaptability and health of modern democracies as they confront increasingly globalized problems.27 Speci[a]cally, **securitization of climate change can impede the collective action required to address the issue through a focus on immediate action and self-survival irrespective of others. Successful securitization might divorce the US from coordinated efforts in the UN to alter economic activity on a sustainable and equitable basis. It might also distort policy-making to focus on obvious policy action at the expense of critical structural changes.** Scholarship has begun to draw on securitization theory and apply it to environmental problems. Detraz and Betsill use a discursive approach to examine security and climate change discourse in the UN and [a]nd an emphasis on discourses of environmental security as climate change degrades human welfare.28 In a separate piece, Detraz highlights the potential costs of empowering state security over human security, because understanding climate change as a matter of human security presents the best possibility of enacting policies designed to address vulnerability to climate change.29 Trombetta argues that the securitization of climate change is moving the concept away from the state and exceptional measures and toward prevention and human security.30 Finally, Floyd challenges securitization theory through the prism of US environmental policy and argues that securitization can be morally bene[a]cial or detrimental depending on outcome, while desecuritization can be morally unacceptable if it results in depoliticization of important issues.31

Climate security justifies militarization and reinforces traditional technocratic decision making

Hayes and Knox-Hayes, 2014
(Jarrod, PhD in polysci from U Southern Cal and IR prof @ GIT, Janelle, assistant prof of economic geography @ GIT, "Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between UES and EU Approaches to Policy," May 2014, *Global Environmental Politics,* vol 14 no 2, muse, accessed 7/16/14 bh @ ddi)

Security plays different roles in the US and the EU. While **securitizing moves in the US have been unsuccessful in terms of generating broader public support**,74 **they play an important role in efforts of political leaders to martial support for climate change policy.** Despite a general failure to shift public constructions of climate change**, the heavy reliance on security discourses in the US has had some impact in terms of shifting policy processes and empowering traditional security actors. The military has been tasked as a responding institution of climate change**,75 **issuing reports on the security implications of climate change**76 **and making highly visible efforts to "green" military equipment**.77 **Securitization and the empowerment of the military have the potential to alienate the US from global efforts to resolve climate change on the basis of consultation, cooperation, discussion, and compromise. These processes are often at odds with the logic of security, which demands immediate action and often constructs the world in adversarial self-other terms.** In stark contrast, militarization is not present to any signi[a]cant degree in the EU.

Serial policy failure—securitization on climate change fails to catalyze effective discussions or even political action to effect change

Hayes and Knox-Hayes, 2014
(Jarrod, PhD in polysci from U Southern Cal and IR prof @ GIT, Janelle, assistant prof of economic geography @ GIT, "Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between UES and EU Approaches to Policy," May 2014, *Global Environmental Politics,* vol 14 no 2, muse, accessed 7/16/14 bh @ ddi)

The divergence between US and European approaches to climate change provides the central problématique for this paper. **Probing the role of security discourses, we find that security plays a prominent role in the discourses of proponents of policy action in the US.** Conversely in Europe, discourses of leadership and opportunity dominate. Our data identify two motivating factors, culture, and governance structure. Our findings move the literature forward and highlight two issues—culture and technocratic decision-making—that have heretofore largely been overlooked. Our findings also highlight the importance of 96 • Security in Climate Change Discourse 84. Harry Reid (D-NV) 2010. looking at how climate change is constructed in order to understand climate policy outcomes. These findings go beyond climate change. Increasingly, the boundaries of the domestic and the international are eroding as globalization expands the scope of human and natural processes. The ability of international actors to deal with these problems will play a strong role in determining humanity's collective future. Classical realists have long debated whether democracy could survive the threats facing it.85 The end of the Cold War seemed to answer that question, but environmental challenges renew the debate. **Given the chronic nature of climate change, it is unlikely that securitization represents a viable and durable political approach**, but alternative policy mechanisms available to US leaders remain unclear. Continued European leadership—particularly if it comes with economic bene[a]ts—may prod US political leaders to action. However, **the world may have to wait until catastrophic natural events in the US homeland lend sufficient external legitimacy to securitizing moves to push them to success. Of course, by that point legislation would be too little, too late.**

Food sec link

Their framing of food security not in terms of people but in terms of states shifts the goal away from feeding the hungry to preventing nuclear war, destroying agency and killing drive to solve hunger.

Shepherd, Benjamin. "Thinking critically about food security." Security Dialogue 43.3 (20**12**): 195-212.
Rethinking food security¶The assignment Booth gives us is to challenge **the conventional framing of food security and to rethink it in emancipatory terms, in terms of the hungry, as opposed to terms that suit or are readily co-opted by global and systemic actors.** For Booth (2007: 112), 'emancipation seeks the securing¶of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others'. **Hunger is one of the most basic oppressions that people must be secured against. In this light, food security can be framed in terms of securing vulnerable populations from the structural violence of hunger.¶ Thinking about food security in this way de-privileges currently privileged actors in order to centralize the needs of those who must be the central focus of food-security strategies**: human beings experiencing or vulnerable to hunger. It centralizes the hungry and those at risk of hunger as the focus of food-security activity. **This framing also seeks to place an onus on institutional and systemic actors of agency**. That onus is first to assess their own agency in securing the vulnerable from malign structures and second to challenge the agency of others. **This is fundamental to creating the conditions of human emancipation**.¶In pursuit of these conditions, **it is crucial that this new framing offers some practical purchase in terms of guiding strategic and tactical decisionmaking for any actor engaging with a 'food security' problem. Certainly it provides a basis for designing, implementing and evaluating practical and measurable strategies, policies and actions for creating food security**. (It should be easier to plan a project and measure its success on the basis of identifying and taking appropriate actions to help secure a group from its vulnerabilities to hunger than on the basis of guaranteeing that 'all people at all times' will have adequate food.)¶Moreover, **this framing is active. By adopting this framing, an actor with agency – one with capacity to analyse, influence, modify, reshape or halt existing, malignant institutional arrangements – must be ready to act, and to be challenged by others, in terms of how its policies, behaviours or actions assist in this ultimate objective of securing those going hungry or vulnerable to hunger**. The challenge by others is crucial. This framing provides a normative position that can (must) be used by actors to validate and evaluate the actions of others. **Actors need to be able to be held to account for their 'food security' policies and actions and how they are securing the vulnerable against hunger. By facilitating actor accountability, this framing seeks to limit the risk of co-option by self-interested actors and the creation of conditions for human emancipation is sought.** Helping place an onus on actors with agency to secure the vulnerable from malign structures is a major shift from making utopian claims of 'freedom from hunger' to making pragmatic improvements in institutional arrangements that perpetuate the structural violence of hunger and poverty. **This is an important step in developing a systematic approach, not only for thinking about, but also for acting in response to the insecurity of hunger. It seeks to pursue the emancipation of humans from structural malignity and facilitate practical approaches for making material improvements in reducing hunger.** This pragmatic goal is also one of the key reasons for framing food security in terms of structural violence. Because structural violence is the result of institutional arrangements, this definition provides some direct purchase on the tasks of developing and evaluating strategies, policies, actions and behaviours. It forces the questions to be asked of any particular initiative: What are the existing institutional arrangements? What changes are likely to result? And, what impact will they have on, or for, the hungry?¶This reframing of food security offers some additional advantages. Shaw (2007: 384) has described **the pathologies of the existing global food-security paradigm and concludes that it is shackled by 'the problem of institutional incoherence': with 'so many multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental organizations and international institutions involved, food security has tended to become everybody's concern and so, in reality, no one's concern'.**

Drilling link

The quest for oil turns oil into a security threat that has no impact on people. That securitization views the oil spills and results a separate process, divorceed from the drilling itself. Viewing it like that ignores the ways in which the oil affects people.

Mayer, Maximilian, **and Peer** Schouten. "Energy Security and Climate Security under Conditions of the Anthropocene." Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change (**2011**): 13-35.

Assembling environmental security Environmental security is qualitatively different from energy security in so far as it does not represent a single parsimonious global assemblage. Instead, it points to the competition between interest groups that are differently affected by energy production processes such as mining, drilling or energy-related development projects (Peluso and Watts, 2001). **The many cases of environmental securitizations thus present us with a more diffuse and con-fused array of matters of concern,** ranging from local and transnational competing interest groups to wildlife diversity and the preservation of the 'Gold Coast' of Califorg€1**. They dissolve the rational language of resource supply and demand intera wide array of affected contradicting interests of humans, animals and whole ecosystems**. By giving these actors a voice, envi-ronmental securitizations are assemblages revolving around different matters of concern. **The US reactions to the huge underwater oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in May 2010 perfectly illustrate how energy and environmental security are at once linked and at odds**. First, **a draft climate bill which was to encourage oil drilling In US territory was hastily revised to take the opposing posi-tion** (Broder, 2010b). Second, **Governor** Arnold **Schwarzenegger halted oil exploration projects along the Californian Coast stating his most pressing concerns on television**: ¶All of you have seen when you turn on the television the devastation in the Gulf. And I'm sure that they also were assured that it Is safe to drill. I see on TV the birds drenched in oil, the fishermen out of work, the massive oil spill, oil slick destroying our precious ecosystem. It will not happen here in California. (Rothfeld, 2010)¶**The sort of environmental security Schwarzenegger evokes here concerns oil, but it assembles it differently and draws in more elements than energy security does** — including for instance birds, fisherman and the ecosystem. **Instead of aggregate national concerns, it brings to the fore many of the con-sequences of oil production that are otherwise silenced**. As such, **it exposes matters of fact that are silenced by the energy security agenda and makes them matters of concern**. Whereas the environmental security agenda is often treated as a separate concern from the energy security agenda, **this example shows how environmental security Is literally attached to the same assemblage of drilling platforms and submarine ecologies as energy security** —an assemblage that Is differently enrolled by invoking environmental con-cerns. To put it differently, **the Whig off the Gulf Coast, which had previously been a smooth-functioning technical element in an energy security assem-blage, was revealed to be an unstable network of elements that could not simply be transposed to the Californian coast without possibly unacceptable environmental costs.¶**Where environmental securitisations gain in inclusiveness and symmetry vis-a-vis energy securitisations of related assemblages of elements, they point to much less straightforward policy agendas. The notion of 'security' under-pinning environmental security is much less wedded to the policy-ready state centrism underpinning energy security. For instance**, an environmen-tal securitisation of the Arctic region extends the perspective from that of a single state to that of a hybrid referent object (consisting of biodiver-sity, indigenous people and mankind through potentially rising sea levels) threatened by crude oil production, industrial pollution and rising local temperatures** (Martello, 2008; Kristoffersen and Young, 2010).

Mapping link

Mapping destroys intimacy with the ocean and turns renders it as a mere conceptual device for human purposes.

Anderson and Peters 14

Dr Kimberley Peters Lecturer in Human Geography BSc (hons) Human Geography and Planning (Cardiff University) MA Cultural Geography (Royal Holloway, University of London) PhD (Royal Holloway, University of London)

Filling the Watery Void

The second key aim of this volume is to continue challenging the aforementioned and long standing configuration of the ocean as an empty space, established through processes of industrial and postindustrial capitalism. Moreover this book seeks to address the use of the sea as a mere conceptual device for understanding alternative socio-cultural and political phenomena, instead positioning the sea as a 'an element of nature itself' (Steinberg 2001: 167). As such, the chapters which follow each demonstrate **the** ways in which **ocean is 'filled'**: through its own elemental composition, **with more-thanhuman life**, with floating and sunken materialities, and with a range of human significance. Such an approach takes inspiration from non-Western perspectives of the water world. **If we turn away from our modern, terrestro-centric view, we can begin to see how 'other' cultures conceive of the seas and oceans as practiced, embodied and lived spaces.** For example, anthroplogist Bronislaw Malinowski demonstrates the importance of rituals at sea for societies on the Trobriand Islands in the Western Pacific region (1922). Here the land functions as a connection point whilst the ocean is encultured as a significant ritualized space, made meaningful through the 'Kula' system of gift-giving. Kula exchanges involve the sea-based exchange of two types of item (armshells and necklaces) between 'Kula partners' (Young 1979: 163). Articles are moved from island to island by sea-going canoes, and as such, seafaring has been integral to the custom, culture, and ceremony of the Trobriand people (Young 1979: 172-3). Thus **despite Western culture's willingness to reduce the water world to an empty space, many 'indigenous' cultures refute this essentialism.** As Raban notes, drawing on David Lewis' discussion of Polynesian mariners, We, the Navigators (1994): **the open sea could be as intimately known and as friendly to human habitation** as a familiar stretch of land to those seamen who lived on its surface, as gulls do, wave by wave.... **the stars supplied a grand chain of paths across the known ocean, but there was often little need of these since the water itself was as legible as acreage farmed for generations.** Colour, wind, the flight of birds, and telltale variations of swell gave the sea direction, shape, character. (Raban 1999: 94) According to Raban, **this intimate knowing of water worlds was supplanted in the West** by the advent of modern technology, **starting with the use of a compass and sextant and extending through to twenty-first century exploitation of satellite telemetry and geographical positioning systems.** For Raban, **'the arrival of the magnetic compass caused a fundamental rift in the relationship between man [sic] and sea'** (1999: 95). **Possession of a compass, rendered obsolete a great body of inherited, instinctual knowledge, and rendered the sea itself** - in fair weather, at least - **as a void, an empty** **rendered obsolete a great body of inherited, instinctual knowledge, and rendered the sea itself - in fair weather, at least - as a void, an empty space to be traversed by a numbered thumb line.** (1999: 97)

Science Bad links

Science posits itself as objectively true—this defaults issues of security and existential concern to scientific experts and creates hierarchies of what knowledge should be acted on

Berling, 2011

(Trine Villumsen, Post doc @ Institut for Statskundskab, CAST, Center for Advanced Security Theory and visting scholar at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, *Security Dialogue*, "Science and securitization: Objectivation, the authority of the speaker and mobilization of scientific facts," 8/2011, Vol. 42 Issue 4-5, sage, accessed 7/16/14 bh @ ddi)

For securitization theory, this adds a contextual dimension to the political processes in the field of security: **Science can exert a considerable degree of influence on what is being said** and what not. **It can** (co)**determine the setting and the issues deemed legitimate and 'true' as objects of security**. Theoretically, this influence of science links up with the discussion of securitization theory's spectrum of social reality ranging from the non-politicized and politicized to the securitized (see above). Science may hold a power of actively fertilizing a move from the politicized or securitized to the non-politicized through scientific practices of objectivation and a closing down of controversy in the political realm. This constitutes the first mechanism of **science in relation to securitization theory**. And it **produces a democratically problematic outcome that differs from the legitimation of extreme measures through fierce securitization moves: The non-politicized has no language; it is 'what we know without knowing that we know it'** – what Bourdieu referred to as doxic practice.20 **Without debate, without language, security strategies**, for example, **can become so deeply rooted that change becomes utopian and emergency measures become everyday practice**.21 392 Security Dialogue 42(4-5) The authority of the speaker Related to the mechanism of objectivation, but analytically distinct from it, is the production of authority in specific fields. Salter (2008: 344) argues that 'to engage with the ethical or normative dilemma of the analyst's involvement in securitization processes, we must first ask "what makes an intervention successful"?' For Bourdieu, authority is produced in fields structured by different types of field-specific, valued capital – military capital, social capital (networks), economic capital, scientific capital, etc. (Villumsen, 2008). A field's limits are determined by an agreement on the 'stakes at stake' and the reach of the effects of the field.22 **Some agents possess more valued capital than others and thus hold a position 'from where to speak with authority'** (Bourdieu, 2004: 34; Leander, 2005: 812). As argued above, Buzan et al. (1998) recognize that **the standing of the speaker is important in securitizations** ('security is a structured field'), but offer no tools for studying this element in a systematic way. A Bourdieusian focus on fields and field-specific capital could pave the way for an empirically sensitive approach to this issue. With relation to the security field, a range of types of capital have been analysed as important. Huysmans (2002b) points to humanitarian capital, Williams (2007) to military and especially cultural capital, and I have argued that military capital is important, as are social and economic capital (Villumsen, 2008). But, what is perhaps most interesting for the purposes of this article is the extent to which **scientific capital is also co-determining the hierarchy in the field of security and the chances of winning and speaking with authority** (Berling, forthcoming). Two brief examples will serve to illustrate such a mechanism: one relates to authority produced by the natural sciences, the other to the social sciences. First, Brauch (2009: 94) argues **with reference to the climate debate that 'the scientific messages of the IPCC** [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change], **due to its high scientific … reputation … have reached a global audience'** (emphasis added). In other words, **the scientific setting has given scientists 'a place from where to speak' in the security field**.23 Brauch does not give this any more than superficial attention in his attempt to argue that global and environmental change has been successfully securitized. However, without attention to the special status of science in society and the production of authority in specific fields, he risks overlooking the mechanism of authority production underpinning the IPCC's success.

Science and policy don't mix—when science is still deliberating ways to approach things like the environment, policy posits speculation as objectively true in the name of existential threat—(serial policy failure?)

Berling, 2011

(Trine Villumsen, Post doc @ Institut for Statskundskab, CAST, Center for Advanced Security Theory and visting scholar at the NATO Defense College in

Rome, Italy, *Security Dialogue,* "Science and securitization: Objectivation, the authority of the speaker and mobilization of scientific facts," 8/2011, Vol. 42 Issue 4-5, sage, accessed 7/16/14 bh @ ddi)

A third science mechanism concerns the internal workings of the grammar of securitization: If science enjoys a position in society that sets it apart from other social practices, the products of science – for example, facts, scientific models, data – can be mobilized strategically[24] by agents as 'weapons' in political struggles in their efforts to secure for themselves the power to impose the legitimate version of the social world and its divisions (Swartz, 1997: 89). The mobilization of, say, scientific products such as the democratic peace thesis in order to arrive at an agreement on the spread of democracies as a security strategy (see above) or the presentation of a model showing the covariation of greenhouse-gas emissions and rises in sea levels in order to underline the objectivity of human-made rises in world temperatures (Brauch, 2009) are examples of this. These mobilizations strive to close off debate and create doxic practice and objectivation, but will often find themselves in orthodoxy/heterodoxy struggles. But, when a relation is framed in technical terms, the knowledge about this relation can only be challenged by using, for example, sophisticated statistical techniques and academic vocabulary. In this sense, scientific capital is needed in order to counter these mobilizations.[25] To continue with the example from the debate on global and environmental change, a number of models have been central in the moves leading to a near-consensus. Brauch (2009) describes what he calls the new security danger with the use of models from both the IPCC and the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii. He reproduces a graph with the following explanatory text: 'The new security danger in the Anthropocene posed by changes in atmospheric CO2 measured at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii (1958–2007)' (Brauch, 2009: 67). The text not only gives a visual representation of a drastic development and couples this image with the scientificity of a long time span. It also labels the development a security danger. Drawing on data from the IPCC, Brauch (2009: 67) argues that 'the security danger posed by hydro meteorological hazards has killed ca. 1.5 million people and affected more than 5 billion people ... and the trend has been rising in both number and intensity.... [S]uch events will be very likely during the 21st century'. The scientific language 'very likely', the graph, the numbers, the historical mapping and the mentioning of five-sevenths of the world population in a matter-of-fact way all add to the weight of the argument. This constitutes the internal mechanism of science with relation to securitization: the value ascribed to scientific products as 'aces' or 'trumps' should be kept in mind when analysing securitization attempts. There is no causal mechanism, however: the mobilization of scientific 'facts' does not guarantee success, but it is an important factor to be reckoned with. Conclusion: Science and practical reflexivity in securitization studies Stating that science is a factor in political practice seems to be becoming uncontroversial. But, how science works in securitizations has remained underdeveloped. By turning this question into one of 'mechanisms', this article has tried to fertilize debate on this issue with the aid of Bourdieusian concepts. In the process, science materialized as concrete questions of how objectivation, scientific 394 Security Dialogue 42(4-5) authority and scientific facts work in relation to securitization processes. The first and second mechanisms relate to the context of securitizations, while the third concerns the internal grammar of securitization theory. The three mechanisms are related, I argued, but analytically distinct in the sense that they capture different aspects of the science issue with relation to securitization. None of them are constant, but should be read as open research questions that require contextual, empirical answers. Apart from directing our attention to concrete workings of science in securitization, the discussion of the three mechanisms also raised the question of whether the two centres of gravity in securitization theory have been adequately theorized. With the help of Bourdieu's sociology, I argued that in order to understand science in securitization, a contextual dimension is pivotal. The concepts of objectivation, fields and field-specific capital stepped in to do the conceptual work in this regard in the article. Further, the internal centre of gravity was supplemented with a focus on the 'weapons' that agents can mobilize in securitization attempts. These were conceptualized through the Bourdieusian concept of strategic manoeuvring. A further development in this direction, I argued, could develop securitization theory on these specific points. The article illustrated the three science mechanisms through examples drawn from both natural and social science. All cases could have revealed instances of all mechanisms, but in order to show the diversity of science in play – and not least to counter the myth that social science only rarely produces objectivation, authority and 'facts' because of a lack of autonomy and the omnipotence of social constructivism – I made a point of including a range of different examples. The cases revealed that the social sciences have indeed been involved in processes of, for example, objectivation that have led to debate-stopping and doxic practice in international security. While Buzan et al. (1998) focused primarily on natural science, this article argued that the social sciences also need to be taken into account. So, even in the face of the massive attempts at deconstructing the objectivist truth ideal in the social sciences in general over the past thirty years or so, and though truth may not hold the gold standard it formerly did, something seems to happen, I argued, when science leaves the scientific field: It seems that science – whatever type – has a tendency to perform a function in the political field that glosses over the controversies often still active in the scientific field. It is therefore still justified to investigate the status of science in society: the

philosophical deconstruction of truth does not smoothly spill over into a practical devaluation of science as such. This inevitably points a finger to ourselves as researchers: How do we balance the different mechanisms possibly at play in and around securitizations? Can we use these mechanisms strategically to desecuritize? Or, is the securitization–science relationship a maze with no exit? Seen in this light, the discussion in this article can be taken as a call for practical reflexivity on the part of the securitization scientist.26 When acting as external consultants to practical politics, commenting in the news or writing op-eds, practical reflexivity about how 'facts' are presented and how comments are placed within a larger sociological setting of authority can guide the practices of scientists. Perhaps, with time, this can produce answers to how to deal with the normative dilemma of writing security, as formulated by Jef Huysmans (2002a).

Navy Link

Calls for an expanded naval presence are calls for more elite control and power of the maritime space – reducing environmental issues to a logic of war

Oliveira 12 (Gilberto Carvalho de - PhD candidate in international politics and conflict resolution at the School of Economics/Centre for Social Studies for the University of Coimbra in Portugal, "Naval Peacekeeping and Piracy: Time for a Critical Turn in the Debate", *International Peacekeeping*, 17 Feb 2012, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2012.642154#tabModule, JS)

Through a securitization theory lens, **something becomes a maritime security problem 'when the elites declare it to be so'**, which means that **'power holders can always try to use the instrument of securitization' of a maritime issue 'to gain control over it'**.53 Within this process, some aspects are relevant concerning security at sea. First, **those who govern the order at sea 'can easily use it for specific, self-serving purposes', which means that this order is 'clearly, systematically and institutionally linked to the survival of the system and its elites'.**54 Second, **to ensure the maintenance of this order, elites demand more security, exceptional measures aimed at defending objects whose survival is being threatened.** From this perspective, to talk about security is to claim the defence of an object menaced in its existence, which means that security, by definition, preserves the traditional 'threat-defence' logic of war.55 **The move towards securitization of maritime issues can be clearly observed in doctrinal developments made by Western naval powers** and regional organizations, as in the 'Naval Operations Concept 2010' of the US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard: 'Maritime security is a non-doctrinal term defined as those tasks and operations conducted to protect sovereignty and maritime resources, support free and open seaborne commerce, and to counter maritime related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration.56 Other doctrines and **military forums have replicated this attempt at defining maritime security as an umbrella concept to accommodate 'new threats' and justify the use of naval forces in 'operations aimed at enhancing and enforcing security at sea'**.57 In general, **these 'new threats' have been defined around the following main topics: terrorism at sea; transport of weapons of mass destruction; illegal movement of drugs, human beings and arms; flow of illegal immigrants; piracy; dangers to the oceanic environment** (marine pollution, illegal fishing and overfishing); **and global warming. These doctrines' movements to incorporate new threats and to justify new roles for navies within a broader concept of maritime security**, if integrated within a multilateral framework, do not differ significantly from the constabulary roles defended in the early debates on naval peacekeeping. Thus, the key point distinguishing both naval peacekeeping and maritime security operations lies, ultimately, in the multilateral character generally defended in the former and the national interest or collective defence implicated in the latter. Even if one recognizes the importance of this distinction and its implications in conceptualizing naval peacekeeping, this does not significantly change the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying both conceptions: **it is the classical vision of 'good order at sea' and the traditional problem-solving perspective that guide the way both naval peacekeeping and maritime security debates regard problems at sea.** The critical point is that **attempts at widening maritime security and the proposal of an autonomous concept of peacekeeping at sea do not reflect an innocent position**. **Securitization processes at sea ultimately reduce to a logic of war such issues as criminality, piracy, maritime pollution, trade circulation, climate change, fisheries and so on**, which could be approached in more comprehensive, creative, peaceful and sustainable ways within de-securitized agendas.58 In other words, a maritime agenda committed to technical, scientific, legal, normative, social, cultural, economic and political aspects of the sea would be more effective in handling maritime problems in a transformative and self-sustainable way than a securitized agenda whose exceptionality and urgency tends to reduce and simplify those problems in order to manage them through exceptional measures in a problem-solving framework.

Mapping Link

Attempts to gain spatial knowledge are projects of sovereign domination

Steinberg 9 (Phillip E. - Department of Geography at Florida State University, "Sovereignty, Territory, and the Mapping of Mobility: A View from the Outside", *Annals of the Association of American Geographer*, http://mailer.fsu.edu/~psteinbe/garnet-psteinbe/Annals%20Offprint2.pdf, JS)

A key concept here, as stressed by Sahlins (1989), is that the rise of the territorial state is characterized not simply by the construction of its bounded territory as a homogenous administrative zone (as Sahlins charges that Allies [1980] and Gottman [1973] emphasize), but `that **the territorial state constructs its space as a differentiated set of points that are amenable to being plotted** (and thus manipulated and rationalized) **against an abstract spatial grid** (see also T. Mitchell 1991). Historically, **the development of technologies and institutions for performing cadastral mapping and land surveying stand out as mechanisms through which the state has achieved a "bird's-eye" view over territory as a means toward achieving social control over people** (Bohannan 1964; Kain and Baigent 1992; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Edney 1997; Scott 1998; Biggs 1999). Thus, Biggs (1999) locates **the origins of the territorial state in national surveying efforts of the seventeenth century. As surveyors mapped royal domains, they graphically noted each village's affiliation. What had been thought of as a personal relationship came to be expressed as a territorial relationship**, and, at the same time, surveyors imposed a grid of abstract space over the domain to facilitate mapping. Eventually, these two phenomena associated with surveying converged in an example of what Pickles (2003) calls "overcoding": **The abstract, geometric space of the map came to define the lived in space of the state, and the territorial relationship between land and sovereign came to be seen as predicating the personal relationship between individual and sovereign.** Other scholars have further illustrated the relationship between the way that we hierarchically map space and the way that we hierarchically organize social relationships. **Knowledge of space is a crucial tool for control**, and the **technologies of mapping** (and the underlying assumptions about society and space that enable modern mapping), joined **with hierarchical systems for drawing lines and assigning names, play a crucial role in constructing instruments of sovereign domination** (Akerman 1984, 1995; Carter 1987; Buisseret 1992; Ryan 1996; Edney 1997; Brotton 1998; Burnett 2000; Craib 2000; Hakli 2001; Harley 2001; Pickles 2003; ¨, Jacob 2006).4 In short, these scholars emphasize the key role that the ordering of space plays in the construction of state territoriality. This is an important advance over a perspective that simply looks at the bounding of space, but, as Strandsbjerg (2008) notes, these scholars of the cartographic origins of modern state sovereignty still tend to analyze the state as an isolated unit. Given that the modern institution of sovereignty necessarily exists within a system of sovereign units, a study of the modern state (or a story of its origins) that works only from the perspective of the inward-looking aspect of sovereignty cannot be complete. As Taylor (1995) asserts, **the starting point of political geography** (and political history), **must be a theory of the states rather than a theory of the state. In a similar vein, geographies and histories of territoriality** (or the ordering of space) **must examine not just the "emptiable" and "fillable" space constructed inside the territories of sovereign states but also the spaces on the outside that are designated as not being amenable** to this organization of space. Otherwise, any study of state territoriality risks falling into the "territorial trap", wherein states are viewed as internally coherent units, existing ontologically prior to the overall ordering of the state system, and wherein cross-border processes can be viewed only as "international relations" among these preexisting states (Agnew 1994; see also Sparke 2005).

Economy Link

Rhetoric of economic collapse fosters a self-fulfilling prophecy

McKendrick 12 (Joe - An independent analyst who tracks the impact of information technology on management and markets, "Are economic downturns self-fulfilling prophecies?", Smart Planet, 18 September 2012, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/business-brains/are-economic-downturns-self-fulfilling-prophecies/, JS)

There are tangible, and often painful, fundamentals that determine the course of the economy -- unemployment, interest rates, housing prices, inflation, industrial production, government debt. But more than anything else, **markets are psychology**, and **an atmosphere of fear and panic among producers and consumers leads to scaling back of purchases, which further exacerbates a downturn.** Over the past few years in particular, there have been plenty of messages of impending doom circulating through the mass media. Like Eeyore, the miserable mule from Winnie-the-Pooh, many pundits ignore any bright spots and flood the airwaves with grim predictions of imminent collapse and despair just around the corner. **In an economy heavily tied to consumer confidence, such talk could have far-reaching consequences. Such downbeat messages may eventually result in a self-fulfilling prophecy**, actually **translating into job losses.** A new analysis by Sylvain Leduc and Zheng Liu, analysts at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco, says **there is a statistically measurable impact from "talking down" the economy.** The economists say that **the atmosphere of uncertainty in the recent downturn of 2008-2009 added at least one to two percentage points to the unemployment rate:** "During the Great Recession, the increase in uncertainty appears to have been much greater in magnitude.... Our model estimates that uncertainty has pushed up the U.S. unemployment rate by between one and two percentage points since the start of the financial crisis in 2008. To **put this in perspective, had there been no increase in uncertainty in the past four years, the unemployment rate would have been closer to 6% or 7% than to the 8% to 9% actually registered**." Policymakers and pundits can't be pollyanish in the face of economic troubles, of course. But the Fed authors suggest that **as media channels fill up with dire and downbeat talk, fear levels go up, and people start to lose their jobs. "Heightened uncertainty acts like a decline in aggregate demand because it depresses economic activity and holds down inflation**," the Fed economists observe. Another thing is clear as well: when analysts and pundits put their Eeyore faces on, it doesn't help anybody. What is needed is more discussion and ideas about solutions and disruptive innovation that create opportunities, improve our world, and provide people more control over their economic destiny.

Offshore Energy Link

Securitizing against oil dependence is the product of hegemonic knowledge production and constructs the ocean space only in the terms of resource

Martens 11 (Emily - MA in Geography and Regional Studies – University of Miami, "The Discourses of Energy and Environmental Security in the Debate Over Offshore Oil Drilling Policy in Florida," Open Access Theses, 5-10, http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa_theses, JS)

I begin by looking at how **ocean space is constructed as a result of perceptions about its utility to society.** Social constructions of the ocean's position in relation to the social sphere, as well as its perceived utility, serve as a prominent point of departure for the security discourses analyzed later on. The **dominant energy security discourse seeks to maintain the ocean as a source of resources and wealth accumulation external and resistant to socialization, while simultaneously promoting a sense of national security through attempts to reduce dependence on oil imports** by increasing domestic production. On the other hand, **offshore oil drilling opponents, who have adopted an environmental security discourse, have a negative reaction to expanded offshore oil drilling as it signifies a threat to the long-term environmental sustainability and commercial interests that depend on an ocean free of dangerous pollutants.** The opposition attempts to reconstruct the ocean as a pristine environment, an essential element in the Earth's ecosystem as well as coastal tourism and fishing industries, while simultaneously promoting a counter-hegemonic energy security by advocating for alternative fuels. The discussion regarding the construction of the ocean in Chapter 2 uses a historical optic through which one can view the evolution of ocean space in its relationship with human society. More importantly it looks at how **perceptions and representations of ocean space inform how policy is made and how States, as the sources of legitimate territorial jurisdiction, manage to acquire and secure ocean territory in order to utilize it for exclusive resource exploitation.** Chapter 3 and 4 look at the historical evolution of energy security and environmental security in relation to offshore oil drilling first at the level of the federal state (chapter 3) and then at the level of the state of Florida (chapter 4), with the aim of deconstructing the discourses in the historical contexts from which they emanate. The 1970s mark a key turning point for, if not the initial emergence in the United States of concerns about environmental sustainability as well as concerns about the foreign oil supplies. The analysis focuses on the **articulation of concerns about oil dependence and environmental protection in the speeches of United States Presidents as a representation of hegemonic policy discourse. This is important beyond the discursive level, at the level of policy making, because US presidents have the power to directly appoint key decision-makers**, such as the Secretary of the Interior – the department which then appoints the head of the Minerals Management Service which is in charge of leasing, overseeing and collecting revenues from the oil industry – the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of the Environmental Protection Agency. These appointed officials are in charge of the agencies that implement policy and oversee compliance with regulations in the area of offshore oil drilling. Therefore, the sentiments towards offshore oil drilling that are held by the president tend to reflect those held by these appointed leaders and dictate regulations and how strictly they will be enforced. **The discourses of US presidents on energy and environmental security are what Wolford** (2010: 8) **calls "strategic essentialisms", "intentional simplifications of an otherwise complex subject for the purposes of democratic engagement." Engagement in what?** Thus, the primary question behind the discursive analysis I exercise in chapters 3 and 4 is: in the discourse on energy and environmental security, what is it that needs to be made secure, why does it need to be secured, and what are the potential threats to its security?

Geoengineering

Geoengineering puts the jumper cables on the motor of biopolitics that makes bare life, genocide and nuclear war inevitable—we're not kidding

Bruyère 13 (Vincent, assistant prof of French @ Emory Univ., *Paroles En L'air: Climate Change and the Science of Fables*, diacritics Vol 41.3, 2013, pgs 60-79)//mm

The controversial human engineering proposal signed **by Matthew Liao**, Anders Sand berg, and Rebecca Roache **is** equally **demanding** in that respect. **In their paper** "Human Engineering and Climate Change" **they explore** biotechnological alternatives to programs that seek market-regulated behavioral change to address global warming, and to equally **controversial geoengineering programs that seek to cool the planet** through Solar Radiation Management. The suggestions range from the distribution of pharmaceutical patches to induce a meat intolerance that enables individuals to become vegetarians and thus participate actively in the reduction of livestock farming, and oxytocin treatment to enhance altruism and empathy—precious qualities in times of scarcity—to more radical genetic modifications. **These measures**, **insist the authors, would not be forced upon a population but would be encouraged through tax breaks or** sponsored **healthcare incentives**.49 **I am not quite sure what to say about this text**, or how to respond to it, **other than with a yes, no, or perhaps**, based on a review of its assessment of risks and benefits. **But this reaction would only concern the suggested measures, not the form of the proposal itself in its inventiveness**. **Any answer to the question of what biotechnology can** or cannot **do based on the rationale of risk assessments is already part, if not the product, of the bioethicist machine. These measures belong to the corpus of modern panoplies accomplishing the transformability, reformability, and reasoning of bodies through a scriptural machine.** Conspicuously **remodeling the bios involved in** bioethics, **biopolitics**, and biotechnology, **the transformations Liao's measures promote are** taking place in a time when, much like in Lyotard's fable of **biotechnological escalation**, there would be no fundamental difference between a Bildung project and a slow—too slow according to Liao—self-formation process cultivating human potential through the arts and humanities, along with the bio- chemical facilitation that accelerates behavioral change.50 **This reformative effort**, writes de Certeau, preceded the historical form that writing has taken in modern times. It will outlive this particular form. It **is interwoven into this form and determines it like a continuing archaeology whose name and status we are unable to determine.** What is at stake is the relation between the law and the body—a body is itself defined, delimited, and articulated by what writes it.51 In that sense, **when it comes to the bioengineering proposal**, the only thing I can talk about concerns "the relation between the delimitation of a field . . . or a system . . . and what it constitutes as its outside or its remainder" or, in other words, the relation between human engineering as a field of operations and the desire or the need "to make our bodies the emblems of an identifying law."52 **I cannot stop the machine but I can say that Liao and his coauthors renew a** kind of **belief in the history of fables translating discursive surplus into manageable values. They renew the form of an expertise in fiction.** By doing so, they create a system of constraints along with a domain of possibilities. They come up with a new range of answers to Foucault's question: "How can one reduce the great peril, the great danger with which fiction threatens our world?"53 Almost apologetic, Liao, Sandberg, and Roache write: We are well aware that our proposal to encourage having smaller, but environmentally- friendlier human beings is prima facie outlandish, and we have made no attempt to avoid provoking this response. There is a good reason for this, namely, we wish to highlight that examining intuitively absurd or apparently drastic ideas can be an important learning experience, and that failing to do so could result in our missing out on opportunities to address important, often urgent, issues.54 **Liao's bioengineering proposal is contained in a box made of**

competing proposals and options (Solar Radiation Management, **ocean fertilization**, carbon pricing, etc.). **It is not yet approved, or even welcomed as the best possible**, or least risky, **option; and yet it has not been rejected either**. **I am not in a position to open the box**, in the same way that I cannot tell the off-position from the on-position in Schrödinger's experiment, **but I can intensify the proposal by reading for its scriptural plot while resituating it in a culture of fiction and the history of the science of fables**. **The proposal itself functions as one of these theoretical fictions that "tell us that there is no entry or exit for writing, but only the endless play of its fabrications**,"55 fictions among which de Certeau placed Kafka's "In the Penal Colony," Raymond Roussel's Locus Solus, and Marcel Duchamp's celibate machines. **In Kafka's story, access is granted to a**n antiquated **judiciary mechanism designed to enforce**/write/project/engrave/inscribe/prescribe **the law directly into the flesh of those who have been found guilty, and to write it in such a way that the body brought before the law perishes in the process, without a trial, unaware of the charges**.56 "In the Penal Colony" grants Lyotard access to a problematization of morals and politics, and by extension to the question of the penitentiary within civil society. **I leave aside much of Lyotard's elaboration** of the innocence and infancy of this body before it entered the (time of the) law and was reclaimed by the legal/lethal apparatus**, to jump ahead to the ending and to the return of a certain form of exacting cruelty. The old machine destroys itself before the eyes of the visitor who had been granted access to it**, thus **making room for the representational machine of politics, an enlightened machine that, unlike the previous one, would permit trials and deliberations**. **But like the previous one, the new machine would convene a community around its proceedings**. The original machine was already old, and its mode of operation in question. The visitor was preparing to report back on its cruelty and spread outrage in the nascent public space of the colony that had sought his services and granted him access to the machine. The narrative feat that brings about the demise of the machine only brings to the fore, and for the naked eye so to speak, what was meant to happen, and may have in fact already happened. As Lyotard remarks at the beginning of his "intervention," Kafka's text doesn't call for any commentary, which would only diminish both its clarity and its violent quality. **One could also argue that there is nothing radically new in principle in the bioengineering proposal, and again nothing much to say about it, nor to read into it. Liao's proposal restarts the old moral machine that had been stopped in Kafka's story**. **In the updated version, the judicial function is almost entirely absent but the communal spectacle that** at once **embodies and engineers the** obligation, responsibility, **prescription, and a certain sense of Anthropocenic citizenship is more pronounced than ever** (even if it is blood- less). **In a normative world that only knows procedures**, **technical rationality, and values, an ethics of responsibility ends up being performed by the return of Kafka's machines**. What is left of cruelty if sanguis is not shed to become cruor?57 **With Liao, it is not about the body anymore,** nor about its indifference regarding the law and the law's exacting timeliness, even when one of the proposed measures exposes the unborn, through pre- implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), to select shorter children. **That which stands before the cruel machine has been relocated, and cruelty is** thus **redirected toward a timeless and unmitigated future that does not include us—"a future beyond the grasp of historical sensibility"—to be reclaimed by a moral apparatus.**58 Those sudden shifts only happen in fiction, and particularly in fictions that write themselves as fictional machines. The illegible praescripta to be inscribed on the body of the convict become lethal only when the machine reads them; a button is red only if pressed. **The machine targets a scriptural and legal effort that**, turning one last time to de Certeau, "**preceded the historical form that writing has taken in modern times**" **and that "will outlive this particular form." This machine we call fiction stands for that which does, operates, and intervenes without having to be observed doing, operating, and intervening**. It is its own archive even when access has been granted to it. **For this reason, any machine would dream of being a doomsday device that will keep on ticking**, not necessarily indefinitely, but **at least until—doomsday or not—there is nothing left to register its movement or notice its fading rustle anymore**.59

James Watt's steam engine achieved that status in a post hoc fashion thanks to Paul Crutzen.60 **Even if all working steam engines have disappeared by the time the last observer expires, Watt's invention will have still been a doomsday device for those who are not there on doomsday to recall the instrument of their demise**. **Having created "the future prospects of a genetic genocide," Liao and his colleagues may** just **have set such a machine in motion**, **for,** as George Annas contends, "**given the history of humankind, it is** extremely **unlikely that we will see the better** [or for that matter the shorter] **babies** . . . **as equal in rights and dignity to us, or that they will see us, the 'naturals,' as their equals**."61 **And so it may be with geoengineering proposals**— Alan Robock confides his fears in the same issue of Ethics, Policy and Environment where Liao published his proposal: "**I can imagine** worse scenarios, including **global nuclear war started in response to** unilateral **geoengineering implementation**."62 But it is also in light of Liao's device and its splicing of evolutionary, biotechnological, and historico-legal timelines that normative differentials, such as human rights, may endure in the conjectural ecologies of the Anthropocene.63 **Policy relevance is very much a new frontier in the humanistic** and social humanistic **culture of research**. And it is so perhaps because of the way it adjusts forms of inquiry to meet demands for meaning. It is new as far as "**the future appears as a contingent set of possibilities** about which decisions are demanded; **decisions are demanded because the future appears as something about which we must do something**."64 **As such—and because adjustments entail** delays, **mishaps**, and replays—**the historicity of policy relevance, as an object of** discourse and an object of **desire, must not be ignored by** literary **scholars even if they cannot decide on the definitional status of policy relevance within relations of power.** However, when it comes to policy relevance in its modalities of existence, as well as its non-definitional dimension and exteriority relative to the reality it seeks to transform, protocols of intervention and renunciation remain to be invented, textual competencies to be conceived. It is less a plea to make literary criticism policy relevant, or a praise of its functional policy irrelevance in a knowledge economy driven by risk management, and more a memorandum of understanding for what the governance of futurity invests in—or attaches **to—the cultivation of difference** in forms of inquiry, and for the kind of comparative work, notional distinctions, **and forms of life that might sanction the description of emergent orders of difference. If there is a definitional outcome to this Anthropocenic sequencing** of artifacts, **it may be found in the distinction between survival techniques and** what Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents calls **"techniques of living." A policy-relevant view of** Svalbard, **Liao's proposal**, **and demands for sustainability would see each of these as survival techniques necessary for the management of life after good life**. Seen from the perspective of those "systemics of development" that, according to Bill Readings commenting on "Oikos," are now "the general horizon under which . . . all forms of life are being subsumed,"65 Svalbard, Liao's biotech proposal, and their respective demands for sustainability, are all techniques of living. They "stylize [our] capacity for sense-feeling and awareness."66 They manner sentience—where insentience is "not necessarily the nonawareness of a dead thing [but] also the opacity, to us, of the inhuman structures that structure the human, and emerge in our artifacts."67 And **through this operation, they define zones of interest in life, rather than ways "to keep death—or the wrong kind of death—at bay.**"68 It is in this manner that the Anthropocene project leaves us with something interesting to read. **Policy relevance relies on the ability to "imagine the calibration of exchange by means of abstract instruments**,"69 **and on the** particular **regulatory, authoritative exchange of forms of expertise.** But **what is of interest is precisely the relation of policy relevance "to the living, which is to say dying, beings who create them**,"70 especially as it mediates their life interests. Likewise, **what systemics of development will leave us with, "if we are sent to space after the explosion of the sun**"71 **in a final send-off, is less a matter of carbon life,** finitude, **and survival, than of an obligation toward the philologies and**

those **other techniques, disciplines, institutions**, architectures, proposals, **policies, and narratives of the "once we had been sent to space," that interest us in our fables**.

Nuclear shipping

Nuclear power is born out of the intent of mass destruction—the aff's insistence on nuclear safety cedes social power to technocrats and makes meltdown inevitable

Luckin 5 (Bill, research prof in urban history @ the Univ. of Bolton, *Nuclear Meltdown and the Culture of Risk*, Technology and Culture, Vol 46. 2, April 2005, pgs 393-399)//mm

Nevertheless, **the conventional narrative, still present** in shadowy form in Walker's thought-provoking study, **tends to feature a semipanicked corporation watching, aghast, as dysfunction merges into impasse, and impasse into potential** regional, national, and international **disaster. Then technical specialists, regulatory agencies, and the local or central state ride to the rescue and restore operational integrity.** However, in the case of Three Mile Island, we now know that restabilization might well have been unattainable. By way of epilogue, Walker's account recovers investigatory processes whereby **accident specialists retrospectively discovered the existence of potentially uncontrollable meltdown**. **At any instant, in other words, a decimating explosion could have smashed through containment and "deep defence."** The authorities would have ordered mass evacuation, throwing the unprepared Harrisburg hinterland into chaos and transform- ing delimited regional crisis into national and international catastrophe. In this sense, **Walker's intensive blow-by-blow narrative illuminates the terrifying implications of living with the unknown**, communally **enduring an endlessly recurring Promethean moment in which a revolutionary source of energy promises** protection from external aggression, **the delivery of cheap and plentiful heat and light—and potential mass destruction of human life. The line is**, and must be, **a narrow one**. Charles Perrow in- formed the postcrisis Kemeny Commission that **the logic of human-technical relations**, and the complexity of day-to-day routines **in a nuclear plant, rendered it statistically inevitable that the United States**, France, Britain—or India—**must,** as a matter of course, **expect to be smitten by large-scale nuclear catastrophe.**4 In recent years,psychosocial aspects of this territory have been explored by Jürgen **Habermas**, Ulrich **Beck, and** Anthony **Giddens.**5 Each of these writers **has in** a slightly different way **summoned up an image of a near future in which affluence, consumerism**, and collective avoidance of risk **will increasingly govern the direction and flow of communal and domestic life.** According to this scenario,fear of pollution and contamination,giving rise to inexplicable allergies and associated mental stress and neuroses,will undermine relational stability and intimacy. Beck and Giddens argue that **the very sophistication of production and consumption in advanced societies constitutes a threat to mental and physical health, sense of safety, and psychic integrity**. **The act of giving** and of giving oneself, **central to the creation of community** and of a degree of interpersonal cohesion—note here the links with social capital theory—**may be sacrificed to an obsessive search for a risk-free existence for affluent, privatized, individuated, and anticommunal loners**.6 Similar ideas permeate much recent (and particularly American) fic- tion—notably the work of Saul Bellow, Kurt Vonnegut, Thomas Pynchon, and Don DeLillo. In the latter's darkly ironic quasi-nuclear fantasy White Noise(1985)—as well as in Underworld(1998) and Cosmopolis(2003)—self- protection, risk, and an unmanageable waste society constitute prime movers in the destruction of traditional domestic values. **Tension between ecological sustainability, profit making, and the politics of the personal generate bizarrely dysfunctional relational formations**. **Depersonalized multinational corporations** and no more than semivisible large-scale technologi- cal systems produce the goods, but **threaten the integrity of the individual.** Walker confirms that the cult of risk—and particularly nuclear risk— had its origins in the cold war. He demonstrates that **the pronuclear camp could not have prospered in the way that it did without**

the technical knowledge and political support derived directly from what C.Wright Mills classically termed **the military-industrial complex** .On the other side of the fence, skeptics, who kept up a barrage of oppositional pressure and propa- ganda throughout the 1970s, emphasized the extent to which **the** new **energy source owed its existence to the act or the immediate intention of destruction.** In that sense, unresolved folk memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki coalesced with warnings of the deadly epidemiological and hered- itary impact of minute levels of radiation to produce an ambience of deep panic.Ralph Nader jokingly insisted that, **were the full extent of the danger to be made public, Americans might finally understand why it would be safer to invest in trillions of candles rather than** become dependent on **nuclear energy**. The astonishing "prediction" of events in the Susquehanna Valley in the runaway box office hit China Syndrome triggered a frisson of semifascinated fear.7 **Increasingly subliminal forms of visual and verbal representation proved central to the** complex **shift from cold war fear to** what can some- times seem **the perverse narcissism of** the risk **society**. The bulk of historically informative comment and analysis surrounding Three Mile Island may be derived from local and national television news coverage and press features and editorials. (Walker also makes excellent use of technical and nuclear industry periodical literature.) All this now seems far removed from early-twenty-first-century digital multichannel 24/7 media culture, incessantly transmitting images of civil war, hurricane, flood, famine, and disease into every home at every hour of the day and night. During the first Gulf War, Jean Baudrillard famously suggested that that **conflict had not in fact objectively taken place. Rather, it had been planned, financed, produced, and directed by major progovernmental news channels**. In this sense, **repeat after repeat of "spontaneous" images of crisis**, suffering, and death **awakened passive viewers to transitory awareness of international disaster but also created an intangible and ideologically distanced cultural space which** militated, and **continues to militate, against the development of** a **meaningful oppositional politics**. For the chronicler of nuclear near-catastrophe during the—in media terms—unsophisticated 1970s and 1980s,cultural analysis of content proves less revealing than the detailed micronarratives that may be derived from press and television transcripts and public opinion polls. Thus, in a valuable discussion of the multiple meanings of Chernobyl for post–Three Mile Island Americans, Walker claims that surveys organized by the then-still- highly-influential ABC and NBC News confirmed that more than half of the adult population believed that their own country might one day suffer dis- aster on a similarly horrific scale. Two-fifths (Walker considers this to be a low rather than surprisingly high figure) agreed with the view that all exist- ing nuclear plants should be closed down (p.239).At the level of subjective and collective imagination, the Russian catastrophe completed a process ini- tiated seven years earlier. Nobody died as a result of the Three Mile Island accident, but many thousands might have. In that sense American panic reproduced itself as international near-nemesis in Russia in 1986. By **the mid-1980s the authorities appeared to have secured a higher level of scientifically and technologically authenticated protection against** the possibility of **meltdown. The population at large, the** great **majority of whom could now be said to have learned to live with the bomb and with nuclear energy, received, by way of symbolic recompense, a** relatively **risk-free space in which to enjoy the fruits of affluence**. The alternative would have been to take to the streets. Throughout Walker's period, mass protest proved the exception rather than the rule. Operating outside the formal American political mainstream, antinuclear activists found themselves fighting a lonely battle against policies that, despite the OPEC-triggered cri- sis among energy corporations in the 1970s, had been fixed by the Atomic Energy Act in 1954. In societies in which conventional nuclear wisdom engendered militant opposition—notably in Japan and West Germany— DeLillo-like riot police fulfilled their historic role. In Britain, great and good radical antinuclear protestors were carried away in ambulance-like police trucks. (The courageous women of Greenham Common were less gently treated.) **Given the inherent conservatism of the American political system,** prevailing **attitudes toward scientific and technical expertise, and presidential**

and political legitimation of what was then known or admitted to have happened at **Three Mile Island**, a clear majority of citizens gravi- tated toward the scary certitudes of the risk society. Simultaneously, and in line with new social movement theory, antinuclear pressure groups continued to associate themselves with broader countercultural opposition to "materialism."(Later, eclectic New Ageism modi- fied—and significantly weakened—dominant radical orthodoxies of the 1960s and 1970s.) **At the same time**, **deliberately eschewing the language of moral condemnation, the Union of Concerned Scientists attempted to refute the** strategic, economic, and environmental **arguments propagated by industry-backed think tanks**. **Death and injury on rail and highway during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were relatively high risks over which knowledge and expertise were assumed to have little effect. Such things simply happened**. **There- after**, as infrastructural systems became more complex and large-scale technologies established themselves as ubiquitous features of everyday life in economically advanced societies, **citizens looked for protection to experts who would finally attain full social and cultural preeminence** during the cold war–dominated 1950s. Simultaneously, perceptions of danger to life, limb, and psyche became subject to cultural homogenization. In an important but underdeveloped coda to his study, Walker notes that two children's books published in 2002 in a series devoted to disaster bracketed the Three Mile Island episode with the Challenger space shuttle of 1986,the Exxon Valdez crisis of 1989, the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, and— inevitably—the destruction of the World Trade Center (p. 243). **The demand and tacit assumption that the richest** and most economically advanced **nation in the world must now guarantee state-authenticated access to** a **risk-free social existence nurtured a wholly misleading image of the nature of risk itself.** Ethologists have noted that beasts of prey, which must kill to survive, occasionally confuse the snapping of a twig by a conservationist or tourist with the click of a rifle safety, and savage the wrong victim. Human beings—or this, at least, is the theory—are believed to be able collectively to discriminate between subtly different kinds of military and political threats and, drawing on evolved observational and reasoning powers, to formulate appropriate responses to danger. Within the political domain, failure to follow these basic procedures invariably leads, sooner or later, to the collapse of a dominant mainstream political ideology**. A further and paradoxical side effect of** what may be termed **misidentification is that it tends to increase communal expectation that absolute immunity from risk is indeed possible: somewhere there must be a safe house** in which citizens can be assured of their inalienable right to enjoy the fruits of affluence. **The Gaza Strip is assumed to be inherently "dangerous,"but not London,Paris, or New York**. **The ubiquity of** military and civilian **nuclear energy generated high levels of suppressed communal disquiet.** three Mile Island provided a kind of belated release. This epoch-making episode also underlined the fact that there had been no meaningful debate about the political and communal implications of the revolutionary post-Hiroshima settlement. **Neither in the United States nor in** secretive and supine **Britain had the decision to move into the atomic era been subject to democratic scrutiny**: **the policy had flowed seamlessly from an act of mass destruction** and American- Soviet rivalry.8 In that sense, and disappointingly, the nuclear controversies of the 1970s did no more than ruffle the surface of a culture in which the problem itself had long been excluded from meaningful debate. Walker demonstrates that the antinuclear movement picked up a great deal from its opponents, particularly from military and restricted academic sources. But **genuine discursive power continued to be monopolized by the federal government, the energy industry, Washington think tanks, and "apolitical" regulatory agencies. Both sides** learned—or **believed they learned—some- thing important from Three Mile Island**. As Walker puts it, "**nuclear proponents** had **underestimated the risks of a** major **accident at a nuclear plant** in the United States . . . critics had over-stated the likely consequences"(p. 240). Twenty-five years later, the new Department of Homeland Security finds itself confronted by the brute fact that key sites must now be pro- tected against airborne suicide bombers. In 2005 as in 1954, **military and civil aspects, and threats, remained deeply intertwined**.

Satellites

Satellites have always fueled the ignorant drive for innovation—the desire to know every inch of the Earth cedes power to closed military circles and lowers the threshold for inevitable wars

Masco 12 (Joseph, Prof. of Anthropology @ Univ. of Chicago, *the End of Ends*, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol 85.4, Fall 2012, pgs 1107-1124)//mm

In 1960 the corona Project became the first space based reconnaissance system, providing the CIA with the first satellite photographs of soviet military installations

The corona system offers us, in benjamin's terms, **an important opportunity to "brush history against the grain" as it was both a technological marvel—a demonstration of the power of instrumental rationality—and a** stark **reality check on Us national security culture itself, offering a new optics on the psychopolitics of cold War** (Orr 2006). **the first photographic survey** of the soviet Union from outer space **showed that US policymakers took the world to the brink of nuclear war in response to their fantasies of soviet power, not the reality of** soviet **capabilities**. **This well documented insight might have produced a fundamental rethinking of how threat, security**, and nuclear power **were organized in the US, establishing a cautionary tale** at the very least. **but instead the corona photographs remained a highly classified set of facts** through the cold War. **this secrecy enabled a system of nuclear normalization to be reinforced rather than interrogated**, securing the project of cold War for the next 30 years. **In the end, the new optics offered by corona** (on both soviet machines and American fanta- sies) **were reduced simply to a push for new space technology—higher resolution photographs, better real time transition of data**, and so on. **In other words, the structure of the security state did not change even when confronted with evidence of its own fantasy projections and error**. **the "success" of corona ultimately produced an American cold War project even more focused on technological innovation** and the projection of nu- clear power **rather than one capable of re-thinking its own** cultural terms, **expert logics, or institutional practices**. The constant slippages between crisis, expertise, and failure are now well established in an American political culture. the cultural history of cold War nuclear crisis helps us understand why. Derrida (1984), working with the long running theoretical discourse on the sublimity of death (which links Kant, Freud, and benjamin), describes the problem of the nuclear age as the impossibility of contemplating the truly "remainderless event" or the "total end of the archive." For him, nuclear war is "fabulously textual" because until it occurs all you can do is tell stories about it, and because to write about it is to politically engage in a form of future making that assumes a reader, thus performing a kind of counter-militarization and anti-nuclear practice. In the early 1960s, the Us nuclear war policy was officially known as "overkill," referencing the redundant use of hydrogen bombs to destroy targets (rosenberg 1983). this "overkill" installs a new kind of biopower, which fuses an obliteration of the other with collective suicide. the means to an end here constitutes an actual and total end, making the most immediate problem of the nuclear age the problem of differentiating comprehension from compensation in the minute-to-minute assessment of crisis. **This seems to be a fundamental problem in Us national security culture—an inability to differentiate the capacity for war with the act itself, or alternatively to evaluate the logics of war from inside war.** today, **space is filled with satellites offering near perfect resolution on the surface of the earth and able to transmit that data with great speed and precision to computers** and cell phones, as well as early warning systems, missiles, and drones. **What we cannot** seem to **do is find an exterior viewpoint on war itself—a perspective that would allow an assessment not only of the reality** of conflict **but also of the motivations, fantasies, and desires that support and enable it.** Indeed **expert systems of all sorts**—military, economic, political, and industrial—**all seem unable to learn from failure and instead**

in the face of crisis simply **retrench and remobilize longstanding and obviously failed logics. War**, for example, **is not the exception but the norm in the US today**—**which makes peace "extreme**." so what would it take for Americans to consider not only the means to an end—that is, the tactics, the surges, the preemptions, and surgical strikes—but also to reevaluate war itself? What would it take to consider an actual end to such ends?

2NC shit

A2: Tech/Engineering Solves

Both physical and social engineering will fail

Hulme (School of Environmental Science, UEA, Norwich and Tyndall Centre for Climate Change) **8**
(Mike, (2008), The conquering of climate: discourses of fear and their dissolution. The Geographical Journal, 174: 5–16)

A number of prospective routes for conquering climatic change are conventionally held out to us, all of them variants on the idea of 'engineering'– geo-engineering, political engineering and social engineering – and all of them with connotations of global control and mastery of the climatic future.5 The idea of large-scale deliberate intervention in the functioning of the Earth's climate system to engineer a desirable climate outcome has a long history which is well explored in Fleming (2006a). He identifies three cycles of promise and hype – of seeking mastery over the climate – starting in the nineteenth century and culminating in the ideas of geo-engineering our way out of global warming mooted in recent years (e.g. Morton 2007). Various schemes have been proposed – for example fertilising the southern oceans to enhance carbon uptake, deflector mirrors in orbit around the Earth, aerosol emissions into the stratosphere – and some have even been evaluated formally inside climate models (e.g. Crutzen 2007). All of these schemes carry an element of hubris and: by emphasising the purely technical or economic aspects of strategies of weather and climate control, bypassing understanding and prediction and neglecting the human dimensions . . . we are in danger of entering a new cycle of discourse saturated with hype, the heirs of an impoverished debate. Fleming (2006a, 15) A second variant of the engineering route out of the discourse of catastrophe involves a systematic attempt to align the institutions of international science, environmental management, governance and diplomacy to find rational alliances of interest which can deliver a global climate regime – what we might call 'geopolitical engineering'. This brings together the insights of Earth system scientists and technologists (e.g. the vision outlined by Hall and O'Connell 2007) with those of political scientists and economists to yield a system which Frank Biermann has labelled 'Earth system governance' (Biermann 2007). This vision (implicitly) underpins the structure of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the subsequent Kyoto Protocol, the Stern Review and the new round of international negotiations and diplomacy seeking a new post-2012 global climate change settlement. The framing of climate change as a problem of 'climate stabilisation' is an outcome of this way of thinking (as traced by Boykoff et al. 2008; also Oels 2005). A successful outcome to this governance project demands a degree of optimism unfounded on the evidence of progress achieved to date. If geopolitical engineering is a top-down route for averting climate catastrophe, then it is perhaps complemented by a third engineering route, namely the purposeful manipulation of lifestyles and consumption habits – bottom-up 'social engineering'. Social marketing campaigns (e.g. by Defra in the UK; see Linder 2006) are attempts to change individual behaviour and social consumption habits in favour of lower carbon emissions. The call for mass participation in global events, such as Live Earth (July 2007), is further demonstration of a desire to achieve climatic goals through social engineering. Social movements, such as the international Cities for Climate Protection campaign (Slocum 2004) and the Stop Climate Chaos campaign in the UK, are also part of these purposeful attempts to defuse climate catastrophe, as is Paul Hawken's book Blessed unrest (2007). The limits to this type of mass social engineering, however, are revealed through work in social and behavioural psychology (see Baron 2006; Weber 2006). Reading climate change through culture These three caricatures of 'engineering' approaches for defusing the discourse of climate catastrophe – geo-engineering, geopolitical engineering, social engineering – all bear the language of control and mastery over climate. This mastery is exercised over, respectively, the planet directly, the institutions of governance or the choices and behaviour of individuals. These approaches suggest that climate is an objective reality to be manipulated through material intervention. They imply an unambiguous separation between Nature and culture. Taken at face value these projects all echo the hubris of Ellsworth Huntington from 1915: 'If we can conquer climate, the whole world will become stronger and nobler' (1915/2001, 294). It seems unlikely that any of these global mega-engineering projects will offer the salvation that is sought (Fleming 2006b).

A2: Spurs Axn Ext. – Geoengineering

Will only lead to geoengineering and quick fix solution that make environmental destruction inevitable

Crist (Prof in Department of Science and Technology in Society @ Virginia Tech) **7**
(Eileen, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, Telos 4 (Winter 2007): 29–55)

Given the dominant framing of climate change, it is hardly surpris- ing that schemes for what is called "geoengineering" (and, in even more Orwellian speak, "radiation management") are increasingly aired as rea- sonable solutions to the climate crisis; it will be equally unsurprising if they are soon

promoted as inevitable. A recent article in Nature claims that given "the need for drastic approaches to stave off the effects of rising planetary temperatures . . . curiosity about geoengineering looks likely to grow."54 Six months earlier, an article in Wired gushed over the prospects, assuring us that "luckily, a growing number of scientists are thinking more aggressively, developing incredibly ambitious technical fixes to cool the planet."55 In the wake of apocalyptic fears, geoengineering is easily pack- aged as an idea whose time has come; physicist Paul Crutzen's recent attentions have imbued it with even more credibility. Crutzen received the Nobel Prize for his work on ozone depletion, and is now cautiously pro- moting "active scientific research" into the possibility of shooting SO2 into the stratosphere, which, by converting into sulfate particles, would mask global warming by an effect known as global dimming; Crutzen calls it "stratospheric albedo enhancement."56 In essence, this strategy calls for countering one form of pollution with another. In a 1997 article in the Wall Street Journal, nuclear physicist Edward Teller beat the environmental mainstream to a geoengineering solution for global warming by a decade. Indeed Teller's summons to undertake, if necessary, incredibly ambitious technical fixes to cool the planet, as a rational and economically defensible enterprise, may turn out in retrospect to have been pioneering in the realm of policy. It even seems plausible that Teller's self-assured and dollar-quantified message (coinciding with the year of the Kyoto protocol) played into the current U.S. administration's resolute defiance of calls to curb emissions, for he confidently affirmed that should global warming turn out to be dangerous, an ingenious engi- neering mega-fix for it will be cheaper than phasing out fossil fuels.57 If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution pro- moted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwilling- ness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these ele- ments of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse underway—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conver- sion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to— with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and sec- ond, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur. Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manip- ulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended conse- quences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresenta- tion and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user spe- cies; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

A2: Radical Action Not Possible

Radial action is possible – their argument are self-fufilling prophesies

Crist (Prof in Department of Science and Technology in Society @ Virginia Tech) **7**
(Eileen, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, Telos 4 (Winter 2007): 29–55)

In fatalistic thinking, the trajectory of industrial-consumer civiliza- tion appears set on tracks that humanity cannot desert without derailing; it is implied that while the specifics of the future may elude us, in broad outline it is (for better or for worse) a fixed direction of more of the same. Fatalism projects the course of human history (and concomitantly of natural history) as the inevitable unfolding of the momentum of present trends. By virtue of the inertia that massive forces display, from a fatalistic viewpoint,66 present patterns of global economic expansion, consumption increase, population growth, conversion and exploitation of the land, kill- ing of wildlife, extinction of species,

chemical contamination, depletion of oceans, and so on, will more or less keep unfolding.67 We glimpse here what Horkheimer and Adorno had in mind when they pointed out that "logical necessity . . . remains tied to domination, as both its reflection and its tool."68 Indeed fatalism is a mind-set that strengthens the trends that generate it by fostering compliance to those very trends. The compliance that fatal- ism effects is invisible to the fatalistic thinker, who does not regard him or herself as a conformist, but simply as a realist.69 But the conceptual and pragmatic fortification of the socioeconomic establishment by fatalistic reasoning is incontestable, arising as an effect cognate to what is called "positive feedback" in cybernetics,70 "looping action" in philosophy,7_ and "self-fulfilling prophesy" in sociology.72 The complicity of fatalism in sustaining the dominance of industrial- consumer civilization merits close scrutiny: fatalism may be the most potent form of ideology in existence. Ideology, as Jürgen Habermas suc- cinctly recaptured the concept, "serves to impede making the foundations of society the object of thought and reflection."73 The declaration that we live in the Anthropocene (to stay with this key example) has the ideological effect of discouraging deep questioning and dismissing even discussion of revolutionary action. Rather, we are indirectly advised, our fate is to live our days in the "Age of Modern Man," within which we must manage ourselves and the world as best we can. Further, the narrow and technical conception of climate change as "the problem" is beholden to the same fatalistic mind-set. The real problem—the industrial-consumer complex that is overhauling the world in an orgy of exploitation, overproduction, and waste—is treated with kid gloves, taken as given, and regarded as beyond the reaches of effective challenge. But **this civilization is not beyond the reaches of radical action—and it is certainly not beyond the reaches of radical critique**.74 If the price of "think[ing] in terms of alternatives to the dominant order [is to] risk exclu- sion from polite intellectual society," as social theorist Joel Kovel observes about our times, then let us pay the price while preserving our clarity about the unredeemable socioeconomic reality in which we live.75

A2: Polarization/Demonization Good

Divisive rhetoric tanks movements

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

Perhaps the polarizing rhetoric of melodrama may shift the ground of the climate change debate away from economic costs and benefits, to the moral stakes of decimating the earth, as Peterson suggests (Kinsella, 2008). Drawing clear distinctions between heroes and villains could motivate identifications to mitigate emissions. As Check counters, the complex issue of climate change may not lend itself to divisive, melodramatic structure, for it does not have a single clear "rhetorical devil that is powerful, ubiquitous, deceitful, and identifiable" (Kinsella, 2008, p. 98). We, too, worry that divisive rhetoric, particularly in the form of tragic apocalypse, **has precluded and will continue to suffocate opportunities for a widespread collective will to form**. If we accept the view advocated by a number of experts-that global warming represents a challenge to every aspect of modern development-it is imperative for as many different sectors of society as possible to contribute to positive change. Polarizing the community while denying the potential for action, as in apocalyptic tragedy, seems an untenable rhetorical strategy for encouraging the public to become active participants in climate change mitigation.

Uniqueness Ext. – Apoc Reps High Now

Apocalyptic climate reps are high in every sector

Hulme (School of Environmental Science, UEA, Norwich and Tyndall Centre for Climate Change) **8**
(Mike, (2008), The conquering of climate: discourses of fear and their dissolution. The Geographical Journal, 174: 5–16)

Shorter-term cycles of heightened concern and anxiety about anthropogenic climate change have followed over the last 15 years, many of them linked directly to new scientific assessments or to major political negotiating set pieces (e.g. Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). Yet the language and metaphorical constructions of fear and catastrophe shaping this discourse have been embellished substantially in the years following 9/11. The 'war on terror' provided a new benchmark against which the dangers of future climate change could be referenced, whilst new linguistic and metaphorical repertoires have been enabled3: 'The alarmist repertoire uses an inflated language, with terms such as 'catastrophe chaos and havoc, and its tone is often urgent. It employs a quasi-religious register of doom, death, judgements, heaven and hell. It also uses language of acceleration, increase, intractaibiltiy, irreversibility and

momentum' (Retallack et al. 2007, 55). These following examples are indicative: The impacts of global warming are such that I have no hesitation in describing it as a 'weapon of mass destruction'. Sir John Houghton, The Guardian (28 July 2003) In my view, climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today – more serious even than the threat of terrorism. Sir David King, Science (9 January 2004) Billions of us will die [from climate change] and the few breeding pairs of people that survive will be in the Arctic where the climate remains tolerable by the end of the twenty-first century. James Lovelock, The Independent (16 January 2006) Terror only kills hundreds or thousands of people. Global warming could kill millions. We should have a war on global warming rather than the war on terror. Stephen Hawking, quoted in The Times (31 January 2007, 3) At the same time, enhanced Earth system modelling capabilities have opened up new scenarios of the climatic future, simulating our alleged impending approach to triggering major re-organisations of large-scale functions of the Earth system. The melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet, the massive release of methane hydrates in the tundra, or a re-direction of the thermo-haline circulation of the world's ocean (and attendant changes in the 'Gulf Stream')4 are three of the more significant ones. These prospective futures, given virtual reality through computer modelling, have been grouped together and communicated to an expectant world using Malcolm Gladwell's 'tipping point' metaphor, further nourishing the discourse of global climate catastrophe. Not only does this discourse find saliency in the media (witness examples above), but also through a new cohort of popular science books – for example, Fred Pearce's (2007) book With speed and violence: why scientists fear tipping points in climate change, or Mayer Hillman and colleagues' (2007) The suicidal planet: how to prevent global climate catastrophe– and in the more formal academic literature (e.g. Ereaut and Segnit 2006; Hansen et al. 2007; Risbey 2008).

No Action Coming Now/Communication Key

No Action on climate change coming now but can be achieved with a reframing of the issue

Nisbet (an assistant professor at American University's School of Communication and an affiliated researcher at the Center for Climate Change Communication at George Mason University) **9**
(Matthew, Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement, Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 51:2, 12-23)

The efforts of recent administrations to pass health care, welfare, or immigration reforms have depended on generating widespread public support and mobiliza- tion while effectively countering the com- munication efforts of opponents of these reforms.1 When these conditions are not met, as in health care and immigration reforms, presidents have suffered major policy defeats. There is no reason to suspect that climate change policy will be any differ- ent, especially given the long history of partisan gridlock in U.S. politics. In the context of two wars and an economic cri- sis, absent a shift in the polls and a surge in input from a diversity of constituents, it is unlikely over the next four years that a strong majority in Congress will accept the political risks needed to pass mean- ingful policy actions such as a cap-and- trade bill, carbon tax, or new international climate treaty. More importantly, democratic prin- ciples are at stake. Policies to address climate change will bear directly on the future of Americans, impacting their pocketbooks, lifestyles, and local com- munities. These decisions are therefore too significant to leave to just elected officials and experts; citizens need to be actively involved. **Reframing the relevance of climate change in ways that connect to a broader coalition of Americans**—and repeated- ly communicating these new meanings through a variety of trusted media sources and opinion leaders—can generate the level of pub- lic engagement required for policy action. Successfully reframing climate change means remaining true to the underlying science of the issue, while applying research from communication and other fields to tailor messages to the existing attitudes, values, and percep- tions of different audiences, making the complex policy debate understandable, relevant, and personally important.2 This approach to public outreach, however, will require a more careful understanding of U.S. citizens' views of climate change as well as a reexamination of the assump- tions that have traditionally informed cli- mate change communication efforts.

War Likely Impact Booster

And this not some K bullshit – even the CATO wonks think these wars are likely

Paul **Benjamin**, Foreign Policy Analyst; Master's Degree, IR, Central European University, Budapest, 2K
(Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa369.pdf)

> The second danger of this redefinition of security is that it cannot achieve what it sets out to do. Despite the assumptions of its proponents, can environmental security efforts actually achieve security? The problem here is in finding a reasonable definition of "security" itself. Unfortunately, that is not an easy task. A huge academic debate on the subject has raged for several decades and remains unresolved; one author has even described security as an essentially contested concept.41 However, if we for the moment equate security with peace—and even the most ardent champions of redefining security recognize peace as a crucial component of the concept4 2—then proponents of efforts to achieve environmental security should ponder whether such efforts might perversely threaten security (peace) itself. There are two ways in which that perverse result could come about. First, concentration on issues such as the environment could distract the military from more orthodox security activities, with detrimental effects on the maintenance of peace. Second, and more probable, the execution of environmental security policy could lead **to tensions and even conflict with other countries**. The latter scenario is not hard to imagine. While intelligence analysts busy themselves predicting the next environmentally induced conflict overseas, U.S. military planners are preparing for the deployment of troops to intervene in such an event. The propensity for conflict is further enhanced by efforts to cajole other countries to abide by environmental standards and by U.S. intervention in their domestic affairs. In both cases, the **logical consequence is war**, when diplomatic means fail or sufficient resentment is felt in the country subject to intervention.

Military planning proves that linking to securitization leads to interventionist wars and violent crack downs

Girvan (a Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions (PICS) Fellow at the University of Victoria) **10**
(Anita, Atmospheric Alienation, Carbon Tracking and Geo-Techno Agency, Code Drift: Essays in Critical Digital Studies, 5/13/2010, www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=645)

> As military documentarian, Gwynne Dyer, demonstrates in his book, Climate Wars, scenarios of climate change now being mapped by American and British military which use climate modeling to predict early 'losers' and 'winners' in climate impacts. [28] Military predictions feature:
> ... a world where people are starting to starve, but it is not always the familiar scene of helpless peasant societies facing famine with numb resignation. Some of the victims now are fully developed, technologically competent countries, and their people will not watch their children starve so long as there is any recourse, however illegitimate, that might save them. So the lucky countries in the northern tier that can still feed themselves -- but have little or no food to spare -- must be able to turn back hordes of hungry refugees, quite probably by force. They must also be able to deal with neighbours who try to extort food by threats -- and these desperate neighbours may even have nuclear weapons. Appeals to reason will be pointless, as it is reasonable for nations to do anything they can to avoid mass starvation. [29]
> The anticipated security risks from global 'others' who are vying for scarce survival resources motivates military organizations to plan for worst-case scenarios. Dyer's documented evidence shows that military preoccupations with climate change feature not only resource protectionism and violent border control to secure national populations from the viral parasitic populations that threaten to swarm those inside, but also larger military interventions to prevent nuclear annihilation. From the perspective of totalizing military regimes, the world may be evacuated of plurality and construed along green zones and red zones in militarily-predicted climate wars.
> As military organizations in their tireless operations of securitization attempt to predict the unpredictable, an alienating sense of uncertainty paradoxically both evades and reifies military intelligence (as in the military logic that partly underwrites 'carbon tracking' discussed below). This pervasive sense of uncertainty about what is to be done defines the fourth aspect of atmospheric alienation.

A2 realism

Neorealism is *really* bad because it views failure to prevent and cooperate on things like climate change as rational choices – the act of claiming realism is true is the very reason that the impact occurs.

Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq. "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society." Global Change, Peace & Security 23.3 (20**11**): 335-355. Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict

Under traditional **neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must¶ involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised governance¶ structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well¶ as to ensure that a particular state's own resource requirements are protected**. **Neorealism understands¶ inter-state competition,** rivalry and warfare **as inevitable functions of states' uncertainty¶ about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains¶ for one state are losses for another, and each state's attempt to maximise its power relative to¶ all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is¶ the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as¶ over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a 'rational' strategy** – even though this ultimately¶ amplifies global systemic insecurity. **Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual¶ benefit is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states**.¶ The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence and¶ escalation of global crises. **Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system¶ that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploitative¶ relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as¶ 'new issue areas' appended to already existing security agendas.**59¶ Yet **by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself¶ powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes.** In effect,¶ despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, **neorealism's approach to issues¶ like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame¶ these 'non-traditional' issues purely as amplifiers of quite traditional threats.** As Susanne¶ Peters argues, the **neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy¶ a** pragmatic and **necessary** response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, **in doing so, it¶ entails the inevitable escalation of 'resource wars' in the name of energy security.** Practically,¶ this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate international¶ security through the proliferation of violent conflict to access and control diminishing¶ resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies.60 **Neorealism thus negates its¶ own theoretical utility and normative value**. **For if 'security' is the fundamental driver of state¶ foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the¶ global systemic amplifiers of 'insecurity', despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of¶ warding off collective destruction, if not planetary annihilation**?61

Science Bad

Environmental "science" is tied to an imperial epistemology that fuels threat construction

Dalby 4 (Simon - Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies and Political Economy at Carleton University in Ottawa, "Ecological Politics, Violence, and the Theme of Empire", *Global Environmental Politics*, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v004/4.2dalby.html, JS)

Perhaps, then, **conventional views of both environmental threats and of geopolitical concerns are parts of the same problem. The geopolitician's fears of external threats to the domestic political arrangements of modernity map neatly onto fears of environmentalists concerning environmental disruptions causing conflicts and disasters of various sorts. Both require a response that controls and dominates that external space that is the origins of the supposed threat. Whether in terms of resource management, or imperial interventions to ensure political stability, the same cartographic imagination of danger impels action.**¶ Environmentalists have long bemoaned the damage done by what is frequently termed "the domination of nature." Once one asks the simple geographical question "what is the geography of the domination of nature?" the answer fairly quickly reveals itself as the history of colonization and imperialism. **Ironically environmentalists who wish to ease the burden of that domination have frequently promoted the establishment of protected spaces, parks and** [End Page 8] **the control of populations in manners that nonetheless replicate the practices of empire.**¶ **Science and academic knowledge are not neutral here**; neither are geographical designations of politics. **The heuristic point about empire is that it challenges the taken for granted assumptions of territorial sovereignty and inter-governmental cooperation in building environmental regimes.** The theme of empire suggests something more important is going on. This is the case whether either the novel claims of Hardt and Negri's formulation are taken seriously, or whether the historical view of empire sketched above is worked into the analysis. The argument here is that both matter and that they complement each other rather well. The geographic specification of politics is unavoidable; it is especially important when "global" phenomena are invoked.¶ Finally, **it is important to emphasize that the development of "science" and the knowledge that it produces is not divorced from social and economic context.** Mike Davis shows this, so eloquently and so tragically, in his analysis of the rise of meteorology and the extension of European empires in the nineteenth century.35 In providing preliminary evidence of what was only much later understood to be the El Nino Southern Oscillation phenomenon, meteorological science charted a picture of a cruel and unpredictable nature that could easily be blamed for famine in various parts of the world. Nature as precarious and fickle let European imperial grain merchants off the hook for the disruptions to the global patterns of food production that were a major contributing cause tothe famines. **Environmental science too is tied into the thinking of empire here at the largest of scales; not least when it provides powerful support for neo-Malthusian arguments about overpopulation, nature and all sorts of disasters in "far away" places, whether understood as matters of environmental security, or not.**36¶

Nation-states only see climate change through the framework of security – extending a militarized epistemology to environmental issues

Marzec 12 (Robert P. - Associate Professor of ecocriticism and postcolonialism in the Department of English at Purdue University, "Environmentality: Military Maneuvers, the Ecosystem, and the Accidental", *Postmodern Culture*, May 2012, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v022/22.3.marzec.html#b5, JS)

Players of the game were divided into four groups, representing the planet's four greatest emitters of greenhouse gases: China, India, the European Union, and the United States. The point of the game was to establish a framework that all could agree on for addressing long-term climate change. In addition to this scenario, the players were given nonfictional statistical figures of climate change projection models that were generated by the most recent IPCC data (the "A1F1" model made available to the public in 2011), and both the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Sustainability Institute were on hand to provide additional "non-fictional" (i.e., empirically-based) projections during the course of the game. **Although ostensibly the point of the exercise was both to educate important international leaders on the reality of climate change and its growing effects**

on planetary status and intergovernmental relations and to generate practical solutions for the risks of probable international conflict, its goal was clear: "to explore the national security consequences of climate change" (Burke and Parthemore 6). **Despite its attempt to bring together a massive international community, the game compulsorily reinvigorates and is symptomatic of the return of the late twentieth century's most touted repressed: the nation state.** (As we will see, however, this is a particular form of the nation state that, in part, leaves the traditional idea of the narrated nation and its homogenous cultural identity gasping and struggling to catch up in its wake.) **At the level of the traditional form of the State, the key concern of impending climate change was the nation-State boundary—specifically the change in borders that will result from the rise of sea levels, and the need for greater border patrol in the face of the new, twenty-first century phenomenon of climate change refugees: the mass migrations that will threaten national structures and identities for the next century.** The "findings" of the game—that is, **the common ground for agreeing on how to address climate change—were governed by an intensely military mode of thought. National security formed he basis of this ontology, and was presented not simply as a main concern, but as the central "framework for understanding climate change"** (7, emphasis added). In fact, the game had the effect of installing the military focus on national security in the minds of the players: These **military "maneuvers," I argue in this essay, constitute a new and formidable pressure on current theoretical formulations of the citizen-subject. The Climate Change War Game raises the level of a specifically militarized form of knowledge-production and extends it beyond the site of military life to become a generalized form of knowing, thereby affecting the constitution of State subjectivity.** This extension, in other words, is not confined by a traditional conception of "the military," in the sense of armed forces and structures such as the Department of Defense. **Both the signifier and the event "climate change" were reterritorialized as vehicles for expanding the structural being of the military to the civilian register on the levels of conceptual production and thought itself:** "Note that participants in this case did not equate 'security' with 'military' and in some cases noted that militaries were not the most important elements of national power in concerns about climate change" (Burke and Parthemore 7). **Securitizing the nation state and maintaining the reproduction of national power were grounded in the significant need to break down any and all barriers between civilian life and military life.** At the level of representation, **the militarized constitution of "military life" and its opposite, "civilian life," names the two poles of what might be more clearly understood** 1) **as State-formed life and** 2) **as a citizen-subject life enacting an extra-State existence** that Étienne Balibar has identified as the other, more radical and liberatory pole of the citizen-subject (I elaborate on this distinction below). These two poles might be better understood, that is, as the constitution of the citizen-subject by the State and as her (presumably) less colonized and more radical constitution as an actor understood in relation to a groundless liberation. (In this representational militariality, "civilian" should not be mistaken as the subject of "civil society" in Gramsci's sense.) This breakdown of the borders of customary military configurations and identifications—taken as a productive outcome of the game—became a motif in the narrative summary of the game in its aftermath. The breakdown effectually redefined and exploded the supposed empirical neutrality of the scientist, the game's other major player: the military community and the science community "were able to develop mutually intelligible positions and collaborate to develop a negotiating strategy" (Burke and Parthemore 7, emphasis added). Despite the work of De Landa and Virilio—and recent work by people like Elizabeth DeLoughrey and Mike Hill—this indissoluble epistemological and ontological connection between the military, the sciences, and ecology, and the effects this trinity has on the constitution of subjectivity are relatively unacknowledged.1 I am tempted to say there is even a studied blindness in effect here. While the popular press and its interpellated citizenry debate the "actuality" of climate change, and the conservative public denies its existence out of a sense of an anti-State, individualized succor for freedom, the military continues to expand its control of the planet's ecosystems. In September 2009, the CIA opened its new branch, the Center on Climate Change and National Security. But as early as 1992, the CIA had begun to establish direct connections with climate scientists in the program known as MEDEA (Measurements of Earth Data for Environmental Analysis), which declassified satellite imagery for patriotic climate scientists). In 2006, the Center for Naval Analysis convened a military advisory board of retired, three-star and four-star admirals and generals to assess the impact of global climate change on key matters of national security, and to lay the groundwork for future military responses to the threats posed by this "unavoidable catastrophe." And **in the strategy of the climate change war game, a rationale develops based on the assumption of an empirical, clear-headed approach to the problem of climate change that in fact installs an axiomatic breakdown of the boundary between military and civilian modes of existence—a breakdown in the construction of the citizen, as we historically and ontologically understand this subjectivity. This breakdown then opens the door to the ontological supremacy of what I call environmentality: a new political ecological paradigm that functions by generalizing and**

normalizing a military pattern of thought across the various twenty-first-century ecological fields of concern—including human to human and human to nonhuman interactivity. **Within this environmentality, the citizen-subject of late modernity is transformed into a militarized form of neoliberal subjectivity** to become what we might call the green patriot.2

The 1AC is a product of western science – this crowds out and ignores localized knowledge that is key to achieving solvency

Gregory et al 6 (Robin - Senior Researcher at Decision Research and Director of Value Scope Research, Lee Failing - Compass Resource Management, Dan Ohlson – Compass Resource Management, Tim McDaniels - University of British Columbia, "Some Pitfalls of an Overemphasis on Science in Environmental Risk Management Decisions", p. 14, *Journal of Risk Research*, April 2006, http://nctc.fws.gov/courses/ALC/ALC3159/resources/Gregory_Failing_Ohlson_McDaniels_In_Press.pdf, JS)

While sound science must underlie estimates of the consequences of proposed ‚alternatives, it is increasingly recognized that **appropriate attention must also be given to the significant body of knowledge that is not grounded in conventional scientific methods. Some of the holders of this "local" knowledge are long-time community residents; some are aboriginal populations with special interests in cultural uses of environmental resources; some are resource users with specialized knowledge such as fishers, farmers, trappers, or hunters. Local knowledge, while often relevant and useful for decision-making, is not widely recognized as science. Calls for more science therefore can be in direct conflict with the growing social imperative**, and in some cases ‚legal requirement, that the knowledge held by community residents and aboriginal ‚societies be more fully considered in resource and risk management. Substantive work ‚ remains to be done to examine when and how to integrate local and traditional ‚knowledge with science as part of decision making, and to find ways to ensure the ‚integrity of the information while respecting the knowledge bases of diverse stakeholders ‚(Ford and Martinez, 2000). Yet **calls for "more science" – taken to mean more western, conventional science -- do little or nothing to bridge the gap in knowledge systems** or to ‚bring together these diverse sources of knowing.

The aff's reliance on science is an attempt to rationalize military interventionism

Burke 7 (Anthony - Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, "Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason", https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html, JS)

By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain **why so many policymakers think military violence works.** As I argued earlier, **such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably**, and which, **by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common** -- and thoroughly modern -- **horizon of certainty**. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, **it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology** -- **one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth**, reality and technological progress, **and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences** (such as mathematics and physics) **onto human behaviour, politics and society.** For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 **Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources** -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- **are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features.**‚ These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. **One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from** the writings (and actions) of **Henry Kissinger**, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. **He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology**

plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55 **Kissinger's conviction was based** not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but **in a particular epistemology** (theory of knowledge). **Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data** -- the more accurately the better'. **This, he claimed**, has since the Renaissance **set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'**.56

Science can't divorce itself from the politics of security

Trombetta 8 (Maria Julia - Teaching Fellow in Politics and Environment in the Department of International Studies at the University of Nottingham in China, "Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557570802452920#tabModule, JS)

In a risk society instead **'the logic of compensation breaks down and is replaced by the principle of precaution through prevention'** (334). According to Beck, **a risk society undermines the credibility of institutions and practices dedicated to security provision.** First, Beck suggests that **it is impossible to disentangle oneself from a web of risk**. **Contemporary risks affect everybody and it is impossible to create barriers and distance oneself from them—the enemy.** For the Copenhagen School security is about the inscription of enemies and the logic of war. On the other hand, Beck points out that **'[t]he concept of "enemy" is the strongest possible antithesis to the concept of security' since 'enemy stereotypes empower' as they create 'the relationships and the behavioural logic of attack and defence, pro and contra, which first kill the question and then the people'** (1997, 82). Second, Beck challenges the very possibility of having a security logic based on evoking and governing through emergencies. Beck is suggesting that contemporary threats are beyond insurability and '[m]aybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. **Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies** (ecological, medical, military), **but there is no politics to prevent them'** (Agamben 2002, 24). The first consideration targets the antagonistic understanding of security described by the Copenhagen School, whereas the second challenges the **neoliberal discourse of risk.** This discourse **relies on more sophisticated techniques to try to insure even catastrophic risk by shifting it to the capital market. In the case of the environment this discourse is problematic because it can also paradoxically contribute 'to continually generate the condition of emergent catastrophe, in order to profit from it'** (Cooper 2004, 8).

Viewing the environment through the lens of security forecloses the possibility of including broader social and cultural concerns in the debate

Rogers 2000 (Raymond A. - graduate of the Masters and the PhD programs in the faculty of environmental studies, "Are Environmentalists Hysterical or Paranoid?: Metaphors of Care and "Environmental Security", p. 219 – 220, *Ethics & the Environment*, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v005/5.2.rogers.pdf, JS)

Security concerns confirm and entrench modern industrial relations within the environmental debate, and in so doing, short circuit the wider social and cultural debate that would historicize the current context of conservation discussions and allow for the recognition of the connection of social failure and ecological failure. Security perspectives presume a drive for control and dominance; they assume competition with others who have the same goal. They assume a pervasive negative concern in the world and the necessity of competition and force, given that resources are scarce and environmental security is a zero-sum game. In this sense, **the appearance**

of security concerns confirms that the wider social and cultural debate that could accompany the environmental debate will not appear. In other words, **environmental security confirms an approach to sustainability based on internalizing environmental concerns not so much in an expanded conception of the economic model as in an expanded conception of security concerns in which powerful interests ensure their access to scarce resources.** Therefore, the Gulf War can be seen as the new paradigm of environmental security.

Serial Policy Failure

Security politics assures the constant reproduction of the very problems it seeks to eradicate – serial policy failure guts Aff solvency.

Dillion & Reid 2000 (Michael - Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster & Julian - Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, "Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency", *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986?seq=1&uid=3739800&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104505325033, JS)

More specifically, **where there is a policy problematic there is expertise**, and **where there is expertise** there, too, **a policy problematic will emerge.** Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. **Policy domains reify the problematizatiòn life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations**. Here, too, **we** may also **discover** what might be called "**epistemic entrepreneurs."** Albeit the ,market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, **bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted.** In ,principle, **there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized.** All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. **Governmentality** ,thereby **creates a market for policy**, for science and for policy science, **in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations**. , Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ,ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their ,very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And **there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of** such **assumptions.** ,Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to ,avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less ,control than they proclaim. **What they do not have is precisely the control that they want.** Yet **serial policy failure - the fate and the fuel of all policy - compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.** 35 ,**Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy** - and policy science - **will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate.** As a particular kind of intervention into life, , **global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure.** ,Thus, **global** liberal **governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems** ,simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear ,upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, **it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.** ,In consequence, **thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks**, and by the local conditions of application ,that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten ,to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.36 It is ,here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to ,make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there **are no definitive policy**

solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways

Burke

Security politics make war and environmental destruction inevitable – only the alt solves

Burke 7 (Anthony - Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, "Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason", https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html, JS)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that **war is** not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather **the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community** -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The **violent ontologies** I have described here in fact **dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states** and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that **the challenge is posed** not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but **by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence.** Many of **the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die.** Viewed in this light, **'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence**. **It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of **the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the** Clausewitzian paradigm, within the **instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the** stark **ontology of the friend and enemy.** They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider **the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency** can be all too often limited; they **can remain confined** (sometimes quite wilfully) **within the** overarching strategic and **security paradigms. Or**, more hopefully, **policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly** inclusive, cosmopolitan and **peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic**

thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90,, **This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it.** Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

Warming Focus Bad

Biodiversity Trade Off Module

Total environmental collapse is inevitable even if warming is solved – their focus on warming trade off with broader environmental protections

Crist (Prof in Department of Science and Technology in Society @ Virginia Tech) **7**
(Eileen, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, Telos 4 (Winter 2007): 29–55)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet's ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the lime- light for the one issue that trumps all others.

Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve "the problem." Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun's rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by "changing our whole style of living."_6 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, "the one lifeline we can use immediately."_7 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. "The Montreal protocol," he submits, "marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem."_8 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem.

Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet's pre- dicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforesee- able) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, **the root cause** of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consump- tion, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet._9 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numer-

ous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what tech- nological means can save it from impending tipping points.2_

The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine dis- ruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with "dangerous anthropogenic inter- ference" with the climate system.

In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiver- sity,23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the cli- mate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—**the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.**

Biodiversity Trade Off Module – A2: GW → No Bidodiv/Impact Comparison

Non-warming caused environmental destruction is comparatively larger and is the underlying cause that makes it possible for climate change to threaten extinction

Crist (Prof in Department of Science and Technology in Society @ Virginia Tech) **7**
(Eileen, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, Telos 4 (Winter 2007): 29–55)

The whittling down of ecological complexity has been a global trend proceeding from the conversion of ecosystems for intensive human uses, the aforementioned population depletions, and the invasion of nonnative species. Nonnative species are the generalists hitching rides in the bustle of globalization—from the climate-change-favored fungus that is killing frogs, to millions of domestic cats preying on birds, to innumer- able more.26 Human-facilitated invasions, coupled with the disappearance of natives, lead to places losing the constellation of life-forms that once uniquely constituted them. The inevitable outcome of extinction, plummet- ing populations, lost and simplified ecosystems, and a bio-homogenized world is not only the global demolition of wild nature, but also the halting of speciation of much complex life. The conditions for the birth of new species within a wide band of life, especially of large-bodied species that reproduce slowly, are being suspended.27 All these interconnected dimensions constitute what conservation biologists call the biodiversity crisis—a term that to the postmodernist rings of rhetoric, while to the broad public (insofar as it has heard anything about it) involves a largely illiterate and vague understanding of "extinction."28 Academic frivolity and public ignorance aside, the biodiversity crisis heralds a biospheric impoverishment that will be the condition and experience of all future human generations: it requires 5 to 10 million years for biodiversity to recover after a mass extinction of the current scope. In light of this fact, I submit that unless global warming unleashes appalling penalties—in which case, the climate crisis and biodepletion will merge into one devastating event for virtually all life29—the implications of humanity's impact on biodiversity are so far-reaching that they may, in reality, dwarf the repercussions of climate change. And yet, the current framing of climate change as the urgent issue encourages regarding the unwinding of biodiversity as a less critical matter than the forthcoming repercussions of global warming. Attention to the long-standing ruination of biodiversity underway is subverted in two ways in climate-change discourse: either it gets elided through a focus on anthropocentric anxieties about how climate change will specifically affect people and nations; or biodepletion is presented as a corollary of climate change in writings that closely consider how global warming will cause biodiversity losses. Climate change is undoubtedly speeding up the unraveling of life's interconnectedness and variety. But if global warming has such potential to afflict the

natural world, it is because the latter's "immunity" has been severely compromised. It is on an already profoundly wounded natural world that global warming is delivering its blow. Focusing on the added blow of climate change is important, but this focus should not come at the expense of erasing from view the prior, ongo- ing, and climate-change-independent wounding of life on Earth. Through the Looking-Glass of Climate Change Rather than focusing on global warming as a driver of more biodiversity losses, climate change can be considered as a mirror that reflects how wild nature's ability to adapt to climate change has been seriously under- mined. In other words, beyond escalating the destruction of nature, climate change is bringing into high relief the violence that has already been perpetrated. There is a point to looking through climate change rather than at it: the point is that climate change is not "the problem." The problem is a sprawling civilization that is destroying the biosphere, and will continue to do so even after it (somehow or other) deals with a major glitch in the machine—the consequences of accumulating greenhouse gases.

Emissions Focus Trade Off

Papers over ongoing environmental destruction and prevents cooperative solutions

Trombetta (Delft University of Technology) **8**

(Maria Julia, Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21:4, 585-602)

A focus on emissions has the merit of involving industrialized countries and avoiding the removal of their responsibility suggested by the discourse on environmental conflicts, which focused on the global south, its inadequacy and responsibility. Moreover, it links the discourse on climate security with that on energy security, suggesting that the two issues are interconnected. This focus however has two problematic implications. First it tends to reduce the problem of sustainability to one of emissions, creating the illusion that it is enough to simply focus on cutting emissions or switching toward nongreenhouse gas energy, such as nuclear or bio-fuel to solve the environmental crisis. This approach downplays the complexity of environmental problems and the impact of the overuse of limited resources. Instead, climate change is only one aspect of a larger human-made environmental change. As humankind pushes the boundaries of the carrying capacity of the planet, the impact of climate change is going to increase especially on those who live in marginal, vulnerable areas. Reducing emissions will not solve all the other environmental problems or increase the resilience of vulnerable population. Returning to the previous example of hurricane Katrina: even though it has been associated with global warming, its devastating impact was also a result of other local problems, such as the draining of the wetlands or the extraction of groundwater; problems of levee design and maintenance standards; the failure of emergency services which had been focused on other security priorities. **There is a trade-off between the focus on reducing emissions and that on improving resilience and adaptability**. In this sense, the focus on emissions tends to limit the holistic perspective suggested by environmental security. The second implication is related to the link between climate security and energy security. This link contains an inherent tension since energy security is traditionally associated with national security and its logic, whereas climate security is supposed to promote a cooperative approach to global issues. Agreements on energy supply are generally the result of bilateral agreements between states. The energy sector contributes a substantial portion of states' income and policy—states gain revenues from concessions, transit fees and taxes or are directly involved with national companies. Hence the current situation of tight energy markets characterized by rising demand, high prices and concerns for terrorist attacks against critical infrastructures is particularly challenging for states, which are divided between promoting privatization and being more involved in energy policy. Besides, there are limited multilateral institutions that deal with energy security, resulting in the higher risks of fostering a zero-sum mentality and an antagonistic attitude which can be problematic in dealing with climate issues.

Climate Conflict/Refugees

Climate Conflict Link – Short 1NC

Climate conflict thesis is racist and wrong

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **9** (Betsy "From climate refugees to climate conflict: who is taking the heat for global warming?" In Climate Change and Sustainable Development: New Challenges for Poverty Reduction, Salih M (ed.). 2009. p. 142-143)

> Along with the Darfur stories came other dire predictions about the threat of so-called climate refugees. In May the UK based NGO Christian Aid (2007a) released a report entitled Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis that painted an apocalyptic scenario of millions of displaced climate refugees roaming the globe and wreaking havoc, creating 'a world of many more Darfurs' (Christian Aid 2007b). Journalists and pundits alike joined the cause. Writing in Scientific American online, Columbia University economist Jeffrey D. Sachs warned that climate change could soon force 'hundreds of millions' of people to relocate (Sachs 2007). In the New York Times, Canadian political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon claimed that 'Climate stress may well represent a challenge to international security just as dangerous – and more intractable – than the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war or the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the rogue states today' (Homer-Dixon 2007). National security agencies have also entered the arena. A 2003 Pentagon sponsored study of the impacts of abrupt climate change paints a grim neoMalthusian scenario of poor, starving populations overshooting the reduced carrying capacity of their lands, engaging in violent conflict over scarce resources, and storming en masse towards our borders (Schwartz and Randall 2003). More recently the defence think tank, CNA, gathered a team of 11 retired US generals and admirals to produce a report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, which argues that global warming could trigger widespread political instability in poor regions and large refugee movements to the US and Europe (CNA 2007). While in many places environmental changes due to global warming could exacerbate already existing economic and political divisions, whether violent conflict and mass migrations result depends on so many other factors that it is far too simplistic to see climate change as a major cause or trigger. Moreover, such threat scenarios ignore the way many poorly resourced communities manage their affairs without recourse to violence. A substantial body of research indicates that violent conflict in the global South connects more to resource abundance (rich oil and mineral reserves, valuable timber, diamonds, and so forth) than resource scarcity (see Fairhead 2001). Above all it is institutions and power structures at the local, regional, national and international levels that determine whether conflict over resources turns violent or not. The images and narratives in the articles and reports cited above have an all too familiar ring, drawing on neoMalthusian environmental security discourses of the 1980s and 1990s that blamed intrastate conflict in the global South on environmental degradation, resource scarcity and migration. Then as now, **this line of reasoning not only naturalizes profoundly political conflicts, but casts poor people as victims-turned-villains, a dark, uncontrollable force whose movement ultimately threatens our borders and way of life**. As Nordas and Gleditsch note, neoMalthusian climate conflict scenarios are based largely on speculation and questionable politicized sources. While there is little substantive research to corroborate their claims, they are nevertheless fast making their way into influential policy arenas. In April 2007, for example, the UK government was able to convince the UN Security Council to establish climate change as a security issue (Nordas and Gleditsch 2007).

Climate Conflict Link – Long 1NC

The environmental conflict thesis is wrong, racist and locks in systemic poverty and inequality

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **10** (Betsy, POLICY ARENA RETHINKING CLIMATE REFUGEES AND CLIMATE CONFLICT: RHETORIC, REALITY AND THE POLITICS OF POLICY DISCOURSE, Journal of International Development, J. Int. Dev. 22, 233–246)

> The construction of Darfur as a climate conflict should serve as canary in the coal mine that something is amiss when environmental determinism overrides serious analysis of power relations. This is not to deny that environmental changes

due to global warming could in some instances exacerbate already existing economic and political divisions. However, whether or not violent conflict and mass migrations result depends on so many other factors that it is far too simplistic to see climate change as a major cause or trigger. Moreover, such threat scenarios ignore the way many poorly resourced communities manage their affairs without recourse to violence. Brown et al. (2007) cite the case of the semi-arid regions of Northern Nigeria where conflicts between pastoralists and agricultural communities occur over water and fodder, but seldom spread because of the existence of traditional conflict resolution institutions. They argue that helping these communities adapt to climate change should involve strengthening such institutions. Research in the drylands of Marsabit District in Northern Kenya found that, in times of drought and water scarcity, there was actually less violence, not more (Witsenburg and Roba, 2007). Poor herdsmen were not inclined to start fights during droughts, and despite poverty and population growth in the region, strong but flexible common property regimes governing water helped people adjust to its scarcity. 'If at any time a conflict over a scarce natural resource like water exists,' the authors write, 'it can be a sign that local resource users themselves have been made powerless and that their negotiating system has been paralysed, either by external agencies or local elites' (Witsenburg and Roba, 2007, p. 235). A study done in northern Senegal from 1998–2002 concluded that drought-related migration led pastoralists to develop better strategies to manage herds and also had positive repercussions on the communities where they settled due to expansion of agriculture and trade (Juul, 2005). In fact, there is a rich body of empirical case studies of African agriculture, pastoralism and forestry that challenges conventional neo-Malthusian narratives about population, scarcity and conflict (e.g. Leach and Mearns, 1996; Gausset et al., 2005; Derman et al., 2007). Yet it is hardly ever cited in the environmental conflict or climate conflict literature. A certain exceptionalism is at work —while it is commonly assumed that scarcity can lead to institutional and technological innovation in more affluent countries, just the opposite is assumed for poor people in less affluent countries. Scarcity renders them into victims/villains, incapable of innovation or livelihood diversification and naturally prone to violence. Also neglected in the climate conflict literature is scholarship that connects violent conflict in Africa more closely to resource abundance (e.g. rich oil and mineral reserves, valuable timber and diamonds) than resource scarcity (e.g. Fairhead, 2001). Today, critiques of 'climate conflict' are emerging. For example, regarding the implications of climate change for armed conflict, Buhaug et al. (2008) note the difficulty of coming up with any generalisable model since increased likelihood of organised violence 'depends crucially on country-specific and contextual factors' (p. 2). The report concludes that alarm about climate conflict is not based on substantive evidence.

The term 'climate refugees' is also coming under increased scrutiny on a number of grounds. First, while climate change is likely to cause displacement, the extent of that displacement will not only depend on how much the temperature rises and affects sealevels, rainfall patterns and extreme weather, but also on the existence and effectiveness of adaptation measures that help individuals and communities cope with environmental stresses. Whether or not such measures are in place in turn depends on political economiesat the local, regional, national and international levels that are often conveniently left out of the discussion of so-called 'climate refugees.' As one report points out, larger climaterelated humanitarian emergencies may be in places 'where people cannot afford to move, rather than the places to which they do move' (GECHS, 2008, p. 24). Secondly, migration is too complex a process to label simply as environmental or climate-induced (Dun and Gemenne, 2008; Morrissey, 2008, p. 28). For example, studying the impact of desertification on migration patterns in the northeastern Ethiopian highlands, Morrissey (2008) found that people's decisions on whether to migrate or not were mediated by both structural and individual factors. These included the potential for livelihood diversification within rural areas as well as whether or not one had real opportunities and connections in urban areas. In addition, the high degree to which ethnicity has been politicised in the country limits migration options. His research shows the impossibility of providing a grand narrative, or simplistic model, of environmentally induced migration in which farmers experiencing adverse environmental change migrate out of those areas (and livelihoods) affected by environmental deterioration (p. 29). Even on islands and atolls threatened by sea-level rise, decisions to migrate can entail many more factors than climate change alone. A study of the small Pacific island nations of Kiribati and Tuvalu found that socio-economic pressures resulting from lack of employment and development opportunities as well as other kinds of environmental changes are the main drivers of out-migration. The role of climate change needs to be viewed together with these processes (McAdam and Loughry, 2009). A third area of concern is how the label 'climate refugee,' like 'environmental refugee' before it, could further undermine the rights and protections of traditional refugees as defined by the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 1951/1967). According to the Convention, a refugee is someone who 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion and nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. . .' (UNHCR, 1951/1967). At the same time that it has become popular to apply the label refugee to any group of forced migrants, immigration enforcement agencies, especially in Europe, have fractioned the traditional refugee category

by creating a bureaucratic hierarchy of asylum seeker eligibility in order to restrict admission (Zetter, 2007). It is against this politicised background that one must view the evolution of the term 'climate refugee.' Both the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) caution against using either the term environmental refugee or climate refugee since they have no basis in international refugee law and could undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees (UNHCR, 2008; IOM, 2009). UNHCR further emphasises that much displacement due to climate-related factors is likely to be internal in nature, without the crossing of international borders. A more appropriate legal regime for climate-related migration may be human rights law (McAdam and Saul, 2008).

Given their analytical flaws and lack of supporting evidence, why have these narratives gained so much momentum? Part of the reason lies in the ways **they draw on deep-seated fears and stereotypes of the dark-skinned, over-breeding, dangerous poor** (Hartmann, 2009). For example, a June 2009 ABC prime time television documentary on climate change, Earth 2100, scared the viewers with scenes of future apocalypse in which starving Africans take to arms against the West, desperate Mexicans storm the American border, and half the world population dies of a new plague so that humans can get back into balance with nature again. In policy circles, the persistence of these narratives is tied to their usefulness to a variety of interests. Critical literature on policy narratives illustrates the importance of population 'crisis narratives' in justifying certain kinds of Western development interventions — particularly the spread of commercial agriculture and forestry at the expense of peasant livelihoods —in Africa and elsewhere (Roe, 1995). A similar phenomenon is witnessed for climate narratives. For example, a 2008 report titled A Climate of Conflict argued that climate change would likely compound the propensity for violent conflict in 46 poor countries and political instability in another 56 (Smith and Vivekananda, 2008). Much of the authors' analysis is based on old assumptions about the relationship between environmental scarcity and violence. They propose a solution in which international agencies invest in sustainable development, climate change adaptation measures and peace-building activities. There is also a role for multinational corporations. In this win- win world, the rich help the poor, and are largely absolved of responsibility for resource degradation and extraction, as well as political violence. It is as if the scramble for oil, minerals and land in Africa is of little consequence.

However, it is also important to note that climate refugee and conflict narratives are sometimes deployed strategically by actors demanding that Western states take seriously their obligations to curb carbon emissions and provide adaptation assistance to affected communities. For example, in May 2009, twelve Pacific Island states brought a resolution to the UN General Assembly linking climate change to political instability in an attempt to get the Security Council to address their plight (MacFarquar, 2009). But even the best of intentions cannot obscure that we do not live in a win-win world, and that spinning climate change as a security threat is likely to undermine, rather than strengthen, serious efforts to link climate change mitigation and adaptation to development efforts that reduce poverty and promote equity. Playing with fear is like playing with fire. You cannot be sure exactly where it will spread. In the current moment, crisis narratives about climate refugees and conflict serve the interests of national security actors. The next section looks at the United States as a case study of how these narratives threaten to blur the line between development and military assistance, especially in Africa

Climate Conflict Link – 2NC

It's racist and leads to interventionism

Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) **2k**
(Jon, "Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis," Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)

The argument that environmental degradation will induce violent conflict over scarce resources recasts ecological problems in mainstream international relations terms; it scripts the 'South' as primeval Other, and as a consequence suggests the imposition of the North to maintain order. The water wars thesis is no less ethnocentric in outlook, and it is here that **we see most clearly the deployment of environment in the rewriting of security to justify longstanding interventions in regions of strategic importance, particularly the Middle East**. That it is uncon vincing in its assertion that there will be large scale violent conflict

over water further highlights this article's claim that the environment-conflict thesis is a poor theoretical justification for security business-as-usual. The selective interpretation continues in the argument that when population growth exceeds ecological limits, conflict will ensue. Here, the most immediate development and human security issues are peripheral to strategic concerns about civil conflicts and refugees. Again, the interpretation is of the South, by the North. As a body of theory, the environment-conflict literature reflects the intermingling of **neorealist** and liberal theories in North American security discourse, a confluence which excludes alternative critical perspectives and which, ironically in the case of environmental security, serves to marginalize the insights of a Green theory. At this point some further critical observations about environment-conflict theory are warranted.

And its obscures role of western business interests and the root cause and allows 25,000 deaths a day from systemic violence

Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) **2k**
(Jon, "Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis," Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)

The theory that environmental degradation will induce violent conflict may affect a change in social 'reality' consistent with its image. Elliott suggests that predictions which 'posit more conflict as environmental decline increases will become self fulfilling prophecies'.65 In short, in describing a world of 'coming anarchy', the environment-conflict literature prepares for the reification of this possible world. In this respect the environment-conflict thesis is notable both for the way it justifies the defence of Northern interests, and for the way it obscures Northern complicity in the generation of the very environmental problems scripted as threats. An examination of US environmental security policy reveals that the US interprets environmental security largely in terms of environmentally induced conflicts. This includes an awareness of the potential need to deploy forces in con flicts of a (supposed) environmental nature, and the need to?in some ambiguous way?defend the United States against externally originated environmental 'threats' likened to drug trafficking, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.66 Thus the 1997 National Security strategy states that: Natural resource scarcities often trigger and exacerbate conflict. Environmental threats such as climate change, ozone depletion and the transnational movement of dangerous chemicals directly threaten the health of US citizens ... our national security planning is incorporating environmental analyses as never before.67 This occurs in the context of a strategy to 'retain our superior diplomatic, technological, industrial and military capabilities'.68 This discourse evades the most salient point about security and environmental degradation, which is that as the world's largest economy with the world's largest military and more greenhouse gas emissions than any other country, the country most complicit in 'global' environ mental degradation is the United States itself. Thus the scripting of environmental problems as externally originated security threats to the state is a discursive tactic that excludes from consideration the role of Northern businesses, consumers and governments in generating environmental problems. Further, a familiar construction of Us and Other is evident. So conceived, environmental security as environment-conflict displays the usual suite of geopolitical disjunctures necessary to preserve the security of the select few at the expense of the insecurity of the many. In environmental security terms, the most environmentally insecure are not the states of the North, but the people of the underdeveloped South whose lives are jeopardized by a suite of environmental changes including exacerbated climatic uncertainties causing more storm surges, floods and droughts, and **25,000 daily deaths from water-borne diseases**.69

Climate Conflict Link – Structural Violence Impact

Locks in global inequality and ignores the most vulnerable to climate change

Detraz and Betsill (Colorado State University) **9**
(Nicole and Michele M., Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts, International Studies Perspectives (2009) 10, 303–320)

Lastly, a shift to the environmental conflict discourse may lead to the continuation of the status quo—meaning that those who are currently advantaged in society will suffer much less from the impacts of

climate change as well as the strategies for mitigating climate change and vice versa. Norda˚ s and Gleditsch (2007:635) claim that the security scenarios may well be constructed with the benign intention of arousing the world to greater attention to a global issue. But they could also lead to greater emphasis on a national security response to whatever degree of cli- mate change is seen as unavoidable. This would not be helpful to the primary victims of climate change. This is true both in terms of states and segments of society. IPCC reports have claimed that the negative impacts of climate change are expected to fall dispro- portionately on poor countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Biermann and Dingwerth 2004; Park 2005). Additionally, there are different levels of vul- nerability to climate change. Those impacted most are likely to be those who depend on natural resources and ecosystem services for their livelihoods (Barnett and Adger 2007). This includes agricultural-based economies in particular. If climate change is understood as a security issue tied to potential for conflict, then these poor states are likely to be seen as a military threat first and foremost. This may result in military strategies, like ecological intervention, rather than more humanitarian strategies to help those suffering from environmental insecurity. A related concern is the potential for disadvantaged populations within states to be targeted differently for climate change solutions. Paterson (1996) suggests that as countries are hit by the negative impacts of climate change, existing ethnic, religious, or other divides may play a role in decision-making processes, and governments may favor dominant groups in decisions. Nondominant groups could be classified as the ''aggressor'' in an environmental conflict situation and therefore become targets of environmental conflict solutions implemented by the state. Again, we are not denying that the potential for climate-related conflict is a legitimate threat. If climate-related conflict occurs, it would likely have devastat- ing impacts for individuals, states, and the environment itself (Homer-Dixon 1999; Busby 2007; Salehyan 2008). However, we agree with Purvis and Busby (2004:72) when they argue, while climate change could contribute to armed conflict and violence, that is not the primary risk. Preventing large-scale humanitarian catastrophes from climate-related droughts, floods, crop failures, mass migrations, and exceptionally severe weather remains the most significant policy challenges. Climate change is predicted to have immense impacts on much of the world's population, resulting in large-scale human security threats (Barnett and Adger 2007). A limited focus on conflict over resources ignores the wider implications of climate change. We acknowledge that some will still prefer to discuss climate change within an environmental conflict discourse. For example, some will argue that the environmental conflict discourse could produce deci- sions to free up resources for adaptation efforts in societies vulnerable to cli- mate-related conflict. The problem is that this privileges those groups most likely to come into conflict rather than targeting those populations who are truly most vulnerable to climate change impacts and thus in greatest need of enhanced adaptive capacity. Climate change is an incredibly complex issue. The threat of conflict is clearly important, but there are many other risks that also need to be considered. At present, we are concerned that a focus on conflict would narrow the range of policy options in a way that privileges the interests of those who are already pow- erful over those who are already disadvantaged. In other words, there are equity concerns that must not be ignored (Parks and Roberts 2006). In this respect, the environmental security discourse allows for a much broader range of policy concerns to be taken seriously.

Climate Conflict Link – War Impact

Climate conflict thesis leads to arms build ups that cause war and trade off with efforts to solve warming

Brzoska (Inst. for Peace Research and Security Policy @ Hamburg) **8**

(Micahel, "The Securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security" ISA Convention Paper)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round 'exceptionalism' in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards 'security experts' (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on 'what to do'. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to

strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus **leading to arms races**. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection, as well as more soldiers and arms, is expensive, the financial means compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas emission and adapting to climate change will be reduced. Global military expenditure is again at the level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2°C by 2050) and adaptation are speculative at the moment,1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy areas are in competition for scarce resources.

Climate Conflict Link – War Impact Ext.

Leads to militarism and war

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **10** (Betsy, POLICY ARENA RETHINKING CLIMATE REFUGEES AND CLIMATE CONFLICT: RHETORIC, REALITY AND THE POLITICS OF POLICY DISCOURSE, Journal of International Development, J. Int. Dev. 22, 233–246)

Constructing climate conflict as a particularly African security threat meshes well with these objectives. CNA's previously cited report on the threat of climate change, specifically linking potential insecurity caused by climate change to the proposed mission of AFRICOM. While it is highly unlikely that the United States would send in troops or base strategic development assistance solely on a perceived risk of climate conflict, the promotion of that risk helps to make such interventions more palatable, especially in liberal foreign policy circles. Indeed, a report by the Center for American Progress, another think tank close to the Obama administration, calls for protecting America through 'sustainable security' (Brigety and Dewan, 2009). It seeks to tie U.S. development assistance to strategic defence and intelligence objectives. 'Climate-induced resource conflicts' are cited as a potential 'significant source of political instability and violence' (p. 14). CNAS, meanwhile, is promoting a similar concept of 'natural security' (Burke, 2009). At the very least the military mobilisation of climate refugee and conflict narratives should give development and environment agencies cause to reflect on the consequences, intentional and unintentional, of painting climate change, and the poor people most vulnerable to its effects, as a security threat. There are some hopeful signs that this reflection is starting to occur. For example, the Commission on Climate Change and Development (2009) criticises the 'pessimistic literature' on climate change and migration: 'There is evidence that framing migration as a threat leads to policies that do little to control migration but that limit the benefits of migration to migrants and their original and destination communities' (p. 69). Within the U.S. defence and intelligence communities there are also divergent views about the risks of climate conflict; one observer noted that at least some of the alarmist hyperbole is driven by the interests of private defence contractors and think tanks rather than the official military (Personal Communication, 2009). Yet many challenges remain. IPCC's (2007) coverage of climate and security issues has neglected the significant body of critical literature on the resource scarcity/conflict connection, and there is concern that if it takes up security more seriously in future reports, it could do so in a problematic manner (Nordas and Gleditsch, 2009). In the United States, members of Congress eager to pass climate legislation have resorted to the security threat argument as a way to win support on Capitol Hill, where according to the New York Times (2009), 'many politicians will do anything for the Pentagon.' Raising the spectre of climate refugees and climate conflict obscures the real battle lines in the climate policy arena. How will the benefits of carbon capping systems be distributed —as windfall profits to large energy companies or as transitional assistance to poor communities struggling with rising energy costs and investments in green technologies? Will the integration of aid for climate adaptation and aid for poverty reduction become just another way for more affluent countries to fund problematic carbon offset projects in less affluent countries? To the extent that people are displaced by climate change, how can they best be accommodated in new settings inside and outside national borders? Are the concepts of adaptation, vulnerability and resilience too accepting of the status quo of inequality (see also Gaillard, 2010; Mercer, 2010)? Might the challenge of climate change provide an opportunity to rethink the meaning of development and economic growth in ways that promote redistribution of power and wealth while simultaneously protecting the environment? We do not need the military to fight these battles. Instead they should take place in public, democratic, civilian spaces at all levels of politics

and governance. Those who continue playing the climate refugee and conflict card are raising the stakes unnecessarily and threatening to militarise not only climate policy, but also development aid.

Climate Conflict Link – Wrong and Racist Ext.

Based on a long tradition of racist environmental scholarship

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **9** (Betsy "From climate refugees to climate conflict: who is taking the heat for global warming?" In Climate Change and Sustainable Development: New Challenges for Poverty Reduction, Salih M (ed.). 2009. p. 143-144.

Why are these narratives taking hold when there is little evidence to support them? To answer that question one needs to look at both their construction – the history of the key assumptions, stereotypes and images upon which they draw – as well as their strategic uses by various actors and institutions. In the process, this chapter will argue, one cannot avoid the salience of race. Western environmental thought has a long tradition of both racism and climatic determinism, with dangerous places and inferior races an especially common motif in the period of European expansionism. As historian David Arnold writes, 'While race was often regarded as a self-sufficient and self-evident dynamic, used to explain and justify the superiority of Europeans on a global scale, geographical and climatic determinism was also used to bolster racial arguments' (Arnold 1996, p. 28). Climatic determinism also has links to conflict. For example in the early part of the twentieth century, American geographer Ellsworth Huntington argued that drought and famine caused by climate changes rendered Asian societies in particular permanently unstable and uncivilized (Arnold 1996). It is remarkable how these assumptions, albeit with modifications, survive and thrive in the present day. Their resilience is due in part to how they draw on a reservoir of core racial stereotypes.2 such as Africans as savages. Contemporary literature on policy narratives also helps explain how certain narratives persist because they are useful to powerful interests. For example, Emery Roe has coined the phrase 'crisis narrative' to describe the Malthusian population/scarcity scenarios applied indiscriminately to different African countries, designed to justify the intervention of Western development agencies (Roe 1995). Often a part of this narrative is the unproven assertion that vast areas of the continent are experiencing a 'soil fertility crisis' (Keeley and Scoones 2003). Deeply embedded racial stereotypes are in these crisis narratives. Their primary association with Africa provides a link to negative domestic stereotypes about African- Americans.

Climate Conflict Link – Warming Impact/A2: Spurs Action

Kills action against warming – will seek limited solutions, military actor fails

Detraz and Betsill (Colorado State University) **9**

(Nicole and Michele M., Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts, International Studies Perspectives (2009) 10, 303–320)

A security dialog is an understandable choice for those who wish to raise the profile of climate change on the global agenda. As mentioned earlier, the inclu- sion of environmental concerns into security debates was designed to raise the environment into the area of ''high politics.'' Many scholars and policy makers view climate change as an issue worth all of the attention that is typically bestowed on traditional security issues. In fact, many are convinced of the secu- rity implications of climate change—although how security is defined varies. At the same time, there are others who question whether framing climate change as a security issue is beneficial. In a field that is marked by complexity, adding security to the debate may only serve to confuse matters. As discussed through- out this paper, discourses have implications for the way a problem like climate change is defined and the range of policy options that are considered. Ulti- mately, we believe that a discursive shift to the environmental conflict perspective, even if limited to the Security Council, **would be counterproductive in the development of a global response to climate change**. Our primary concern is that a shift to the environmental conflict discourse would result in a narrowing of policy options focused on a particular form of adaptation—avoiding conflict—and that other issues of human security as well as adaptation and mitigation strategies for addressing those issues could fall off the agenda. One of the problems of relying on the environmental conflict discourse to understand the security implications of

climate change is that the climate issue is different than most other issues discussed in the literature that links conflict and the environment. Climate change is a more abstract phenome- non than many other environmental issues and will be experienced in differ- ent ways. While there is some variation in the time horizon expected for climate change, the pace will be relatively slow but the impacts will spread to a variety of environmental arenas, including water availability, food availability, and so on. (IPCC 2007). This means that climate change is more likely to act as a threat multiplier than as a primary source of insecurity. This presents different issues than those often tackled by the existing environmental con- flict cases, which tend to be focused on only one ''resource'' at a time.17 According to Purvis and Busby (2004:68), ''the connection between climate change and the outbreak of violence will unlikely be as strong as when natu- ral resources can be exploited for quick financial reward.'' None of this is to suggest that environmental conflict is unlikely to occur as a result of climate change. On the contrary, there is a possibility that groups in society will con- flict over resources if climate change results in resource scarcity.18 Our point is that this is only one concern in the climate change debate and quite prob- ably not the most pressing concern. Another issue with the environmental conflict discourse is the tendency to locate the authority for solutions and action in the military apparatus of states. Allenby (2000:13) claims that the national security community in most countries is conservative, insular, heavily focused on military threats and challenges, secretive, and powerful; it also tends to focus on short-term, obvious problems. Culturally, such security communities are among the least likely to embrace environmental consider- ations, and, when they do so, only in a mission-oriented context. Scholars have long questioned whether armed forces are capable of meeting the challenges posed by environmental change (Barnett 2003). Liotta and Shearer (2007:133) argue against the idea that climate change in particular should be met with a militarized response: ''The problems are too broadly dis- tributed and the consequences are too deeply penetrating for such an approach to be successful.'' These positions point out the tendency of militarized solutions to be narrowly defined and potentially top-down. If climate change requires a behavioral shift to achieve lasting solutions, then narrowly defined militarized solutions are unli- kely to be sufficient responses. These problems are in addition to the fact that militaries around the world are responsible for major environmental damage, both through wartime and peacetime activities (Paterson 2001; Liotta and Shearer 2007). It may be counterproductive to depend on the military apparatus of states as a potential solution to environmental problems when they are simul- taneously contributing to those same problems.

And these rhetorical appeals, no matter what they are trying to justify are destructive, its not pragmatic

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **9** (Betsy "From climate refugees to climate conflict: who is taking the heat for global warming?" In Climate Change and Sustainable Development: New Challenges for Poverty Reduction, Salih M (ed.). 2009. p. 152)

Presenting issues as security threats in order to garner funding, media attention and political support has long been a favourite ploy of governments around the globe. Climate change is no exception. As journalist Jonathan Freedland writes in the Guardian, The glum reality is that governments tend to take security threats more seriously than any other kind . . . So this makes political sense: cast global warming as an environmental or science issue, and it will be given a budget to match. Cast it as a problem for the big boys, on a par with nuclear proliferation or international terror, and then it should get a big-boy budget and attention (Freedland 2007). Some environmental groups in Washington DC are now linking climate change to national security in order to persuade conservative members of Congress to pass legislation limiting carbon emissions. Population lobbying organizations may start to employ similar tactics to convince conservatives to support international family planning assistance.7 Those who pursue such strategies often claim they are simply being pragmatic and have the best of intentions. Whatever their motivations, their appeals to security and use of fear often have negative consequences, intended or not. There are a number of stages before a rhetorical appeal to security actually leads to an issue being securitized, that is, becoming an actual object of security agencies and policies (Buzan et al. 1998). However, rhetorical appeals can perform another vital function by buttressing and expanding already existing security agendas and undermining the role of civilian institutions seeking solutions. How might climate refugees and climate conflict do this? The following suggestions are necessarily speculative, but they warrant close monitoring.

Climate Refugees Link – 1NC

The "climate refugee" thesis is wrong, racist, obscures the causes to environmental destruction and is seized by the right for xenophobic crackdowns

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **10** (Betsy, POLICY ARENA RETHINKING CLIMATE REFUGEES AND CLIMATE CONFLICT: RHETORIC, REALITY AND THE POLITICS OF POLICY DISCOURSE, Journal of International Development, J. Int. Dev. 22, 233–246)

For those familiar with the environmental security field, particularly neo-Malthusian models of environmental conflict developed in the 1980s and 1990s, climate refugee and conflict narratives seem very much like old wine in a new bottle. The vintage goes back even further, however, to a powerful policy narrative that I call the 'degradation narrative' (Hartmann and Hendrixson, 2005; Hartmann, 2006). Drawing on old colonial stereotypes of destructive Third World peasants and herders, degradation narratives go something like this: population-pressure induced poverty makes Third World peasants degrade their environments by over-farming or over-grazing marginal lands. The ensuing soil depletion and desertification then lead them to migrate elsewhere as 'environmental refugees', either to other ecologically vulnerable rural areas where the vicious cycle is once again set in motion or to cities where they strain scarce resources and become a primary source of political instability. Despite salient critiques by international development scholars and practitioners (for example, Boserup, 1965; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Williams, 1995; Leach and Mearns, 1996; Thompson, 2000), the degradation narrative has proved particularly popular in Western policy circles because it kills a number of birds with one stone: it blames poverty on population pressure, and not, for example, on lack of land reform or off-farm employment opportunities; it blames peasants for land degradation, obscuring the role of commercial agriculture and extractive industries and it targets migration both as an environmental and security threat. With the waning of the Cold War, growing interest in sustainable development and alternative visions of security increased the authority of the degradation narrative. In particular, concern began to mount about the dangers posed by so-called 'environmental refugees'. Central to the concept is the assumption that population pressure is one of the main precipitating causes of environmental degradation and resulting migration (Saunders, 2000). Myers (1995) further popularised and legitimised the concept of environmental refugees offering a working definition: Environmental refugees are persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change [my emphasis], also natural disaster such as cyclones, storm surges and floods. In face of these environmental threats, people feel they have no alternative but to seek sustenance elsewhere, whether within their own countries or beyond and whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis. (Myers, 1995, pp. 18–19) In many cases, Myers wrote, environmental refugees are actually 'population pressure' refugees (p. 63). The report made the statistical claim that there were at least 25 million environmental refugees in the world, compared with 22 million refugees of 'traditional kind' (p. 1). Despite the fact that the 25 million figure was arrived at more by conjecture than scientific method,1 it began to circulate widely in the international policy arena (Saunders, 2000; Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007). Now Myers claims there will be 200 million climate migrants by 2050, a figure which is similarly making the rounds in policy documents even though Myers himself acknowledges that the estimate is based on 'heroic extrapolations' (Brown, 2008, p. 8). In addition to unreliable statistics, the 'environmental refugee' concept has a number of shortcomings. It **naturalises the economic and political causes of environmental degradation and masks the role of institutional responses to it.** Should people forced to leave their homelands because of the development of a large dam, mine tailings, petroleum pollution or flooding caused by illegal logging all be categorised together as 'enviro- nmental refugees'? In the case of extreme natural events such as droughts, storms and floods, whether or not people are forced to migrate permanently from their homes usually depends on pre-existing social relations (who is most vulnerable) and post-disaster responses (what kind of aid/relief is provided and who receives it). (Wisner et al., 2004). Rooted as it is in neo-Malthusian thinking, the concept of 'environmental refugee' overemphasises the role of demographic pressures in migration. The causes of migration are extremely complex and context-specific, and moreover, there is little evidence to support the view that demographic pressure is at the root of many population movements (Suhrke, 1997). In addition, negative neo-Malthusian narratives of migration obscure the positive roles migration can play in improving people's livelihoods and diminishing vulnerability to environmental change. Often, migration from rural areas is not a linear phenomenon or a rejection of rural livelihoods, but is instead a vital part of sustaining them (Black, 1998). Despite such shortcomings, the environmental refugee concept was deployed by a variety of political actors. Sustainable development advocates found it useful to focus policy attention

on environmental degradation issues (Black, 1998) and it also appealed to Western interests in favour of more rigid immigration controls, including limiting the grounds for political asylum. Kibreab argues that the term was invented in part to 'depoliticise the causes of displacement' so that states would not have the obligation to provide asylum (Kibreab, 1997, p. 21, cited in Saunders, 2000, p. 240). As the concept gained favour, environmental refugees were increasingly portrayed as a security threat, even though there was little serious research to substantiate the claim (Black, 1998).

Climate Refugees Link – 2NC

Produces tangible racist violence against not just those vulnerable to the immediate effects fo climate change but also immigrants and African American in the US

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **9** (Betsy "From climate refugees to climate conflict: who is taking the heat for global warming?" In Climate Change and Sustainable Development: New Challenges for Poverty Reduction, Salih M (ed.). 2009. p. 150-151)

When Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in late August 2005, most of the world, along with all of America, sat glued in front of the TV set, watching with horror the scenes of flooding streets, flattened homes and floating corpses. If broadcasting these images intended to pull on our heartstrings, the broadcasting of another set of images was intended to have the opposite effect. These were the pictures of young black men out of control, shattering glass and looting stores and later running amok at the Superdome. How similar these visuals and associated commentary were to American TV coverage of African urban warfare. Others have noted the same parallel. Alex de Waal writes how Robert Kaplan's influential article, 'The coming anarchy', which portrays West African young men as postmodern barbarians in a region rendered hopeless by overpopulation and environmental degradation, served along with 'the imagery of black youth rampaging through a shattered tropical city [as] rich sources of metaphor for New Orleans' (de Waal 2006, p. 7). The Army Times newspaper wrote on 2 September 2005, that 'combat operations are now underway on the streets . . . This place is going to look like little Somalia . . . We're going to go out and take the city back' (cited in Rodríguez and Dynes 2006, p. 3). Later when the waters settled, critiques emerged of the mob and looting stories. Many people looting were actually in a desperate search for necessities like clean water, food and diapers. Moreover there was much less violence at the Superdome than previously reported and the New Orleans murder rate stayed stable during the week after Katrina. The disaster and displacement were very real, but the violent anarchy was a spectacle, an illusion created by the media. As Rodríguez and Dynes (2006, p. 6) note, 'While it is common for rumors of looting and all kinds of anti-social behavior to emerge in most major disasters, the volume and persistence of such rumors on TV in Katrina was unparalleled.' One particularly effective TV strategy was to show the same footage of looting repeatedly and to begin news segments about Katrina with unproven rumours of violent crime. Another repeated image of Katrina also stands out: Katrina as a swirling mass of clouds on a weather map with Al Gore or another commentator standing in front, warning us that climate change threatens us with ever more Katrinas (Oprah 2006). While many scientists agree that the rise in sea temperatures could cause more damaging storms, there is yet no scientific consensus that global warming caused Katrina. Nevertheless, poor black people displaced from New Orleans are increasingly being depicted as climate refugees. In the aftermath of Katrina, environmentalist Lester Brown, now director of the Earth Policy Institute, stated that the estimated 250 000 Katrina evacuees were climate refuges: 'The first massive movement of climate refugees has been that of people away from the Gulf Coast of the United States' (Brown 2006). The progressive magazine In These Times carried a story linking Katrina's exiles with displaced Bangladeshis and Tuvaluans: 'Driven from home, history and culture by a warming planet, they also share unofficial status as climate refugees – a category that no international treaties recognize or protect' (Allen 2007). Even if one could definitively prove that climate change caused Katrina, would it make sense to speak of those internally displaced by the hurricane as climate refugees? The extent of the human disaster in New Orleans has much more to do with race, class and government incompetence than with the strength of Katrina's winds. It is outside the scope of this chapter to describe why Katrina was an unnatural disaster – others have done that well (see Pastor et al. 2006). From an explanatory point of view, the term climate refugees does nothing to illuminate why people were forced to flee in the first place and why many of them have not been able to move back to their homes. In fact, the term obscures the role of powerful actors like the Army Corps of Engineers, who despite ample warning did not maintain the levees. Yet, we are not likely to hear the term 'Army Corps of Engineers refugees'.

It is worth considering whether the term climate refugees would have been used for Katrina's victims if they were majority white. There is an implicit connection between the racialized images of looting and anarchy seen on our TV screens and Al Gore's weather map. We are taught to fear not so much global warming as the dark people it will set loose, on the move, whether from across the seas or within the borders of our own nation. This fear helps lay the ground for the militarization of global warming.

The beat is on. Climate refugees, climate conflict, even climate terrorists – we are likely to witness escalating rhetoric about these dangerous threats in the coming months and years, despite the absence of credible evidence. Africans and African-Americans will not be the only scapegoats. A recent article on global warming and sea level rise in Bangladesh in a liberal US environmental magazine paints a lurid picture of millions of destitute Bangladeshi environmental refugees as potential Islamic terrorists (Black 2008). The task now is to examine why, how and by whom are these narratives being strategically deployed.

Leads to immigrant crackdowns

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **9** (Betsy "From climate refugees to climate conflict: who is taking the heat for global warming?" In Climate Change and Sustainable Development: New Challenges for Poverty Reduction, Salih M (ed.). 2009. p. 153-154)

> The threat of climate refugees, deployed strategically by anti-immigrant groups and government agencies may help to build public support for further crackdowns on illegal immigrants in both the US and Western Europe. In the US, anti-immigrant groups already appeal to environmental arguments – that is, immigrants are the cause of urban sprawl and the destruction of pristine landscapes – to draw liberals into their fold. In January 2007, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), a Halliburton subsidiary, won a contract from the federal government to augment existing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention and removal facilities 'in the event of an emergency influx of immigrants into the US'. The contract allows for 'migrant detention support' to other government agencies during an immigration emergency 'as well as the development of a plan to react to a national emergency, such as a natural disaster' (Halliburton 2006). This contract generated considerable controversy, including accusations that the government is building concentration camps. Although the concentration camp theory is (hopefully) far fetched, there is the potential that these facilities could be used for internally displaced Americans, such as those affected by Hurricane Katrina (Vlahos 2006).

General Environmental Conflict

Resource Wars Link 1NC

It's racist and leads to interventionism – injects a neorealism that turns the liberalism adv

Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) **2k**
(Jon, "Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis," Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)

> The argument that environmental degradation will induce violent conflict over scarce resources recasts ecological problems in mainstream international relations terms; it scripts the 'South' as primeval Other, and as a consequence suggests the imposition of the North to maintain order. The water wars thesis is no less ethnocentric in outlook, and it is here that **we see most clearly the deployment of environment in the rewriting of security to justify longstanding interventions in regions of strategic importance, particularly the Middle East**. That it is uncon vincing in its assertion that there will be large scale violent conflict over water further highlights this article's claim that the environment-conflict thesis is a poor theoretical justification for security business-as-usual. The selective interpretation continues in the argument that when population growth exceeds ecological limits, conflict will ensue. Here, the most immediate development and human security issues are peripheral to strategic concerns about civil conflicts and refugees. Again, the interpretation is of the South, by the North. As a body of theory, the environment-conflict literature reflects the intermingling of **neorealist** and liberal theories in North American security discourse, a confluence which excludes alternative critical perspectives and which, ironically in the case of environmental security, serves to marginalize the insights of a Green theory. At this point some further critical observations about environment-conflict theory are warranted.

Resource Wars Link 2NC

And its obscures role of western business interests and the root cause and allows 25,000 deaths a day from systemic violence

Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre

for Resource and Environmental Studies) **2k**
(Jon, "Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis," Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)

The theory that environmental degradation will induce violent conflict may affect a change in social 'reality' consistent with its image. Elliott suggests that predictions which 'posit more conflict as environmental decline increases will become self fulfilling prophecies'.65 In short, in describing a world of 'coming anarchy', the environment-conflict literature prepares for the reification of this possible world. In this respect the environment-conflict thesis is notable both for the way it justifies the defence of Northern interests, and for the way it obscures Northern complicity in the generation of the very environmental problems scripted as threats. An examination of US environmental security policy reveals that the US interprets environmental security largely in terms of environmentally induced conflicts. This includes an awareness of the potential need to deploy forces in con flicts of a (supposed) environmental nature, and the need to?in some ambiguous way?defend the United States against externally originated environmental 'threats' likened to drug trafficking, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.66 Thus the 1997 National Security strategy states that: Natural resource scarcities often trigger and exacerbate conflict. Environmental threats such as climate change, ozone depletion and the transnational movement of dangerous chemicals directly threaten the health of US citizens ... our national security planning is incorporating environmental analyses as never before.67 This occurs in the context of a strategy to 'retain our superior diplomatic, technological, industrial and military capabilities'.68 This discourse evades the most salient point about security and environmental degradation, which is that as the world's largest economy with the world's largest military and more greenhouse gas emissions than any other country, the country most complicit in 'global' environ mental degradation is the United States itself. Thus the scripting of environmental problems as externally originated security threats to the state is a discursive tactic that excludes from consideration the role of Northern businesses, consumers and governments in generating environmental problems. Further, a familiar construction of Us and Other is evident. So conceived, environmental security as environment-conflict displays the usual suite of geopolitical disjunctures necessary to preserve the security of the select few at the expense of the insecurity of the many. In environmental security terms, the most environmentally insecure are not the states of the North, but the people of the underdeveloped South whose lives are jeopardized by a suite of environmental changes including exacerbated climatic uncertainties causing more storm surges, floods and droughts, and **25,000 daily deaths from water-borne diseases**.69

Environmental Refugees Link

The "environmental refugee" thesis is wrong, racist, obscures the causes to environmental destruction and is seized by the right for xenophobic crackdowns

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **10**
(Betsy, POLICY ARENA RETHINKING CLIMATE REFUGEES AND CLIMATE CONFLICT: RHETORIC, REALITY AND THE POLITICS OF POLICY DISCOURSE, Journal of International Development, J. Int. Dev. 22, 233–246)

For those familiar with the environmental security field, particularly neo-Malthusian models of environmental conflict developed in the 1980s and 1990s, climate refugee and conflict narratives seem very much like old wine in a new bottle. The vintage goes back even further, however, to a powerful policy narrative that I call the 'degradation narrative' (Hartmann and Hendrixson, 2005; Hartmann, 2006). Drawing on old colonial stereotypes of destructive Third World peasants and herders, degradation narratives go something like this: population-pressure induced poverty makes Third World peasants degrade their environments by over-farming or over-grazing marginal lands. The ensuing soil depletion and desertification then lead them to migrate elsewhere as 'environmental refugees', either to other ecologically vulnerable rural areas where the vicious cycle is once again set in motion or to cities where they strain scarce resources and become a primary source of political instability. Despite salient critiques by international development scholars and practitioners (for example, Boserup, 1965; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Williams, 1995; Leach and Mearns, 1996; Thompson, 2000), the degradation narrative has proved particularly popular in Western policy circles because it kills a number of birds with one stone: it blames poverty on population pressure, and not, for example, on lack of land reform or off-farm employment opportunities; it

blames peasants for land degradation, obscuring the role of commercial agriculture and extractive industries and it targets migration both as an environmental and security threat. With the waning of the Cold War, growing interest in sustainable development and alternative visions of security increased the authority of the degradation narrative. In particular, concern began to mount about the dangers posed by so-called 'environmental refugees'. Central to the concept is the assumption that population pressure is one of the main precipitating causes of environmental degradation and resulting migration (Saunders, 2000). Myers (1995) further popularised and legitimised the concept of environmental refugees offering a working definition: Environmental refugees are persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change [my emphasis], also natural disaster such as cyclones, storm surges and floods. In face of these environmental threats, people feel they have no alternative but to seek sustenance elsewhere, whether within their own countries or beyond and whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis. (Myers, 1995, pp. 18–19) In many cases, Myers wrote, environmental refugees are actually 'population pressure' refugees (p. 63). The report made the statistical claim that there were at least 25 million environmental refugees in the world, compared with 22 million refugees of 'traditional kind' (p. 1). Despite the fact that the 25 million figure was arrived at more by conjecture than scientific method,1 it began to circulate widely in the international policy arena (Saunders, 2000; Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007). Now Myers claims there will be 200 million climate migrants by 2050, a figure which is similarly making the rounds in policy documents even though Myers himself acknowledges that the estimate is based on 'heroic extrapolations' (Brown, 2008, p. 8). In addition to unreliable statistics, the 'environmental refugee' concept has a number of shortcomings. It **naturalises the economic and political causes of environmental degradation and masks the role of institutional responses to it.** Should people forced to leave their homelands because of the development of a large dam, mine tailings, petroleum pollution or flooding caused by illegal logging all be categorised together as 'enviro- nmental refugees'? In the case of extreme natural events such as droughts, storms and floods, whether or not people are forced to migrate permanently from their homes usually depends on pre-existing social relations (who is most vulnerable) and post-disaster responses (what kind of aid/relief is provided and who receives it). (Wisner et al., 2004). Rooted as it is in neo-Malthusian thinking, the concept of 'environmental refugee' overemphasises the role of demographic pressures in migration. The causes of migration are extremely complex and context-specific, and moreover, there is little evidence to support the view that demographic pressure is at the root of many population movements (Suhrke, 1997). In addition, negative neo-Malthusian narratives of migration obscure the positive roles migration can play in improving people's livelihoods and diminishing vulnerability to environmental change. Often, migration from rural areas is not a linear phenomenon or a rejection of rural livelihoods, but is instead a vital part of sustaining them (Black, 1998). Despite such shortcomings, the environmental refugee concept was deployed by a variety of political actors. Sustainable development advocates found it useful to focus policy attention on environmental degradation issues (Black, 1998) and it also appealed to Western interests in favour of more rigid immigration controls, including limiting the grounds for political asylum. Kibreab argues that the term was invented in part to 'depoliticise the causes of displacement' so that states would not have the obligation to provide asylum (Kibreab, 1997, p. 21, cited in Saunders, 2000, p. 240). As the concept gained favour, environmental refugees were increasingly portrayed as a security threat, even though there was little serious research to substantiate the claim (Black, 1998).

Environmental Conflict Link

The environmental conflict thesis is wrong, racist and locks in systemic poverty and inequality

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **10** (Betsy, POLICY ARENA RETHINKING CLIMATE REFUGEES AND CLIMATE CONFLICT: RHETORIC, REALITY AND THE POLITICS OF POLICY DISCOURSE, Journal of International Development, J. Int. Dev. 22, 233–246)

The construction of Darfur as a climate conflict should serve as canary in the coal mine that something is amiss when environmental determinism overrides serious analysis of power relations. This is not to deny that environmental changes due to global warming could in some instances exacerbate already existing economic and political divisions. However, whether or not violent conflict and mass migrations result depends on so many other factors that it is far too simplistic to see climate change as a major cause or trigger. Moreover, such threat scenarios ignore the way many poorly resourced communities manage their affairs without recourse to violence.

Brown et al. (2007) cite the case of the semi-arid regions of Northern Nigeria where conflicts between pastoralists and agricultural communities occur over water and fodder, but seldom spread because of the existence of traditional conflict resolution institutions. They argue that helping these communities adapt to climate change should involve strengthening such institutions. Research in the drylands of Marsabit District in Northern Kenya found that, in times of drought and water scarcity, there was actually less violence, not more (Witsenburg and Roba, 2007). Poor herdsmen were not inclined to start fights during droughts, and despite poverty and population growth in the region, strong but flexible common property regimes governing water helped people adjust to its scarcity. 'If at any time a conflict over a scarce natural resource like water exists,' the authors write, 'it can be a sign that local resource users themselves have been made powerless and that their negotiating system has been paralysed, either by external agencies or local elites' (Witsenburg and Roba, 2007, p. 235). A study done in northern Senegal from 1998–2002 concluded that drought-related migration led pastoralists to develop better strategies to manage herds and also had positive repercussions on the communities where they settled due to expansion of agriculture and trade (Juul, 2005). In fact, there is a rich body of empirical case studies of African agriculture, pastoralism and forestry that challenges conventional neo-Malthusian narratives about population, scarcity and conflict (e.g. Leach and Mearns, 1996; Gausset et al., 2005; Derman et al., 2007). Yet it is hardly ever cited in the environmental conflict or climate conflict literature. A certain exceptionalism is at work —while it is commonly assumed that scarcity can lead to institutional and technological innovation in more affluent countries, just the opposite is assumed for poor people in less affluent countries. Scarcity renders them into victims/villains, incapable of innovation or livelihood diversification and naturally prone to violence. Also neglected in the climate conflict literature is scholarship that connects violent conflict in Africa more closely to resource abundance (e.g. rich oil and mineral reserves, valuable timber and diamonds) than resource scarcity (e.g. Fairhead, 2001). Today, critiques of 'climate conflict' are emerging. For example, regarding the implications of climate change for armed conflict, Buhaug et al. (2008) note the difficulty of coming up with any generalisable model since increased likelihood of organised violence 'depends crucially on country-specific and contextual factors' (p. 2). The report concludes that alarm about climate conflict is not based on substantive evidence.

The term 'climate refugees' is also coming under increased scrutiny on a number of grounds. First, while climate change is likely to cause displacement, the extent of that displacement will not only depend on how much the temperature rises and affects sealevels, rainfall patterns and extreme weather, but also on the existence and effectiveness of adaptation measures that help individuals and communities cope with environmental stresses. Whether or not such measures are in place in turn depends on political economiesat the local, regional, national and international levels that are often conveniently left out of the discussion of so-called 'climate refugees.' As one report points out, larger climaterelated humanitarian emergencies may be in places 'where people cannot afford to move, rather than the places to which they do move' (GECHS, 2008, p. 24). Secondly, migration is too complex a process to label simply as environmental or climate-induced (Dun and Gemenne, 2008; Morrissey, 2008, p. 28). For example, studying the impact of desertification on migration patterns in the northeastern Ethiopian highlands, Morrissey (2008) found that people's decisions on whether to migrate or not were mediated by both structural and individual factors. These included the potential for livelihood diversification within rural areas as well as whether or not one had real opportunities and connections in urban areas. In addition, the high degree to which ethnicity has been politicised in the country limits migration options. His research shows the impossibility of providing a grand narrative, or simplistic model, of environmentally induced migration in which farmers experiencing adverse environmental change migrate out of those areas (and livelihoods) affected by environmental deterioration (p. 29). Even on islands and atolls threatened by sea-level rise, decisions to migrate can entail many more factors than climate change alone. A study of the small Pacific island nations of Kiribati and Tuvalu found that socio-economic pressures resulting from lack of employment and development opportunities as well as other kinds of environmental changes are the main drivers of out-migration. The role of climate change needs to be viewed together with these processes (McAdam and Loughry, 2009). A third area of concern is how the label 'climate refugee,' like 'environmental refugee' before it, could further undermine the rights and protections of traditional refugees as defined by the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 1951/1967). According to the Convention, a refugee is someone who 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion and nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. . .' (UNHCR, 1951/1967). At the same time that it has become popular to apply the label refugee to any group of forced migrants, immigration enforcement agencies, especially in Europe, have fractioned the traditional refugee category by creating a bureaucratic hierarchy of asylum seeker eligibility in order to restrict admission (Zetter, 2007). It is against this politicised background that one must view the evolution of the term 'climate refugee.' Both the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) caution against using either the term environmental refugee or climate refugee since they have no basis in international refugee law and could

undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees (UNHCR, 2008; IOM, 2009). UNHCR further emphasises that much displacement due to climate-related factors is likely to be internal in nature, without the crossing of international borders. A more appropriate legal regime for climate-related migration may be human rights law (McAdam and Saul, 2008).

Given their analytical flaws and lack of supporting evidence, why have these narratives gained so much momentum? Part of the reason lies in the ways **they draw on deep-seated fears and stereotypes of the dark-skinned, over-breeding, dangerous poor** (Hartmann, 2009). For example, a June 2009 ABC prime time television documentary on climate change, Earth 2100, scared the viewers with scenes of future apocalypse in which starving Africans take to arms against the West, desperate Mexicans storm the American border, and half the world population dies of a new plague so that humans can get back into balance with nature again. In policy circles, the persistence of these narratives is tied to their usefulness to a variety of interests. Critical literature on policy narratives illustrates the importance of population 'crisis narratives' in justifying certain kinds of Western development interventions — particularly the spread of commercial agriculture and forestry at the expense of peasant livelihoods —in Africa and elsewhere (Roe, 1995). A similar phenomenon is witnessed for climate narratives. For example, a 2008 report titled A Climate of Conflict argued that climate change would likely compound the propensity for violent conflict in 46 poor countries and political instability in another 56 (Smith and Vivekananda, 2008). Much of the authors' analysis is based on old assumptions about the relationship between environmental scarcity and violence. They propose a solution in which international agencies invest in sustainable development, climate change adaptation measures and peace-building activities. There is also a role for multinational corporations. In this win- win world, the rich help the poor, and are largely absolved of responsibility for resource degradation and extraction, as well as political violence. It is as if the scramble for oil, minerals and land in Africa is of little consequence.

However, it is also important to note that climate refugee and conflict narratives are sometimes deployed strategically by actors demanding that Western states take seriously their obligations to curb carbon emissions and provide adaptation assistance to affected communities. For example, in May 2009, twelve Pacific Island states brought a resolution to the UN General Assembly linking climate change to political instability in an attempt to get the Security Council to address their plight (MacFarquar, 2009). But even the best of intentions cannot obscure that we do not live in a win-win world, and that spinning climate change as a security threat is likely to undermine, rather than strengthen, serious efforts to link climate change mitigation and adaptation to development efforts that reduce poverty and promote equity. Playing with fear is like playing with fire. You cannot be sure exactly where it will spread. In the current moment, crisis narratives about climate refugees and conflict serve the interests of national security actors. The next section looks at the United States as a case study of how these narratives threaten to blur the line between development and military assistance, especially in Africa

Environmental Conflict Link – War Impact

Securitization of climate change leads to arms build ups that cause war and trade off with efforts to solve warming

Brzoska (Inst. for Peace Research and Security Policy @ Hamburg) **8**

(Micahel, "The Securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security" ISA Convention Paper)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round 'exceptionalism' in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards 'security experts' (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on 'what to do'. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a

security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus **leading to arms races**. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection, as well as more soldiers and arms, is expensive, the financial means compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas emission and adapting to climate change will be reduced. Global military expenditure is again at the level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2°C by 2050) and adaptation are speculative at the moment,1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy areas are in competition for scarce resources.

Environmental Conflict Link – A2: Key to Action

Environmental security has been tried and failed – comprehensive studies prove

Oels (University of Hamburg, Grindelberg) **11**
(Angela, Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability to contingency, Geoforum, 25 November 2011, ScienceDirect)

Existing research on climate change as a security issue **has not been able to identify policy changes as a result of the discursive shift**. The Copenhagen School has investigated if climate change has been articulated as an existential threat by political elites, if these securitizing moves have been accepted by relevant audiences, and if they have enabled extraordinary measures to address the threat ([Buzan et al., 1998] and [Waever, 1995]). Extraordinary measures imply a political state of exception where democratic procedures may be circumvented and the law suspended. The Copenhagen School criticises successful securitization as 'failure' of the political elites to deal with an issue by 'normal' democratic politics (Waever, 1995). In the case of climate change, successful securitization could "legitimate extraordinary and costly measures that require a progressive increase in energy efficiency and a decarbonisation of the energy system by increasing renewable energy sources" (Brauch, 2009) or even "military action against polluting factories" (Trombetta, 2008, p. 599). Those who use the Copenhagen framework have concluded that the securitization of climate change (as defined above) has failed, **and that there is no evidence of** such **extraordinary measures** (Stripple, 2002; Oels, 2011; Trombetta, 2008). While those drawing on the Copenhagen School support decisive climate mitigation action, the political price paid for 'extraordinary measures' is considered too high. From the perspective of discourse theory, Swyngedouw (2010) argues that the articulation of climate change as a climate apocalypse in public discourse is marked by populism that evacuates 'the political' from climate change debates. The threat of climate change is constructed as an aberration to an otherwise unproblematic capitalist system: "CO2 stands here as the classic example of a fetishized and externalised foe that requires dealing with if sustainable climate futures are to be attained" (Swyngedouw 2010, p. 222). From Swyngedouw's perspective, the securitization of climate change has the primary function of producing "a socio-ecological fix to make sure nothing really changes" (Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 222).

Population Conflict Link

Excuses western consumption and encourages imperialism

Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) **2k**
(Jon, "Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis," Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)

This population-environment-conflict reasoning is captured in an early pronouncement by Robert MacNamara (former US Secretary of Defense and former President of the World Bank), who said in 1984 that: 'short of thermo nuclear war itself, population growth is the gravest issue the world faces over the decades immediately ahead'.40 We should be immediately suspicious when pronouncements likening population growth to nuclear war come from key figures in the Northern world order such as MacNamara; whose 'world' is MacNamara referring to? If MacNamara the philanthropist is talking here about the plight of those who are adversely affected by rapid population growth and famine, then the 'world' in question may be that of the Southern people at the receiving end of the exploitative, poverty-making global economy. This 'world' is at risk from those very institutions with which MacNamara is

so familiar?the World Bank, the Pentagon, and Ford motor company. More probably, MacNamara the former US defence secretary is referring to the world of US interests and the possibility that the growth in the number of Others might undermine the stability of (Northern) world order. In environmental security discourse, claims to the 'global' often mask the pursuit of the industrialized world's interests.41 So it seems that the 'world' view of acNamara is the view that comes with a position of power; the view that comes from directing aircraft carriers and satellites, and from granting billion dollar loans and shaping national economies to fit the global economy. The 'world' in question is the world of the wealthy and powerful. There are three principal features of the population-environment-conflict litera ture. First, by scripting population growth in industrializing countries as a threat to the interests of the industrialized countries, it presents population growth as an issue which requires management by the industrial powers. However, this is rarely seen to involve the relinquishment or adjustment of economic power. Second, it assumes that the number of people is absolutely indicative of ecological impact. This totally ignores the question of what kinds of lifestyle these people lead. Overall environ mental impact is not merely a function of numbers, but also a function of the resources people use and the wastes they generate. So lifestyle is as important as the number of lives. In this respect the most overpopulated country in the world is the United States, which has 4.7 per cent of the world's population, consumes 25 per cent of all processed minerals, and produces 24 per cent of the world's greenhouse gases. In contrast, an 'overpopulated' country like India has 16 per cent of the world's population, but consumes only 3 per cent of all minerals and produces around 4 per cent of greenhouse gases.42 Hence overemphasizing population turns a blind eye to the complicity of industrialized nations.

Famine Conflict Link

Linking famine and war kills possible solutions to it and promotes Western interests

Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) **2k**
(Jon, "Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis," Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)

The ways in which population growth leads to environmental degradation are reasonably well known. However, the particular ways in which this leads to conflict re difficult to prove. In the absence of proof there is a negative style of argu mentation, and there are blanket assertions and abrogations; for example: 'the relationship is rarely causative in a direct fashion', but 'we may surmise that conflict would not arise so readily, nor would it prove so acute, if the associated factor of population growth were occurring at a more manageable rate'.38 It is possible though, that rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war. Indeed, it is less the case that famines in Africa in recent decades have produced 'first rate breeding grounds for conflict'; the more important, pressing, and avoidable product is widespread malnutrition and large loss of life. To equate famine with warfare and threat is to deny the prima facie issue of the responsibility of the industrialized world to those in affected regions. To focus on the conflict potential is to ignore the real causes of poverty and vulnerability, namely the economic disadvantages people in the industrializing world experience from their exposure to global capital. Ignoring global processes also leads to impoverished policy.39 Vulnerability to famine can be lessened through substantial increases in access to employment, health care, education for women and children, and contra ception. Resilience to famine can be enhanced by protecting traditional societies from the disruptive effects of modern society, by creating safe political conditions, and by permitting more autonomous governance at the local level. The con sequences of famine can be lessened by making use of the efficient collection and delivery mechanisms that characterize world trade between industrialized nations to deliver necessary supplies. All these mainstream development concerns are ignored or treated as afterthoughts when the issue of population growth is understood as a probable cause of war.

Water Wars

Water Wars Case 1NC

Water war discourse is false and trades off with structural violence that needs to be prioritized

Asmal (South Africa, Minister of Education) **1**
(Prof. Kader, *International Journal of Water*, "Water is a catalyst")

> With all due respect to my friends, have battles been fought over water? Is water scarcity a casus belli? Does it in fact divide nations? My own answer is no, no and no. I recognise the obvious value to sensational Water War rhetoric. Alarmists awaken people to the underlying reality of water scarcity, and rally troops to become more progressive and interdependent. By contrast, to challenge or dispute that rhetoric is to risk making us passive or smug about the status quo, or delay badly needed innovations or co-operation against stress. And yet I do challenge 'Water War' rhetoric. For there is no hard evidence to back it up. If the 'water's-for-fighting' chorus is off key, then its disharmony affects lives as well. It shifts energy and resources from local priorities to foreign affairs. It scares off investment where it is most in need. It inverts priorities, delays implementation of policy. And it forgets that water management is, ultimately, about real people. Mahatma Gandhi said, "When you are unsure of a course of action, remember the face of the poorest, weakest person in society and ask yourself what impact the action you are about to take will have on that person." More recently Nelson Mandela reiterated that democratic systems lose their validity if they fail to combat and eradicate poverty. We thus would be well advised to remember that, for the poorest and weakest, water's for drinking, not fighting over. The poor are most affected by rhetoric, just as they are by war. It is easier to ignore their thirst than to divert attention to potential foreign threats, real or imagined. Easier, not better. To help the poor and weak, let us reform our unstable, consumptive, ultra-nationalistic habits to share our resource.

And comprehensive studies of all historical evidence disproves the impact

Turton (African Water Issues Research Unit, Political Scientist; Gibb-SERA Chairman, Integrated Water Resource Management, South Africa) **2k**
(Green Cross International and AWIRU, African Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2, Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality, "Water Wars in Southern Africa: Challenging Conventional Wisdom," Google Scholar.)

> Water Wars are nothing more than a myth. There is not a shred of evidence to support their existence in any of the chapters in this book. True, there is a lot of conflict, or potential conflict, over water resources. This is particularly true where these water resources are found in shared river basins or aquifers. However, this does not mean a war over water. In this sense, we need concep- tual clarity (Turton 2000a). Water scarcity, as both a necessary and sufficient condition for going to war, is an almost non-existent phenomenon. In this regard, it is illuminating to read the revealing findings of a comprehensive research project which used the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. One of the main conclusions was that, 'the actual history of armed water conflict is somewhat less dramatic than the water wars literature would lead one to believe: a total of seven incidents, in three of which no shots were fired. As near as we can find, **there has never been a single war fought over water'** (emphasis in the original text), (Wolf 1998:255) This has been the case since at least 2,5000 BC, when the Sumerian city-states of Lagash and Umma went to war over the right to exploit boundary channels along the Tigris River (Cooper 1983 as cited in Wolf 1998:255). However, that was not even a true water war (Turton 2000), falling neatly, instead, into the definition of a quasi water war. These seven incidents are briefly as follows (Wolf 1998:256): • The 1948 partition between India and Pakistan saw the Indus Basin being divided in a convoluted fashion. No less than 12 years of negotiations, led by the World Bank, resulted in the Indus Waters Agreement.

Their authors conclusions are flawed – they apply the abstract concept of water wars based on militarism and Eurocentrism

Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) **2k**
(Jon, "Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis," Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)

In sum, the selection of cases to prove the water wars thesis is suspect. What is truly notable is the failure to examine successful and peaceful water management regimes, such as those in Western Europe and North America.31 This omission might be explained by an absence of scarcity, or the relative balance of military powers (although this is not the case with US–Mexico cooperation over the waters of the Colorado River), but the failure to examine positive cases might also be a function of the way in which warfare appeals to our sensationalist and militaristic culture. The water wars thesis can be read as a case of **'civilized' Europeans constructing a barbaric Other**. It suggests that there is really a pervasive disinterest in peace, and that warfare is more interesting. The focus on conflict rather than peace creates **the justification for strategic interventions in key regions**, in this respect 'environment' is part of the discursive repackaging of the Northern security agenda.

Water Wars K 1NC

War wars discourse locks in Northern security interests and trades off with addressing root causes of environmental degradation

Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) **2k**
(Jon, "Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis," Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)

In the final analysis, the more telling question about the linkages between environ ment and conflict is not?is environmental degradation likely to lead to violence?? nor even how might environmental degradation lead to violence??b ut rather why are we interested in the linkages between environmental degradation and violence? In short, why this literature! This article has argued that the thesis that environmental degradation will lead to violence is generally unconvincing and is more a reflection of Northern theoretical and strategic interests than the reality of environmental degradation. This is to say, then, that the first two questions are by and large irrelevant. The answer given to the latter question is that the environment-conflict literature is the discursive primer to legitimate defence of the status quo. Thus the obsession with only one of the possible effects of environmental degradation (conflict) at the expense of other effects and at the expense of taking seriously the root causes of the degradation. The net effect of the environment-conflict thesis, then, is the justification of a state response that maintains the legitimacy of the security and military elite, and the justification for impending military and economic defence of Northern lifestyles.

Water Wars K 2NC

Securitizing water conflicts prevents cooperation which is critical to solve – the alt can solve

Turton (African Water Issues Research Unit) **3**
(Anthony, "The Hydropolitical Dynamics of Cooperation in Southern Africa : a Strategic Perspective on Institutional Development in International River Basins")

Desecuritisation of shared water resources: Plus-sumhydropolitical dynamics Waever (1995:56) notes that security and insecurity are not in binary opposition, but are social constructs. By using the term 'security'in relation to something else, this suggests that a problematic situation exists in which some extraordinary measures need to be taken in response. Seen in this light, insecurity is a situation with a security problem but with no response. Consequently, the problematique of securitisation can be transcended, not by couching the problem in security terms, but rather by viewing it away from such terms. This implies the politicisation of the problem, rather than the securitisation of the problem, thereby allowing normal political processes of dialogue, negotiation and agreement to resolve the issue. Seen in this light, politicisation allows the issue to be dealt with in the open as a matter of free choice between the parties involved. In this context, security (or the securitisation of the issue) should be seen as being a failure to deal with the matter as normal politics (Buzan et al 1998:29). Desecuritisation of water resource management

is thus a healthy manifestation, because it opens up the discourse and allows a wider range of roleplayers to become involved in the resolution of the core problem. This tends to foster institutional development and manifest as a win-win outcome, which is inherently more conducive to economic growth and hence positive peace. How is this to be achieved? In a comprehensive analysis of various international river basins, it was found that a country could benefit from a lack of agreement with other riparian states in some cases. Under these circumstances, usually found in upstream riparians, there is little incentive for cooperation and a history of distrust and ill-will between the riparians can destroy the confidence needed for a joint programme (Le Marquand 1977:131). The conclusion to this study, however, was that mutual self- interest is the most common basis for cooperation (Le Marquand 1977:132). If mutual self-interest is a key driver of cooperation, and desecuritisation is the key to the establishment of positive peace, it is necessary to understand the fundamental dynamics of this process. Returning to the quotation by Buzan and others (1998:18) noted earlier, the concept of a regional security complex was introduced. Asecurity complex is defined as a set of units (states) of which the major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan 1991:190; Buzan et al 1998:201; Buzan & Waever 2001:31). In terms of this conceptualisation, a region like SADC is locked into a security complex by virtue of a number of fundamental drivers not related to water resource management (see Buzan 1991:186-229). Riparians in water-scarce regions can also be part of a hydropolitical security complex. For example, Schulz (1995) has noted the existence of such a complex in the Tigris and Euphrates basin, while the author has identified an immature hydropolitical complex in SADC that is clustered around the Orange, Limpopo, Okavango, Kunene, Incomati and Maputo basins (Turton 2001; 2003). Ahydropolitical security complex can therefore be defined as being a special form of regional security complex that exists when those states are part 'owners'and technically 'users'of shared rivers, and start to consider the rivers to be a major national security issue (Schulz 1995:97). Significantly, the fact that problems occurring within the basin can only be resolved in the context of cooperation within the same river basin, means that a hydropolitical complex exists, irrespective of the fact that water resource managers may deny the existence of such a complex (Turton 2002a). In this regard, the concept is an analytical tool, rather than an actor-defined condition (Buzan et al 1998:20). It therefore becomes instructive to develop an understanding of how states are linked with one another through shared river basins in water-scarce regions where most of the readily available water has been allocated to some form of economic activity or another. Figure 3 shows the linkages between the Okavango River basin riparian states and other countries (and international river basins) within SADC.

They're racist and wrong – even if there were a chance of conflict it wouldn't escalate and solve inequality first solves

Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) **2k**
(Jon, "Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis," Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)

The environment-conflict literature is almost entirely premised on the ethno centric assumption that people in the South will resort to violence in times of resource scarcity. Rarely, if ever, is the same argument applied to people in the industrialized North. There is continued scripting of people from the South as barbaric, strongly implying that those in the North are more civilized. Nevertheless, the former Yugoslavia excepted, there may indeed be a degree of institutional/social resilience in industrialized societies that hedges against large scale violence most of the time, and this, at least, offers hope as a meaningful research agenda for environmental security. There are at least three possible reasons for the resilience of industrialized societies. First, as the industrialized economies partake of the global division of labour they effect a global division of environmental degradation as well, thereby transferring environmental degradation abroad. Given this, practising environmental security seems to be the practice of securing the ecological health of the nation by transferring environmental externalities. Second, the levels of wealth in the indus trialized world?wealth gained through the exploitation of cheap labour and materials abroad?allows for institutions that provide stability and resilience to environmental change. The market, well financed government, the insurance industry, transport and communications infrastructure, a degree of democratic participation, and a base level of personal affluence all seem to help hedge against turmoil in the face of environmental stress. Third, trade between similarly affluent liberal democracies assists in the transfer of necessary food and technology that helps enhance resilience and decreases the likelihood of rivalry. Underwriting all this, however, is the ability to pay and to participate in the domestic and global economy without great disadvantage. This ability, of course, is limited to the few and underwritten by the

exploitation of the many. This brings us to a pervasive analytical difficulty of the literature which posits the possibility of environmentally induced conflicts. If, as Gleick suggests, 'developing countries have far fewer technical and economic resources at their disposal', and hence are less able to adapt to environmental change, then this institutional to their to wage war as well.15 The threat from the South could scarcely manifest itself as large scale warfare, despite Gleick's observation that 'Third World arms capabilities are impressive and growing' and so 'the threat to peace and security becomes fully apparent'.16 There may indeed be some possibility of low-intensity conflict driven by desperation and resentment of the policies and practices of the North, but it is important to step back and view the broader picture. The revealing question is whose peace and security] The absolute peace and security problem is not that in the face of intolerable oppression the oppressed may resist; **the problem is the oppression and injustice itself**. The task, then, is to eliminate this injustice. The real irony of the environment-conflict literature is that it is the industrialized world which assumes that the South will threaten; the North creates its own fiction, based on little or no evidence. In this literature the Northern strategic vision projects onto the industrializing world its own violent rationality. It assumes that the 'South' will behave as the North would, that is with aggression and force. Yet this is merely an assumption, there may be rogue states (Iraq, Libya, North Korea), but these few are exceptions and do not represent the vast majority of industrializing states. Hence the 'threat to peace and security' which is 'fully apparent' to Gleick is by no means apparent. The peace and security being referred to is the peace and security of the industrialized states, not the positive peace and security to which the majority of the world's people are entitled. This Northern 'peace' is a negative peace, and its 'security' is a resistance to change.

Water wars are empirically denied—their authors assume political fear mongering qualifies as evidence

Katz, 2011
(David, Director of the Akirov Institute for Business and Environment at Tel Aviv University, "Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars," *Global Environmental Politics,* Vol. 11 No. 1, February 2011, muse, accessed 7/14/16/14, bh @ ddi)

A number of critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical evidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmental security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars is guilty, is that **warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence**. 28 **Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will be over water have already proven false.** Research has shown, however, that **even the more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on comments by officials may be suspect.** Leng, for instance, found no correlation between the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conflict and cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over **400 incidents of water-related verbal exchanges by political figures between 1948 and 1999 that were conflictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conflict** of varying levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, **none were** David Katz • 15 20. Mirza 2008. 21. Bajpaee 2006; Reddy 2006; and Ban Ki-moon, "A Climate Culprit in Darfur." Washington Post, 16 June 2007. 22. Singer 1981, 2000. 23. Singer 1981; and Vasquez 2000. 24. Dinar 2009. 25. Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Gleditsch et al. 2006; and Hensel et al. 2006. 26. Toset et al. 2000; and Furlong et al. 2006. 27. Miguel et al. 2004; Levy et al. 2005; and Hendrix and Glaser 2007. 28. Gleditsch 1998, 381. 29. Leng 1980. **more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars, and in none was water the central cause of conflict**.30 **Proponents of water war** scenarios often **premise their dire conclusions on the fact that water is essential for life and non-substitutable**.31 Yet **water for basic needs represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.**32 Economists and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawals are for the agricultural sector, a relatively low-value use and one in which large gains in efªciency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice of crops. Thus, **economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that the value of water that would be gained from military conflict is unlikely to outweigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the loss of life.**33 Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion that freshwater is increasingly scarce,34 an assumption on which the water war hypothesis relies. Such a "cornucopian" view claims that people adapt to scarcity through improvements in technology, pricing, and efªciency—rendering water less scarce, not more so. Perhaps **the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is the lack of empirical evidence** of precedents.Wolf found **only one documented case of war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago**.35 Moreover, he could document only seven cases of acute conºict over water. Yoffe and colleagues also ªnd

that armed con°ict over water resources has been uncommon. 36 They found that **cooperation was much more common than conflict**, both **globally** and in all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. This pattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies of water con°ict are presented in the water wars literature. Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are based on case studies because such works tend to have no variation in the dependent variable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address such shortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under ªre. For instance, a number of large-sample statistical studies ªnd correlations between water-related variables and con°ict, however, few, if any, provide convincing support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that water availability had no impact on the likelihood of either domestic or international con°ict,38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies 16 • Hydro-Political Hyperbole 30. Yoffe et al. 2003. 31. For example Elhance 1999. 32. Gleick 1996. 33. Deudney 1999; Allan 2002; and Fisher and Huber-Lee 2005. 34. For example Lomborg 2001. 35. Wolf 1999. 36. Yoffe et al. 2003. 37. Levy 1995; and Gleditsch 1998. 38. Esty et al. 1999; Levy et al. 2005; and Stalley 2003. that claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of several studies that do ªnd correlations between water and con°ict are either not robust or are contrasted by other ªndings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal ªnd that the statistical signiªcance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one or two observations, leading them to conclude **that actual effects of water scarcity "are weak, negligible or insignificant."**40 Jensen and Gleditsch ªnd that the results of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the original dataset.41 Gleditsch and colleagues found that shared basins do predict an increased propensity for con°ict, but found no correlation between con°ict and drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, leading them to state that "support for a scarcity theory of water con°ict is somewhat ambiguous."42

Heg Links

Lifton

Hegemony is the superpower syndrome—a fear of vulnerability that breeds unnecessary violence to showcase Americas omnipotence

Lifton, professor of psychiatry at Harvard, 3 [Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, previously Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School and Director of The Center on Violence and Human Survival at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 2003 (Superpower Syndrome: America's Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, Published by Thunder's Mouth Press / Nation Books, ISBN 1560255129, p. 125-130)]

It is almost un-American to be vulnerable. As a people, we pride ourselves on being able to stand up to anything, solve all problems. We have long had a national self-image that involves an ability to call forth reservoirs or strength when we need it, and a sense of a protected existence peculiar to America in an otherwise precarious world. In recent times we managed, after all, to weather the most brutal century in human history relatively unscathed. THE BLESSED COUNTRY Our attitude stems partly from geography. We have always claimed a glorious aloneness thanks to what has been called the "Free security" of the two great oceans which separate us from dangerous upheavals in Europe and Asia. While George Washington was not the isolationist he is sometimes represented to be, he insisted on his celebrated Farewell Address of 1796, "'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world." That image has been embraced, and often simplified or distorted, by politicians ever since. (He warned against permanent alliances, not alliances in general).

The idea of our separateness and safety from faraway conflicts has had importance from the time of the early settlers, many of whom left Europe to escape political religious, or legal threats or entanglements. Even if one came as an adventurer or an empire-builder, one was leaving a continent of complexity and conflict for a land whose remoteness could support new beginnings. **Abraham Lincoln absolutized** that remoteness and **security from outside attack i**n order to stress that our only danger came from ourselves: "**All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with a Buonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years."** However much the world has shrunk technologically in the last half century, and however far-ranging our own superpower forays, **that sense of geographic invulnerability has never left us**. **We have seen ourselves as** not only separate from but different from the rest of the world, a **special** nation among nations. That sense of American exceptionalism was intensely observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, the brilliant French politician and writer, in the early nineteenth century. In de Tocqueville's view of America, "A course almost without limits, a field without horizon, is revealed: the human spirit rushes forward and traverses [it] in every direction." **American exceptionalism has always been**, as the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed out, "**a double-edged sword." In the psychological life of Americans it has been bound up with feelings of unique virtue, strength, and success. But this has sometimes led Americans to be "utopian moralists, who press hard to institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices."** That subjective exceptionalism has been vividly expressed in the historian Richard Hofstadter's observation, "**It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one**." At the time of the Puritans, sentiments of exceptionalism were expressed in biblical terms: America was an "Arcadian image of the New World ... an Eden from which the serpent and forbidden trees had been thoroughly excluded," and "a new Promised Land and a New Jerusalem." The language was that of a postapocalyptic utopia, and remnants of such sentiments persist whenever we speak of ourselves in more secular terms as the "new world." Important to this feeling of exceptionalism has been a deep sense that America offered unparalleled access to regenerative power. As Richard Slotkin explains: "The first colonists saw in America an opportunity to regenerate [end page 127] their fortunes, their spirits, and the power of their church and nation," though "the means to that regeneration ultimately became the means of violence." Even when Americans played what has been called a "shell game of identity," they could experience an unlimited capacity for renewal—endless new beginnings as individuals or as a nation. Slotkin speaks of a new relationship to authority in this new world. While "in Europe all men were under authority; in America all men dreamed they had the power to become authority." These claims of new authority extended to the country as a whole, to America's authority among nations—a claim to new national authority that was expanded over time thanks to America's considerable achievements—economic, technological, scientific, and cultural. **American exceptionalism has often had the overall psychological quality of a sense of ourselves as a blessed people, immune from the defeats and sufferings of others. But underneath that sense there had to be a potential chink in our psychological armor**–**which was a deep-seated** if hidden **sense of vulnerability.** OMNIPOTENCE AND VULNERABILITY Ironically, **superpower syndrome projects the problem of American vulnerability onto the world stage**. A superpower is perceived as possessing more than natural power. [end page 128] (In this sense **it comes closer to resembling the comic-strip hero Superman than the Nietzschean Superman.**) **For a nation, its leaders, or even its** ordinary **citizens to enter into the superpower syndrome is to lay claim to omnipotence**, to power that is unlimited, **which is ultimately power over death. At the heart** of the superpower syndrome then **is the need to eliminate a vulnerability that**, as the antithesis of omnipotence, **contains the basic contradiction of the syndrome**. For **vulnerability can never be eliminated, either by a nation or an individual**. **In seeking its elimination, the**

superpower finds itself on a psychological treadmill. The idea of vulnerability is intolerable, the fact of it irrefutable. One solution is **to maintain an illusion of invulnerability**. But the superpower then **runs the danger of taking increasingly draconian actions to sustain that illusion**. For to do otherwise would be to surrender the cherished status of superpower. Other nations have experiences in the world that render them and their citizens all too aware of the essential vulnerability of life on earth. They also may be influenced by religious and cultural traditions (far weaker in the United States) that emphasize vulnerability as an aspect of human mortality. No such reality can be accepted by those clinging to a sense of omnipotence. At issue is the experience of death anxiety, which is the strongest manifestation of vulnerability. **Such a deep-seated** [end page 129] **sense of vulnerability can sometimes be acknowledged by the ordinary citizens of a superpower, or even at times by its leaders,** who may admit, for instance, that there is no guaranteed defense against terrorist acts. **But those leaders nonetheless remain committed to eliminating precisely that vulnerability**—committed, that is, to the illusory goal of invulnerability. **When that goal is repeatedly undermined**—whether by large-scale terrorist acts like 9/11, or as at present by militant resistance to American hegemony in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East—**both the superpower and the world it acts upon may become dangerously destabilized.**

Hegemony does not project power without nuclear stockpiles and the ability to threaten global destruction—this makes hegemonic violence inevitable

Lifton 3 [Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, previously Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School and Director of The Center on Violence and Human Survival at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 2003 (Superpower Syndrome: America's Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, Published by Thunder's Mouth Press / Nation Books, ISBN 1560255129, p. 1-4)]

The apocalyptic imagination has spawned a new kind of violence at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We can, in fact, speak of a worldwide epidemic of violence aimed at massive destruction in the service of various visions of purification and renewal. In particular, **we are experiencing what could be called an apocalyptic face-off** between Islamist* forces, overtly visionary in their willingness to kill and die for their religion, and American forces claiming to be restrained and reasonable but no less visionary in their projection of a cleansing war-making and military power. Both sides are [end page 1] **energized by versions of intense idealism**; both see themselves as embarked on a mission of combating evil in order to redeem and renew the world; and both are ready to release untold levels of violence to achieve that purpose. The war on Iraq—a country with longstanding aspirations toward weapons of mass destruction but with no evident stockpiles of them and no apparent connection to the assaults of September 11—was a manifestation of that American visionary projection. The religious fanaticism of Osama bin Laden and other Islamist zealots has, by now, a certain familiarity to us as to others elsewhere, for their violent demands for spiritual purification are aimed as much at fellow Islamics as at American "infidels." Their fierce attacks on the defilement that they believe they see everywhere in contemporary life resemble those of past movements and sects from all parts of the world; such sects, with end-of-the-world prophecies and devout violence in the service of bringing those prophecies about, flourished in Europe from the eleventh through the sixteenth century. Similar sects like the fanatical Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas into the Tokyo subways in 1995, have existed—even proliferated—in our own time. **The American apocalyptic entity** is less familiar to us. Even if its urges to power and domination seem historically recognizable, it nonetheless **represents a new constellation of forces bound up with** what I've come to think of [end page 2] as "**superpower syndrome."** By that term I mean **a national mindset—put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership group—that takes on a sense of omnipotence**, of unique standing in the world that grants it the right to hold sway over all other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II as uniquely powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower left standing at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. **More than merely dominate, the American superpower now seeks to control history. Such cosmic ambition is accompanied by an equally vast sense of entitlement**, of special dispensation to pursue its aims. That entitlement stems partly from historic claims to special democratic virtue, but has much to do with an embrace of technological power translated into military terms. That is, a superpower—the world's only superpower—is entitled to dominate and control precisely because it is a superpower. The murderous events of 9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. **Superpower syndrome did not require 9/11, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved superpower, a giant violated and made vulnerable**, which no superpower can permit. Indeed, **at the core of superpower syndrome lies a powerful fear of vulnerability. A superpower's victimization brings on both a sense of humiliation and an angry determination to restore,** or even [end page 3] extend, **the boundaries of a superpower-dominated world. Integral to superpower syndrome are its menacing nuclear stockpiles and their world-destroying capacity. Throughout the decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both lived with a godlike nuclear capacity to obliterate the cosmos, along with a fear of being annihilated by the enemy power. Now America alone possesses that world-destroying capacity, and post-Soviet Russia no longer looms as a nuclear or superpower adversary. We have yet to grasp the full impact of this exclusive capacity to blow up anyone or everything, but**

its reverberations are never absent in **any part of the world**. The confrontation between Islamist and American versions of planetary excess has unfortunately tended to define a world in which the vast majority of people embrace neither. But **apocalyptic excess needs no majority to dominate a landscape**. All the more so when, **in their mutual zealotry, Islamist and American leaders seem to act in concert.** That is, **each, in its excess, nurtures the apocalypticism of the other, resulting in a malignant synergy**. * In keeping with general usage, Islamist refers to groups that are essentially theocratic and fundamentalist, and at times apocalyptic. Islamic is a more general ethnic as well as religious term for Muslims. The terms can of course overlap, and "Islamic state" can mean one run on Islamist principles.

Governments use security discourse to target their own citizens, labeling them as threats, and thus creating an authoritative regime and greater insecurity.

Grondin, 04 (David, founding-member of the Canadian Critical Security Studies Network, *(Re)Writing the National Security State*, Occasional Papers, March 20, http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf)

The U.S. response to 9/11 is encapsulated as an armed struggle against a phantom enemy who replicates the tactics used in guerrilla wars in its capacity to strike any time, anywhere. The enemy is thus constructed as being both everywhere and nowhere, which allows state leaders to enact a security discourse of an Other against whom the U.S. must be protected as a legitimate and necessary one at the expense of some civil rights (e.g., colour tags for travellers and fingerprint biometric sensors in passports). **A "state of war" is indeed incorporated into American political life** : "For a society committed to armed struggle, **there is little distinction between military and civilian life.** 'The cause' becomes everything, **justifying extraordinary measures, demanding larger-than-life sacrifices.** Ordinary life is recruited into the ruthless binary that frames the struggle [...]. **There is no room for a loyal opposition; to question is to betray**" (Milner, Krishna, and Ferguson, 2001).¶ In the context of a global war on terrorism, **every citizen may become a "terrorist"**. As Ronnie Lipschutz argues in *After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century*, "**[a]ll individuals**, whether citizen or permanent resident, whether legal or illegal, **become potential threats to state security**" (Lipschtuz, 2000: 51). Surprisingly, **not many American citizens contested or protested such undemocratic limitations on civil liberties**. Why is that so? One possible answer is that **a great many are convinced that such measures will not be applied to them and that their own rights and freedoms will not be threatened. They seem to believe that since they are not doing anything wrong, they are protected.** Accordingly, **they think that those whose privacy and rights are being violated have done something wrong and that they deserve it.** As Iris Marion Young explains, this is where they err, for **"[t]he move from a relatively free society to one over which the state exercises authoritarian domination often occurs by means of just this logic: citizens do not realize how easily they may find themselves under suspicion by authorities over whose decisions there is no public scrutiny**" (Young, 2003: 12). When societal and individual security is considered, **the national security discourse produces more insecurity than security.** We must therefore question state practices that threaten individuals, rendering the state a source of insecurity for its citizens

Algae Biofuels are Harmful to Environment

Howell 10

(Katie Howell, freelance writer and editor based in Washington, D.C. Her work has appeared in the New York Times, USA Today, Scientific American,National Geographic Traveler, Kiplinger's Personal Finance, Greenwire, Nationalgeographic.com and Knitty.com. Washington and Lee University and a master's degree in geology from Louisiana State University. June 22, 2010, "Is Algae Worse than Corn for Biofuels?" Online: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/algae-biofuel-growth-environmental-impact/)

Growing algae for use in biofuels has a greater environmental impact than sources such as corn, switch grass canola, researchers found in the first life-cycle assessment of algae growth. Interest in algae-based biofuels has blossomed in t sparking major investments fromExxon Mobil Corp. and Dow Chemical Co., and it has gained steam on Capitol Hill, as well. Bu **nascent industry has major environmental hurdles to overcome before ramping up production, according to published this week in *Environmental Science and Technology***. "What we found was sort of surprising," said Andres civil and environmental engineering professor at the University of Virginia and lead author of the paper. "We started doing this much optimism as everybody else." **Algae production consumes more energy, has higher greenhouse gas emission more water than other biofuel sources**, like corn, switch grass and canola, Clarens and his colleagues found by using a st model to compare growth data of algae with conventional crops. **"From a life-cycle standpoint, algae are not nearly as**

as you would think they are," Clarens said. "And that was surprising to us." The culprit, the researchers say, is fertilizer. Growing algae in open ponds is akin to producing them in a shallow swimming pool, Clarens said, so all of the nutrien nitrogen and phosphorus -- needed to keep them alive and boost their production come from outside sources. And that fertilize environmental impact because it's often made from petroleum feedstocks, Clarens said. "If you grow corn, you rotate the field with soybeans so you get nitrogen fixation," Clarens said. "You still have to fertilize a lot, but if you're growing algae ... all that fe to come from you, and the fertilizing demands are much higher." **Carbon dioxide also contributes to algae's environme footprint. Algae use sunlight and water to convert carbon dioxide into materials that can be easily converted i But that CO2 has to come from somewhere, Clarens said. And until it's economical to pull it out of coal-fired p plant smokestacks or other industrial sources, it comes from petroleum-based sources, as well. Algae produc some other negative environmental impacts, Clarens said. For one, to convert algae into fuel, producers centr algae-laden water to separate the two, and that takes "a fair amount of energy," Clarens said. But Clarens and colleagues aren't writing off algae as a potential future energy source "We wanted to point to areas where alg performs poorly so we'll have a bit of a road map if we do decide to go down the algae road," Clarens said**. The industry has called for life-cycle assessments and is working on its own complete analysis, Mary Rosenthal, executive director o Biomass Organization, said in an e-mailed statement. She said her organization had not had time to fully review the paper and comment on it specifically. "

Desalination is Harmful to Environment

Francis 13

(Katie Francis, 2013, Greenopedia Inc. "Desalination of Seawater Can Do More Harm than Good" Online: http://greenopedia.com/article/desalination-seawater-can-do-more-harm-good)

Ocean desalination plants are located just off the coast, where their intake pipes suck in billions of fish, eggs, and other small organisms every day, along with the seawater. Once these living organisms enter the machinery of the desalination plant, they are killed. This represents a huge loss of life and could potentially destroy entire ecosystems. Additionally, the **high energy levels needed to run these plants may also contribute to environmental problems.** The **desalination process requires huge amounts of electricity** to separate drinkable water from dissolved salts and other minerals. **Burning fossil fuels is the most common method of attaining this energy, which, of course, contributes to air pollution and the greenhouse gas effect.** In addition to the machines themselves, **another serious environmental concern is the quality of the water put back into the ocean after the drinkable water is collected. This outflow is called brine because of its extremely high salt content** (all of the non-salty water has been removed). **Not only does brine have more salt than natural seawater, it also commonly contains leftover chemicals and metals from the treatment process. Components of brine and their related environmental issues include: Chlorine: interacts with preexisting chemicals to form carcinogens and mutagens. Acids: damage the tissues of organisms. Products used for machinery upkeep: cause algal blooms and eventual loss of oxygen in the area. Heavy metals: accumulate at the bottom of the ocean where sea creatures ingest them and eventually pass them to humans, where they could be toxic.**

Nuclear Power Ships Are Fatal

Greenpeace 14

(Greenpeace USA, 2014, Washington D.C., Environmental Organization, "No New Nukes",

Online: http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/campaigns/nuclear/)

Nuclear power is neither safe nor clean. There is no such thing as a "safe" dose of radiation and just because nuclear pollution is invisible doesn't mean it's "clean." **If a meltdown were to occur, the accident could kill and injure tens of thousands of people, leaving large regions uninhabitable.** And, more than 50 years after splitting the first atom, science has yet to devise a method for adequately handling long lived radioactive wastes. **For years nuclear plants have been leaking radioactive waste from underground pipes and radioactive waste pools into the ground water at sites across the nation. In addition to being extremely dangerous, the continued greenwashing of nuclear power from industry-backed lobbyists diverts investments away from clean, renewable sources of energy. In contrast to nuclear power, renewable energy is both clean and safe.** Technically accessible renewable energy sources are capable of producing six times more energy than current global demand. From the dawn of the nuclear age, it has been recognized that nuclear power and nuclear weapons are inextricably linked. **The spread of nuclear technology and ultimately nuclear weapons undermines our national security and the security of the planet.** Add to that the very real risks of nuclear meltdown. If a meltdown were to occur the accident could kill and injure tens of thousands of people, leaving large regions uninhabitable. **After the events of September 11th, the risk of a nuclear reactor meltdown must encompass not only the potential for an accident but also the very real possibility of sabotage. And if all that weren't enough, more than 50 years after splitting the first atom, science has yet to devise a method for adequately handling long lived radioactive wastes.**

Not Lifton

Hegemonic assumptions cede power to the sovereign American empire that necessitates violence under the auspices of freedom and equality

Markwick 10—Michael Markwick, Lecturer at Simon Fraser University, Ph.D candidate in philosophy at Simon Fraser University [Spring 2010, "Terror and Democratic Communication," Ph.D Dissertation, http://summit.sfu.ca/item/9989]

Far from living in a post-metaphysical era, I believe Connolly is correct in his assertion that every "**political interpretation projects presumptions about the primordial character of things**". (Connolly, 1993: 1) There is, therefore, a caesaropapist effect in the liberal narrative of public neutrality; it provides plausible cover for the construction of dominant, history-ending definitions about what it means to be human. Instead of building a political culture beyond metaphysics—the purely procedural and inclusive political culture, democratic in the equal freedoms it accords for **our private fulfilment in seeking the good individually**—this narrative **allows sovereign power to enforce its edict about the nature and purpose of human life**. **The** post-metaphysics **feint allows a political culture to develop** 200 **and enforce the limits of the political community, setting the bounds between the citizen and the alien, and the community of life itself, setting the bounds between human and subhuman, the quick, the dead and the expendable. It is the means by which sovereign power bifurcates human existence**, producing on the one hand politically qualified life—the citizen made in its own image—and, on the other, bare life, the human organism. Political liberalism's restraint about the big questions, its concern to create maximal space for our individual, creative self-fashioning, is part of its edict about the "primordial character of things". **Instead of standing against republicanism, political liberalism works symbiotically with the** republican **project of defining the national character,** the way of life, of a democratic people. **Together they confer freedom and equality on the terms of** sovereign **power, not on the terms of conscience**. **They set the bounds of** democratic **communication, and remove** from the function of citizenship public **deliberation about existential questions**. There is no return through political liberalism to classical politics, the sharing in self-governance of a democratic people through the scrupulous separation of public and private life, of political life and organic life. Instead, **citizenship becomes the constructed acceptance of** a **synthetic freedom and equality, synthetic because freedom and equality under sovereign power are not the fruit of** the operation of **conscience**; **they are**, instead, the **doctrines of the state policed by violence**. Citizenship becomes sovereign power's imposition of a doctrinal closure on the debate about what it means to be human, because the definition of who is a citizen carries with it the power to define who is and who is not human. This places citizenship at odds against conscience and its principal function of continually discerning the meaning and purpose of human existence; sovereign power 201 might simulate conscience, but it cannot replace the restless human work in conscience of examination and deconstruction. I will argue below that the persistence of this unexamined, dominant metaphysics allows the continuing ascendance of the security regime. Further, **the political effect of this metaphysics is to consolidate power in the messianic presidency**. **A great deal of authoritative work has been done to map** the contours of, and at times laud, **the "imperial presidency",** with reference to the global reach of the executive branch in the United States. (Schlesinger, 1989) In the words of Michael Ignatieff, "Yet **what word but 'empire' describes the awesome thing that America is becoming**?" (Ignatieff, 2005) **My concern is the biopolitical dimension this office now assumes;** I believe the claim it makes to validate human life as such, to "touch the soul" of the citizen, to be the agent of a divine plan in the unfolding of human history **suggest a presidency that is not simply imperial in its self-understanding but messianic.** I will suggest that a biopolitical reading of the war on terror gains ground in deconstructing the covert ontology of what passes for democratic political culture, moving the analysis from ideology and discipline to the messianic powers of vivification and vivisection. **Ostensible neutrality** "about the primordial character of things" **is the shell within which the messianic presidency quickens, rising to primacy over constitutional governance in the United States**. The Obama White House does not represent a break with this phenomenon; it does not return the Office of the President to the proportions the framers of the republic entrenched constitutionally. Instead, through its reinvigorated prosecution of the war on terror**, the Obama White House represents the next phase in the maturation of the messianic presidency.**

Even if they are right that hegemony reduces conflict, the process of attaining power increases conflict – history proves

Human Security Report Project, an independent research center @ Simon Fraser University of Vancouver, 2011

(*Human Security Report Project,* "Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War," http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR20092010/20092010HumanSecurityReport-Part1-CausesOfPeace.pdf, accessed 7-19-14 bh@ddi)

As with other realist claims, **there are reasons for skepticism about the peace through preponderance thesis.** First, **if it were true, we** might **expect that the most powerful states would experience the least warfare.** However, **since the end of World War II, the opposite has in fact been the case**. Between 1946 and 2008, t**he four countries that had been involved in the greatest number of international conflicts were France, the UK, the US, and Russia**/USSR.19 **Yet, these were four of the most powerful conventional military powers in the world— and they all had nuclear weapons. The fact that major powers tend to be more involved in international conflicts than minor powers is not surprising.** Fighting **international war**s **requires the capacity to project substantial military power across national frontiers** and often over very long distances. **Few countries have this capacity; major powers have it by definition**. But there is a more serious challenge to the preponderance thesis. From the end of World War II until the early 1970s, nationalist struggles against colonial powers were the most frequent form of international conflict. The failure of the far more powerful colonial powers to prevail in these conflicts poses a serious challenge to the core assumptions of preponderance theories—and marked a remarkable historical change. During most of the history of colonial expansion and rule there had been little effective resistance from the inhabitants of the territories that were being colonized. Indeed, as one analyst of the wars of colonial conquest noted, "by and large, it would seem true that what made the machinery of European troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain."20 The ease of colonial conquest, the subsequent crushing military defeats imposed on the Axis powers by the superior military industrial might of the Allies in World War II, and the previous failure of the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations, to stop Fascist aggression all served to reinforce the idea that preponderance—superiority in military capability—was the key both to peace through deterrence and victory in war. But in the post-World War II world, new strategic realities raised serious questions about assumptions regarding the effectiveness of conventional military superiority. In particular, **the outcomes of the wars of colonial liberation, the US defeat in Vietnam, and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan demonstrated that in some types of conflict, military preponderance could neither deter nationalist forces nor be used to defeat them.** The outcomes of these conflicts posed a major challenge for preponderance theories. **While preponderance itself may reduce the risk of war, the process of trying to attain it increases the risk.** Not only did the vastly superior military capabilities of the colonial powers fail to deter the nationalist rebels from going to war but in every case it was the nationalist forces that prevailed. **The colonial powers withdrew and the colonies gained independence. Military preponderance was strategically irrelevant.** Writing about US strategy in Vietnam six years before the end of the war, Henry Kissinger noted: We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.21 For the nationalist forces, military engagements were never intended to defeat the external power militarily—that was impossible. The strategy was rather to seek the progressive attrition of the metropole's political capability to wage war— "will" in the language of classical strategy.22 In such conflicts, if the human, economic, and reputational costs to the external power increase with little prospect of victory, support for the war in the metropole will steadily erode and the pressure to withdraw will inexorably increase. But asymmetric political/military strategies were not the only reason that relatively weak nationalist forces prevailed over militarily preponderant colonial powers in the post-World War II era. In the aftermath of World War II, there had been a major shift in global norms with respect to the legitimacy of colonial rule—a shift that made crushing nationalist rebellions politically more difficult for the colonial powers. In 1942 Winston Churchill had defiantly declared that "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."23 Less than 20 years later, another British prime minister, Harold MacMillan, sounded a very different note: "The wind of change is blowing through this [African] continent and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it."24 The "wind of change" made crushing anticolonial uprisings fought in the name of self-determination politically difficult for the colonial powers who were after all signatories to the UN Charter that had strongly proclaimed the right to self-determination. Understanding this shift in global norms helps explain the failure of the colonial powers to prevail in the wars of colonial liberation. The anticolonial nationalists had history on their side, plus international political, and sometimes material, support from the US, from European countries that were not colonial powers, and, of course, from the Soviet Union. In many cases power was transferred to nationalist movements without any violence—fighting was often more about the timing of independence than its principle. **Traditional realist "peace through strength" theories, with their focus on the importance of material capability in deterring war, and winning if deterrence fails, and their deep skepticism about the importance of ideas as drivers of change in the international system, have never been able to provide compelling explanations for the strategic successes of militarily weak insurgents in national liberation wars.**

Kappler

Kappler

Their focus on the atrocities that the government creates trades off with recognizing our own personal complicity with violence. Only by refusing to make statements like "the United States Federal Government should" allows us to transform our own personal will to violence that is the root of their impacts

Susanne **Kappeler** (Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University) **1995** The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour, pg. 75-76)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. **The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all**. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen.5 'We are the war' - and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.6 On the contrary, **the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action**. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. **Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility — leading to the -well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens** — even more so those of other nations - **have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events** as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - **since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere**. Yet **our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a** Serbian general or a Croatian **president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action.** In particular, **it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions**. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. **For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything**, **say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation**; because we are not where the major decisions are made. **Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the** general, the prime minister, the **president**, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.'7 **'We are this war'**, however, **even if we do not command the troops or participate** in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, **in our 'non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments** or less than innocently taking

advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence

Focus on largescale politics absolves us of personal responsibility—triggers violence

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Prof @ Al-Akhawayn U, *The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior*, p. 10-11)

'We are the war' does not mean **that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively** and diffusely **by an entire society** - which would be equivalent to **exonerating warlords and politicians** and profiteers or, as, Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of' collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility **becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.** 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. **Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them** and to command such collective action. **We need to hold them clearly responsible** for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. **Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure** our sight in relation to **our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying** phenomenon, our so-called **political disillusionment. Single citizens** - even more so those of other nations - have **come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for** such **large-scale political events** as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - **since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that** indeed **we are not responsible** for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president **tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all**, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons- ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, **it seems to absolve us from** having to try to see any relation between **our own actions** and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions **and** our own **personal decisions**. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or- ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For **we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made.** Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of **mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were** the general, the prime minister, **the president**, the **foreign minister or** the **minister of defence**?' **Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out** in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, **in our** non-comprehension': our **willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking** and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't'- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others.' **We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us**, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according: to the structures and the values of war and violence. So if we move beyond the usual frame of violence, towards the structures of thought employed in decisions to act, **this** also **means making an analysis of action**. This seems all the more urgent as action seems barely to be perceived any longer. **There is talk of the government doing 'nothing'**, of its 'inaction', **of the need for action**, the time for action, the need for strategies, our inability to act as well as our desire to become 'active' again. We seem to deem ourselves in a kind of action vacuum which, like the cosmic black hole, tends to consume any renewed effort only to increase its size. Hence this is also an attempt to shift the focus again to the fact that we are continually acting and doing, and that there is no such thing as not acting or doing nothing. Rather, **the binary opposition of 'action' and 'no action' seems to** serve the simple evaluation of the good and the bad. We speak of being 'active' or wanting to be active again, where **be**ing active in its simple vacuity is 'good', 'doing nothing' is rather bad, and **where the quality of the action seems secondary to the fact of action as such**. Quite the reverse, however, if we analyse the past: there, having 'done' anything bears the danger of it having been bad, since the results are available for analysis. Consequently, analyses of the past tend to feature an abundance of victims, who as victims cannot by definition have done anything, and therefore cannot either be 'guilty'. While descriptions of our future actions are thus distinguished by their vacuity - saying nothing about the kind of activity and explaining nothing about its purpose - the past on the contrary seems to cry out for the

writing of histories that explain everything. In these rewritings of history asjustification, the mark of distinction for personal identity is no longer to have 'been active', but on the contrary, to have been the passive victim - if not of actual deeds by others, at least of circumstances. In other words, in the past we tend to have been passive, while in the future "we may become active. The present, however, is the eternal present in which we inhabit states of being, our identity.

Alts

Hulme Alt

Our alternative is to reject the Aff depictions of climate catastrophe

The alternative is possible and will galvanize massive environmental social change

Hulme (School of Environmental Science, UEA, Norwich and Tyndall Centre for Climate Change) **8**
(Mike, (2008), The conquering of climate: discourses of fear and their dissolution. The Geographical Journal, 174: 5–16)

> Whichever ways our fears of the climatic future have emerged from the wider cultural settings and trends of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries – and all of the above cultural readings of climate change are in need of further exploration (see Hulme 2008) – it is the argument of this essay that it is **only through further cultural change**, working on and through material processes, that the contemporary discourse of climatic catastrophe will be dissolved. As the naturalistic causal turn of the nineteenth century dissolved the fear of climate rooted in unknown causes and the technology and hyper-mobility of the twentieth century weakened and defused the fear of unknown climatic spaces, so we will find new cultural movements and new hierarchies of power changing the discourse of fear about unknown climatic futures. Our relationship with climate will change again, whilst attempts at engineering the climate of the future, at conquering climate through mastery of the material world, will yield but minor successes. As Boia (2005) implies, the battles over climate change occur as much in the cultural and individual imagination as in the atmos- pheric spaces in which physical climates are formed. So there are other possible cultural readings of climate change, poorly explored in the research liter- ature, which do not connote with fear of catastrophe. Climate change and the unknown future look very different when seen, for example, through the cultural eyes of dryland pastoralists in Africa, South Pacific islanders or the Canadian Inuit (see Strauss and Orlove 2003); climatic catastrophe may not feature within these frames. And the ideas about the domestication of nature explored by Kareiva et al. (2007) offer another way of reading our relationship with climate, a reading which recognises climate as a hybrid entity emerging inescapably from the reflexive shaping of Nature and culture. New ideas, ideologies and powers will emerge and shape new discourses of climate, discourses located in the new dominant cultural movements of the future. Alignments between ideologies, techno- logies and cultural movements can change more rapidly than can the physical climate (Ungar 1992; Dalby 2007). There is a future beyond ecological modernisation. Globalism, neoliberalism and the 'war on terror' will not be with us for ever. Neither may climate catastrophe, at least in its current constructed form. As Terry Eagleton bluntly puts it: It is the hard-nosed pragmatists who behave as though the World Bank and caffe latte will be with us for the next two millennia who are the real dreamers, and those who are open to the as yet unfigurable future who are the true realist. Terry Eagleton (13 June 2005) Through all of this, humanity will retain its precarious and ambiguous relationships with climate, relation- ships which have a long history and an unknown future. The prediction of future climates will remain tantalisingly out of our grasp, just as the prediction of the path of human cultural development on this planet will remain elusive. Rather than seeking to conquer climate, we should be aiming to celebrate climate and respect it as part of ourselves.

Foust Alt

Our alternative is to reject the Aff's representations of climate catastrophe

As communication scholars we have an obligation to determine effective rhetorical strategies for our policy proposals – apocalyptic reps of climate change must be rejected as an utter failure

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

> In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change.The apocalyptic frame, particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions. Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. Together, we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity.

Local Focus First

Solves the problems with apocalyptic frame

Brace and Geohegan (Profs at University of Exeter) **11**
(Catherine Brace and Hilary Geoghegan, Human geographies of climate change: Landscape, temporality, and lay knowledges, Prog Hum Geogr 2011 35: 284 online 20 August 2)

> In this paper, we have outlined an agenda for tak- ing forward work on landscape in cultures of cli- mate change. Taking landscape, temporalities and lay knowledges as our organizing themes, we have set out an emergent cultural geography of climate and the ways it might change, and examined how it might be grounded and loca- lized through the concept of familiar – embodied, practised and lived – landscapes of everyday life. In this final section, we draw out three important conclusions to take this work forward. First, a focus on landscape gives substance to the widely cited assertion that human geogra- phers are uniquely positioned to study the social, cultural, ethical and political impacts of climate change. Although Hulme (2008: 8) notes that 'Geographers are well placed to do the imagina- tive yet meticulous work of revealing the local roots of climate meanings', landscape (as under- stood by cultural geographers) has not been recognized as a means by which this is to be achieved. Landscape provides a way of making climate relevant as a physical and intellectual artifact and an embodied and experiential pro- cess, and thereby providing the means to imag- ine climate and the ways it might change. It does the work of 'allowing climate to travel and cross scales without losing . . . essential anchors and narratives' (Hulme, 2008: 8). A focus on familiar landscapes offers that opportunity for engagement and understanding using a scale and rhetoric accessible to scientists, the public and active groups of green/climate change citizens. As a richly theorized concept, landscape enables us to study present-day and future questions of citizenship and responsibility, cultural histories, contested imaginaries, scientific interpretations and physical manifestations of climate change. Moreover, a concern with landscape helps us to

're-balance spatial insensitivities in current academic debates' (Bailey, 2008: 420), not only on climate policy, as Bailey argues, but on climate change more generally. In this sense, our 'ground' in this paper is physical, metaphorical and discursive. Second, a more grounded approach to climate change insists on a greater sensitivity to questions of scale, both spatial and temporal. A concern with local and familiar landscapes helps us to understand how people connect with the life cycles of geology, weather, plants and animals and envision the real or imagined, current or pro- jected impacts of climate change on them. To paraphrase Grosz, writing about biology, climate occupies a space between the natural and the cultural (in as much as these categorizations are useful), and our understanding of how climate might change is 'opened up by the transformation the cultural enacts or requires' (Grosz, 2004: 1). Contemplating individual action in relation to self and place also entails thinking about time. We argue for a future-orientated temporality commit- ted to openness that sets aside the relatively deter- ministic understandings of climate and the ways it might change offered by the natural sciences. Through this theoretical lens, it may be possible to see the development of environmental knowl- edge in which individual, group, community and government actions are renegotiated in the light of new understandings about climate and the ways it might change. Third, combining landscape with the open- ness of futurity entails valuing lay knowledges differently. Those who live and work in these landscapes should be our concern, along with how they understand, imagine, witness and experience weather and place changing over time (Cresswell, 2003; Lorimer, 2006) and how such knowledges and practices encounter and modify or are modified by climate science. Further research might ask how these relatively unfamiliar lay knowledges, often dismissed by 'experts', could contribute to the study of climate by natural scientists, the organization and implementation of environmental and social policy on climate change, as well as the emer- ging body of work on the culture of climate and the ways it might change. In sum, climate change is a relational phenomenon that needs to be understood on a local level, attending to its distinctive spatialities and temporalities.

Comedic Frame Alt Solvency

I mean it solves I guess…

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) **9**
(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

As a frame, apocalyptic comedy may promote agency on the issue of global warming more than tragic polarization. The comic frame promotes humanity as mistaken, rather than evil. As such, comic discourse allows some space for bringing ideologically disparate communities together. To the extent that humanity is mistaken, it has agency for making different choices which may lead to different outcomes. Time is open-ended, with human intervention possible. Humanity is less likely to be resigned to its fate, and, as such, may be inspired to take steps to change.

However, it is important that we recognize the comic frame as "charitable, but not gullible" (Peterson, 1997, p. 44) in forming a collective will, particularly in light of the tendency to valorize comedy. Though comedy unifies communities and promotes possibilities, it may do so by appealing to hegemonic values rather than, for instance, fundamentally challenging the neo-liberal logic which justifies exploitation of the earth (Kinsella, 2008). Comic fluidity must not be taken as an excuse to justify doing nothing about global warming, or to maintain the status quo.

As Moser and Dilling (2004) argue, one of the greatest challenges facing a movement to mitigate global warming is the communication of urgency. Rhetors must strike a balance between framing global warming as cataclysmic, or simply inconvenient-something which does not require immediate action. To strike this balance, we must avoid the tragic tendencies of apocalyptic discourse, while effectively promoting human agency. As a starting point to constituting audiences as active advocates and participants, we suggest three comic strategies. First, to combat tragic divisiveness, rhetors may link the concerns of global warming to discourses already in existence and of importance to different stake-holders (Leiserowitz, 2007). For instance, articulating climate change to energy independence (from "foreign oil") may prove powerful in building identification between (American) "naysayers" and environmental advocates.

Second, we believe that careful attention to the various perspectives on time scale may combat tragic apocalyptic risk, which leads to resignation (or at least inaction). In particular, we advise rhetors to avoid framing their estimates in terms of

ultimatums, which exacerbate a tragic denial of human agency. Rather than threatening that the public must "act in ten years or face an apocalypse," rhetors may rearticulate the current crisis as an opportunity to avoid potential disaster for our families and communities. Communication scholars and climate scientists must work together on the difficult task of providing appropriate perspectives toward time, such that readers may experience the urgent effects of global warming as something they have opportunities to manage.

Finally, rather than maintaining the tragic apocalyptic assumptions that global warming is fated by the cosmos, rhetors may frame narratives to promote human agency. Instead of beginning stories with mysterious rises in carbon dioxide concentrations, journalists should focus on global warming as it relates to human activities, such that human agency is at the heart of the narrative. A comic apocalyptic scenario casts humans as mistaken, in need of-and capable of-correction. Reframing the tragic apocalypse cannot end with vaguely interpretive or individualized agency. While becoming educated and expressing one's support for the growing coalition are important, in order to reduce emissions, such agency must be joined by concrete changes in our daily routines. Furthermore, while small behavioral changes (such as installing compact fluorescent light bulbs) are important to prepare individuals for the major changes to come, they must be connected to collective efforts and structural changes. To positively influence the global warming narrative, rhetors should, for instance, stress human agency in a number of sites, from altering heating and cooling practices; advocating for and using mass transit, bicycling, walking, and tele-commuting; to public support for funding alternative energy infrastructure.

Climate Conflict Reject Alt

Human security is better and stuff

Hartmann (Director, Population and Development Program, Associate Professor, Development Studies, Hampshire College) **9** (Betsy "From climate refugees to climate conflict: who is taking the heat for global warming?" In Climate Change and Sustainable Development: New Challenges for Poverty Reduction, Salih M (ed.). 2009. p. 155)

Today there are many scholars in the field, advocates in the policy arena and activists on the ground promoting a different approach to climate change. That approach puts poverty reduction, equity, human rights and sustainable development at the centre of the debate. How to make vulnerable communities more resilient in the face of climate change; how to ensure that new energy and resource policies raise the living standards of the poor rather than line the pockets of the rich; how early warning systems and disaster response can be organized better to meet the human needs and respect the human rights of those affected: these are the real challenges, both in the global North and global South. Climate change poses a serious threat, but it also presents an opportunity to rethink development. That rethinking requires that we look critically at old ideas that restrict our vision. This chapter has questioned the problematic reasoning and racialized assumptions underlying commonly accepted discourses about environmentally induced migration and conflict. All too often these discourses ignore history, power relations and political economy, ascribing to nature what is essentially manmade. They are overly simplistic and the world is, for better or worse, a very complex place. We need to embrace that complexity to find workable solutions to the multiple problems posed by climate change. Sustainable development should focus on enhancing livelihood security, not national security. In the climate change arena, the appeal to the high politics of national security is low politics. It scapegoats and demonizes the people who bear the least responsibility for global warming and who are the most vulnerable to its effects. Solutions lie not in beating the war drums, but in finding ways to work across borders of race, class, gender, ethnicity and nationality, in peace.

*****Aff Ans*****

Catastrophe Good

The 1ac's narrative of environmental risk is motivating and drives individual activism

Veldman 12 – PhD Candidate Religion and Nature at U of Florida
(Robin- National Foundation Fellow at the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship, Spring, "Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists" Ethics and the Environment, Vol 17 No 1, ProjectMuse)

Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism.¶ Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several "interpretive communities," which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled "alarmists," described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as "Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation," "Heat waves, it's gonna kill the world," and "Death of the planet" (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. **To the contrary**, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists "were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions" (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid).¶ Further supporting Leiserowitz's findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled "the Alarmed" (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) "are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response" (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that "[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)" (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.¶ National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior.¶ When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: "As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary" (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as "monkeywrenching," or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional "paper monkeywrenching" (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together.¶ The connection between belief in impending disaster and

environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting "dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration" (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia's impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior:¶ images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212)¶ What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative.¶ All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement's history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8]¶ The Apocalyptic Narrative as a Framework for Moral Deliberation¶ In discussing how apocalypticism functions within the environmental community, it will be helpful to analyze it as a type of narrative. I do so because the domain of narrative includes both the stories that people read and write, as well as those they tell and live by. By using narratives as data, scholars can analyze experiential and textual sources simultaneously (Polkinghorne 1988; Riessman 2000).¶ To analyze environmental apocalypticism as a type of narrative is not to suggest that apocalyptics' claims about the future are fictional. Rather, it is to highlight that the facts to which environmentalists appeal have been organized with particular goals in mind, goals which have necessarily shaped the selection and presentation of those facts. Compelling environmental writers do not simply list every known fact pertaining to the natural world, but instead select certain findings and place them within a larger interpretive framework. Alone, each fact has little meaning, but when woven into a larger narrative, a message emerges. This process of narrativization is essential if a message is to be **persuasive** (Killingsworth and Palmer 2000, 197), and has occurred not only in the rapidly expanding genre of environmental nonfiction, but in much scientific writing about the environment as well (Harré, Brockmeier, and Mühlhäusler 1999, 69).¶ What defines narratives as such is their beginning-middle-end structure, their ability to "describe an action that begins, continues over a well-defined period of time, and finally draws to a definite close" (Cronon 1992, 1367). Here I will focus on the last of these elements, the ending, because anything we can learn about how endings function within narratives in general will be applicable to the apocalypse, the most final ending of all.¶ An ending is essential in order for a story to be complete, but there is more to it than this. Endings are also key because they establish a story's moral, the lesson it is supposed to impart upon the reader. In other words, to know the moral of the story, auditors must know the consequences of the actions depicted therein, so there can be no moral without an ending. To take a simple example, when we hear the story of the shepherd boy who falsely claims that a wolf is attacking his flock of sheep in order to entertain himself at his community's expense, what makes the lesson clear is that when a wolf does attack his flock, the disenchanted town members refuse to come to his aid. By clearly illustrating how telling lies can have [End Page 9] unpleasant consequences for the perpetrator, the ending reveals the moral that lying is wrong. As Cronon explains, it is "[t]he difference between beginning and end [that] gives us our chance to extract a moral from the rhetorical landscape" (1992, 1370).¶ Endings play a similar role in environmental stories. In Al Gore's book Earth in the Balance (1992), for example, he devotes over a third of the book's

pages to presenting scientific evidence that disaster is imminent.5 As he sums it up, "Modern industrial civilization…is colliding violently with our planet's ecological system. The ferocity of its assault on the earth is breathtaking, and the horrific consequences are occurring so quickly as to defy our capacity to recognize them" (1992, 269). He builds this argument so carefully precisely because if the ending does not seem credible, the moral he wants readers to draw from the story will not be compelling. If his readers are not convinced that the ending to this story of ecological misbehavior will be a debacle of colossal proportions, they will not become convinced that they need to dramatically alter their ecological behavior. Thus the vision of future catastrophe that Gore presents provides a crucial vantage point from which the present environmental situation can be understood as the result of a grand moral failure, and Gore's readers are made aware of their obligations in light of it. Gore himself appreciates the importance of this recognition, arguing that "whether we realize it or not, we are now engaged in an epic battle to right the balance of our earth, and the tide of this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join an all-out effort" (1992, 269, emphasis added). Here, as in so many other stories, the ending must be in place for the moral to become clear.¶ To say that endings are essential in order for stories to have morals is already to hint that stories alter behavior, that they can encourage action in the real world even as they invoke an **imaginary** one. This much is clear from Earth in the Balance (1992): Gore does not just want people to grasp a moral, to perceive some ethic in the abstract—he wants them change their behavior in the here and now. In constructing a narrative with this goal in mind, he is banking on the ability of powerful stories to motivate social change, to be, as Cronon puts it, "our chief moral compass in the world" (1992, 1375).¶ Mark Johnson's insightful synthesis of cognitive science and philosophy helps explain further how this process of moral guidance occurs. For [End Page 10] Johnson, narrative is fundamental to our experience of reality, "the most comprehensive means we have for constructing temporal syntheses that bind together and unify our past, present, and future into more or less meaningful patterns" (1993, 174). Narratives are also critical to our ability to reason morally, an activity which Johnson asserts is fundamentally imaginative. In this view, we use stories to imagine ourselves in different scenarios, exploring and evaluating the consequences of different possible actions in order to determine the right one. Moral deliberation is thus¶ …an imaginative exploration of the possibilities for constructive action within a present situation. We have a problem to solve here and now (e.g., 'What am I to do?'…. 'How should I treat others?'), and we must try out various possible continuations of our narrative in search of the one that seems best to resolve the indeterminacy of our present situation. (1993, 180)¶ Put another way, what cognitive science has revealed is that from an empirical perspective the process of moral deliberation entails constructing narratives rooted in our unique history and circumstances, rather than applying universal principles (such as Kant's categorical imperative) to particular cases. That we use narratives to reason morally is not a result of conscious choice but of how human cognition works. That is, insofar as we experience ourselves as temporal beings, a narrative framework is necessary to organize, explain, and ultimately justify the many individual decisions that over time become a life. Formal principles may be useful in unambiguous textbook cases, but in real life "we can almost never decide (reflectively) how to act without considering the ways in which we can continue our narrative construction of our situation" (Johnson 1993, 160). Empirically speaking, "our moral reasoning is situated within our narrative understanding" (Johnson 1993, 180, italics in original).¶ The observation that people use narratives to reason morally may help explain the association between environmental apocalypticism and activism. The function of the apocalyptic narrative may be that it helps adherents determine how to act by **providing a storyline** from which they can imaginatively sample, enabling them to assess the consequences of their actions. In order to answer the question, "Should I drive or walk to the store?" for example, they can reason, "If I walk, that will reduce my carbon footprint, which will help keep the ice caps from melting, saving humans and other species." It is their access to this narrative of impending [End Page 11] disaster that makes such reasoning possible, for it provides a simple framework within which people can consider and eventually arrive at some conclusion about their moral obligations.6 More broadly, it can guide entire lives by providing a narrative frame of reference that imbues the individual's experiences with meaning. For example, it is the context of looming anthropogenic apocalypse which suggests that dedicating one's life to achieving a healthier relationship with the natural world is a worthwhile endeavor. Absent the apocalypse, choices such as limiting one's travel to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, becoming vegetarian, working in the environmental sector (often for less compensation), or growing one's own food could seem to be meaningless sacrifices. Within this context, on the other hand, such choices become essential features of the quest to live a moral life.¶ The apocalyptic narrative is but one of many ways to tell the environmental story, yet it is one that seems **particularly well-suited** to encouraging **pro-environmental behavior**. First, the apocalyptic ending discloses certain everyday decisions as moral decisions. Without the narrative context of impending

disaster, decisions such as whether to drive or walk to the store would be merely matters of convenience or preference. In the context of potentially disastrous consequences for valued places, people, and organisms, by contrast, such decisions become matters of right and wrong. Second, putting information about the environment into narrative form enables apocalyptics to link complex global environmental processes to their own lives, a perceptual technique Thomashow describes as "bringing the biosphere home" (2002). Developing this skill is essential because without that felt sense of connection to their own lived experience, people are much less likely to become convinced that it is incumbent upon them to act (2002, 2). Finally, the sheer magnitude of the impending disaster increases the feeling of responsibility to make good on one's moral intuitions. By locating individuals within a drama of ultimate concern, the narrative frames their choices as cosmically important, and this feeling of urgency then helps to convert moral deliberation into action. With this conceptual overview in place, we can now examine more closely what the relationship between apocalypticism and moral reasoning looks like in practice. [End Page 12]

Catastrophe Good Ext.

Catastrophic climate reps are key to action – 30 years of behavior research proves

Weber (Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University) **9**
(Elke, EXPERIENCE-BASED AND DESCRIPTION-BASED PERCEPTIONS OF LONG-TERM RISK: WHY GLOBAL WARMING DOES NOT SCARE US (YET), Climatic Change (2006) 77: 103–120)

It is instructive to place the risks of global warming into the two-dimensional space of Figure 1. To the extent that people conceive of climate change as a simple and gradual change from current to future values on variables such as average temperatures and precipitation, or the frequency or intensity of specific events such as freezes, hurricanes, or tornadoes, the risks posed by climate change would appear to be well-known and, at least in principle, controllable ("move from Miami to Vancouver when things get too hot or dangerous in Florida"). While some of the perceived control may be illusory, the ability or inability to take corrective action is an important component of vulnerability. It is only the potentially catastrophic nature of (rapid) climate change (of the kind graphically depicted in the movie "The Day after Tomorrow") and the global dimension of adverse effects which may create hardships for future generations that have the potential for raising a visceral reaction to the risk (see Leiserowitz, 2004).

Continues…

In conclusion, **behavioral decision research over the past 30 years strongly suggests that attention-catching and emotionally-engaging informational interventions may be required to engender the public concern necessary for individual or collective action in response to global warming**. Such interventions would need to be conducted with full awareness about unintended side-effects (like reductions in concern about other important risks) and in ways designed to help people overcome cognitive and affective capacity limitations (e.g., the single action bias). To the extent that time-delayed consequences of our actions do not attract the attention or generate the concern ex-ante that they would seem to warrant ex-post, behavioral decision research provides some corrective actions. The concretization of future events and moving them closer in time and space seem to hold promise as interventions that will raise visceral concern. Guided protocols by which decision makers consider arguments for conservation and climate change mitigation before they are allowed to consider arguments against such actions may help to improve the balance between the desire for immediate gratification and the goal of sustainable development. Finally, for at least a subset of the public, better (environmental) science and statistics education can create the familiarity with the scientific presentation of information and mental habits that will create citizens who give greater weight to the output of their analytic processing system, moving the risk perception of the general public and its officials closer to that of climate scientists. Failing these efforts, the problem discussed in this paper is ultimately self-corrective. Increasing personal evidence of global warming and its potentially devastating consequences can be counted on to be an extremely effective teacher and motivator. Unfortunately, such lessons may arrive too late for corrective action.

A2: Catastrophe → Fatalism/Inaction

As long as it coupled with a solution, apocalyptic reps aren't destructive

Feinberg and Willer (Psychology Dept and Sociology Dept, UC Berkeley) **11**

(Matthew and Robb, Apocalypse Soon? Dire Messages Reduce Belief in Global Warming by Contradicting Just-World Beliefs, Psychological Science January 2011 vol. 22 no. 1 34-38)

> These results demonstrate how dire messages warning of the severity of global warming and its presumed dangers can backfire, paradoxically increasing skepticism about global warming by contradicting individuals' deeply held beliefs that the world is fundamentally just. In addition, we found evidence that such dire messaging led to a reduction in participants' intentions to reduce their carbon footprint—an effect driven by increased global-warming skepticism. Our results imply that because dire messaging regarding global warming is at odds with the strongly established cognition that the world is fair and stable, people may dismiss the factual content of messages that emphasize global warming's dire consequences. **But if the same messages are delivered coupled with a potential solution, the information can be communicated without creating a substantial threat to deeply held beliefs in a just world.** Our findings extend past research showing that fear-based appeals, especially those not coupled with a clear solution, can backfire and undermine the intended effects of the messages (Witte, 1992, 1994). In addition, our results complement recent research showing that framing environmentalism as patriotic can successfully increase proenvironmental behavioral intentions in individuals most attached to the status quo (Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010). Taken together, these findings emphasize the importance of framing global-warming messages so that they do not contradict individuals' deeply held beliefs. In addition, our results suggest that reducing individuals' just-world beliefs could result in decreased skepticism regarding global warming. Although we were able to manipulate just-world beliefs in Study 2, it remains to be seen how such beliefs could be changed in field settings over a longer period of time.

Pro-economic framing solves

Jost et al. (Dept of Psychology at NYU) **10**

(Irina Feygina, John T. Jost, and Rachel E. Goldsmith, System Justification, the Denial of Global Warming, and the Possibility of "System- Sanctioned Change", Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36(3) 326 –338, SAGE)

> Our third and final study provides encouraging evidence that system justification tendencies need not hinder the formation of pro-environmental intentions and behaviors. To the extent that we can encourage people to perceive environmentalism as a way of upholding (rather than threatening) cherished societal institutions and practices, it may be possible to transform resistance and inaction into constructive engagement. The key, it seems, is to characterize pro-environmental change as "system sanctioned," that is, as a desired, perhaps necessary, means of preserving the American way of life, and to com- municate that it is, among other things, patriotic to defend and protect natural resources. Under such circumstances, it is conceivable that many more citizens (including more of those who are presently skeptical) will embrace and begin to justify a new, more environmentally sound regime. Along these lines, Kay et al. (2002) found that people engage in anticipatory rationalization of the status quo so that as the perceived likelihood of an event increases, it is judged to be increasingly desirable. This aspect of system justification motivation may well give rise to stronger support for change in the face of pro-environmental legislation and economic initiatives, once they are perceived to be inevitable. The communication of information about environmental problems leaves much room for interpretational ambiguity, partly because of the novelty and complexity of the issues. Although this ambiguity has often contributed to confusion and misinterpretation, our findings suggest that it can also be used constructively. The philosophy that assumes an inher- ent opposition between the well-being of our social and especially economic systems and the natural environment is deeply flawed, at least in terms of its behavioral conse- quences. Our research suggests that people may be more open to pro-environmental initiatives than is commonly assumed. If including a brief message suggesting that envi- ronmentalism is patriotic and helps preserve our way of life can eliminate the negative effect of system justification, there is reason to hope that a more concerted campaign can succeed in creating the perception that caring about one's country (and its

socioeconomic institutions) is compatible with a concern for the natural world.

TOPIC LINKS

Wind Energy causes issues with aesthetics

Good 06

Justin Good, Cummings & Good Design, Human Ecology Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2006
© Society for Human Ecology, Human Ecology Forum, "The Aesthetics of Wind Energy" Online: http://www.humanecologyreview.org/pastissues/her131/good.pdf

There are, of course, non-aesthetic reasons to like or dislike wind farms, and it is important to distinguish the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic factors. **One might object to a proposed wind farm for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with, or are at best indirectly related to, aesthetics. One might, for example, be worried about the ways a proposed wind farm is going to harm migrating birds or local sea life, or about ways it might harm the regional economy by injuring neighboring farms or marinas or beaches or property values; or a tourist industry because of its disruption of the perceived natural amenity of the site. Or one might have concerns over a regulatory process involved in the planning and construction of the wind farm, which is granting private, corporate, profit-making control over a public trust resource** (Griscom 2002). **There are obvious connections to aesthetics in these objections; for example, worries about how a wind farm is liable to affect tourism are connected to an anticipated loss of visual amenity.** But in that case, the primary concern is economic, not aesthetic. The easiest way to single out the strictly aesthetic aspects of the wind farm question is to consider again the example from the beginning of the paper. There **we imagined the difference between someone who experiences the wind farm as beautiful and a second viewer who holds the same beliefs about wind farms as the first, but who perceives the wind farm as ugly.** I'll call the first person an aesthetic wind appreciator, because she literally sees the beauty of the wind farm and **the second, a NIMBY wind appreciator since the latter exemplifies a widespread attitude that otherwise ecologically-minded individuals have towards proposed wind farms: great idea, but not-in-my-backyard, because it's ugly!**

Industrial Wind Energy is a Security Issue

Linowes 11

Lisa Linowes, Founder and Executive Director of Industrial Wind Action Group, September 26, 2011, "Wind Energy and Radar: A National Security Issue" Online: http://www.masterresource.org/2011/09/wind-radar-national-security/

Military leaders are under pressure to not disrupt White House green energy policies even while green energy technology is disrupting our navigation aids and impairing U.S. national security. Washington has a track record of muzzling military testimony to protect its pet policies and political friends. Last week, Air Force Gen. William Shelton admitted he was pressured by the administration to change his testimony regarding LightSquared's network and its adverse impact on military space-based navigation systems. We applaud Shelton for not bowing to the pressure. But the military has not been honest about the effect wind turbine technology has on our national radar systems. **The fact is that our air space has been made less safe by turbines and our national security compromised because of a reckless policy of siting wind towers within 50-miles of radar installations. Military radar experts in the field know the damage that's been done.** But with the debate surrounding energy policy dominated by politics and money, the military has bowed to the pressure. The military services and federal agencies have conducted numerous studies on the radar question, as have multiple international military and private interests. **Not all studies agree on levels of severity and potential mitigations, but all agree that large scale industrial wind turbines have the potential to negatively affect military installations, radar, and navigation aids. The problem is easy to explain, but difficult to resolve. Since radar technology is designed to detect moving objects, spinning turbine blades create interference which degrades the signal. Wind towers carry a signal strength greater than a Boeing 747, so when the radar repeatedly sees the large return it cannot detect actual aircraft in the same area.** Large expenditures of time and funds have been allocated in pursuit of technical mitigations but so far the results are controversial. According to Raytheon lead radar engineer, Peter Drake, radar mitigation technology does not yet exist. "…These things [turbines] inside of 20 miles, look like a 747 on final approach," Drake said. The trick, he adds, "…is to somehow make them disappear, while still being able to see a real 747…we have not figured that out yet." **By 2008, nearly 40% of our long-range radar systems were**

compromised by wind turbines. Today, more than twice the wind capacity is installed and the problem of radar interference persists. The problem of radar interference first cropped up in the United States in early 2007 near Travis Air Force base in California. Two wind proposals were before the Solano County Planning Commission that would erect over one-hundred new turbines in the area. **The spinning blades resulted in smaller planes appearing to drop off the radar while others appeared when they weren't actually there.** Both Travis and the Solano County Airport Land Use Commission urged the planning commissioners to delay approving the projects, citing air safety and the need for more time to study the effects the towers had on navigation. In his letter to the County, **Colonel Steven Arquiette, commander of the 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis, warned: "…we have evidence indicating the wind turbines will create significant interference with the base's radar and could lead to potentially serious flight safety hazards in terms of planes dropping off radar, flight tracks on radar different from actual tracks and 'false targets' — planes the radar sees but aren't actually there."** The county heeded their concerns and agreed to the delay. Commissioner John Moore was particularly firm when he said "…If they can't fix it, it might never get done. Nothing happens unless the Air Force's problem gets fixed."

Wind turbines have problems with gearbox's
Sovereign Independent UK **2014"Wind Turbines: The Ghost in the Gearbox" Online: http://www.sovereignindependentuk.co.uk/2014/01/09/wind-turbines-the-ghost-in-the-gearbox/**

Industrial Wind turbines (IWT's) have a generic, long standing and apparently intractible problem with gearbox reliability. Many gearboxes need a rebuild within 5 -7 years instead of lasting 25 years as designed. Many suffer catastrophic failure within the 5-7 period or even earlier. Depending on the age of the turbine, a gear box failure may effectively write it off. **Even when repaired, these gearbox failures are highly expensive and often take out the turbine for months. Replacing the gearbox adds massively to the overall cost of the IWT. Manufacturers increase the cost to cover warranty repairs in the first 5 years.** When out of warranty, the cost of a maintenance contract sky-rockets, eventually to a point where the operation of the IWT becomes untenable.

Wind Energy Disrupts Environment

Ritter 14

Great Plains Windustry Project Lloyd Ritter, founder 2014, is the recipient of the Distinguished Service in Community Wind Award for 2014, "Why Wind Energy?"

Online: http://windustry.org/wind-basics/why-wind-energy

Aesthetics: People have widely varied reactions to seeing wind turbines on the landscape. Some people see graceful symbols of economic development and environmental progress or sleek icons of modern technology. Others **might see industrial encroachment in natural and rural landscapes.** There are many ways to minimize the visual impact of wind turbines, including painting them a neutral color, arraying them in a visually pleasing manner, and designing each turbine uniformly. **Sound: Wind turbines are not silent. The sounds they produce are typically foreign to the rural settings where wind turbines are most often used,** but as turbine technology has improved over the years, the amount of sound has fallen considerably. The sounds of wind turbines do not interfere with normal activities, such as quietly talking to one's neighbor.· **Biological Resource Impacts:** As with any construction project or large structure, **wind energy can impact plants and animals**, depending on the sensitivity of the area. **Loss of wildlife habitat and natural vegetation are the primary wildlife concerns associated with wind energy.** With modern turbines, mounted on tubular towers and whose blades spin only about 15 times per minute, bird collisions are now rare. Extensive environmental impact analysis is an integral part of project development to mitigate impacts as much as possible. The Audubon Society and Sierra Club both support wind energy development, because the environmental advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.· **Construction: Wind systems can involve the transportation of large and heavy equipment. This can cause a large temporarily disturbed area near the turbines. Erosion is another potential environmental problem that can stem from construction projects.** The single most reliable technique for limiting erosion is to avoid grading roads and to perform site reclamation post construction..

Environmental Security-Climate Change

Environmental Security is linked to Climate Change

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v011/11.3.detraz.pdfNicole **Detraz 11**Published by The MIT Press Global Environmental Politics, Volume 11, Number 3, August 2011,"Threats or Vulnerabilities? Assessing the Link between Climate Change and Security" pg. 106, Project Muse

The environmental security discourse is concerned with the negative impacts of environmental degradation for human beings. While environmental conoict is largely state-centric and can still directly be linked to military security, **environmental security is much more closely linked to notions of security at an individual level, or human security**. It is important to note**, however**, that **the concerns embedded in environmental security are more speciac than the general concept of human security, which can refer to anything that negatively impacts the safety and survival of humans.** In this discourse, the threat is located in negative consequences of environmental damage and those who are vulnerable are all human beings. This concept of human vulnerability is widely used in general discussions of global environmental change, and climate change in particular. According to Gaillard, much of the literature on vulnerability focuses on "the susceptibility to suffer damage in a potentially dangerous event, either natural, economic or political."[19] In the context of these debates, vulnerability stresses **the condition of humans being susceptible to individual and collective harm because of environmental change.** In general, environmental security is broader than environmental conoict because of the former's interest in issues concerning all of humanity and the latter's more focused concern with those susceptible to resource conoict. That being said, **environmental security does include a concern about the potential for conoict over resources**—however, this is not the only concern. **The deaning characteristic of the environmental security discourse** is that all authors who use it address the negative impact of environmental degradation for human beings.

We don't control threats so we need to have strategies for coping with threat perceptions

Knudsen 11 [Olav. F., Prof at Södertörn Univ College, Security Dialogue 32.3, "Post- Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization," p. 360]

In the post-Cold War period, agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parliaments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the post-Cold War period. Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this **emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat**. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, **threats** – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to 'real' phenomena, and they **refer to 'real' phenomena** now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. **Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening**. The point of Wæver's concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, 'One can view "security" as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.' The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Wæver's joint article of the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Wæver himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article. **This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns**. What has long made 'threats' and 'threat perceptions' important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Wæver first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent 'politics of panic', as Wæver aptly calls it. Now, here – in the case of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Wæverian bathwater.

When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Wæver's world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that **instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena 'out there' by reconceptualizing them**, as Wæver does, **we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states** (such as civil wars, for instance), **not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them**.

Environmental Conflict discourse

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v011/11.3.detraz.pdfNicole **Detraz 11**Published by The MIT Press Global Environmental Politics, Volume 11, Number 3, August 2011,"Threats or Vulnerabilities? Assessing the Link between Climate Change and Security" pg. 110, Project Muse

The primary storyline in the **environmental conflict discourse is the potential for violent conflict over resources. This fits into climate debates with talk of increased resources scarcity and competition over basic resources like water, energy sources, and food.** Many scholars and policymakers have focused particular attention on Africa as a region at risk for resource conflict as a result of climate induced resource scarcity. In particular, there has been a great deal of discussion over whether the conflict in Darfur is evidence of climate conflict. **Several texts** in the analysis **go so far** as **to suggest** that the **conflict in Darfur is a glimpse into potential environmental conflict that will become more widespread as climate-induced resource scarcities increase.** Despite this, most of the texts do not actually suggest that we will see all-out resource wars because of climate change. Instead, **most sources predict that climate-induced scarcity will exacerbate existing tensions and potentially enflame resource conflicts at the sub- state level.**

Environmental Issues are linked to Climate Change and Security

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v011/11.3.detraz.pdfNicole **Detraz 11**Published by The MIT Press Global Environmental Politics, Volume 11, Number 3, August 2011,"Threats or Vulnerabilities? Assessing the Link between Climate Change and Security" pg. 116, Project Muse

The reasons that **people link environmental issues to security discourses,** including to draw attention and as a policy strategy, are some of the same reasons that people get on the climate change bandwagon. **One of the most often-cited reasons for why climate change is securitized is that some see it as a way to capture attention and needed resources in order to benefit those who are the most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change**. For example, at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, environmental activist Wangari Maathai suggested that **Northern states might not act on climate change unless they are convinced of the severity of its impacts**. She stressed that "it is up to the developing world to convince them that the threat is real and it will face them too, despite their perceived invulnerability. **Climate change is an issue of security both locally and internationally**."70 This is a powerful example of the logic of using security language to shake Northern countries into action on climate change. However, there are some important implications of securitizing climate change that should be considered. Hartmann claims that despite lofty intentions of gaining attention for an important global issue, "spinning climate change as a security threat is likely to undermine, rather than strengthen, serious efforts to link climate change mitigation and adaptation to development efforts that reduce poverty and promote equity. Playing with fear is like playing with are. You cannot be sure exactly where it will spread."71 **This is why making strategic linkages between climate change and security should not be undertaken lightly**.72 It is clear that actors can frame climate change as a security issue for strategic purposes. However, it is important to consider the different outcomes that can emerge from using one discourse over another. This analysis has illustrated that while most texts tend to use a combination of environmental conflict and environmental security discourses, these discourses stress very different elements of the impacts of climate change. Additionally, it appears that the **human security concerns of climate change are typically being raised only in combination with state security or resource conflict concerns.** If the Copenhagen School is correct in its claims that securitizing an issue allows the state to take the lead role in implementing emergency measures for "security" issues, then using the environmental conflict discourse may result in states creating climate policy designed to promote state stability as its primary objective. This may leave addressing human vulnerability as a lower priority for climate policy.

ES Good – Military Impacts

No war impacts – warming discourse changes security discourse, not the other way around. International coop solves

de Brito (PhD Student, Department of Politics & International Relations; University of Southampton, United Kingdom) **11**
(Rafaela Rodrigues, A Climate for Conflict or Cooperation? Addressing the Securitisation of Climate Change, Paper prepared for the Third Global International Studies Conference, 17-20 August 2011, University of Porto, Portugal)

> Trombetta, however, argues that the logic of security itself can change as new principles, actors, capabilities and threats gain relevance and different security discourses emerge (2011: 142). In line with this reasoning, Detraz and Betsill identify two different discourses of climate change and security and argue that each produces distinct understandings and yields unique policy recommendations (2009: 305). According to the authors, while the environmental conflict discourse is directly linked to traditional understandings of military and state security, the environmental security discourse is more closely linked to notions of human security in which the protection of human welfare is central (Detraz and Betsill, 2009: 306). According to this line of thought, linking climate change and security does not inevitably imply linking it to military security. In the EU, although climate change is increasingly being framed as a security issue by key actors, both causes and effects are being dealt within the realm of normal environmental politics: adaptation and mitigation measures, with a commitment to climate research and international cooperation. What securitisation created was an increase sense of urgency attributed to climate change that is speeding the response to the issue (Brito, 2010: 48). Furthermore, there are no predictable signs that military responses to climate change will be formulated in a near future. This is not to say, however, that there is no role envisaged for the military in climate-security. In fact they are seen as key players in climate related crisis management and disaster response (High Representative for CFSP and the European Commission, 2008: 10). However, crisis response is but one component of EU action on climate change which attempts to combine prevention, mitigation, adaptation, and response to crisis (Council of the European Union, 2009: 3). The analysis of climate change politics in the EU suggests that Maria Julia Trombetta is correct when she argues that the securitisation of the environment is transforming existing security practices and provisions (Trombetta, 2008: 585). As Javier Solana argues, in the case of climate change, mitigation and adaptation should be seen as preventive security policies (Solana, 2008).

ES Good – Action/Co-op**

Warming discourse is key to action and international cooperation – does not lead to competitition

de Brito (PhD Student, Department of Politics & International Relations; University of Southampton, United Kingdom) **11**
(Rafaela Rodrigues, A Climate for Conflict or Cooperation? Addressing the Securitisation of Climate Change, Paper prepared for the Third Global International Studies Conference, 17-20 August 2011, University of Porto, Portugal)

> One of the problems attributed to the state-centred approach is that, by enhancing the competition between states, it hinders cooperation, when climate change is a problem that cannot be managed by states individually. Rita Floyd, for example, argues that, from an environmentalist perspective, climate security is not a desirable concept as it may inhibit much needed cooperation between states (2008: 63). She makes the case against linking climate change and security, as she believes cooperation on climate action seems much more likely in the absence of securitisation (Floyd, 2008: 62). However, one can find in the international arena many examples of cooperation in security affairs. Even a traditionalist theoretical perspective on security such as the Liberal perspective acknowledges a potential for security cooperation. Looking at regional security institutions, Louise Fawcett accounts for an increase in

collaborative security ventures, typically with the UN, but also with other regional and cross-regional institutions, and also non-governmental organizations (2008: 308). She argues that although international security is an area in which institutionalist theories predicted that cooperation would be hardest to achieve, security cooperation has been achieved across a wide range of issues (Fawcett, 2008: 322). In the EU, structures of cooperation in the security field are being progressively developed. Consequently, the inclusion of climate change in the EU security agenda is compatible with the adoption of cooperative measures to address the issue. In fact, advocates of climate-security in the EU advocate cooperation as a necessity in order to tackle the issue. This cooperation is not only between member-states, but also with third parties. In their joint report on CCIS, the High Representative and the European Commission argued that "it is in Europe's self interest to address the security implications of climate change with a series of measures: at the level of the EU, in bilateral relations and at the multilateral level, in mutually supportive ways" (2008: 3). The 2008 review of the European Security Strategy also identifies effective multilateralism as essential to respond to the changing security environment. In this context, it identifies climate change as a key priority in international multilateral negotiations, with the objective of reaching a new and ambitious international agreement on climate change (European Union, 2008: 12). The EU recognizes that climate change cannot be tackled by individual states or the EU alone and is cooperating with countries most at risk with the goal of strengthening their capacity to cope. On this matter, the Union considers international co-operation, with the UN and regional organizations to be essential (European Union, 2008). In the follow up report, an intensified dialogue with third countries and organizations was one of the three main recommendations of the High Representative to deal with the security impacts of climate change (High Representative for CFSP, 2008: 2). Solana acknowledges European efforts to raise the issue of climate change and security in its dialogue with key global players and organizations and recommends further engagement. He urges the EU to focus on working with key global partners, such as the US, China, India, and Russia, sharing assessments and exploring potential for more cooperation on climate change and security. Moreover, the High Representative argues that the EU should cooperate with regions at particular risk, working to enhance resilience to cope with the security aspects of climate change, and key international organizations in order to achieve a coordinated response to the issue (High Representative for CFSP, 2008: 7). Also in the joint progress report on CCIS, it is acknowledged that managing the security implications of climate change "requires a global dialogue which creates the transparency and confidence needed to forge common policies and actions" (Council of the European Union, 2009: 2). It is argues that, if the response to the security implications of climate change is properly managed, it could provide opportunities for increased multilateral cooperation (Council of the European Union, 2009: 2). Conclusion Climate change has unequivocally entered the international security agenda. However, there is extensive debate on the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a link between climate change and security. On the one hand, the securitisation of climate change is acknowledged a positive role, mainly because it is seen to attribute a sense of urgency to the issue and consequently attract political support. However, on the other hand, there is a strong concern in the literature that linking climate change and security could represent a militarisation of the issue and lead to a state-centred approach to deal with it, hindering necessary cooperation to tackle the issue. Mostly focusing on the case of the EU, this paper has analysed the assumption of militarisation that is usually connected to securitisation. The paper has sought to demonstrate how security is no longer seen exclusively in military terms, as the securitisation of non-military issues, and notably climate change, is transforming security practices. In the EU, although climate change is increasingly being framed as a security issue, both causes and effects are being dealt within the realm of normal environmental politics, namely through adaptation and mitigation measures. **What securitisation created was an increase sense of urgency that is speeding the response to both causes and consequences of climate change**. The paper has also addressed the belief that handling climate change through a security framework prevents cooperation to address the issue. As the paper has attempted to demonstrate, there is wide agreement that the complexity of a threat such as climate change requires cooperation between various actors to effectively tackle the issue. The EU recognizes that climate change cannot be tackled by individual states or the EU alone and is cooperating with key global players and countries most at risk. This is the path the securitisation of climate change appears to be taking in the EU. If this path remains unaltered, the securitisation of climate change might be a positive development. Security attributes a sense of urgency to issues and attracts political support. This is good news in terms of resource allocation and policy prioritisation. As Brown et al. so eloquently put it, "a 'securitized' [sic] climate debate might be able to marshal sufficiently compelling arguments to encourage the politicians to do something about reducing emissions and investing (carefully) in adaptation. These are things the international community should be doing anyhow and, done well, are consistent with enhancing security and reducing the potential for conflict at all scales. So if securitization speeds their implementation, it will serve a useful purpose" (Brown et al., 2007: 1154).

A2: ES Bad – Perm

Perm solves their impacts – we can acknowledge warming is an existential risk but reject military securitization, rejecting warming threat wholesale leads to passivity and depoliticization

Corry (University of Cambridge) **11**
(Olaf, Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 8 November)

> Whereas a securitisation legitimates the defence of a valued referent object against an existential threat, a riskification renders an issue one of governing a valued referent object to control conditions of possibility for harm against it. Like threat discourses, riskifications, it was argued above, deal with potential harm, but they do so in terms of conditional causality – a kind of second-order security politics that focuses on the conditions of possibility for harm rather than on direct causes of harm. Theorising riskification like this maintains the integrity of the concept of securitisation and identifies a different mentality of governing that can be treated separately. Climate change may indeed one day become more securitised, for example if the idea that greenhouse emissions are an 'act of aggression' against climate-vulnerable societies is successful in defining the politics of climate change. This appeared to be the line Osama bin Laden was taking when he once remonstrated with Americans who he said 'have destroyed nature with your industrial waste and gases more than any other nation in history. Despite this, you refuse to sign the Kyoto agreement so that you can secure the profit of your greedy companies and industries', thereby linking climate change with violent assaults on Islam.116 However, such a securitisation is not currently the prevailing discourse on climate and security, even in military institutions – at least not in the sources often quoted as evidence of securitisations of climate change. A very different logic of political action ensues from current constructions of climate change as a risk-issue. This means that calls to de-securitise climate change may unwittingly be having a very different effect, **in effect shifting climate change away from a risk-paradigm towards a normalising or non-politicised logic**. This has happened because, hitherto, risk-security writing has tended to see 'risk' as a securitisation multiplier such that 'securitisation' rather than having a well-defined meaning, has come to be used to cover not just existential threat-based security politics but all forms of appeals to danger and harm. Trombetta117 and Brauch118 identify what they see as a conundrum in terms of 'securitisation' of the environment not leading to exceptional means and violence, but they still decide to include risk-politics in the concept of securitisation rather than preserve the Copenhagen School stipulations of existential threats and exceptional means. This conundrum is explicable if, with a more pluralistic lens, the complex field of security politics is not viewed as a grand dispositif of risk where risk simply expands securitisation. If we move beyond the dichotomy of 'normal' de-securitised politics versus 'emergency' securitised politics, policy implications from analysis of political logics can be more fine-grained and appropriate. The panoply of reactions to climate change can be seen in terms of both securitisation and riskification, highlighting separate logics. In terms of normative implications, risk theorists would claim that risk is just as insidious as traditional securitisation, if not more as it allows 'securitisation' on the basis of less-than-existential and merely potential dangers. While it may not necessarily lead to full-scale military attacks on an external enemy, it may be argued that riskification legitimates extensive and permanent measures, discrimination of those profiled as risky, and potentially oppressive governance of populations in the name of removing conditions of possibility for harm.119 However, this evaluation builds on risk being associated closely with securitisation – or indeed as a radicalisation of securitisation – which need not necessarily be the case. It is possible that riskification can coexist with securitisations leading to hyperbolic securitisation, but there has been a tendency to assume that any invocation of danger is 'a securitisation' and hence a bad thing politically.

A2: ES Bad – No War or Warming Impacts

Their war and totalitarianism impacts are a joke

de Brito (Programa de Mestrado em Relações Internacionais Especialização em Estudos da Paz e da Segurança) **9**
(Rafaela Rodrigues, Securitizing Climate Change: Process and Implications, Dissertation: Universidade de Coimbra Faculdade de Economia, Julho)

The Security dimension is more evident in the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the White Paper, entitled Impact Assessment (2009). Again, in the section dedicated to the external dimension of EU's adaptation measures, the security implications of climate change are addressed, through the inclusion of a sub-section dedicated to climate change's impacts on global security (European Commission, 2009c: 112). The Commission recommends that adaptation is "mainstreamed" in, i.e. becomes a customary component of, EU's external policies, particularly development cooperation, security and migration (European Commission, 2009b: 128). Despite these documents recognising of a security dimension in adaptation, no extraordinary measures are envisaged in any of them. There are no military measures defined to deal with the security implications of climate change, nor any radical instruments to address climate change, such as, for instance, the criminalisation of greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, adaptation is transformed into a security strategy, raising the urgency of its implementation. Furthermore, it is perceptible from the documents that the security implications of climate change will be dealt within the realm of normal politics, more precisely through **development aid cooperation policies**. With respect to mitigation it is also important to understand the impacts generated by the application of a mind-set of security to climate change. In an opinion article for The Guardian, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, argued that "saying that climate change poses security risks reinforces the need to stick to our [EU's] commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions" (Solana, 2008). Hence, mitigation policies can be seen as making part of a strategy to attain security. In this context, the EU declares to be committed to obtain a 2°C target in international negotiations. The 2007 communication from the European Commission entitled precisely Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius frames this target within a security concern. According to the document "strong scientific evidence shows that urgent action to tackle climate change is imperative (…) a failure to act will have serious local and global security implications" (European Commission, 2007b:3).

Debate Good/A2: Expertism

Public debate over global warming science are key to public engagement and challenging technocracy

Spoel et al. (Comms Profs @ Laurentian University) **9**

(Philippa Spoel, David Goforth, Hoi Cheu, and David Pearson, Public Communication of Climate Change Science:Engaging Citizens Through Apocalyptic Narrative Explanation, TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION QUARTERLY, 18(1),49–81)

These goals are consonant with the growing emphasis in environmental com- munication research and practice on the importance—indeed the necessity—of in- cluding citizens in environmental policy discussions and developments. Much of the recent literature on public participation in environmental policy-making has focused on deliberative democracy methods for directly engaging relatively small groups of citizens in science policy issues and debates (e.g., methods such as citi- zen forums, focus groups, community meetings, public hearings, public advisory committees, community-based participatory research, and so on). These are the fo- rums in which members of the public are encouraged to adopt and develop the identity of the scientific citizen. According to Mark Elam and Margareta Bertilsson (2002), scholars and practitioners in the public understanding of science—espe- cially in Europe—are increasingly working with "a vision of the public as capable of active and mature reasoning on technological [and scientific] issues" (p. 14). By contrast with earlier conceptualizations of the public as essentially passive recipients of expert-controlled scientific literacy, this emerging vision entails "the construction of new and more active forms of 'scientific citizenship' in support of knowl- edge-based community" (p. 4). These newer, more engaged forms of scientific citi- zenship are integral to the project of democratizing science and society relations by broadening public participation in policy deliberations and decision-making pro- cesses (Elam & Bertilsson, 2002; see also Irwin, 2001; Burgess et al., 1998). Although we agree that explicitly deliberative, participatory forums are essen- tial to the climate change policy process, we also think that the kind of public communication enacted by *An Inconvenient Truth* (*AIT*) and *Climate Change Show* (*CCS*) is integral to the development of the new scientific citizenry because it forms part of the broader sociodiscursive context within which citizens' knowl- edge and attitudes about climate change are shaped. By educating public audiences about climate change issues in accessible, engaging, and meaningful ways, these rhetorical works enable the development of public expertise on a topic of deep so- cial and ethical as well as scientific significance: helping to give people the means to participate in intelligent,

substantive conversation with others—whether that be family, friends, communities, environmental organizations, policy experts, or sci- entists—about climate change issues. In the context of environmental science and policy discussions, William Kin- sella (2004) argues that "to counter monolithic technocratic decision making, or better yet, to engage in productive collaboration with technical specialists, mem- bers of the public must have reasonable fluency in the language(s) of science" (p. 85). Kinsella calls this fluency "public expertise": "The ideal form of public exper- tise is technical competency acquired and used directly by affected citizens. Such competency need not, and cannot, replace the more specialized knowledge of tech- nical or policy professionals, but it can provide members of the public with an ade- quate foundation for genuine dialogue with these specialists" (p. 85; see also Tytler, Duggan, & Gott, 2001).

Securitization of the environment makes oppressive eco-totalitarian security state.

Daniel Deudney, political scientist and associate professor of Political science at Johns Hopkins University, 1999, Environmental Security: A Critique, Contested Grounds, edited by Daniel Deudney and Richard Matttew, p. 197

Expanding the security state also puts individual freedom at risk. As James Der Derian has pointed out, "to secure" also means, "to tie down" or "prevent from moving."' A "security jacket" protects by confining. **State actions to secure against a threat often involve erosion of individual liberty and greater restraint and oppression. Strong states have been the greatest source of security threats in the twentieth century: authoritarian and totalitarian states have murdered more of their citizens than died in all interstate wars, and most deaths in war occurred in conflicts started by aggressive authoritarian and totalitarian states.** Given this record, Eric Stern's agenda of "comprehensive security" and Norman Myers's agenda of "ultimate security" have a sinister potential.3° **Because almost all human activities affect the environment in some way or another, assigning states the task of environmental security could provide the foundation for an eco-totalitarianism. In short, a state providing comprehensive security will also assume total control.**

Reject affirmative's framing or discourse of environmental securitization in order to oust our current presumptions of enormous impacts.

Alan Klæbel(MSc in Political Science from the University of Copenhagen. He is a PhD fellow in international politics at the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. His main research areas are securitization theory and the social constitution of nternational relations.) 3/3/07
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/8/1/0/9/pages181092/p181092-1.php

Whether people accept the whole 'package' of The Day after Tomorrow or similar popular cultural products (movies, novels, TV-series etc.) or not, is not terribly important. The central issue is that these pop-cultural texts contribute as intertextual resources with their images and plots. **And when people hear a warning about 'global warming' or a speech act that seeks to securitize 'climate change' they will draw on the available textual resources** (plots, tropes, images) in order to bring meaning to that utterance. And **the texts they** will **invoke are the ones that most vividly let them 'experience' that future/hidden existence**. It is **here** that **popular culture plays such a significant role on the epistemic level with it's imaginations of secret worlds and future existences.** Furthermore, popular culture also plays a role regarding the praxeological dimension, that is, what needs to be done. As stated above, the main protagonist in the movie The Day after Tomorrow Jack Hall, attempts a securitizing move that strictly instructs the other characters and us, the audience, what to do. And so as the intertextual relation makes images available to our interpretation of other texts; other texts also make certain sets of actions and moral standpoints available, as illustrated with the case of intertextual relation between 24 and 'The War on Terror'. It is my claim that isolated each text (the

environmental discourse and the movie) would be ineffectual. **The security discourse would refer to hidden worlds and catastrophic futures that people would find exceedingly hard to imagine. And it would be even harder for them to accept these discourses as a basis for accepting the political and economic costs of a securitization. The movie on the other hand would in turn be seen as a hopelessly unrealistic catastrophe-movie** that could perhaps be enjoyed for its human drama, **but would not be experienced in terms of a broader meaning.** However, as these texts enter into intertextual relations with other texts and each other, these texts acquire significance beyond themselves; **the security discourse all of a sudden refers to easily invoked images of devastation, and the movie becomes more than just entertainment, but refers to futures we now experience as uncomfortably real.**

Warming Education Good

Infusing climate change education into debate should a priority – shapes our environmental consciousness – solves environmental harm

Boyes 12 - senior lecturer in education and chairman of the Board of Studies of the Centre for Lifelong Learning and director of postgraduate research in the Educational Development Division at the University of Liverpool. He is involved with a number of projects in the division, mainly involving statistical analysis. His current research interests include conceptual understanding of physical phenomena and the preconceptions that children, students, and adults hold about major environmental and health issues, including public concerns about scientific advances. He is a member of the Environmental Education Research Unit and has published widely on children's understanding of science and environmental education issues
(Eddie, first author on the Steering Committee, Climate Change Education, Climate Change Education in Formal Settings, K-14: A Workshop Summary, NAP)

America's Climate Choices (National Research Council, 2011a) describes key issues the nation faces in responding to climate change and developing strategies for mitigation and adaptation, noted Charles W. (Andy) Anderson (Michigan State University) in opening the workshop. The report articulates **two challenges for the formal education system: to prepare** scientists, leaders, and **practitioners with the needed expertise to address climate change issues, and** also **to prepare all citizens to become informed decision makers**. The report proposes that decisions about mitigation and adaptation be viewed in **a framework of** iterative **risk** management. That **is**, Anderson explained, **the optimal response** to climate change would be "an ongoing process of identifying risks and response options, advancing a portfolio of actions that emphasize risk reductions and are robust across a range of possible futures, and revising choices related to the climate over time to take advantage of new knowledge." The report does not call for a commitment to some particular course of action, Anderson noted. Instead, it asks for a commitment to understanding the implications of different courses of action and choosing in a deliberative way among them.¶ America's Climate Choices identifies key elements of an effective national response, Anderson explained, one of which is to develop institu- tions and processes that ensure that pertinent information is collected and that links scientific and technical analysis with public deliberation and decision making. **Deliberation and decision making are critical to effective responses to climate change**, Anderson emphasized, and thus **it is essential to prepare all citizens to understand the risks of both action and inaction and to engage in effective deliberation about all available choices**.¶ **The vital importance** of an informed citizenry **is illustrated**, Anderson noted, **in data** presented at the Roundtable on Climate Change Education's first workshop, **on the diversity of beliefs people hold about climate** change. In a series of studies that examined how the American public responds to climate change information, researchers categorized the public into "Six Americas"1: the six basic response categories are "dismissive," "doubtful," "disengaged," "cautious," "concerned," and "alarmed." "It's disturbing," Anderson observed, "that between 2008 and 2010 **public opinion shifted away from concerned toward dismissive**."¶ **An** even more **important issue** demonstrated in these studies, Anderson stressed **is that public understanding of factual issues related to climate change is distinctly limited** (National Research Council, 2011a). He stated that "as the evidence mounts, the controversy [about climate change] is inevitably going to die down" but noted that public deliberation becomes difficult or impossible when individuals choose their own facts, as well as their opinions and values, to interpret information. Anderson observed that in

the future the controversy may shift from whether climate change is occurring to what actions need to be taken to address it and pointed to the need to prepare today's children for a future in which **the basic facts of climate change are no longer controversial, and the consequences are real**.¶ CLIMATE CHANGE EDUCATION FOR A CHANGING WORLD¶ Two assumptions underlie the way many people approach the topic of climate change education, noted Daniel Edelson (National Geographic Society) in the keynote presentation: one is that such **education would begin with** components of the science education curriculum, and the other is that much of it would concern climate science and **the dynamics of climate change**. Although he supports the idea that young people need to learn about climate processes and the ethics of anthropogenic climate change, he has a different view of the best way to conceive of climate change education.¶ To explain his perspective, he listed **educational goals** that **are** widely shared in the climate change education community. Every graduate of the K-14 education system should understand¶ • **Fundamental processes that influence climate**, at scales ranging from local to regional to global.¶ • Natural variability and natural cycles in climate.¶ • **Human impact on the climate**—that is, how the growth in human population and technology has made it possible for human activity to change climate patterns at various scales.¶ • How changes in climate can and do influence physical systems, ecosystems, and society.¶ • **Why the scientific community is now convinced** that anthropogenic climate change is under way.¶ • What the range of effects of climate change is **and** how likely various **different scenarios of climate change** are under different conditions.¶ These ideas, he suggested, make up the common ground for educators who may have different perspectives on how to approach **climate change education**. People may draw different conclusions based on how this material should be covered in schools, but these basic **ideas are the foundation for informed debate and decision making** and thus provide a reasonable definition of climate literacy. He believes strongly that "**the future of society and earth's ecosystems do hang in the balance, and … will depend, ultimately on our success in preparing the next generation to make good decisions [related to] climate change**."

Climate-centered deliberation shapes out-of-round consumption decisions

Boyes 12 - senior lecturer in education and chairman of the Board of Studies of the Centre for Lifelong Learning and director of postgraduate research in the Educational Development Division at the University of Liverpool. He is involved with a number of projects in the division, mainly involving statistical analysis. His current research interests include conceptual understanding of physical phenomena and the preconceptions that children, students, and adults hold about major environmental and health issues, including public concerns about scientific advances. He is a member of the Environmental Education Research Unit and has published widely on children's understanding of science and environmental education issues
(Eddie, first author on the Steering Committee, Climate Change Education, Climate Change Education in Formal Settings, K-14: A Workshop Summary, NAP)

Adding climate change education on top of all that is already in the curriculum, in Edelson's view, is likely to yield a situation in which "some teachers do a great job with it, some teachers don't understand it or don't believe it and don't do it at all, and a lot of people will try to squeeze it in amongst a bunch of other competing priorities." Instead, he suggested, **it would be possible to work backward from an understanding of the tasks that young people will face when they leave school and establish educational priorities that will truly prepare them**. For example, Edelson emphasized, "**students should be able to make well-reasoned decisions about purchases of cars and major appliances that take into account environmental impact, including climate change. They should be able to evaluate arguments for and against particular energy policies, and be able to communicate their own arguments** to their elected representatives **if they choose**." Participants had questions and comments about Edelson's proposed approach. Roberta Johnson (National Earth Science Teachers Association) asked whether Edelson was targeting a straw man, because, in practice, **there are currently a very small number of courses being taught that focus on climate change**. She commented that "if you are lucky enough to have an earth science class or an earth systems class, you might be doing a unit on climate change in the context of everything else you are doing." Edelson agreed, stressing that **there should be both short and long-term strategies**. In the short term, he said, **it is important to work within the current system and integrate climate change into the classroom**

whenever possible. The long-term strategy he advocates is to address the fundamental problem with earth systems understanding and to treat climate change in the context of both earth and human systems.

Introducing the warming threat into academic space is a key starting point for more thoughtful consumption decisions in our everyday life

Boyes 12 - senior lecturer in education and chairman of the Board of Studies of the Centre for Lifelong Learning and director of postgraduate research in the Educational Development Division at the University of Liverpool. He is involved with a number of projects in the division, mainly involving statistical analysis. His current research interests include conceptual understanding of physical phenomena and the preconceptions that children, students, and adults hold about major environmental and health issues, including public concerns about scientific advances. He is a member of the Environmental Education Research Unit and has published widely on children's understanding of science and environmental education issues
(Eddie, first author on the Steering Committee, Climate Change Education, Climate Change Education in Formal Settings, K-14: A Workshop Summary, NAP)

A starting point for thinking about the materials used to teach about climate for Niepold **is that "we don't have a century; we don't have half a century. We should have been moving on this three decades ago**." Teaching about climate is happening today, he observed, and there are many materials in use, so **it is essential to focus** simultaneously **on short-term goals as well as those that will take more time to reach**, such as recasting the climate-related curriculum.¶ **The climate literacy framework provides a sound basis**. Niepold noted, **because** it incorporates the goal that **students**, learners, and citizens **should be prepared to make informed and responsible decisions with regard to actions that affect climate. This** goal **poses a major challenge to the education system**, he added, **and will require a more comprehensive focus and integrative approach** than exist **in** most of the current climate education resources, programs, and textbooks or curricula. At present, in Niepold's view, most resources are fragmented, and **the topic of climate is not a priority in education systems**. However, he stated that recent activities, such as the climate literacy framework, have begun to influence the development of resources, standards, and professional development materials and programs.¶ The climate literacy framework was the basis for a new means of evaluating the quality of climate education materials, he added. Funded by the National Science Foundation, the Climate Literacy and Energy Awareness Network (CLEAN)4 is a collaboration among science and academic organizations5 that was developed to identify and review online resources for teaching about climate science, climate change, and energy awareness, primarily those used in grades 6 through 16 and in informal science education. The resources are reviewed for scientific and pedagogical quality and are annotated by the reviewers. Resources are also aligned with the National Science Education Standards, the AAAS Benchmarks for Science Literacy, and the Excellence in Environmental Education Guidelines for Learning of the North American Association for Environmental Education.¶ CLEAN is designed to help educators locate excellent materials, although Niepold acknowledged, "excellence is a subjective thing." Nevertheless, CLEAN has helped to expand the framework within which climate must be understood, in part by including energy use in its purview, he explained. Thus far, the CLEAN researchers, in partnership with NOAA's Climate Program Office, have found what they classified as "excellent" resources that address over 15 percent of the learning goals presented in Project 2061's Atlas for Science Literacy6; an excellent resource or activity being defined as, above all, one that is scientifically accurate.7 That is, the sources are accurate and trustworthy, the material is accurate and current, and there are proper citations and references. Excellent learning activities are also aligned with the identified climate and energy concepts, topics, and educational standards; they provide pedagogical scaffolding or teaching tips or are presented in such a way that educa- tors can develop their own instructional strategies; and they are easily accessible online and affordable. The CLEAN team has reviewed only materials that are available for free on the Internet, Niepold noted, adding that reviewing textbooks would be beyond the program's current capacity. One challenge, he cautioned, is that the science is moving so quickly that material can go out of date. However, Niepold stressed, the process benefits from the multiple layers of review and the materials are updated as new ones emerge.¶ The developers of the CLEAN database have also used the collected information to conduct some analyses. They found, for example, that approximately 16 percent of K-12 curricula, across all subjects, related in some way to climate literacy (including but not limited to climate change), which Niepold views as quite a large number (unpublished data, based on CLEAN and NOAA analysis using the NSDL Strand Map Server tool, the AAAS Benchmarks alignment to the climate literacy concepts). Among the 1,123 benchmarks for K-12, for example, they found 191 direct and related alignments to climate literacy concepts that spanned primary to high school grades across a wide range of curricular topics.¶ The team had several observations about the available resources, Niepold noted. In general, the resources they reviewed can be narrowly focused and their quality uneven. Some **important areas**, such as adaptation to climate change, **are missing or thinly covered,** and for others the resources lack interactive features likely to engage learners. Excellent resources can be difficult and time-consuming to locate on the Internet. He concluded that **there is a need for better** coordination so that effective practices can be more widely shared across disciplines, and that there is much more potential for **integrated learning**. Many of the resources are organized around a climate problem, he noted, and skillful balance will be needed "between gloom and doom on the one hand and inadequate strategies on the other."¶ Niepold emphasized the integrated, cross-disciplinary aspects of the study of climate and climate change. The ideas addressed in these curricula, such as consideration of the consequences of resource shortages, he noted, are complicated and represent rich topics that might be addressed in science, geography, or history class, for example. Such multilevel, multidisciplinary ideas, he added, are challenging to teach because teachers may address the subject matter in different ways that are not aligned with each other. He closed with a reminder that the guiding principle for informed climate decisions in the U.S. Global Change Research Program's climate literacy guide is that "humans can take action to reduce climate change and its impact" and that **this principle sets the stage for** the other principles, which are oriented toward "**making informed and responsible decisions**."

Warming Scenario Planning Good

There is intrinsic value to the future-counterfactual simulation of the 1ac – representations of future climate change impacts leads to new solutions external to the aff and avoid traditional pedagogical dilemmas of role-playing

Junio 13 – PhD in Political Science @ Penn, currently @ Stanford

(Timothy and Thomas Mahnken, "Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations," International Studies Review, 15)

As noted in our discussion of the counterfactuals literature, **most scholars writing about the method focus on history**. We argue that **future counterfactuals** may **assist scholars** in the same ways as historical ones **and offer additional benefits**. **Scenarios may be useful for theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating "world views," setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching**.¶ Theory Building and Development¶ The structured analysis of **future counterfactuals offers a unique approach for the study of** causal effects in **social systems**. The first category, and perhaps most significant, is the ability of researchers to use scenarios to identify variables of interest and consider ways to measure them. This is an approach sometimes rec- ommended for qualitative research; **it consists of writing a notional depiction of what a case study might look like. This exercise helps researchers to think through** what **variables** are of greatest interest, what values those variables might take on, **and how they interact** to cause values of the dependent variable. Sce- nario analysis is one way in which researchers may conduct such a notional case study. **Rather than introduce a timeless** or historical **vignette regarding** fictional **circumstances, the researcher may find it beneficial to place their case in the future**. **This helps orient the research project toward** current and **anticipated political issues**—thus increasing the relevance of the work—even if the actual case studies are historical. **Thinking through the causal process** in this way **helps the researcher to identify a wider range of explanatory variables, including those that have not yet occurred or may be of very low probability** (but are still consis- tent with existing or proposed theoretical arguments). Scenario analysis also helps the researcher to consider the range of values that the identified indepen- dent variables may take on, as exploration of **different "worlds" push**es the **boundaries of the researcher's predispositions** going into the research project. Robust scenario analysis thus helps the researcher to identify the upper and lower bounds of their theory.¶ Second, a commonly cited advantage of counterfactual reasoning that is useful for this process of theory building is a researcher's attempt to manipulate one variable in a causal process while holding others constant, thus isolating the effects of different values of the independent variable on the dependent vari- able. Manipulating one variable at a time to do a better job of analyzing causal processes is often very difficult to do, as, in the real world, interactions between variables often lead to unpredictable and nonlinear outcomes (Jervis 1997:34– 60). For instance, a scholar conducting an analysis of tax rates and other domes- tic legislation regarding oil may use a counterfactual of a different average oil price in the 1970s. Such a counterfactual would have some fairly obvious implica- tions for the domestic political question, but a world in which that one variable were manipulated would have a large number of equally plausible second- and third-order consequences for regional politics in the Middle East. Those **conse- quences could** conceivably **feed back into** domestic US **politics**, thus **affecting the** social **system under analysis in a way the researcher may not have controlled for in the original scenario**.¶ **Despite** these **acknowledged difficulties** in using a "manipulate one variable" approach for the purpose of assaying real-world policy options, **it is a useful input to the processes of building theory and research design**. The best defense¶ of such an approach is that all forms of modeling involve abstractions from real- ity, and **even highly unrealistic models**—such as James Fearon's famous ideal condition in which war should never occur—**are useful for studying real events** (Fearon 1995). Furthermore, **manipulating one variable** at a time **is** more **appro- priate** to some kinds of counterfactual **reasoning** than others. Consider the three main categories of scenario use: political narratives, game theory and formal modeling, and experimentation. The "manipulate one variable" approach seems least useful to political narratives, which often try to tackle such tough questions as "What is the future of the international system?" Although scenarios offer advantages to developing and extending theory in regard to these sorts of ques- tions, particularly in assessing key drivers and articulating world views (discussed in the next subsections), a scientific approach of controlling for various social factors is unlikely to succeed. In these projects, manipulating one variable at a time serves only to develop one of many possible futures in the interest of extending the range of the theory's explanatory power.¶ On the other hand, **the "manipulate one variable" approach** offers **more direct advantages for formal modeling and experimentation**. The reasoning for each follows a comment made by Elinor Ostrom in her 1997 American Political Sci- ence Association presidential address. Ostrom suggested that "**from…scenarios, one can proceed to formal models and empirical testing in field and laboratory settings**" (Ostrom 1998). The experimental method with human subjects benefits strongly from the use of scenarios. In one study of how values factor into Ameri- cans' economic decision making, a team of researchers sought to "attribute sig- nificant differences in average responses between conditions to the independent variables manipulated in the hypothetical scenario; that is, to the factors intuitive neorealists should weigh heavily and intuitive economists should weigh lightly" (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001). That is to say, **one variable** related to individuals' world views **could be manipulated at once** in the experiment, **and the researcher may test for the significance of variance between the test and con- trol groups**.¶ After using scenarios to better identify variables of interest and the role of their specific values in a causal process, a third category of applications of scenario analysis to theory building is to develop new hypotheses and ways to test them. This follows from using scenarios to identify new independent variables and how their values may effect changes on the dependent variable; each new causal argu- ment may (and

should) be expressed as a hypothesis to be tested in the broader research project for which the scenario analysis was developed. Additionally, "day-after" scenarios that seek to walk back the causal processes that may have led to a consequential event are particularly well suited to developing hypotheses (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008). By definition, **this type of scenario analysis seeks to discover causal pathways**. For instance, one might seek to chart various paths by which a particular type of social revolution may occur in a country of interest. Each narrative of how such a revolution could come to pass would result in at least one hypothesis regarding the links between the many variables of interest. These hypotheses may then be tested against historical data or used to develop new kinds of data collection methods (discussed further in the next section).¶ Finally, scenario analysis helps to explore completely new theoretical projects in a deductive way, whereas a great deal of qualitative work in political science tends to be inductive from the case study method. The use of scenario analysis may help scholars to pursue an "abductive," or hybrid, method of theory build- ing that draws on both deductive reasoning and insights from cases (Mayer and Pirri 1995). For example, a data-poor research subject, such as how states may respond to computer network attack, has few historical precedents (Mahnken 2011; Rid 2012). If a researcher were interested in identifying the circumstances under which states are more likely to resort to violence in response to cyber¶ attack, he would be confounded by the problem that never in history has a state responded with violence to such an attack. **Scenario analysis** beginning with the value of violent counter-attack on the dependent variable (the DV being a state's strategy choice) **would help the researcher to deduce** likely **circumstances under which such an outcome may occur**. **Historical analysis**, such as regarding other kinds of information threats, would be helpful for such a project, but the differ- ences between cyber and other kinds of information transmission **would result in an incomplete causal narrative based on inductive reasoning alone**.¶ Data-Poor Research Topics¶ **Scenarios are a useful method for theory building and research design for topics that, despite being of high importance, lack an empirical base. The best example of this** type of research **is** scholarship on **nuclear warfare**. An enormous literature evolved during the Cold War regarding how a nuclear war might be fought and how escalation dynamics might occur (Kahn 1962; Brown and Mahnken 2011). **This literature was based almost exclusively on future counterfactuals,** as **there were no nuclear wars to study** and a very low "n"—consisting of the Cuban Missile Crisis and very few other crises—for publicly acknowledged "close calls" (Sagan 1995). Indeed, in our survey of the use of scenarios in the discipline, more than 25% were about nuclear warfare. **Other topics that are of high impor- tance but have a very low or zero "n" include** great-power war, global epidemics, **climate change**, large-scale cyber attack, and weapon of mass destruction terrorism.¶ The points made earlier regarding the identification of new variables and hypotheses are relevant here. In addition to these advantages to new research topics, **scenario analysis helps to identify new sources of data.** This is partially because **scenarios help to identify new independent variables, thus leading the researcher to think about** how to measure their **values**, but also by helping him to think of proxies for measurement when direct observation is not possible. For instance, **a day-after analysis of a scenario of interest would cause the researcher to ask what [s]he would have needed to know to predict the occurrence of the future counterfactuals and** in turn **help the researcher** to **think about ways** in which th**e discipline could identify that low-probability process if it begins to happen in the real world**.¶ Articulation of "World Views"¶ In addition to the process of building theory, **scenarios are useful in helping to link theories**. This is known as the articulation of a "world view," which is a set of guiding logics for how an international system operates, such as realism, con- structivism, and neoliberal institutionalism (Doyle 1997). For any world view, one may use scenario analysis to narrate what the theory logically dictates ought to happen in the world. Similar to the benefit to theory building, but on a greater scale, this approach offers an opportunity for empirical validation of the world view over time. For instance, a scenario at a high level of abstraction, such as the structure of a political system, allows for the validation or invalidation of multiple theories and interactions of theories. Should behavior in the world fail to conform to the expectations of the world view, this of course offers scholars an opportunity to reconsider the guiding logics of their world view.¶ In the early 1990s, for example, a team of defense analysts had been tasked with developing a set of scenarios for the post–Cold War security environment (Project 2025 1994). They crafted a scenario of a future world dominated by conflict between radical Islam and the West that resembled in some key respects the current struggle against Al Qaeda and its Associated Movements. The sce- nario should not be seen as a prediction of current events, however. Rather, the¶ scenario was developed to test whether or not one could plausibly make the case for a global ideological conflict at a time when IR scholars such as Francis Fukuy- ama were arguing that ideological conflict had become a thing of the past (Fukuyama 1992). Islam appeared to be the most plausible universalist ideology that could trigger widespread conflict.¶ Another example is that a realist scholar may benefit from a scenario analysis of the likely futures of the European Union. Such an analysis would project dif- ferent possible outcomes—ranging from dissolution through more coherent for- eign policy and security integration—from basic premises consistent with the realist world view pitted against the premises of competing world views. The final section of this article offers an example of when John Mearsheimer conducted such an analysis more than 20 years ago; he developed scenarios regarding the future of Europe by comparing the expectations of offensive realism to other theoretical approaches.¶ Setting Research Agendas¶ The remainder of this section describes ways in which **scenarios are useful** to political scientists **in ways other than developing theory. Scenarios are often used** in the business and national security policy communities **to have "smarter con- versations." This use of the scenario method differs from positivist social science and instead seeks to improve knowledge through participation in scenario exer- cise**s. Such exercises usually involve a facilitated discussion. One way in which **scenario conversations** may make researchers smarter is to **identify new research questions. Thinking about critical drivers of the future may help scholars to understand areas that presently have no useful theories and to avoid the ten- dency** of the political science discipline **to consistently focus on a**

small number of questions. For instance, the New Era Foreign Policy Conference, initiated by the University of California, Berkeley, and currently cosponsored by the Ameri- can University, University of California, Berkeley, and Duke University, seeks to bring together graduate students of political science to engage in scenario analy- sis and identify future research topics.8¶ Avoiding Cognitive Biases¶ In a methods book on scenarios, James Ogilvy discussed the inability of extre- mely bright people to see ahead due to cognitive biases, that is, what people found "unthinkable," though those futures eventually came into being. In the context of discussing the future of US and USSR nuclear arsenals during a 1980s scenario exercise, Ogilvy wrote in hindsight that "two decades later we now take for granted what was then unthinkable to some very good thinkers" (Ogilvy 2002:191). This comment is very similar to an insight by Philip Tetlock that polit- ical scientists tend to view surprises as overdetermined in hindsight, but as incon- ceivable ahead of time (Weber 1996:281).¶ **Scenarios**, whether formally written or developed for purposes of conversation, **offer a powerful way for researchers to compensate for cognitive biases endemic to any kind of human research. Scenarios do this by forcing researchers to con- front their most basic assumptions about how the world operates** and **by teasing out the logical implications of extreme values** on the independent variables of interest. As Peter Schwartz put it,¶ "[**Scenario building is] all part of a process of self-reflection: understanding your- self and your biases**, identifying what matters to you, and perceiving where to put your attention. It takes persistent work and honesty to penetrate our internal mental defenses. To ensure the success of our efforts, we need a clear under- standing of the relationship between our own concerns and the wider world around us. To achieve that, it helps to have a constant stream of rich, diverse, and thought-provoking information" (Schwartz 1996:59).¶ **One of the most common forms of bias that scenarios** help to compensate for is an anchoring bias; that **is**, the tendency to interpret new information in ways that conform with our preexisting beliefs (Jervis 1976:143–202). One might also think about this as **a "linear projection" bias; scholars who have a view of how the world is operating in the present** (theoretically informed or not) **may well project this view into the future. In addition to forcing scholars to explicitly confront these beliefs, the scenario process offers a way to think about** sorting **new information. A** com- pleted **scenario project allows a researcher to think about multiple futures** (with differing plot lines for how the world arrived there) at once. Thus, new informa- tion is not automatically compared against a single linear projection into the future, but rather weighted relative to alternative futures. New information might be consistent with all hypothesized futures, in which case the new information may not lead to a new understanding. An example is the current debate regarding whether China is rising or declining relative to the United States. This literature, despite access to the same data, offers remarkably different projections regarding the future strength of each state and what this portends for the international sys- tem (Pape 2005; Layne 2009; Beckley 2011/2012; Subramanian 2011). In many cases, however, new information is likely to favor one trend line over another, thus changing how a researcher assigns probabilities to various futures.¶ Pedagogy¶ Scenarios offer many of the same benefits as simulations, recently a hot topic in the pedagogical literature, to teaching in political science (Newkirk and Hamil- ton 1979; Smith and Boyer 1996; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Simpson and Kauss- ler 2009; Sasley 2010). Indeed, **scenarios are** often **a key part of** simulation **learning**. For instance, in a decision-making simulation in which students are assigned the roles of heads of state, the students are often offered a scenario vignette to respond to with policy choices. The emphasis of scenarios and simu- lations in pedagogy, however, is different. The literature on simulations tends to focus on experiential learning, but recent scholarship has cast some doubt on whether or not this kind of learning improves students' knowledge of core course concepts (Raymond 2010).¶ Scenarios offer a way to make classroom exercises more explicitly oriented toward the incorporation of theories. For instance, **rather than asking students to take on the roles of the President**, National Security Advisor, etc., **the students may be presented with a vignette and asked to analyze the strategic implications of the scenario** for the United States. Both coauthors of this article have used scenarios in classroom exercises. Tom Mahnken has taught the use of scenarios for stategic planning at the Naval War College. Tim Junio used scenario exer- cises at the University of Pennsylvania. Students in the class "International Secu- rity," having been assigned Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence and other core readings on strategy, were asked to evaluate a scenario in which the United States had committed itself to military action, but was subsequently held hostage by a foreign power.¶ In Junio's scenario, a future US President was led to believe that due to an intel- ligence breakthrough, North Korean nuclear weapon targets were rendered¶ vulnerable to a US first strike with conventional weapons. The United States and close allies saw this as an opportunity for regime change and pre-positioned US forces in the region. The US President then issued an ultimatum to the North Korean regime to vacate the country within 48 hours, akin to the US threat to Sad- dam Hussein in 2003, or face a forceful regime change at the hands of the US-led coalition. To the surprise of US leaders, North Korea's Supreme Leader went on television to announce that an unspecified number of nuclear warheads had been smuggled into the United States as a contingency against such a situation. The Supreme Leader then declared that any act of aggression against the North Korean people would be met with retaliation against the US homeland. Students in the class were asked to first discuss the strategic situation for the United States. What mistakes had been made to get the United States into that scenario? What issues were at stake? Then, the students were asked to apply strategic concepts to discuss how the United States might seek to extricate itself from the situation.¶ The North Korea's blackmail scenario is an example of an extremely low-prob- ability event that almost certainly would not justify much further analysis by the intelligence and defense policy communities, but is extremely useful for peda- gogy. **This kind of scenario increases student interest** in the material **and forces them to engage with the theories and concepts** of the course. **Rather than focus on policy decisions alone**, as simulations are likely to do, **students are forced to bring deductive logic to bear to assess the boundaries of the scenario**.¶ Demonstrations of Robust Scenario Analysis¶ Mearsheimer 1990a,b¶ A widely read example of scenario analysis, though one not often considered methodologically interesting, is John Mearsheimer's "Back to the Future: Insta- bility in Europe After the Cold War" (published more accessibly in The Atlantic as "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War") (Mearsheimer 1990a,b). Mearshei- mer offered several scenarios of what post–Cold War Europe might look like; the one he deemed most probable suggested that Germany (and possibly others) would develop nuclear weapons and that European states would resume security competition. Mearsheimer contrasted this scenario, driven by the theoretical expectations of offensive realism, with outcomes predicted by the democratic peace and economic

interdependence perspectives.¶ The dependent variable of interest in Mearsheimer's scenario analysis was the risk of war in Europe following the end of the Cold War. His primary research question was, "Would the end of the bipolar power structure result in a higher or lower risk of war?" He considered several independent variables, including the distribution of military power (possible values: a range along a spectrum from bipolar to multipolar [unipolar perhaps being logically possible, but he does not explicitly include it as a possibility]); the character of military power, defined in terms of the distribution of nuclear weapons (possible values: aboli- tion, sustenance of existing levels, unmitigated proliferation, or mitigated prolif- eration [current nuclear powers manage their spread]); and domestic politics (possible values: degree of nationalism, ranging from high to low). Mearsheimer was explicit regarding how he believed these independent variables should effect values on his dependent variable of war proneness. Bipolar power distributions were believed to be more stable than multipolar. Nuclear weapons were expected to increase the probability of war in the first three of his four categori- cal values. High values of nationalism were expected to increase the risk of war, while low values of nationalism would reduce or keep even the risk of war.¶ The shortest formulation of Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism is that states seek to maximize their relative power. A relevant aspect of the theory¶ that Mearsheimer articulated is states' perceptions of the costs and risks of going to war; he believed a competitive world under offensive realism might still be peaceful if the costs and risks of going to war were perceived to be high and the benefits of going to war low (Mearsheimer 1990a:12). Mearshei- mer also noted competing theoretical approaches regarding how European states were likely to behave during his analyzed time period: an international institutions perspective (IV: the strength of international institutions, ordinal), which Mearsheimer deemed irrelevant as power-seeking behavior should trump institutional concerns; democratic peace theory (IV: joint democracy, binary), which he found unpersuasive for a few reasons, including nationalism, defec- tion, and uneven spread of democracy among post-Soviet states; and pacifism (IV: binary, learned war is bad or did not), which Mearsheimer believed lacks an empirical basis.¶ Although Mearsheimer discussed these other theoretical perspectives superfi- cially, he developed a detailed account based on how he believed offensive real- ism would effect values on his three main independent variables of interest. He believed "it is certain that bipolarity will disappear, and multipolarity will emerge in the new European order" (Mearsheimer 1990a:31). He believed this because with the end of the US and Soviet spheres of influence, European states would be strongly incentivized by the anarchic character of the international system to provide for their own security. Thus, no two states were likely to emerge as clear poles in the European state system; rather, power would be diffused as many states competed with one other. Mearsheimer was highly confident in this out- come and treated it as more of a background condition than an important determinant of outcomes on his dependent variable.¶ The second two independent variables were nuclear proliferation and nation- alism. Mearsheimer viewed the most critical uncertainty regarding the future of security in Europe as the distribution and deployment patterns of nuclear weap- ons. He wrote that "the best new order would incorporate the limited, managed proliferation of nuclear weapons. This would be more dangerous than the cur- rent order, but considerably safer than 1900–1945. The worst order would be a non-nuclear Europe in which power inequalities emerge between the principal poles of power" (Mearsheimer 1990a:31). Mearsheimer offered scenarios of what it would look like if each of these outcomes resulted. Finally, Mearsheimer con- sidered the future that actually resulted, or the continuation of existing nuclear weapon ownership patterns. He argued that his theory predicted this future would not come to be, as Germany was expected to desire nuclear weapons so that they would not have to rely on Poland and Czechoslovakia to provide a bar- rier against a Soviet invasion, and because small East European states would simi- larly perceive nuclear weapons to be of the highest security interest. Nationalism was less important and factored into Mearsheimer's analysis as an interaction effect between nuclear proliferation and nationalism that may make war more likely under some conditions.¶ In summary, Mearsheimer's article provides an excellent example of scenario analysis being used to extend an existing theory and develop testable hypotheses that were subsequently falsified. His futures also constitute "plot lines" formed by the interaction of multiple variables of interest. Mearsheimer explained why he expected a particular outcome in Western Europe in the 1990s and why he did not expect other outcomes. The historical record clearly falsifies the hypoth- eses derived from his theory of offensive realism. Various reasons may explain why his theory was incorrect—such as normative claims, continued reliance on US security guarantees, and so on—but it is at least clear that his scenario-based approach framed a debate in a rigorous and clearly articulated way and has led to new areas of exploration for the discipline.¶ A second example of robust scenario analysis is a chapter from Keith Payne's book The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Payne 2001). In this chapter, Payne used a scenario to demonstrate how the assumptions underlying traditional deterrence analysis, which were developed during the Cold War, may not apply to a conflict between the United States and China. Payne also used this scenario to demonstrate why in the theoretical sections of his book he emphasized some variables that traditional deterrence theorists downplay. His self-proclaimed purpose was to use a scenario analysis to test whether a more empirical approach, drawing on cultural and domestic political contexts, is more applicable to future conflicts than the deductive reasoning applied to the Cold War.¶ The dependent variable in Payne's analysis was whether or not an adversary is deterred. He then took traditional independent variables from the existing deterrence literature and drew on extensive secondary sources to question what relaxing assumptions about the values of those variables would do to the depen- dent variable. For instance, in deductive reasoning, such factors as a state's cul- tures (organizational and in the usual sense of tradition) are assumed to be either constant on both sides or irrelevant because other variables matter more. Payne suggested that in a particular context, these variables are not only impor- tant, but also may dominate outcomes.¶ To explain how variation in these independent variables may yield an unde- terred adversary, Payne developed an excellent "full" qualitative scenario. His pri- mary interest was Chinese decision making. The context is whether or not the United States could deter China from escalating to violent conflict during a cri- sis over the status of Taiwan. Rather than assume constant values for China on the independent variables, Payne manipulated these variables (several at once, not a "one variable at a time" approach) to show how China: is more risk toler- ant than notional adversaries in the traditional deterrence literature; considers many political issues of lower importance than the status of Taiwan; perceives it has little freedom to back down; and has difficulty understanding US demands and viewing them as credible. Factors that cause them to have these different val- ues are related to the Chinese regime's culture and incentive structures. For instance, Payne focused on how the erosion of communist ideology has led the regime to emphasize national unity and stability as justifications for its continued hold on power, thus making the Taiwan issue of high importance. His points regarding risk tolerance come from Chinese strategic culture; Payne follows ana- lysts who place great meaning in the fact that the Chinese word for "crisis" has connotations of both danger and opportunity. Variation on all of these indepen- dent variables may, Payne argued, lead to an undeterred China, although tradi- tional deterrence theory would yield a deterred China.¶ Conclusion¶ The role of academics in policymaking is a cyclical debate in **the IR subfield**. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghani- stan, a vocal group has once again elevated the perspective that political science professors **should be contributing to** these **pressing** national security **problems** (Andres and Beecher 1989; George 1993; Putnam 2003; Monroe 2005; Nye 2009; Mead 2010). Nearly all of the discourse on "bridging the gap" between academia and the policy world emphasizes how academics may help policymak- ers, particularly with rigorous methods for testing social science hypotheses. The scenario method is one way in which political scientists may improve the policy relevance of their work. It also shows that ideas flowing in the other direction¶ are promising: the policy community and other disciplines have potential to improve the quality of political science research. **The future counterfactual approach has been used by policymakers** and wealth creators to **improve deci- sions for decades**, while our discipline has consistently relied to a great degree on the past. **Thinking and writing about the future in a robust**

way offers politi- cal scientists **an exciting opportunity to push the boundaries of current debates and to generate new ones, while also improving the processes of teaching and theory building**.

Alt Solvency Key

Assess alt solvency in terms of other possible solutions to climate change – all solutions involve negative consequences, only *comparative* assessment of negative side effects produces ethical outcomes

Penn State Rock Ethics Institute 8

("Ethical Issues Entailed by Geologic Carbon Sequestration", http://rockblogs.psu.edu/climate/2008/06/ethical-issues-entailed-by-geologic-carbon-sequestration.html June 23, 2008)

Climate change potentially **raises** enormous and **unprecedented challenges for and threats to the human race**. Among the challenges are numerous profound ethical questions for our species that arise for at least four reasons. One, **those nations** and people **who are the major contributors to climate change are not the same as those who are most vulnerable** to its impacts. Second, **climate change impacts are potentially catastrophic**. Third, **to solve** the **climate change's threat, those who cause the problem need to consider the adverse impacts of climate change on people and their environment separated from them in time and space**. Fourth, **the solutions to climate change usually have potential harms and risks that must be considered through an ethical lens**. By ethics in this post, we mean the domain of inquiry that examines claims about what is right or wrong, obligatory or non-obligatory, or when responsibility attaches to human actions. An ethical analysis of geologic carbon storage examines claims made about whether and under what circumstances geologic carbon storage should be pursued as a solution to climate change. A proper ethical analysis of geologic carbon storage must begin with a description of known environmental, economic, and social impacts and risks of geologic carbon storage. For these reasons, **an ethical analysis of** this **technology must be based upon current understandings of the harms, risks and benefits of this technology**. **If** our **scientific understanding of this technology changes, then our ethical conclusions may also change**. Therefore, ethical conclusions reached in this post could be provisional. As there are numerous demonstration projects on carbon storage in various stages of development, it is likely that a better understanding of the risks from harm from geologic carbon storage will increase in the years ahead. **Each solution to climate change poses certain risks of harms**. For example, deployment of **large-scale biofuel production may make land unusable for other purposes**, geo-engineering solutions often pose serious environmental risks, and even wind power may create risks to birds. **Yet climate change raises such enormous and unprecedented challenges to the human race that the potential risks from particular climate change solutions must always be considered in relation to climate change's threats**. **It is also important to compare the potential harms of each climate change solution to the potential risks created by other climate change solutions**. For these reasons, **society needs to consider the ethical dimensions of climate change solutions from a comparative point of view**, that is, **the ethical dimensions of each solution to climate change must be compared both to ethical issues entailed by harms of business-as-usual use of fossil fuel and in comparison to ethical issues raised by other climate change solutions.**

Environmental Security Solvency

Securing the environment causes solvency to be impossible by concentrating on the effects rather than the causes of environmental collapse

Rasa **Ostrauskaite**, EU Political Advisor in the Office of the High Representative for BiH, December, **2001**, Environmental Security as an Ambiguous Symbol[1]: Can We Securitize the Environment? Rubikon, http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/rasa2.htm

Having demonstrated the ambiguities of the environmental security discourse, I shall specify the link between environment and security, arguing against this linkage. According to supporters of the environment-security linkage, environmental degradation is as severe as the military threats and thus deserves to be lifted to the "high politics"; i.e. environmental degradation should be placed under the umbrella of national security. Yet tacking the security label to environmental issues deserves more than a word of caution. First, in the environmental security discourse, whose interests should be secured: those of the state, humanity, the future generations or the nature? As we have seen in the previous sections, these interests can be and usually are in conflict. It could be pointed out, however, that once a link between environmental degradation and violent conflict is established, the answer to the question whose interest should be secured becomes self-evident. It is at these crucial junctures of conflict that the issue of environmental degradation becomes worthy of a "security" label. Nevertheless, the linkage between environmental degradation and violent conflict could not be easily established, and even those who maintain the existence of such linkages, albeit indirect, subtle and not always predictable, admit that environmental degradation is not very likely to cause interstate conflicts[47]. Therefore, it is "analytically misleading to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat, because the traditional focus of national security has little in common with either environmental problems or solutions"[48]. Second, since one state's unilateral efforts may have little effect, if at all, states may choose to cooperate to prevent or minimize environmental threats for which they share responsibility. To agree upon collective strategies to reduce environmental vulnerabilities would be easier, however, if decision-makers first desecuritized environmental degradation. As rightly pointed out by Waever, while to securitize an issue is to declare it being "off limits", to desecuritize an issue is to remove it from the realm of the politics of survival and to allow for a more open and fruitful debate on it[49]. Thus, desecuritization renders the issue amenable to more cooperative forms of behavior. And this could be applicable to the logic of international environmental relations among the states. Moreover, the collective approach frequently entails negotiating treaties that commit states to limit certain activities within their jurisdiction, which, if the issue is declared to be "off limits", might prove to be more difficult to achieve. The only reason to feel tempted to keep environment "off limits", however, would be the possibility to have more resources allocated from the state budget, which, unless environment is securitized, might prove to be a complicated task. Yet the question remains whether the benefits of increased attention of environmental issues to be gained through association with security are worth the harms caused by negative connotation and effect. It is probably accurate to say that one of the biggest difficulties for securitization of environment is posed by the fact that causes and effects of environmental issues differ in time and space. If one of the motives for speaking of environmental degradation as a threat to national security is rhetorical: to make people respond to environmental threats with a sense of urgency, effects rather than causes tend to be securitized. As Buzan et al. point out, "in terms of politicizing causes, much is happening, but most of the threats are too distant to lead to securitization"[50]. With the exception of already discussed securitization of the threats posed by nuclear plants in Central and Eastern Europe, which are close in both time and space to the European states, slow progress has been made towards addressing the causes rather than effects of environmental threats. Even climate change, which is a global problem that requires a coordinated global response, has recently been defined as "at least a 100-year problem,"[51] signaling that, inter alia, asymmetries in causes and effects might seriously impede securitization moves at the global level. Another motive for securitization of effects rather than causes is a recognition that crises call for resolution during which the patience of society can be mobilized. Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that permanent patterns of environmentally sound behavior could be supported for a long time, especially if requires some personal sacrifice[52]. For this reason, it seems that environmental concerns could be better addressed if they constitute part of 'normal politics', rather than if enveloped in the national security, since the focus should be on the causes, rather than effects.

Environmental Security Altnernative

Action can be taken without securitizing non-military issues

Waever 1998 [Ole, professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, "Securitization and Desecuritization," On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]

Finally, the approach I have proposed above points toward a study of the mechanisms leading to securitization of certain issues related to identity, especially when and how these problems are handled, by society , in security terms. Such an approach implies that we have to take seriously concerns about identity, but have also to study the specific and often problematic effects of their being framed as security issues. We also have to look at the possibilities of handling some of these problems in nonsecurity terms, that is, to take on the problems, but leave them unsecuritized. This latter approach recognizes that social processes are already under way whereby societies have begun to thematize themselves as security agents that are under threat. This process of social construction can be studied, and the security quality of the phenomenon understood, **without thereby actually legitimizing it**. With the "as much security as possible" approach, this is hard to handle: one will have either to denounce such issues as not being security phenomena ("misperceptions"), or one will be pulled into the process as co-securitizer.

Threat Predictions Fail

Preemption Bad

Preemptive politics are a self-fulfilling prophecy—our example of 9/11 is not an isolated historical event but rather a realization of a current mode of American politics

McClanahan, 2009

(Annie, PhD in English from Berkeley and Professor of English and Humanities Fellowship Scholar @ Harvard, *symploke, "Future's Shock: Preemption, Plausibility, and the Fiction of 9/11,"* November 2009, Vol. 17 No. 1-2, muse, accessed 7-18-14 bh@ddi)

Giving substance to **the abject horror of today's preemptive post-9/11 futurity**, "The Suffering Channel" **reveals the perversities not simply of preemption's effects but of its very epistemology. Preemption transforms its prophecies into self-guaranteeing prolepses in which the future is always written in advance**; Wallace's ironic mode of prolepsis, on the other hand, dislocates the position of the reading and narrating subject and destabilizes our claims of actual future knowledge. More generally, literature's plausibility has always been determined, in a dialectical fashion, both by our anticipation of narrative closure and completion and by literature's capacity to surprise us and to disrupt that closure—to expect the probable is ultimately to produce the conditions for the occurrence of the unlikely. In the preemptive narrative, on the contrary, statistical probability is disavowed and replaced by a selfperpetuating imagination whose effect is to transform the possible into the actual and the distant into the immediate. **The imagined future turns out to be the result of its ostensible prediction.** In this way, the future is unmoored from history, denied the contingency of the yet-to-come. Wallace's story also shows that while it is wrong to call 9/11 constitutively unforeseeable, it is equally mistaken to view such events as easily, materially predictable. These views are really two sides of the same coin: the latter is a reaction to the void left by the former, a fantasy born of an experience of inevitability that only ever emerges after the fact. **The preemptive conception of the future**, we must acknowledge, **is** also **not** yet **a relic of the post-9/11 "past." Despite the opportunity offered by the changing presidential administration to "seize" a very different kind of moment**, President **Obama has not rescinded the doctrine of preemption**, nor does he seem likely to.15 But this merely confirms what I have thus far tried to argue, namely that **the doctrine of preemption is not an isolated legal episode that can be so easily reversed and set to rights. It is**, on the contrary**, the realization of a philosophy of the future tied to decades of imbricated economic and political interests, bursting into public discourse as a way to capitalize on confused notions about 9/11 as a historical event.** If 9/11 really "repeats" the end of history as has been recently claimed, it does so by serving as the grounds for legally codifying the foreclosure of radically uncertain and transformative futures.16 **Scenario thinkers' assertion that the past no longer provides a model for the future now underwrites the rhetoric of financial bubbles as much as it provides the justification for new models of prediction: in both, the future is removed from the vicissitudes of historical determination and reimagined as a static, reproducible image of endless accumulation. In place of risk management, the preemptive philosophy of history preaches risk exploitation, through which contingency itself can be instrumentalized in the name of a moment's opportunity: threat or uncertainty can just as easily justify military strike as be monetized into a credit default swap.** It has long been an axiom of Marxist or utopian political thought that to transform our historical situation, we must be able to imagine a radically different future. **The perverse predictions that define our current historical moment now ensure that a truly revolutionary act of imagination can only begin by intervening in the futurity of our present.**17

Predictions Bad

Policy predictions fail-- policmakers maintain overzealous confidence without evidence and re-entrench their false assumptions through bureaucratic groupthink

Maor, 2012

(Moshe, Department of Political Science @ Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *Journal of Public Policy,* "Policy Overreaction," December 2012, Vol. 32 No. 3, ProQuest, accessed 7-18-14 bh@ddi)

According to Kahneman (2011, 194**), extreme predictions and a willingness to predict rare events from weak evidence are both manifestations of** System 1, which produces **fast and intuitive thinking**, as opposed to System 2, which produces slow thinking. Applying this insight in the realm of public policy requires recognition that **policy-makers are intendedly rational actors who try to get policy right** (Simon, 1982; Jones, 1999). **However, they occasionally face important decisions on issues over which they have little evidence. But even poor evidence can still make a very good story. Considering the limits of policy-makers' forecasting abilities, how little they know and the fact that only the evidence at hand counts, the excessive confidence in what policy-makers believe may trigger excessive policy.** The theoretical framework also draws insights from research on groupthink, which is defined in Merriam-Webster's dictionary as "a pattern of thought characterized by self-deception, forced manufacture of consent, and conformity to group values and ethics". **Analysing policy decisions such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban missile crisis and the escalation of the Vietnam War**, Janis (1972) **identified eight symptoms for** which he coined the term "**groupthink". These symptoms were illusions of invulnerability, collective rationalisation, belief in inherent morality, stereotyped views of out-groups, direct pressure on dissenters, self-censorship, illusion of unanimity, and self-appointed mindguards**. The most salient antecedent of groupthink is high cohesiveness. Cohesiveness is defined as the "degree to which the members value their membership in the group" (Janis, 1972, 245) and is referred to in terms of amiability and esprit de corps as well as other aspects of friendship (Janis 1972, 245-247). Recently, Bénabou (2009) found that "while each person decides how to interpret objective reality, that reality - promising, disappointing, or scary - is itself shaped by the actions of others, and therefore by their subjective mindsets" (p. 2). This implies that "in organisations where some agents have a greater impact on others' welfare than the reverse, strategies of realism or denial will 'trickle down' the hierarchy, so that subordinates will in effect take their belief from the leader" (italics in original, Bénabou, 2009, 2). The theoretical framework advanced here also draws insights from research on emotions, which are the cornerstone of Jones and Baumgartner's (2005) disproportionate information processing model. Emotions may degrade cognitive performance, thereby interfering with decision processes (e.g. Hancock and Warm, 1989). Emotions tend to run high, for example, when individuals are facing negative events or dreadful possibilities. When emotions take charge, probabilities are neglected and the result is harmful overreaction to risk (Sunstein and Zeckhauser, 2010, 116). Governments also suffer from action bias because of their own natural tendencies to take some action regardless of whether it is needed (Patt and Zeckhauser, 2000). Consequently, the government may tend to take excessive preventive actions "if the relevant actors are able to obtain credit from themselves or from the public for responding to the risk" (Sunstein and Zeckhauser, 2010, 116). The discussion so far brings to the fore the importance of two analytical dimensions: (i) the effects of positive and negative events, and (ii) the effects of overestimation and accurate estimation of information. These dimensions are mutually exclusive: whether an event is positive or negative is related neither to an individual's overconfidence, which exists in human behaviour because people often have imperfect information about their own performances, abilities, or chances of success, and even worse information about others (Moore and Healy, 2008), nor to groupthink, which is "endogenously spread, horizontally and vertically, through all or part of the organization" (Bénabou, 2009, 4). Attention now turns to a brief discussion of these dimensions. Negative and positive events Negative events are defined as ones that have "the potential or actual ability to create adverse outcomes for the individual" (Taylor, 1991, 67). According to Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon and Slovic (2010, 332), such events "often take the form of specific, well-defined incidents", as opposed to positive events that, "although sometimes visible, are often fussy or indistinct". Negative events elicit strong and rapid psychological, cognitive, emotional and social responses (e.g. Taylor, 1991). But which attributes of such events create a greater sense of fear? Scholars have found that the characteristics that are conducive to disproportionate fear include involuntary exposure, unfamiliarity and invisibility (Stern, 2002/03). In addition, disproportionate fear may result when victims do not realise that they have been exposed to particular risks, when the effects of the risks are delayed, when the mechanism of harm is poorly understood or when long-term effects or the number of people likely to be affected is difficult to predict (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1980). Once negative emotions are brought into the picture, it is necessary to provide some nuance. For example, recent studies of anxiety and anger have shown that negative emotions do not have uniform effects (Lerner, Gonzales, Small and Fischhoff, 2003). Based on a distinction between perceived threat and the anxiety it can elicit, Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav (2005) corroborated these findings in their research on American attitudes toward war after 9/11. They showed that the minority of Americans who experienced high levels of anxiety in response to the 9/11 attacks were less supportive of aggressive military action against terrorists, less approving of President Bush, and were in fact more likely to favour increased American isolation. This finding is in line with psychology research indicating that anxiety leads to an overestimation of risk and risk-averse behaviour (e.g. Lerner and Keltner, 2000). The majority of Americans who perceived a high threat of future terrorism in the United States supported the administration's antiterrorism policies. This finding is in line with psychological research indicating that external and perceived threats increase support for outwardly focused retaliatory action (e.g. Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser, 1999). In light of these findings, the

analytical framework assumes that overreacting policy-makers are aware of the link between external and perceived threats, and popular support for outwardly focused retaliatory action, and therefore may implement policies that manipulatively increase external and perceived threats (Assumption II). A classic example is President Bush's issuance of terrorist alerts into the early months of 2002 (Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav, 2005, 604). In addition, because of the intensity of the 9/11 events, we have to acknowledge the opposite possibility, namely that an event may contain positive and negative sub-events. These cases naturally weaken the analytical framework advanced here. We therefore assume that this framework is limited to events that are either strongly-positive or strongly-negative (Assumption III). An additional nuance is related to short-term vs long-term impacts of negative/positive events in relation to policy overreaction. Taylor (1991) highlighted the asymmetrical reaction over time, i.e. short-term mobilisation and long-term minimisation. Although no single theoretical mechanism could explain the mobilisation-minimisation pattern (Taylor, 1991), there has been no attempt to transcend lower-level responses (e.g. arousal and attention) and higher-level responses (e.g. judgement formation) to focus on exogenous factors that may impact upon both sets of responses (e.g. the media). Numerous studies have suggested that negative aspects of an object, event or choice are weighted more heavily than positive aspects in judgements (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; for a comprehensive review of this literature, see Taylor, 1991, 69-71). In this respect, the media is no different than individuals. Just as individuals pay more attention and give greater weight to negative events, so does the media (e.g. Slovic, 1993). The extraordinary media coverage that such events generate in the short term implies that public announcements and live reporting of an ongoing event disseminate instantaneously throughout the general public and to policy-makers. In other words, every policy-maker simultaneously receives more or less the same update. In the long term, however, media interest declines as other issues top the agenda. Accurate and overestimation of information This theoretical framework is anchored in the literature on **overconfident behaviour and particularly in models in which overconfidence increases the perceived precision of information** (overprecision) **and the perceived ability, level of control and chances of success in solving the policy problem**s (overestimation) (Moore and Healy, 2008, 502). These two confidence judgements are really one and the same for a single-item confidence judgement (Moore and Healy, 2008). The fundamental assumption of the analytical framework advanced here is that major negative and positive events require, first and foremost, an overarching decision - similar to a single-item confidence judgement - regarding the direction of policy (Assumption IV). In other words**, when major negative or positive events occur, policy-makers' beliefs that the information at their disposal is more reliable than it actually is** (i.e. their precise subjective probability distribution in their minds), **and their overestimation of their ability, performance, level of control or chances of success to resolve the policy problem, are indistinguishable.** This assumption also allows us to ignore the effects of overplacement because major events are characterised by increased task difficulty - a condition under which overplacement decreases while overestimation increases (Moore and Healy, 2008, 512). The presence of group overconfidence would have implications for how organisations work. **A policy-maker who is overconfident in his/her social group may put less effort into looking outside his or her social group when searching for new advisors. Overconfidence may also explain why policy-makers often hire individuals to whom they are connected in some way, as well as why decision-making groups often fail to draw on valuable outside information**, even when that information could easily be obtained (Janis, 1972). Recently, Healy and Offenberg (2007) found that "**the overall magnitudes of individual and group confidence are approximately the same**" (p. 4). Given the asymmetric roles that exist in bureaucratic organisations and the finding that realism and denial trickle down from the leaders (Bénabou, 2009, 1), when a number of interdependent policy-makers interact within numerous overlapping, interlocking networks in the core executive, one may expect that they "will contagiously invest excessive faith in a leader's 'vision' " (italics in original, Bénabou, 2009, 18). The leader's preferences that favour some activities or world views over others may serve as a commitment device to reduce policy-makers' concerns over their status in the core executive (e.g. Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000). The leader's request from policy-makers to seek new information may result in the latter obtaining information that is in line with the leader's (expected) signal (e.g. Prendergast, 1993). "Both mechanisms thus lead [policy-makers] to 'conform' their behavior to [the leader's] prior beliefs" (Bénabou, 2009, n22). **Given that policy-makers believe they are more talented and competent than they actually are, have more control over the event at hand than they actually have, have more chances of success in solving the policy problems than they actually do, and perceive the information they possess as more precise than it actually is, the finding that the overall magnitudes of individual and group confidence are approximately the same** (Healy and Offenberg, 2007) **implies that organisations and institutions are not likely to be able to protect against the** enthusiasm and/or **misjudgement of policy-makers.**

Uncertainty is characteristic of modern international relations—policy predictions create overzealous and uninformed reactions to crises and result in policy failure

Oppenheimer, 2012
(Michael F., Clinical Professor in the Global Affairs Masters program@ NYU and life member of Council on Foreign Relations, *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, "From Prediction to Recognition: Using Alternate Scenarios to Improve Foreign Policy Decisions," Vol. 32 No. 1, Winter-Spring 2012, muse, accessed 7/17/14, bh@ddi)

If the Cold War was characterized by rigid bipolar alliances and limited policy flexibility, the more recent past exhibits rapid change, fluid alignments, wide policy choice, and strategic surprise. Indeed, **surprise defines the history of the post-Cold War period**, beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, the outbreak of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, the Mexican and Asian financial crises, the magnitude of genocide in Rwanda, Indian and Pakistani nuclear brinkmanship, global trade meltdowns in Seattle and Cancun, the failure of the Doha Round, the Arab Spring, and the still unfolding global financial and economic crisis. In this era, **surprises are to be expected. They reflect traditional forces in world politics—rising powers, emergent technology, sudden leadership change—as well as new and poorly understood factors, such as physical** 2012 **changes to our planet, economic globalization, the empowerment of non- state transnational actors, the transformation of ideas about politics and society**, and the spread of democracy and pseudo-democracy. We are now struggling to understand political authority and the viability of previously robust institutions under conditions of extended economic stagnation, which is not pretty and full of future surprises. **The proliferation in the sheer number of actors with influence over global conditions affecting U.S. interests as well as the dynamic nature of interactions among these actors produces a complexity that defies prediction**. Try as we must to understand a continually transforming world, the element of surprise will always put us at risk of falling a lap behind. We, in America, could reduce uncertainty by excluding much of this complexity from our definition of U.S. policy interests. (Another approach to reducing uncertainty, "creating our own reality," produces its own surprises.) For example, we could choose to view globalization as self-sustaining despite clear evidence to the contrary; much of the developing world as too ill-governed, resistant to our influence, or peripheral to our interests to be worth our attention; issues of the global commons as amenable to market-based solutions; rising powers as more threatening to—and thus contained by—immediate neighbors, therefore less threatening to us; and the risk of terrorism as low, and the cost-effectiveness of improved homeland security vastly greater than regime change and state building. Neo-isolationism would, over the short term, reduce the knowledge requirements of U.S. policy. At the same time, it would increase the likelihood that U.S. actions in the world would have somewhat more predict- able effects and enable intelligence to focus on "known unknowns," thus improving the accuracy and foresightedness of U.S. policy. Doing only what we have the knowledge to do well is an important criterion to be weighed in making policy choices. But aligning U.S. policy with current knowledge would expose the country to great harm, invite adversaries to fill the gaps left by America's retrenchment, and guarantee unpleasant surprises from outside the restrictively defined perimeter of our interests. This approach, popular among some neo-realist observers, has been rejected by administrations from both parties over seventy years of Cold War and post Cold War history. The temptation to engage actively in the global system, and thus to encounter all the sources of uncertainty, complexity, surprise, and risk discussed above, appears irresistible. Therefore, getting better at decision making in these contexts, as we deepen our knowledge about the world, is an unavoidable necessity. Sources of Surprise Surprise does not necessarily produce bad policy if decision makers are prepared to modify outdated assumptions given new information and are ready cognitively and strategically for a changed environment. Few of the surprises noted above appeared without leading indicators or even a few prescient observers. They were the result of the interaction of underlying trends unseen by experts. They were in part self-inflicted, representing a failure to recognize or properly weigh new information. They were the consequences of unchallenged mindsets, of an excess of certainty confronting a dynamic world. Acute observation was lacking, not foresight. Furthermore, our subsequent **reactions to surprise have often demonstrated more stubbornness than agility,** thus **magnifying the inherent limitations of foresight.** As U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said in describing the New York Fed's reaction to the financial crisis, "Policy was always behind the curve, always chasing the escalating crisis." 1 **Mirror imaging, wishful thinking, entrenched policy positions, bureaucratic inertia, and lack of imagination have all played a part in the** "intelligence **failures" and policy missteps of the last twenty years.** They have been on public display most recently in our extemporaneous response to the Arab Spring and Europe's too little, too late reaction to its sovereign debt crisis. These are the types of surprises that improved process can mitigate. **Policymakers often bring** unrecognized or unarticulated **assumptions about the future into policy debates.** 2 **These assumptions are derived from recent experience (which can produce misleading historical analogies or trend extrapolations), value preferences, time pressure (rewarding assumptions that are "good enough" to permit closure), mindsets based on theoretical or cultural biases, group-think, the political risks of dissent and demands of building a case for change (which create strong incentives to wring the greatest possible value out of current policy). Foreign policy debates proceed within a context of insecurity and uncertainty, which often encourages threat inflation and actions that produce self-fulfilling negative prophecies.** U.S. policymakers are particularly susceptible to these tendencies, given multiple U.S. interests and the consequent thinning of intelligence and increased uncertainty. **The magnitude of relative U.S. power in the world—which multiplies perceived threats—can blind** us to **the interests and perspectives of others and**, when **deployed carelessly**, can **produce massive unintended consequences.**

Predictions lock in beaurcratic bumbling responses that turn small scale incidents into super disasters turning case.

Der Derian 2005 (James, Director of the Global Security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, "National security: an accident waiting to happen", Sep 22, 2005)

It often takes a catastrophe to reveal the illusory beliefs we continue to harbor in national and homeland security. To keep us safe, we place our faith in national borders and guards, bureaucracies and experts, technologies and armies. These and other instruments of national security are empowered and legitimated by the assumption that it falls upon the sovereign country to protect us from the turbulent state of nature and anarchy that permanently lies in wait offshore and over the horizon for the unprepared and inadequately defended. But this parochial fear, posing as a realistic worldview, has recently taken some very hard knocks. Prior to September 11, 2001, national borders were thought to be necessary and sufficient to keep our enemies at bay; upon entry to Baghdad, a virtuous triumphalism and a revolution in military affairs were touted as the best means to bring peace and democracy to the Middle East; and before Hurricane Katrina, emergency preparedness and an intricate system of levees were supposed to keep New Orleans safe and dry. The intractability of disaster, especially its unexpected, unplanned, unprecedented nature, erodes not only the very distinction of the local, national, and global, but, assisted and amplified by an unblinking global media, reveals the contingent and highly interconnected character of life in general. Yet when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural disasters, we continue to expect (and, in the absence of a credible alternative, understandably so) if not certainty and total safety at least a high level of probability and competence from our national and homeland security experts However, between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by US Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis, there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration--and perhaps no national government--is up to the task of managing incidents that so rapidly cascade into global events. Indeed, they suggest that our national plans and preparations for the "big one"--a force-five hurricane, terrorist attack, pandemic disease--have become part of the problem, not the solution. His use of hyberbolic terms like "ultra-catastrophe" and "fall-out" is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities, but the capacity of conventional language itself. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservative faithful of the first term of US President George W. Bush, who, viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be, have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is--and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations, distortions, and lies can close this gap. However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security, realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account--let alone prepare or provide remedies--for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly's wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the "failure of imagination" identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the "ultra-catastrophe" that did? What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises--as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees--not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers--what organizational theorists identify as "negative synergy" and "cascading effects"--that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters?[Just as "normal accidents" are built into new technologies--from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion--we must ask whether "ultra-catastrophes" are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, "planned disasters." What, then, is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events. According to the legal philosopher of Nazi Germany, Carl Schmitt, when the state is unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety, security, and well-being through legal, democratic means, it will necessarily exercise the sovereign "exception:" declaring a state of emergency, defining friend from foe, and, if necessary, eradicating the threat to the state. But what if the state, facing the global event, cannot discern the accidental from the intentional? An external attack from an internal auto-immune response? The natural as opposed to the "planned disaster"? The enemy within from the enemy without? We can, as the United States has done since September 11, continue to treat catastrophic threats as issues of national rather than global security, and go it alone. However, once declared, bureaucratically installed, and repetitively gamed, national states of emergency grow recalcitrant and become prone to even worse disasters. As Paul Virilio, master theorist of the war machine and the integral accident once told me: "The full-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means."

A2: Realism

Realism just doesn't make sense anymore—influence of companies, non-state terrorism, communication media access of non-state actors and the complexity of environmental issues all disprove

O'Lear and Tuten, 2013

(Shannon, professor of Environmental studies and political geography at U Kansas, Adalric H., *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations,* "Environment and Conflict: Security, Climate Change and Commodity Resources," Vol. 14 No.1, Winter 2013, ProQuest, accessed 1-17-14 bh@ddi)

In the current, post-9/11 era "conflict" has become increasingly more complex. **Realists' theories in International Relations which focus on state-to-state interactions are inadequate to capture new or more active modes and agents of conflict. Non-state terrorism, the interests of profit-seeking corporations and industries, and the widespread use of communication media by non-state actors,** such as the Arab Spring protests, **challenge the idea of state actors as the only-or even key-players in conflict.** Samuel P. Huntington's predictive view of cultural conflict centers not on state to state tensions, but on tensions between self-identifying groups of people which may transcend state borders.1 The "Clash of Civilizations" argument looks to differences between cultures, values, and world views as the basis for conflict. However, it is difficult to determine how cultural values may be clearly distinguished from economic issues, or what the objective of culturally-motivated, armed conflict might be other than to secure territory in efforts to exercise self-determination and to gain or protect sovereign statehood. **Conflict is complex precisely because it refers to different types of tensions, involving different types of actors, and happening at multiple-often simultaneous-spatial scales. The very geopolitics of conflict have become more obviously complicated than mere state-to-state conflict.** Conflict is most often thought of as armed and involving direct, physical aggression. However, there are many types of conflict, and violence can interfere with human well-being. Johan Galtung's work on peace and conflict offered this perspective, " Violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual., between what could have been and what is."2 More recently, James Tyner has written about ways in which violence and place are co-constitutive, and about the indirect violence of state-sanctioned activities as an often overlooked feature in scholarship.3 Indeed, there is a vast, multidisciplinary literature on violence, and it is mentioned to acknowledge that a focus on armed conflict does not necessarily capture the trends and processes which are affecting individuals and groups in many different contexts. **The changing geopolitical nature of conflict becomes particularly evident and even more complicated when considering the ways in which natural resources, ecosystem services, and other environmental features are integrated with conflict-armed or otherwise-at multiple spatial scales**. Recent scholarship examining environment-related conflict demonstrates a richness and breadth of focus. **Definitions of conflict can range from civil society engagement with resource development to a military strategy involving the intentional infliction of environmental damage**.5 **Environmental features in conflict can include** the built environment, such as **the destruction of urban spaces and the violent production of new spaces to eradicate the living spaces of certain communities**.6 Other work has examined **anti-terrorist rhetoric influences on popular understandings of how natural resources may be linked to conflict**.7 **A political economy perspective recognizes that conflict related to natural resources**, such as common pool resources, involves multiple spatial scales beyond local actions and impacts.8 These are but a few examples of how conflict linked to environmental features is currendy understood.

Realist analysts fail to take non-state actors, such as terrorists, into account

Grondin, 04 (David, founding-member of the Canadian Critical Security Studies Network, *(Re)Writing the National Security State*, Occasional Papers, March 20)

Realist analysts "observe" that the U.S. is *the* world hegemonic power and that no other state can balance that power. In their analyses, **they seek to explain how the** United States **was able to build and lead coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq with no other power capable of offering military resistance. Barry Posen** "neutrally" **explains this** by emphasizing the United States' permanent preparation for war:1 I argue that **the United States enjoys command of the commons**—command of the sea, space, and air. I discuss how command of the commons supports a hegemonic grand strategy. [...] Command means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United States. **Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S. global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power**, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons has permitted the United States to wage war on short notice even where it has had little permanent military presence. This was true of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1993 intervention in Somalia, and the 2001 action

in Afghanistan (Posen, 2003: 7-9).¶ **Moreover, in realist theoretical discourses, transnational non-state actors such as terrorist networks are not yet taken into account.** According to Brooks and Wohlforth, they need not be: "Today there is one pole in a system in which the population has trebled to nearly 200" (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29). **In their system, only states are relevant. And what of the Al-Qaida terrorist network? At best, realist discourses accommodate an interstate framework, a "reality" depicted in their writings as an oversimplification of the complex world in which we now live** (Kratochwil, 2000).[7]¶ In their theoretical constructs, **these analysts do not address national or state identity in any substantive way. Moreover, they do not pay attention to the security culture in which they as individuals are embedded[8]. They rarely if ever acknowledge their subjectivity as analysts, and they proceed as if they were able to separate themselves from their cultural environment.** From a poststructuralist perspective, however, it is impossible to recognize all the ways in which we have been shaped by the culture and environment in which we were raised. We can only think or experience the world through a cultural prism: it is impossible to abstract oneself from one's interpretive cultural context and experience and describe "the world as it is". There is always an interpretive dimension to knowledge, an inevitable mediation between the "real world" and its representation. This is why American realist analysts have trouble shedding the Cold War mentality in which they were immersed. Yet some scholars, like Brooks and Wohlforth, consciously want to perpetuate it: "Today the costs and dangers of the Cold War have faded into history, but they need to be kept in mind in order to assess unipolarity accurately" (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 30).

Realism is not inevitable

Grondin, 04 (David, founding-member of the Canadian Critical Security Studies Network, *(Re)Writing the National Security State*, Occasional Papers, March 20, http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf)

I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. **The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose.** Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that **identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed**. In a scheme in which "to say is to do", that is, from a perspective that accepts **the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is "a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being**, [...] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak" (Campbell, 1998: 221).

Miscellaneous

Securitizing the environment will only cause further problems internationally

EURAS 14 (European Academy for Standardization, researchers in various fields of academic study, Academic Journal, winter 2014, Vol. 2, No. 1, http://www.euras-edu.org/dosyalar/39A_academic_journal.pdf#page=61)

Proponents of environmental security believe that a link to 'high politics' would make threats to the environment seem more pressing and important, however Deudney believes that **securitizing the environment will not increase the possibility of finding suitable political solutions to environ-mental problems.** He also warns that **if environmental issues will be 'securitized', than environ- mental degradation from one country might be seen from other countries as a national security threat which could trigger various types of intervention and imperialism.**27

The environment always exceeds human meddling—more intervention only worsens the cycle of crisis, guaranteeing ecological extinction.

Luke, 2001 (TIMOTHY W. LUKE Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, USA, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2001 Education, Environment and Sustainability, What are the issues, where to intervene, what must be done?)

Commoner also presents these two worlds as being `at war' . **As humans in the technosphere disrupt the ecosphere, the ecosphere responds with equally or more disruptive secondary effects in the technosphere.** In some sense, the environment is `nature' for Commoner, but it is also `society' , or, perhaps more accurately, a new composite of `nature-as-transformed-by-society' . Commoner stresses this interpretation in The Closing Circle when he claims `**the environment is, so to speak, the house created on the earth by living things, for living things'** (Commoner, 1971, p. 32). **This representation of the environment as life' s house, however, does little more than reduce it to a biophysical housing of all living things or, again, the setting that surrounds organisms.** Pesticides often are used to typify how environmental destruction happens in this conceptual register. **A chemical agent is applied by humans in the technosphere on something in the biosphere, like weeds or animal pests. While this application was intended to eradicate only those plants or animals that destroyed crops, carried disease and infested dwellings, its impact was much broader. Soon pesticides jumped the dualist chasm and spread through everything in the ecosphere both human technosphere and non-human biosphere returning from `out there' in natural environments back into plant, animal and human bodies situated `in here'** , affecting those artificial environments with unintended, unanticipated and unwanted negative effects. This recognition begins with Carson (1962). Many environmental educators accept this ontological momentum in ordinary Education 195 language use and allow the reductionist and dualist vision of the environment to infiltrate their visions of human concern for the Earth' s ecologies. **Up to a point, this view works, but the limited advantage it provides culminate in resource, risk and recreationist managerialism.** When the world is divisible into environment and society, nature and community, ecology and economics, environmental education' s charge is to enlighten everyone about how to mitigate the damage caused by the latter on the former. **Hence, various environmental protection agencies, built `in here' by society to safeguard what is `out there' in nature, can mobilise agents and activities to reduce resource use, mitigate risks, and contain recreational degradation in the environment.** These approaches `work' , but their workability is short-term and limited. **They overlook how resources are misused, risks are avoidable and recreations are mutable.**

Environmental destruction is a result of human managerial control that contributes to the diminishment of planetary resources.

Paul **Trenell 09**, (graduate student in international politics at the University of Wales, "The (Im)possibility of 'Environmental Security," dissertation submitted September 2006, accessed 11/30/09 http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/410/2/trenellpaulipm0060.pdf)

Before tracing the response to the emergence of environmental hazards it is necessary to say a word about the causes of environmental degradation. By this I refer not to the scientific explanations of the process, but the deeply rooted societal and philosophical developments that have allowed the process to continue. As Simon Dalby has detailed, **environmental threats "are the result of the kind of society that the current global political economy produces. Industrial activity,**

agricultural monocultures, and rampant individual consumption of "disposable items" (all of which are efforts to enhance some forms of human welfare through domination and control of facets of nature) produce other forms of insecurity" (1992a: 113). **A large hand in the development of contemporary environmental problems must be attributed to the enlightenment faith in human ability to know and conquer all.** In the quest for superiority and security, an erroneous division between humanity and nature emerged whereby the natural world came to be seen as something to be tamed and conquered rather than something to be respected (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1973). **Over time, this false dichotomy has become accepted as given, and as a result humankind has lost sight of its own dependence on nature. It is this separation which allows the continued abuse of planetary resources with such disregard for the long-term implications. What is at stake** in how we respond to environmental insecurity **is** the healing of this rift and, in turn, **the preservation of human life into the future.** Any suggested solutions to environmental vulnerability must account for these concerns and provide a sound basis for redressing the imbalance in the humanity-nature relationship.

Control over the environment is uniquely dangerous as the state will use it to justify expanding to global securitization resulting in Ecocide and genocides.
Lanthier 99, Isabelle (B.A. and M.A. in political sciences) and Olivier Lavixence (Professor in Department of Political Sciences at the University of Quebec),-1999 [The Construction of Environmental 'Awareness', Discourses of the Environment. SRB)

Thus, we see that **the environmentalist discourse was born with the blossoming of legislation in a wide range of fields that have a direct or indirect effect on the life of individuals. This discourse is rooted in the aspiration for** a better quality of life, better health, **better control over the immediate environment** - in short, over any phenomena that influence on our well being. **On the other hand, the aspiration for quasi- total control over matter, pushed to an extreme, leads individuals to create the death culture so justly condemned by environmentalists. The death culture represents a discourse that was strongly criticized-by a number of groups and scientific disciplines. It appears in the imperialist political will, where oppression and exploitation, assimilation and cultural genocide of subjected people**, constitute the golden rule of the powerful colonizing ruler. 'But more than control over a territory, its subsoil of its wealth, it is a form of cannibalism of values and works of art that devours a culture with all its original creations' (Moscovici 1993: 19). **The death culture can therefore be understood in terms of what some environmentalists call genocide and, transported to the environmental scale, 'ecocide'** (ibid. 20), **as a mode of govermentality in which exploitation is the organizing principle of social life. Ecocide, decried by environmentalists, is reflected in an absence of respect for the environment, through the pollution of air and water and the destruction of entire forests stemming from a fetishization of concrete.** Ecocide is the mutation of the environment by genetic manipulation and cloning, by the nuclear experiment and its production of radioactive waste. Many environmentalists claim that it is the rule of market aesthetics (of ugliness), of waste and of stench.

Environmental discourse enfolds populaces into apparatuses of biopolitical control
Luke 95 'On Environmentality: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge in the Discourses of Contemporary Environmentalism' Cultural Critique, No. 31, The Politics of Systems and Environments, Part II p.57-81 (Autumn,1995), Phttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1354445 Accessed: 13/07/2012 12:05)

These reflections on "the environment" reframe its meanings in terms of the practices of power, allowing us to turn to Michel Foucault for additional insight. **The bio-power formation described** by Foucault **was not historically closely focused upon the role of Nature in the equations of biopolitics** (Foucault, History of Sexuality I 138-42). For Foucault, the whole point of the controlled tactics of inserting human bodies into the machineries of industrial and agricultural production as part and parcel of strategically adjusting the growth of human populations to the development of industrial capitalism was to bring "life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations," making the disciplines of knowledge and discourses of power into many agencies as part of the "transformation of human life" (143). Once this threshold of biopower was crossed, human economics, politics, and technologies continually placed all human beings' existence into question. Foucault notes that these industrial transformations implicitly raised ecological issues as they disrupted and redistributed the understandings provided by the classical episteme of defining human interactions with Nature. **Living became "environmentalized," as humans related to their history and biological life in new ways from within growing artificial cities and mechanical modes of production, which positioned this new form of human being** "at the same time outside history, in its biological environment, and inside human historicity, penetrated by the latter's techniques of knowledge and power" (143). **Here we can begin to locate the emergence of "the environment" as a nexus for knowledge formation and as a cluster of power tactics. As human beings began to consciously wager their life as a species on the outcomes of these biopolitical strategies and technological systems**, it became clear that they also were wagering the lives of other (or all) species as well. While Foucault regards this shift as one of many lacunae in his analysis, it is clear there is much more going on here than he realizes. Once human power/knowledge formations become the foundation of industrial society's economic

development, they also become the basis for the physical survival of all terrestrial life forms. **Here, ecological analysis emerges as a productive power formation that reinvests human bodies-their means of health, modes of subsistence, and styles of habitation integrating the whole space of existence with bio-historical significance by framing them within their various bio-physical environments filled with various animal and plant bodies.**

Resource managerialism submits nature to the power of bureaucratic control and economic manipulation, converting natural objects into usable goods

Luke 95 'On Environmentality: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge in the Discourses of Contemporary Environmentalism' Cultural Critique, No. 31, The Politics of Systems and Environments, Part II p.57-81 (Autumn,1995), Phttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1354445 Accessed: 13/07/2012 12:05)

The script of environmentality embedded in new notions like "the environment" is rarely made articulate in scientific and technical discourses. Yet, there are politics in these scripts. The advocates of deep ecology and social ecology dimly perceive this in their frustrations with "reform environmentalism," which weaves its logics of geo-power in and out of the resource managerialism that has defined the mainstream of contemporary environmental protection thinking and traditional natural resource conservationism (Luke, "Green Consumerism"). **Resource managerialism can be read as the eco-knowledge of modern governmentality.** While voices in favor of conservation can be found in Europe early in the nineteenth century, the real establishment of this stance comes in the United States with the Second Industrial Revolution from the 1880s through the 1920s and the closing of the Western Frontier in the 1890s (Noble). Whether one looks at John Muir's preservationist programs or Gifford Pinchot's conservationist codes, an awareness of modern industry's power to deplete natural resources, and hence the need for systems of conservation, is well established by the early 1900s (Nash, Wilderness). President Theodore Roosevelt, for example, organized the Governor's Conference in 1907 to address this concern, inviting the participants to recognize that the natural endowments upon which "the welfare of this nation rests are becoming depleted, and in not a few cases, are already exhausted" (Jarrett 51). **Over the past nine decades, the fundamental premises of resource managerialism have not changed significantly. In fact, this code of eco-knowledge has only become more formalized in bureaucratic applications and legal interpretations.** Paralleling the managerial logic of the Second Industrial Revolution, which empowered technical experts on the shop floor and professional managers in the main office, **resource managerialism imposes corporate administrative frameworks upon Nature in order to supply the economy and provision society through centralized state guidance.** These frameworks assume that the national economy, like the interacting capitalist firm and household, must avoid both overproduction (excessive resource use coupled with inadequate demand) and underproduction (inefficient resource use in the face of excessive demand) on the supply side as well as overconsumption (excessive resource exploitation with excessive demand) and underconsumption (inefficient resource exploitation coupled with inadequate demand) on the demand side. **To even construct the managerial problem in this fashion, Nature must be reduced-through the encirclement of space and matter by national as well as global economies-to a cybernetic system of biophysical systems that can be dismantled, redesigned, and assembled anew to produce "resources" efficiently and in adequate amounts when and where needed in the modern market-place.** In turn, **Nature's energies, materials, and sites are redefined by the eco-knowledges of resource managerialism as the source of "goods" for sizable numbers of some people**, even though greater material and immaterial "bads" also might be inflicted upon even larger numbers of other people who do not reside in or benefit from the advanced national economies that basically monopo-lize the use of world resources at a comparative handful of highly developed regional and municipal sites**. Many of these eco-knowledge assumptions and geo-power commitments can be seen at work in the discourses of** the Worldwatch Institute as it develops its own unique vision of environmentality for a **global resource managerialism.**

Environmental crisis frames policy solutions in terms of expert discourses and leads to a freeze in action.

Frederick **Buell 2003**, (professor of English at Cornell, From Apocalypse to Way of Life, 2003, p. 184-185)

Elaborating crisis is thus not only hard to do but can also perhaps never really be done. Worse, even an actual occurrence of crisis, not just an elaboration of its imminence, is no guarantee that people will fall in line with the analyses and prescriptions of environmentalists. **Environmental crisis**, as Ulrich Beck has argued, **is uniquely susceptible to social construction, and while an actual crisis**, like Samuel Johnson's hanging, **can indeed concentrate the mind wonderfully, it can concentrate it on the wrong target.** Revenge against an outgroup can easily substitute for remedy to ecological crisis-especially given the political machinery devoted to obscuring problems and displacing blame described in Chapter 1. Looked at critically then, crisis discourse thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a political liability almost as much as an asset. It calls up a fierce and effective opposition with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too vulnerable to refutation by events. It also exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters and antilife Puritan extremists. **Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a "total solution" to the problems involved – a phrase that, as an astute, analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse**, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich's infamous "final solution." **A total crisis of society –**

environmental crisis at its gravest – threatens to translate despair into inhumanist authoritarianism; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite-and expert-led solutions are possible. **At the same time it depoliticizes people, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it.** Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one's back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one's back on "nature" – on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. **If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, people need to delink from nature and live in postnature** – a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millennium. Explorations of how deeply "nature" has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, **ironically, to further indifference to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them**.

Climate Change policies are dominated by the biopolitical securitizing elites – specifically US climate policies

John **Drexhage, 2008** (John Drexhage has worked on the issue of climate change and sustainable development for close to twenty years., http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/geg_climate_gov.pdf, Climate Change and Global Governance, SRB)

In the 20-plus years that climate change has been a subject of serious international negotiations, we have seen a trend of broadening participation in those deliberations, but, **for the most part, it continues to be led by environment departments and constituencies. Initially, when the science of climate change was the dominant topic, the discussions were, not surprisingly, dominated by climate and meteorological specialists** who sometimes were based in environment departments and sometimes not. In Canada, for example, the initial group responsible for negotiating the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was Atmospheric Environmental Services Canada, the sector of Environment Canada responsible for weather forecasts and atmospheric sciences. **This was fairly typical of most countries, with the notable exception of the United States, where all international negotiations—including those on environmental issues—have been led by the State Department**. Much of the reason the environment departments took such a predominant position in all matters relating to climate change—including mitigation and adaptation— is rooted in the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It was founded by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and was mandated to assess— on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis—the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change; its potential impacts; and options for adaptation and mitigation.1 **What was interesting right from the start was that, despite the fact that the IPCC was very much the brainchild of UNEP and WMO, it ventured into areas far beyond their particular expertise.** While Working Groups (WG) I and II, focusing on the science and impacts of climate change,clearly implicated the climate and environmental scientific community, WG III, focusing on (adaptation—in the First Assessment Report—and) mitigation activities, required expertise far different from climate or environment, comprising development economists, energy specialists, agriculturalists, foresters and so forth.

Apocalyptic rhetoric bad

Apocalyptic rhetoric is often promoted but the impacts predicted rarely happen.

Lomborg(adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, director of the Copenhagen Consensus Centre and a former director of the Environmental Assessment Institute in Copenhagen)**October 9th, 2013**(Bjorn , "Climate change: Apocalyptic rhetoric is blinding us", Gulf News, http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/climate-change-apocalyptic-rhetoric-is-blinding-us-1.1241374)

Bad news sells — that is why we hear so much of it. **But it can leave us with a panicked sense that the world is full of problems that urgently need to be fixed. And panic is rarely a good basis for smart policy. MPs on the House of Commons' Environmental Audit Committee released a report on Tuesday arguing that the UK needs strong climate policies, otherwise it will face "dangerous destabilisation of the global climate". Yet, such scary statements simply underpin expensive policies that offer little benefit.** Remember the Millennium Bug? The world was likely to crash, since computers couldn't handle the switch from 1999 to 2000. It was a great story, but we ended up spending billions to tackle an almost non-existent problem. Similiarly, **in 1997-98, the weather pattern known as El Nino made itself felt in the US and elsewhere. On TV and in the newspapers, it was blamed for everything — wrecking tourism, causing more allergies, melting ski slopes, creating snowstorms, even causing a dip in Disney's share price. But economic research provides a fuller picture. A peer-reviewed article tallied, in financial terms, all the problems and all the benefits from El Nino in the US. Yes, the weather pattern caused storm damage, but it raised winter temperatures, which lowered heating bills and cut the number of people who died from the cold. It also reduced flood damage in the spring, created fewer transportation delays and diminished the number of hurricanes in the Atlantic. While the total damage in the US was estimated at $4 billion (Dh14.71 billion), the total benefits were estimated at $19 billion.** We need the same kind of analysis today, particularly about fracking. Drilling for shale gas, we are told, could pollute drinking water. But the US has drilled more than 40,000 wells and the regulator there has not found "any proven case where the fracking process itself has affected water". So, while there is reason to be cautious, we should focus on better regulation. Also, by highlighting the bad news, shale's opponents play down the potential benefits. Natural gas is much more environmentally friendly than coal, which still powers a huge chunk of electricity production. Gas emits less than half the CO_2 to generate the same amount of energy and much lower quantities of nitrogen oxides, sodium dioxide, black carbon, carbon monoxide, mercury and particulates. **If the UK engaged in large-scale fracking of the Bowland Shale, it could reduce air pollution and eliminate around a third of its carbon emissions. This feeds into climate policy. Despite the moderate predictions of the United Nations Climate Panel, many people, not least the MPs on the Environmental Audit Committee, have tried to spin the issue as threatening Armageddon. The reality is that, by 2020, the cost of promised climate policies to the UK economy will be £21 billion** (Dh123.27 billion) **annually. The net effect over the century — after spending more than £1.5 trillion — will be to reduce temperature rises by a pitiful 0.005 degrees Celsius. Compare this to increased shale gas production, which will generate more than £6 billion annually in tax revenues and reduce carbon emissions by about 10 times more than the current plan. We deserve better than to have bad news drive bad decisions. That is why I asked 21 of the world's top economists to look at some of our biggest problems — hunger, health, global warming and pollution — and tell us the bad and the good news.**

Constant Rhetoric of war makes us believe we are always in conflict-leads to conflict inevitably.

Schneier(Chief Technology Officer of Co3 Systems, a fellow at Harvard's Berkman Center, and a board member of EFF.)**3/14/2013**(Bruce, "Rhetoric of Cyber War Breeds Fear—and More Cyber War", The Irish Times, https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2013/03/rhetoric_of_cyber_wa.html)

Americans have a weird relationship with the word "war". We hate using it to describe actual wars but we love using it in a rhetorical context. We had the war on poverty, the war on crime, the war on drugs and the war on terror**. One of the big "wars" we're talking about now is cyber war and, in this case, the**

word is dangerous. It is both a rhetorical war as well as something with elements of actual combat. The word also confuses the political debate about how to deal with cyber security. The danger is that words frame the debate. If we use the rhetoric of war, we invoke feelings of fear and helplessness. We understand that this is something nations do to each other and that it's not "normal" time when we're at war. We accept a different set of security solutions, one that more easily ignores freedoms and liberties. We are more willing to let the military take over our internet infrastructure and spy on our citizens. On the other hand, if we use the rhetoric of peacetime espionage we think more about the rule of law and allow a much more limited role for the military. **Attacks from China If you have been paying attention to the press recently, you might think China just started a cyber war, attacking everyone in cyberspace.** First the New York Times announced it was the victim of a sophisticated cyber attack from China, one intended to obtain the names of Chinese nationals co-operating with the press. Then the security firm Mandiant released a report naming a particular Chinese military unit as the source of a large number of cyber attacks against targets around the world. **Meanwhile, US president Barack Obama has signed a new cyber-security directive, citing threats from China as one of the motivations behind this action. First, we need to understand that there is no cyber war going on. We are not nations at war and claiming otherwise is destabilising. This is all espionage, something that has been going on between nations ever since nations were invented—and the US is giving as good as it's getting. Seymour Hersh has written in the New Yorker magazine about US military operations in China. Meanwhile, the US Cyber Command recently announced that it is expanding from 900 people to almost 5,000, while the National Security Agency is building a massive new data centre in Utah.** I'm sure China is just as fearful of the US as the US is of China. While there are certainly a lot of state-sponsored cyber attacks emanating from China, it is not really news. We in the security industry have been writing about Chinese cyber attacks for years, in earnest since the mid-2000s. Certainly, internet-enabled espionage has been going on ever since there was an internet. GhostNet In 2010, Google announced it was the victim of a sophisticated series of cyber attacks from China. As with the attacks against the New York Times, the hackers were looking for particular people—in this case, human rights activists. Like the others, this attack was directed at more than one company. At least 20 other large companies were targeted as well: internet and technological companies, media companies and traditional companies. In 2009, security researchers discovered a very sophisticated surveillance network they called GhostNet. They found it during an audit of the Dalai Lama's computers. When they unravelled the command and control network, they found it was operating against high-value political, economic and media targets in 103 countries. While there is no direct evidence that the Chinese were behind this, the list of targets read like a Who's Who of targets on whom China wants to spy. The Chinese may deny particular incidents but they make no secret about their general policies. They have been writing about their doctrine of domination in cyberspace for even longer**. From our perspective there is not much new in the revelations of the past month. Still, the increasingly hostile war rhetoric and sabre-rattling is worrisome. We are in the early years of a cyber war arms race. Arms races are fuelled by two things: ignorance and fear. We don't know about the enemy's capabilities and we're afraid they're greater than our own. So we spend more on weaponry, then even more. The other side does the same and the result is both dangerous and destabilising. Profitable On the other hand, it's very profitable—for some. There is an enormous amount of money and power that results from escalating a cyber war arms race: power for the military, power for law enforcement and power for the large government contractors that support these organisations. These are the people pounding the drums of cyber war and making news headlines warning us of a cyber 9/11, a cyber Pearl Harbour or—my favourite —a cyber Armageddon. As long as "cyber" remains a prefix that scares, it will continue to be used as a tool to influence policy.**

Rhetoric of us Vs. them is historically used to push nations into war

Oddo(Professor of English at Carnegie-Mellon)**2011**(John, "War legitimation discourse: Representing 'Us' and 'Them' in four US presidential addresses", Discourse and Society, http://das.sagepub.com/content/22/3/287.full.pdf+html)

In this study, I attempt to challenge the idea that Bush and FDR argued in different ways to promote war. **In fact, this critical intertextual analysis** (Thibault, 1991) **views Bush's call-to-arms rhetoric not as a departure from FDR's rhetoric, but as a continuation of it. Specifically, the study intertextually examines four speeches – two by FDR and two by George W. Bush – to illustrate how the same argumentative techniques and thematic formations are used to legitimize violence against 'enemies'. In the**

course of the analy- sis, I identify the discursive construal of an Us/Them binary as the principal legitimation technique employed by both Bush and FDR to justify war. I discuss how 'Us' and 'Them' emerge as meaningful categories through the differential deployment of highly moral- ized lexical resources – especially highly moralized material processes and nominaliza- tions. Next, I examine how representations of time (specifically, the past and the future) also function rhetorically to legitimate violence across all four speeches. Finally, I exam- ine how both presidents represent membership in the semantic categories of Us and Them. That is, I analyze the rhetorical techniques by which both presidents demarcate who is on Our side and who is on Their side. **Above all, the analysis suggests that FDR and Bush employ similar lexico-grammatical resources and rhetorical techniques to legitimate war. In fact, at least in terms of their call-to-arms rhetoric, Bush and FDR are not so different after all. The analysis implies, therefore, that CDA scholars interested in challenging the prevailing social problem of war should not neglect history. Nor should they assume that any political leader – regardless of party affiliation – is above making the kind of manipulative and dishonest arguments that are often necessary to make war palatable to the public.**

Us Vs. them rhetoric naturalizes our violence and plays up "the enemies"

Oddo(Professor of English at Carnegie-Mellon)**2011**(John, "War legitimation discourse: Representing 'Us' and 'Them' in four US presidential addresses", Discourse and Society, http://das.sagepub.com/content/22/3/287.full.pdf+html)

The overarching thematic formations that I have labeled 'Us' and 'Them' are, in large part, derived from the speakers' patterned distribution of highly moralized lexical resources (see Van Leeuwen's discussion of moral evaluations, 2007). Perhaps most notably, across the four speeches **negatively valued nouns and processes are almost exclusively used to represent Them and their actions; meanwhile, relatively positive (and neutral) nouns and processes are used to represent Us and our actions.** In Table 1, I have focused on representations of 'Our Violence' across the four speeches. That is, I have listed a number of the most common 'violent' material processes (and nominalized pro- cesses) for which We are represented, implicitly or explicitly, as the responsible actor. As indicated in Table 1, **when it comes to representations of Our violent actions, rela- tively positive or neutral lexical resources are typically selected. Intertextually, these words are linked in the lexicogrammar through synonymy. Each of them tends to justify the use of force, while at the same time diminishing or euphemizing the killing and dying that the use of such force compels. In a sense, Our violence doesn't seem violent at all. By contrast, when it comes to representing Their violent actions, the speakers select from a synonymous set of relatively negative material processes. Indeed, Their violence is moralized so that it appears inexcusable, unprovoked and maximally lethal.** In Table 2, I have listed a number of the most common 'violent' material processes (and nominalized processes) for which They are construed, implicitly or explicitly, as the responsible actor. Aside from these moralized representations of violent processes, both speakers also tend to naturalize violence (Van Leeuwen, 2007). Specifically, **Bush and FDR use nomi- nalizations to represent violence as a historically natural and even inevitable force that We are sometimes compelled to 'confront'. For example, Bush uses the nominalization threat 22 times in his two speeches. Very often, the threat seems to be a force that cannot be attributed to human agency** (e.g. 'I want to … discuss a grave threat to peace, and America's determination to lead the world in confronting that threat', Bush, 2002). Correspondingly, both FDR and Bush use the nominalization challenge – often to repre- sent violence as a kind of inexorable test which We have faced and overcome before and which We must now face and overcome again: • Today in the face of this newest and greatest challenge of them all we Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations (FDR, 1941a). • Their challenge has now been flung at the United States of America … the people of the United States have accepted that challenge (FDR, 1941b). • We did not ask for this present challenge, but we accept it (Bush, 2002). **In some cases, these challenges are loosely represented as trials forced on us by an enemy's material actions – such as the challenge 'flung' at America – but more often they are presented as completely agent-less conditions that must be dealt with. Finally, it is worth noting the ways that Our side and Their side are represented with highly moralized titles, attributes and ambitions. The following value-laden words and their variations are often used in noun groups associated with Us – in the form of things, epithets, classifiers and qualifiers** (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 311–35). More gen- Matthiessen, 2004: 311–35). **More gen- erally, these words are used to describe Us; the attributes we naturally possess; the con- cepts that We value, promote and protect; and the qualities that are threatened when They attack**:23 free/freedom (27), peace (19), security

(18), strength/strong (12), good (11), human (10), success (8), liberty (6), civilization (5), justice (5), resolve (5), prosperity (4), decency (4), courage (3) and democracy (2). By contrast, the following value-laden words and their variations are often used in noun groups associated with Them – again in the form of things, epithets, classifiers and qualifiers. This time, the words describe **Them; the attributes they naturally possess; and the goals they promote, value and aspire to bring about: terror** (67), enemy (16), fear (11), danger/dangerous (11), destruction (9), aggressor/aggression (7), dictator (7), violence (5), crime/criminal (4), death/ deadly (4), evil (4), treacherous (4), tyrant (4), murderer/murderous (3), oppression (3), ruthless (3) and perpetrator (2). **Taken together, these value-laden terms enact clear identities for Us and Them. Clearly, the strategy of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation** (Van Dijk, 1998) **is at work in these speeches. Our side is construed in terms that tend to glo- rify and sanitize; meanwhile, Their side is represented through pejorative terms that tend to vilify and demonize. Needless to say, these patterns of lexicalization assign war a kind of legitimacy. Insofar as it is a war for all things good, and against all things evil – it is a war that ought to be waged.**

Rhetoric and representations shape out ideas of security

Williams(Professor at eh University of Wales)**2003**(Michael C., "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics", http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7fba10b1-092d-4644-b86d-b6924047b696%40sessionmgr4002&vid=2&hid=4214)

As pointed out earlier, **in the framework of securitization theory, any referent object may be securitized by any actor. In practice, however, this openness is constrained by two limiting conditions one relating to the structure of the speech- act itself,** and the other to the social position of the "securitizing actor" and the relationship between this actor and the audience being addressed. It may at this point be useful to review these points briefly. As a speech-act, securitization is portrayed as having a specific structure. Most importantly, [the c]onditions for a successful spe**ech-act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical to follow the rules of the act** (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures), **and (2) the external, contextual and social to hold a position from which the act can be made** ("The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked"). (Buzan et al., 1998:32) **Each of these conditions links securitization theory to broad movements within contemporary international theory. Focusing, for example, on how a successful securitizing act is related to the social and institutional position of the speaker, and thus to forms and relations of power well beyond the linguistic element of the speech-act in itself, clearly links securitization theory to the focus on epistemological, normative, and processual structures, and to questions of "logics of appropriate action" and institutional legitimation that have become the focus of neo-institutionalism.** Indeed, there exist clear possibilities for a great deal of productive cross-fertilization between securitization theory and this burgeoning body of work in International Relations. However, **it is around the issue of communicative action, and particularly in the question of the adequacy of the speech-act as an explanation of social action, that one of the greatest challenges to securitization theory lies.** At the heart of this challenge is the way in which a focus on speech and linguistic rhetoric are limited as tools for understanding processes of contemporary political communication in an age when that communication is increasingly conveyed through electronic media, and in which televisual images play an increasingly significant role. Indeed, while the theory of the securitizing speech-act opens up the research agenda of security studies, treating social communication in a strictly linguistic-discursive form risks limiting the kinds of acts and contexts that can be analyzed as contributing to securitizations. **The Copenhagen School's casting of security as a speech-act is not just a metaphor; it delineates a structure of communicative action, and a framework for the explanation of social practices. The act itself is conceived of in linguistic terms, the institution refers to the position from which it is spoken, and the appropriate tool for its recognition as a securitizing act is an analysis of the rhetorical and discursive structure** (the "internal, linguistic-grammatical" rules and "conventional proce- dures") **of the act and its consequences. Yet as numerous analysts have argued, and everyday practice seems increasingly to make inescapable, this focus stands in contrast to a communicative environment ever more structured by televisual media and by the importance of images. In this environment, speech-acts are inextricable from the image-dominated context in which they take place and through which meaning is communicated.** The result of this shift, as Cori Dauber has pointed out in an insightful treatment of the role of images in security practices, is that "while it is often the case that the rhetoritician will focus on

linguistic texts, on words themselves, in an increasingly media-saturated environment, ignoring visual imagery provides less and less satisfactory work" (2001: 209). It is important to point out that the Copenhagen School readily acknowledges that a focus on speech alone is far too narrow an understanding of the structure of communication involved in securitization. The analysis pursued in Security, for example, is at pains to point out that it is not the word "security" that is indispensable to the specific nature of the speech-act (though it often may play a vital role) but the broader rhetorical performance of which it is a part. "It is important to note" they stress, "that the security speech-act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience" (Buzan et al., 1998:27). In this sense, therefore, the speech-act of securitization is not reducible to a purely verbal act or a linguistic rhetoric: it is a broader performative act which draws upon a variety of contextual, institutional, and symbolic resources for its effectiveness.39 Crucially, however, this aspect of securitization theory remains almost wholly undeveloped. Indeed, taking seriously the role of images in the "media-saturated environment" of contemporary political communications provides a series of fundamental challenges for the analysis of security relations developed by the Copenhagen School.

2nc discourse shapes reality

Discourse shapes reality

Discourse precedes and shapes policy—its disavowal ensures scientific managerialism and mastery

Greenhalgh and Russell 9 (*Trisha, Prof of Primary Healthcare @ Barts and the London School of Medicine and Dentistry and **Jill, Senior lecturer in Health Policy and Evaluation @ the Univ. of London, *Evidence-Based Policymaking: a Critique*, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Vol 52.2, Spring 2009, pgs 304-318)//mm

Where does all this leave evidence-based policymaking? The answer is that, at least as expressed in its most idealistic form, **the term is bound up in the assumptions of positivism**—or, as Feyerabend (1999) prefers to call it, **of naïve rational- ism**. Positivist thinking appears to underlie and justify many policy documents and manifestos. For example, in a speech to the Economic and Social Research Council in 2000, the U.K. Home Secretary David Blunkett stated that: "This Government has given a clear commitment that we will be guided not by dogma but by an open-minded approach to understanding what works and why.This is central to our agenda for modernizing government: using information and knowledge much more effectively and creatively at the heart of policy-making and policy delivery" (p. 2). Blunkett emphasized the preference of his New Labour government for quantitative studies over qualitative, for prediction over understanding of mechanism, and for interventions with a known "effect size." **This reflected a more general set of assumptions** by the Blair government **that "policy decisions should be based on sound evidence. The raw ingredient of evidence is information**. Good quality policy making depends on high quality information, derived from a variety of sources—expert knowledge; existing domestic and international research; existing statistics; stakeholder consultation; evaluation of previous policies" (Modernising Government White Paper, Cab- inet Office 1999,p.31;cited in Wells 2007).1 Evidence-based **policymaking assumes that the ethical and moral issues faced by policymakers can be reduced to questions of "best evidence," and that what is actually going on in the world can be equated with what the chosen metrics indicate is going on**. It also assumes that empirical research, especially on "the impact of intervention X on outcomeY,"will provide the answer to most if not all policy questions;that if we do enough research,we will abolish situations in which the available evidence is irrelevant, ambiguous, uncertain, or conflicting; **that evidence from research is value-free and context-neutral; and that such evidence is of greater value than evidence from personal experience or opinion**. Methodologically, **evidence-based policymaking assumes that deficiencies in research evidence are largely due to flaws in the design or execution of the re- search study**; that the policymaking process comprises a series of technical steps (ask focused question ☐ search for evidence ☐ appraise evidence ☐ implement evidence at policy level); and that policy decisions can be studied as discrete events,bounded by time.Finally, **on a practical level, evidence-based policymaking assumes that the** research **evidence, if reliable and complete, will determine a largely unproblematic course of action** (seeTable 1). **All these assumptions have been shown to be questionable.** Numerous empir- ical studies of the policymaking process, summarized in Table 2, have demon- strated that in practice, **the ethical and moral questions inherent to the policy- making process cannot be reduced to issues of evidence**; that **deficiencies in research evidence are not generally resolvable by undertaking more or bigger studies**; that **the policymaking process does not consist of a series of technical "stages"**; that the evidence considered in policymaking goes far beyond conven- tional research evidence;and that **policy decisions do not usually occur as clearly defined "decision points." The reality of policymaking is messier, more haphazard**, and constrained by practicalities such as time and budget. These realities do not,of course,negate the hierarchy of evidence or the need for adequately funded, well-designed research studies.Yes, we need robust epi- demiological and clinical trial evidence to inform policy. But no, **this evidence will not, in and of itself, tell us what the right policy is for any particular situation**. Political theorists have also questioned the desirability of"evidence-based pol- icy." **The very idea of**

evidence-based policy unduly elevates the role that science can ever play in solving sociopolitical problems. Schwandt (2000), for example, has argued that "as **we increasingly look to science for guidance in overcoming the quotidian problems of social life, there emerges the expectation of the mastery of society by scientific reason**"(p.225). The overriding emphasis in evidence-based policy on"what works"arguably eclipses equally important questions about desirable ends and appropriate means. What matters is not merely what works,but what is appropriate in the circum- stances, and what is agreed to be the overall desirable goal (Sanderson 2003).**The problem, as** critics of the evidence-based policy movement see it, **is that political problems are turned into technical ones, with the concomitant danger that political programmes are disguised as science** (Saarni and Gylling 2004). Should we spend limited public funds on providing state-of-the-art neonatal intensive-care facilities for very premature infants? Or providing "Sure Start" programs for the children of teenage single mothers? Or funding in vitro fertil- ization for lesbian couples? Or introducing a"traffic light"system of food label- ing, so that even those with low health literacy can spot when a product con- tains too much fat and not enough fiber? Or ensuring that any limited English speaker is provided with a professional interpreter for health-care encounters? Of course,all these questions require"evidence"—but **an answer to the question "What should we do?" will never be plucked cleanly from massed files of scientific evidence**. Whose likely benefit is worth whose potential loss? These are questions about society's values,not about science's undiscovered secrets. Hammersley (2001) has argued **that the effect of the dominant culture of evidence-based policy devalues democratic debate about the ethical and moral issues faced in policy choices and erodes practitioners' confidence in their ability to make judgments by marginalizing** professional **experience and tacit knowledge** (Hammersley 2001).The application of scientific method to con- temporary life has led to the deformation of whatAristotle called praxis (practi- cal wisdom or, in contemporary terms, embodied knowledge):"the ailment is the growing inability to engage in decision making according to one's own re- sponsibility as we continue to concede that task to experts in all social institu- tions" (Schwandt 2000,p.225). Interpretivist and Critical Perspectives on Policymaking Table 2 shows a number of alternative framings of what policymaking is. In contrast to"policymaking as getting [research] evidence into practice"(positivist framing), other authors have encouraged us to consider "policymaking as itera- tion," and "policymaking as developing collective understanding,""policymak- ing as enactment of knowledge," "policymaking as becoming" (interpretivist and/or critical framing). All these approaches (which have more in common with one another than any of them has in common with the naïvely evidence-based approach) assume a much more diffuse and indirect influence of evidence on policy. **All the** inter- pretivist and **critical perspectives** shown inTable 2 **consider evidence within the context of dynamic patterns of interaction, adaptation, and sense-making among policymakers**; to a greater or lesser extent, **they also offer a critical analysis of the political, social, and economic conditions that gave rise to particular policy problems**. **Whereas naïve rationalists dismiss** "**political context" as a troublesome side issue, political scientists** typically **see policy problems as constructed through the varied perceptions and social interpretations of the political actors involved** (Shaw n.d.).For them,policymaking is essentially a process of incremental deci- sion making or"muddling through,"involving negotiation across these multiple perspectives (Lindblom 1959). Policy and politics are intertwined with "solu- tions" flowing from the different kinds of problem definition that are produced (Bacchi 2000;Bonell 2002;Kingdon 1995). Back in 1993, Rudolf Klein was warning policymakers against seeking a "technical fix" to the contentious problem of priority-setting in health care. Later, as EBM became a social movement offering precisely this technical fix (Pope 2003),Klein wrote in support of debate and deliberation: Given conflicting values,the process of setting priorities for health care must inevitably be a process of debate.It is a debate,moreover,which cannot be resolved by an appeal to science and where the search from some formula or set of principles designed to provide decision-making rules will always prove elusive. **Hence the crucial importance of getting the institutional setting of the debate right …the right process will produce socially acceptable answers—and this is the best we can hope for**.(Klein andWilliams 2000,20–21) **A critical reading of this debate suggests that setting priorities**

for health care **is a discursive process** (that is, it involves argument and debate).**The policy-as-dis- course perspective embraces a number of approaches that are centrally con- cerned with how policy problems are represented. Policymakers are not simply responding to "problems" that exist** in the community, **they are actively framing problems and thereby shaping what can be thought about and acted upon.** According to Stone (1988):"**The essence of policymaking in political com- munities [is] the struggle over ideas. Ideas are at the centre of all political conflict**. …Each idea is an argument,or more accurately,a collection of arguments in favour of different ways of seeing the world"(p.11).**Within this conceptualization of policymaking, the understanding of "what evidence is" takes on a very different meaning**. **Evidence can no longer be considered as** abstract, **disembodied knowledge separate from its social context**: There is no such entity as"the body of evidence."There are simply (more or less) competing (re)constructions of evidence able to support almost any position. Much of what is called evidence is,in fact,a contested domain,constituted in the debates and controversies of opposing viewpoints in search of ever more compelling arguments.(Wood,Ferlie,and Fitzgerald 1998,p.1735) A number of empirical studies of health policy as discourse have been under- taken, though in general,these are not well understood or widely cited in main- stream health services research. Steve Maguire (2002), for example, describes a longitudinal case study of the development and introduction of drugs for the treatment of AIDS in the United States from 1981 to 1994.Detailed analysis of extensive field notes and narrative interviews with people with AIDS, activists, researchers,industry executives,and policymakers led his team to challenge three assumptions in the evidence-into-policy literature: (1) that there is a clear dis- tinction between the"evidence producing"system and the"evidence adopting" system;(2) that the structure and operation of these systems are given,stable,and determinant of,rather than indeterminate and affected by,the adoption process; and (3) that the production of evidence precedes its adoption. Maguire's study found the opposite: that there was a fluid, dynamic, and reciprocal relationship between the different systems involved,and that **activists "successfully opened up the black box of science" via a vibrant social movement which, over the course of the study, profoundly influenced the research agenda** and the process and speed of gaining official approval for new drugs. For example, whereas the sci- entific community had traditionally set the gold standard as placebo controlled trials with hard outcome measures (such as death),theAIDS activists successfully persuaded them that placebo arms and "body count" trials were unethical in AIDS research, spurring a shift towards what is now standard practice in drug research—a new drug is compared with best conventional treatment, not pla- cebo,and"surrogate outcomes"are generally preferred when researching poten- tially lethal conditions.**The role of key individuals in reframing the issue** ("hard outcomes" or "body counts") **was crucial in determining what counted as best evidence and how this evidence was used in policymaking**. Importantly, **Maguire's fieldwork showed that** AIDS **activists did not simply "talk their way in"to key decision-making circles** by some claim to an inherent version of what was true or right. **Rather, they captured, and skillfully built upon, existing** discourses within society, such as the emerging patients' rights movement and the **epistemological debates already being held within the academic community** that questioned the value of "clean" research trials (which only included "typical" and "compliant" patients without co-morbidity).They also collaborated strategically with a range of other stakeholders to achieve a common goal ("strange bedfellows …pharmaceutical companies along with the libertarian,conservative right wing allied themselves with people withAIDS and gays"(p.85).Once key individuals in theAIDS movement had established them- selves as credible with press, public, and scientists, they could exploit this credi- bility powerfully:"their public comments on which trials made sense or which medications were promising could sink research projects"(p.85). "Fair" Policymaking: A Process of Argumentation In summary, interpretivist and **critical research on the nature of policymaking shows that it involves,** in addition to the identification, evaluation, and use of re- search evidence, **a complex process of framing, deliberation, negotiation, and col- lective judgment**. Empirical research studies also suggest that this is a sophisti- cated and challenging process. In a qualitative research study of priority-setting committees in Ontario,for example,Singer and colleagues (2000) identified fac- tors such as representation of multiple perspectives, opportunities for everyone to express

views,transparency,and an explicit appeals process as key elements of fair decision making. **An important dimension of this collective deliberation is the selection and presentation of evidence in a way that an audience will find credible and appealing**. **If we wish to better understand the deliberative processes involved in policy- making, and how evidence actually gets "talked into practice"**(or not) at a micro level of social interaction, **then we require a theoretical framework that places central focus on** language ,argumentation, and **discourse.** Philosophical work on argumentation can be traced back to Aristotle's classic Rhetoric. Aristotle classi- fied rhetoric as a positive, scholarly activity and saw it as having three dimen- sions: logos (the argument itself—the"evidence"in modern parlance);ethos (the credibility of the speaker); and pathos (the appeal to emotions). **Evidence-based perspectives on** health-care **policymaking tend to define the last two of these as undesirable "spin," to be systematically expunged so that the policymaking process can address "pure" evidence in an objective, dispassionate way. But an extensive literature** from political science **suggests that the "What should we do?" questions are addressed more effectively, not less, through processes of rhetorical argumentation** (Fischer 2003; Majone 1989; Miller 2003; Stone 1988; Young 2000). Booth's (1974) definition of rhetoric as "the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared discourse," highlights the value of rhetoric in bringing to the fore the role of human judgment in policymaking. **Rhetorical theory reminds us of the human agency involved in the use of evidence in policymaking,** and indeed requires us to shift from equating rationality with EBM-type procedures to considering rationality as a situated, contingent human construction:"The constructive activity of rationality occurs through the discovery and articulation of good reasons for belief and action,activities that are fundamental to deliberation. Rationality concerns a process or activity (not a procedure) that guarantees criticism and change (not correctness)"(Miller 1990, p. 178). Sanderson (2004) suggests that this alternative conceptualization of rationality and focus on the deliberative processes of reason giving, argument, and judgment has much to offer to those around the policymaking table: **we need to work within a broader conception of rationality to recognise the validity of the range of forms of intelligence that underpin "practical wisdom," to acknowledge the** essential **role of fallible processes of craft judgement in assembling what is to be accepted as "evidence," and to incorporate deliberation,** debate and argumentation **in relation to the ends of policy and the ethical** and moral **implications of alternative courses of action**. From this perspective, the challenge faced by policy makers is seen not as a technical task of reducing uncertainty through the application of robust, objective evidence in the pursuit of more effective policies, but rather as a practical quest to resolve ambiguity through the application of what John Dewey calls"creative intelligence"in the pursuit of more appropriate policies and practice.(p.376)

The question "what should we do?" makes students funnels for regurgitated knowledge unless critically questioned and discursively analyzed

Asen 10 (Robert, Prof of Communication Arts @ the Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, *Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric in Public Policy*, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol 13. 1, Spring 2010, pgs 121-143)//mm

As these examples suggest, **rhetoric articulates policy purposes** and populations, **and negotiates fits between them.** Sometimes, an advocate may begin with a policy purpose, such as a principled opposition to Social Security as contrary to the operation of the free market, then construct a population to advance their goals. Other times, an advocate may imagine a population, such as champions of an emergent "investor class," then pursue a policy to meet its ostensible interests. Exhibiting a mutually informative relationship, purpose and population exert mutual constraint. An advocate who imagines technology-savvy younger workers prospering in a postindustrial economy likely would regard investment as a superior purpose for retirement policy. Along these lines, purposes and populations may exhibit better and worse fits, which can change over time as good fits may deteriorate and bad fits may improve. In this spirit, advocates of private investment accounts have sought to break the original association of Social Security with independence. For instance, Paul

Hewitt, executive director of the National Taxpayers Union Foundation, insisted that "Social Security has indeed helped make many of today's elderly very dependent on Government." He exhorted Congress to break "the cycle of dependency in old age."24 Hewitt and others championed private accounts as an embrace of individualism that would return independence and control to all seniors. **As policies mediate rhetorical and material elements, the process of policy- making foregrounds the role of rhetoric as a constitutive force. Congressional hearings, floor debates, presidential speeches, media campaigns—these all represent irreducibly rhetorical acts**. **Policymaking occurs as debate participants attempt to persuade others to support particular programs and outcomes**. Like ongoing policies themselves, **policymaking ineluctably involves meaning and engages symbol systems. Policymaking also mediates the material, often in the form of institutional power, officially sanctioned authority and privilege, and money**. However, policies and policymaking differ in their explicit use and mode of rhetoric. In terms of mode, I distinguish policymaking from policies as a difference between making meaning (policymaking) and maintaining and enforcing meaning (policies). Of course, practice complicates my analytic distinction, as administrators and field agencies, for instance, can make their own meaning by following the letter of a law while undermining its spirit. Welfare policy betrays a sad history of administrators turning away legally eligible applicants for assistance. The so-called welfare crisis of the 1960s arose as a consequence of poor people successfully claiming their legal entitlements. On this score, James Patterson reports that, whereas only 33 percent of eligible families in the early 1960s participated in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, by 1971 over 90 percent of eligible families participated.25 As this statistic illustrates, varying levels of maintenance and enforcement can expand, restrict, and shift policy meanings. Policymaking nevertheless represents atypical moments in the lives of policies where meaning making appears as the central task occupying participants. Over its 70-plus-year history, Social Security has only periodically undergone explicit legislative revision, with important amendments and changes occurring in 1939, 1950, 1972, and 1983. In these moments—and as advocates of privatization hope, in the contemporary period—questions of aims and methods become primary concerns**. Participants in policy debates ask "What do we want to do?" and "How do we want to do it?" Policymaking thus constitutes paramount rhetorical moments in the lives of policies**. **However, since no policy arises ex nihilo, policymaking does not inaugurate unprecedented meanings as much as it intervenes in an ongoing symbolic field.** Negative attitudes toward assistance already circulated publicly in the 1930s when supporters of insurance invoked this distinction to champion their preferred vision of retirement pensions. In a similar spirit, contemporary advocates of privatization draw on public hostility toward government in their case for individual investment accounts. In these ways, **policymaking provides participants opportunities to constellate meaning, creating and recreating multiple associations and dissociations, in making policy. Drawing on different constellations, debate participants may articulate social problems requiring a government response**, imagine target populations, evaluate histories, and envision futures for public policies. **Rhetoric thus acts as a powerful** but not an unconstrained **force in policymaking**. **Individual participants in policy debates make choices in framing policies, affirming and denying values, representing target populations, inviting or discouraging wider agency, and other areas**, but the participation of other advocates, the judgment of audiences, the social force of discourse, and multiple material considerations constrain these choices. None of these forces acts as an ultimate adjudicator in policy debate. We cannot, for instance, appeal to a transparent and universally understood reality to answer disagreements about the severity of Social Security's financial shortfalls. Anticipating charges that his ominous assessment of Social Security's future finances sounded unnecessary alarms, Rep. Clay Shaw (R-FL) insisted that his framing met the legal definition of bankruptcy: "I would like to submit for the record the definition of bankruptcy as it appears in Black's Law Dictionary: The state or condition of one who is unable to pay his debts as they become due." Unlike other policymakers who saw safety in the Social Security trust funds, Shaw dismissed them as "nothing more than an IOU from the government to the government."26 And yet different perspectives do not engender a stymieing circulation of meaning, since policies elicit action: when members of Congress identify a problem, they oft en

seek to pass bills, and presidents may sign or veto legislation. Rather than expressing entirely fixed or formless meanings, policy debates constellate meanings that emerge through the convergence and contestation of rhetorical and material forces. This point also broaches the processual character of the policy text. Authorship, Temporality, and Polysemy in the Policy Text **As rhetorical scholars know well, texts do not function as static, stable entities**. Instead, texts—even seemingly discrete ones—oft en express multiple, sometimes contradictory meanings that manifest as qualities of dynamism and movement. In this way, we may view such texts less as objects and more as processes. Drawing on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, James Jasinski holds that all texts "contain essential dialogic moments" that reveal "interaction between different languages and voices at the level of word, sentence, utterance, and/or text." **Foregrounding these moments as critically revelatory**, Jasinski **urges scholars to "reconstruct the dialogue embedded in the dialogic word and polyphonic utterance**."27 In a similar spirit, G. Thomas Goodnight underscores the processual character of public argument in his definition of controversy as "ubiquitous, temporally pluralistic, extended argumentative engagements constituted in the full range of communicative actions and enveloping communication systems and practices."28 The ubiquity of controversy refers to its appearance across the diverse forums and interactions of our everyday lives, as well as its emergence across a range of topics. As temporally pluralistic, controversies endure over varying periods of time, exhibiting more and less active periods of engagement. Employing a full range of communicative actions, controversies proceed through debate, narrative, visual display, and other modes of expression. As these qualities suggest, **the rhetorical texts of a public controversy incorporate discourses circulating in different places and at different times. Situating the policy text as a process, then, draws on the insights of rhetorical scholarship in public address, argument, and elsewhere**. However, **even as process resonates across these areas, we need to consider the particularities of the policy text in terms of authorship, temporality, and polysemy**. Public policy texts oft en are composed by hundreds, if not thousands, of authors. For example, in my analysis of federal welfare policy debates in the 1980s and 1990s, I considered the testimony of over a thousand witnesses who appeared before congressional committees.29 Th e number of committee witnesses, policymakers, and other participants in the Social Security debates over their 70-plus-year history far exceeds this figure. These numbers matter not for their sheer quantity but for the implications they hold for analysis. Because of their multiple authorship, policy texts do not readily cohere thematically. Broaching this point in his well-known debate with Michael Leff over the status of rhetorical criticism, Michael McGee famously (or, perhaps, infamously) discerned the "fragmentary" quality of the text. In the postmodern age, McGee asserted, audiences no longer shared a common culture, a development that broke up previously unitary rhetorical practices. In this situation, McGee maintained that "**our first job as professional consumers of discourse is inventing a text suitable for criticism**."30 Although McGee rightly questioned ideas of coherence in rhetorical texts, his explanation and prescription for action do not serve policy texts. First, discerning a common culture is a dubious enterprise: what appears to some as "common" actually reflects relations of power that cast some cultural practices as universal and others as particular. Cultures always exhibit diversity, even if self-appointed arbiters may not recognize it. Th e absence of a unitary policy text, then, does not represent a recent cultural development. Second, McGee attributes too strong a sense of meaning making and agency to the critic. The multiple authors of policy texts do not appear as fragments waiting for the clever critic to give their statements meaning. Rather, **participants in policy debates make meaning through their engagement with each other, and they hope to circulate their preferred meanings more widely**. In the privatization debates, advocates of investment sought to persuade Americans that the present Social Security system confiscated their earnings with only a shaky promise of a minimal return. In contrast, supporters of the existing system reasserted its soundness and favorably contrasted the security of Social Security with the uncertainty of the stock market. The thematic plurality of the policy text arises from the copresence of these competing positions, not the creative assembling of the sovereign rhetorical critic.31 Multiple authorship constrains the participation and significance of any single advocate in a policy debate, who must negotiate his or her participation in light of the others with whom he or she directly interacts as well as others who may participate at diferent times and settings. No single participant can direct the course of a policy debate; instead, trajectories emerge as collective achievements. Even though he possessed the power of the bully pulpit, over the course of his town hall meetings, President

Bush confronted the opposing claims of other policymakers as well as prominent oppositional media campaigns by groups like the American Association of Retired Persons. These considerations challenge the frequent interest in public address scholarship and elsewhere with eloquence and exceptionalism. The project of close textual analysis, for example, appropriately investigates exemplary texts like King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" and the Declaration of Independence.32 **In policy debates, however, mundane statements** oft en **are more influential than exceptional rhetorical performances**. For instance, in a discussion about investing a portion of the Social Security trust fund in the stock market, Rev. Jesse Jackson movingly called attention to the moral basis underlying all investment decisions, urging policymakers to consider whether potential investments in entities such as tobacco companies promoted positive or negative social aims. Jackson insisted that "we could never divorce our money interests from our moral interests and our commitment to human rights. Without that, we lose our moral authority in the world."33 However, his poignant remarks were drowned out by the statements of numerous others—both liberals and conservatives—who insisted that investment decisions should be protected from "politics." In **policy debates, discourse acts as a force that operates relatively independently of individual participants.** Insistence on the "value-free" nature of investment expressed a tenet of "market talk," that is, a utopian view of the market as an ameliorative set of practices, norms, and institutions. Such talk embraces markets as essential elements of human liberty, efficacious forces for financial gain, and superior governing structures.34 **Throughout the debates over privatization in the 1990s and early in this century, hundreds of advocates reiterated market tenets**, such as the belief in the inherently superior efficiency of markets over governments. **In effect, market talk provided "speaking positions" that various advocates could adopt**.35 **The identity of the advocate often mattered less than the tenet articulated.** Moreover, even when discourses such as market talk do not appear explicitly, they may inform interactions in policy debates. Advocates backing government-managed investment of the Social Security trust funds had to address presumptions of partisan interference and higher operating costs. As these examples suggest, **discourses implicate circulating bodies of rhetoric that serve as publicly articulated ways of collectively understanding and evaluating our world, and propagate and enforce social norms with material consequences.**

Assumptions first

Assumptions first, any other alternative justifies slavery

Price 3 (Richard M., associate prof of polisci at the Univ. of British Columbia, *Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics*, World Politics, Vol 55. 4, July 2003, pgs 579-606)//mm

In the end, **if scholars chronicling progressive** moral **change are to deal with the** above **charge of normative bias, they "must take seriously the need to match the rigor of their empirical analyses of normative politics with an equally rigorous defense of their implicit** normative **agenda**, **for ultimately only such a defense can legitimate the politics they observe and wish to encourage**."39 Two rejoinders can be anticipated and preempted in order to advance the debate. First, **scholars could respond with a division-of-labor argument that empirical researchers are not ethical theorists, and such work is best left to philosophers.** Relatedly, empirical scholars could simply agree and footnote the relevant corpus of normative theory that would provide support for the view, for example, that torture or female genital cutting are abominations. Both responses are fine as far as they go, **but they** also both **require that a far greater prominence be accorded normative international relations theory than is the current practice**, at least in mainstream American international relations. **Articles of normative** international **relations theory are a rare find** indeed in the leading American journals of international relations **and hardly reflect an earnest acknowledgment of the mutual interdependence of empirical and normative scholarly work** in the field. Florini makes one of the few attempts to situate the centrality of the normative question of the desirability of TCS influence; even in her volume, however, it is raised as a core concern but then not answered (see also Nelson, in Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink). Indeed, **her contention that the question is "unanswerable in any objective manner**" (p. 231) unfortunately **suggests a perpetuation of the marginalization of ethical questions as mere subjective opinions**. On the contrary, the TCS literature provides a powerful collective moral challenge to alternative theories and demonstrates important synergies between empirical research and normative and positive theory. TCS research documenting the possibility of progressive moral change raises a profound challenge to skeptics: **how does one argue ethically for a theoretical position that as a matter of presumption rejects such possibilities**? To be blunt, **how does one defend as a baseline prescription a theoretical position that, if it had had its way, would** presumably **still be justifying** practices such as **slavery or torture as natural, desirable, or** regrettable but **unavoidable** tragedies in an imperfect world? The collective challenge laid down by the TCS literature to skeptical or conservative theories of international relations is far more pro- found than earlier liberal challenges, since it hitches its ethical challenge to careful empirical work that eviscerates the presumption that the default stance is one that holds moral change across borders as an anomaly to be discounted. Despite the very real cultural and moral differences that can and do exist (and that are used by TCS researchers to explain variations in success),TCS research shows that it is simply not plausible to maintain a priori that the international and domestic realms are ethically distinctive and that the former is devoid of moral content. Does not this research on TCS reverse the burden of proof for theories of world politics, such that the ball is now in the court of skeptical theories? **Why**, they must answer, **should one begin from a position that presumes as unworthwhile and utopian initiatives to improve the lot of some in the world?**

The role of academic intellectuals is to uncover the story of what actually happens, to speak truth to power—the impact is mastery and extinction

Steele 10 (Brent J., Assistant Prof of Political Science @ the Univ. of Kansas, *Defacing Power: the Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics*, Univ. of Michigan Press 2010, pgs 130-1)//mm

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? **How can academic-intellectuals speak "truth to power"?** It should be noted, first, that **the academic-intellectual's** primary **purpose should not be to re-create a program to replace power or** even **to develop a "re- search program that could be employed by students of world politics,"** as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. **Because academics are denied the "full truth"** from the powerful, Foucault states, **we must avoid a trap into which governments would want intellectuals to fall** (and often they do): **"Put yourself in our place and tell us what you would do." This is not a question in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts refused us, an analysis of the situation we aren't allowed to make.** There's the trap. (2001: 453)27 This means that **any alternative order we might provide**, this hypothetical "research program of our own," **will** also **become imbued with authority and used for mechanisms of control**, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. **When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests**, **instead, that the academic should use his or her pulpit**, their position in society, **to be a "friend" "who plays the role of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller"** (2001: 134).28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. **What the President needs, then, is an intellectual father-confessor, who dares to remind him of the brittleness of power**, of its arrogance and blindness, **of its limits and pitfalls**; who tells him how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. **He ought to listen to that voice and tremble**. (1970: 28) The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So **those who are skeptical that academics ever really**, regarding the social sciences, **make "that big of a difference" are missing the point**. **As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and** collectively **analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to "tell the story" of what actually happens,** to document and faithfully capture both history's events and context. "The intellectuals of America," Morgenthau wrote, "can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well" (1970: 28). This will take time,29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the "tact," "rules," and seduction that con- strain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, "humanly speaking, no more is required, and **no more can** reasonably **be asked, for this planet to remain a place fit for human habitation**" ([1964] 2006: 233).

Elite bias makes imperialism inevitable under the guise of "humanitarian intervention"—try or die for radical questioning

Farrell 5 (Theo, reader in War in the Modern World @ King's College London, *Strategic Culture and American Empire*, SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol 25.2, Summer-Fall 2005, pgs 3-18)//mm

As analysts of strategic culture, **what should be our focus?** For Gray, **strategic culture is found in both the thoughts and actions of policy-makers** and military officers, but the **new literature on strategic culture seeks to explore how thought causes action, therefore defining it in terms of ideas that have behavioral consequences**. Attacking Gray's approach, Alastair Iain Johnston argues that from an analytical point of view, beliefs and behavior must separate in order to isolate and track the causal impact of culture (as opposed to some other variable such as technology or force distribution).57 Gray considers this nonsense. He writes, "The traffic of ideas and behavior in strategic affairs is continuous." In contrast to the notion of culture as a "cause" of military behavior, he suggests that it be treated as the "context" that weaves together and gives meaning to strategic action.58 The Gray- Johnston dispute mirrors a meta-theoretical debate in constructivism. Like Johnston, most U.S. constructivists seek to empirically fix and track the causal effect of cultural norms. However**, many European scholars take epistemological issue** with this approach, **arguing that the intertwining, contingency and fluidity**

of beliefs and practice make them inappropriate subjects for social science analysis.59 So far, my own work on culture and war has followed the U.S. social science track. Positivist approaches are particularly well suited to explain- ing how cultural norms regulate behavior. Norms operate in this way to provide technical scripts and moral codes for military action, and these may be found easily in military doctrine, national policy and international law. Indeed, such an approach is appropriate for much of what I have discussed above: namely, the culture of techno-centric warfare and the reinterpretation of legal rules on the use of force.60 **Positivist approaches are not** so **effective at showing how norms operate at a deeper level to constitute actors and meaningful action.** Here **we need to delve into the use of language and images, the articulation of identity, and the negotiation of social situations.** In short, **we** may **need to sacrifice the rigor of social science in order to realize the richness of a more interpretive constructivism**.61 **Even as a self-professed social scientist, I can see that such a trade-off may be necessary** in order **to** fully **appreciate the relationship between force and empire**. **Identity is central to the imperial project**. Thus, liberal democratic empires seek to project abroad progres- sive images regarding the benefits of empire. Equally, identity is central to how metropolitan publics view the imperial enterprise of testing the self, encountering the exotic and domesticating the foreign.62 **A move to interpretivism would have the additional advantage of helping to address the elite bias in existing scholarship on strategic culture**. This bias is somewhat odd since there is a massive social science literature on political culture that seeks to build national profiles of public as well as elite opinion. In Nuclear Strategy and National Style, Gray claims "[t]he con- cept of strategic culture is a direct descendant of the concept of political culture."63 Indeed, one might expect this. However, Gray does not actually draw on the political culture literature in developing his approach. Overall, John Duffield concludes that the concept of strategic culture "has in fact been developed independently, with little or no reference to the literature on political culture." Ironically, even Duffield, who seeks to import the po- litical culture literature into strategic studies, focuses on elite beliefs and values. He does this because, in his view, **elite political culture is easier to measure, is more elaborate and detailed, and "is likely to have a much more immediate bearing on national security**" **than public beliefs**.64 In contrast, the social history of warfare shows that strategic culture has a wide range of sources and that public belief matters in how countries wage wars. **Numerous groups in civil society**—including artists, business interests and the media—**are all involved in the cultural framing of war**. **Ordinary people also enact their own ideas in participating in war, be it on the battlefield or the home front**.65 **Much of this social history** deals with the world wars—wars which, by their total nature, involved and **indeed consumed whole societies.** However, I would argue that popular culture and civil society are equally indispensable to the creation and evolution of empire. For example, missionary movements and business entrepreneurs both harnessed popular ideologies of social progress to justify the expansion of British civilization in 19th-century Africa.66 Similarly, both business groups and Republican Party leaders drew on the popularized "science" of geopoli- tics to promote the rise of the U.S. navy and the projection of U.S. capital into Asia as a means of revitalizing the American economy at the turn of the 20th century. The expansion of American naval and commercial power also linked to the creation of a new socially unifying national identity—one more suited to the post-Civil War United States and able to accommodate the social dislocation associated with industrialization and with the assimi- lation of immigrant populations. By expanding outwards and encountering the "other," Americans could in this way identify themselves.67 **The problem here is one of method-driven theorizing. A focus on political, policy** and military **beliefs serves to facilitate causal analysis, in that elite beliefs are easier to isolate and track**. Obviously, social historians are not shackled by such concerns. Equally, **a move toward a more interpretivist approach offers the possibility of bringing civil society back into our accounts of strategic culture**. An interpretivist take on U.S. strategic culture would open several promising lines of inquiry, especially in terms of the mutually constitutive relationship between military force and identity. For example, both the United States and Britain developed force projec- tion postures that did not threaten liberal democracy back home. Indeed, in 19th-century, Britain navies were viewed as being progressive in contrast with land armies, which were considered characteristic of illiberal powers.68 Similarly, nuclear-armed air power was favored in early-Cold War U.S. so- ciety because it offered

security without sacrificing liberty. Political leaders worried that the alternative—to raise taxes and a massive land army—threat- ened to turn the United States into a garrison state.69 **Another obvious line of inquiry is in the construction of threat.** David Campbell's Writing Security powerfully demonstrates the strategic use and subconscious invocation of language, symbolism and imagery in threat creation and the purpose this served in developing in-group identities and loyalties in the Cold War United States.70 We may witness a similar dynamic in the current "War on Terror." Through this campaign, America has articulated a moral asymmetry between responsible and rogue states, pushing Iran, Syria and North Korea to the margins of the world normative order. Again, comparisons may be made with Imperial Britain's war on piracy and its campaign against the North Africa oligar- chies.71 Domestically, Bush's War on Terror serves to bind Americans to a renewal of the national security state.72 Foreigners and fear therefore are integral to the reproduction of the United States' imperial identity. Conclusion **What may we expect from the American Empire?** As a liberal democracy, it may exercise restraint in some respects, but in a world shared with illiberal opponents and one that contains much racial and ethnic diversity, **liberal democratic empires still may be violent creatures and places.** Moreover**, liberal ideology provides just cause for war**. Arguably, **humanitarian imperatives**, particularly **to "save strangers" from massacre or gross misrule, will** increasingly **provide the template for war in the 21st century**, one that will also increasingly inform U.S. use of force.73 Strategic culture also provides moral codes and technical scripts to guide and regulate American use of force. To be sure, culture operates at multiple levels, including above and below the state, to shape military behavior. However, of all the levels of normative analysis, the national level provides the most explanatory power for the relationship between policy beliefs and military practices. A focus on U.S. strategic culture thus draws our attention to a military preference for high technology, an aversion to casualties, and a pragmatic approach to circumventing legal restraints on the use of force. Iraq is a vivid reminder of the material and moral hazards of the use of force by a liberal empire.74 It also illustrates the points above. It reveals the role of liberal ideology in fueling war and shows the American approach to warfare in action. High technology and legal pragmatism were very prominent in the blitzkrieg invasion of Iraq. The United States has taken sizeable numbers of casualties in this war, with more than 2,000 deaths so far. Nevertheless, it is too early to say whether this means U.S. political and military leaders have gotten over their casualty aversion. Certainly, this number does not come close to the 58,000 Americans killed in Vietnam.75 Let me close with two conclusions. The first concerns the social science of strategic culture. **A focus on the beliefs of policy** and military elites **can tell us much about the cultural biases that shape how the United States does and will use force to protect, police and expand its empire**. **Such a "thin" constructivism** also **misses much. It is poorly equipped to explore the broad range of agents in civil society involved in** producing and **enacting norms of war**. Crucially, it tells us little about the relationship between identity and the purpose of empire or the role of force in reproducing both. **This suggests the need to move toward a "thicker" constructivism, one that is better able to follow scripts** and codes for action **"all the way down" to the identities that sustain them**. **This approac**h, in turn, **creates** all sorts of methodological **challenges for social scientists**, especially if tracking causa- tion remains the objective—**challenges that** nonetheless **need to be faced**.76

Aff Answers

Perm

Perm do both- a threshold approach solves

Owen(member of the International Peace Research Institute)September 20th, 2004(Taylor, "Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition", Sage Journals, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/35/3/373.full.pdf+html)

With this in mind, I propose a hybrid definition, one that requires sacrifice on the part of both broad and narrow proponents. Instead of being pre- chosen, threats would be included on the basis of their actual severity. All would be considered, but only those that surpass a threshold of severity would be labeled threats to human security. Such a threshold-based defini- tion has two parts, discussed below.15 First, h**uman security must recognize that there is no difference between deaths from floods, communicable disease, or war, as all preventable harms could potentially become threats to human security. However, people can be harmed by such a vast array of threats that complete coverage is con- ceptually, practically, and analytically unfeasible.** In addition, varying harms require dramatically different policy responses. The definition must be selec- tive, without limiting any harms that affect large numbers of people. With this in mind, the first part is derived from the Commission on Human Security (2002): 'human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats'. The advantage of this wording is that it remains true to the broad nature of human security, while clearly separating it from more general concepts of human well-being and development. Making the referent object 'all human lives' puts the focus on the individual while at the same time indicating a universalism in the mandate. As the highest level of human insecurity is likely to occur in the developing world, this is particularly important. **Reference to 'critical and pervasive threats' establishes severity, immediacy, and scope. As there is an unlimited number of possible threats, only the most serious, those that take or seriously threaten lives, are included. The definition sets the parameters and lets the conditions on the ground determine what is and is not included. Out of an infinite list of possible threats, some will surpass a threshold and become human security concerns,16 while others will be dealt with through existing mechanisms. The second part of the definition addresses the issue of conceptual clarity. A definition must be able to separate and categorize all possible threats for meaningful analytic study. Categories are therefore established under which all human security threats are ordered.** These categories are not threats them- selves, but are rather conceptual groupings, providing a degree of disci- plinary alignment to what is an overarching concept. **Therefore, human secu- rity is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats.17 Regardless of the exact wording used, the idea of a threshold-based con- ceptualization of human security requires a degree of sacrifice from both narrow and broad proponents.** Narrow proponents have to recognize that violence falls into only one of the six human security categories, personal security. The Human Security Report or the Canadian government's position, for example, focus solely on the personal security category, not on the con- cept as a whole.

Perm do the plan- Only by addressing security threats can we give a voice to all the peoples of the world

Owen(member of the International Peace Research Institute)September 20th, 2004(Taylor, "Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition", Sage Journals, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/35/3/373.full.pdf+html)

The unease between the theory and the normative practice of human secu- rity is reflected in the colloquium. In many ways, the dialogue can be shaped as a chicken-and-egg dilemma. Are policy norms built on lucid theoretical grounding, or do we act first and adjust theory later through 'real world' lessons learned? This is something that proponents must discuss – if only out of a recognition that two very different exercises are under way. **Human security as an analytic and theoretical tool, and human security as a policy mandate are not necessarily incompatible, but if they were to become so, the success and effectiveness of both would be undermined. Put another way, the theoretical success of political realism has come largely from its tandem manifestation in the policy world. In this sense, the theory and policy of human security are surely better together than apart. First and foremost, proponents of policy-based human security concep- tions are not concerned with the lack of definitional (theoretical) clarity.** To many, human security has a utility only if it can be harnessed to address policy problems – something that it has done quite successfully.8 Uvin for example, sees the concept as a

conceptual bridge between the self-contained but clearly 'overlapping' professional fields of humanitarian relief, development assistance, human rights advocacy, and conflict resolution. It is the intersect in their mandates that he calls human security. **Increasingly, he argues, lack of interdisciplinarity not only leads to redundancy, but is actually counterproductive to finding integrated solutions to real-world problems. Hampson adds that by refocusing our attention on the issues affecting the most people, human security gives political voice to the otherwise politically marginalized. Similarly, this approach forces us to address the broader context of vulnerability. While this will often mean a focus on political insti- tutions, it will also lead to a heightened awareness of the indirect social, eco- logical, and economic 'menaces to human security'.**

Perm do both- security is necessary but that doesn't mean it has to come from the state

Owen(member of the International Peace Research Institute)September 20th, 2004(Taylor, "Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition", Sage Journals, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/35/3/373.full.pdf+html)

This is where the empirical validity in the study of human security lies. Better understanding of the causes and correlates of various human security threats will invariably shed light on the concept as a whole, addressing another key critique of the concept – its ambiguity. Any threat (war, poverty, violence, disease, etc.) can be studied as a dependant variable against a host of other independent human security threats. In this sense, by bringing the wide range of issues, data sets and knowledge of threats together, **we facili- tate the very type of interdisciplinary analysis needed to decipher the com- plex relations that make up our human insecurity.** On policy utility: **Too much is made of the implications of 'securitizing everything'. Although this is contested among proponents, I do not believe that anyone ever intended to raise every possible issue to the highest policy priority. Shifting the focus away from the state, as Mack points out, was simply a means of dealing with harms that may not threaten the state as an identity but do threaten the lives of its citizens.** Deciding which harms we include is up for debate, and I will suggest a method in the next section. Second, **nobody is suggesting that securitizing necessarily means militarizing. In fact, it is the very assumption that security is solely a militaristic endeavor that human security attempts to challenge. Of course, in some cases, such as those that meet the ICISS criteria, military action might be needed to protect human security. Generally, however, it is the resources and prescience attributed to the military that is wanted, not the guns.**

Perm do both- a reconciliation of both sides of the debate can solve

Owen(member of the International Peace Research Institute)September 20th, 2004(Taylor, "Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition", Sage Journals, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/35/3/373.full.pdf+html)

WHEN ASKED CRITICALLY about the level of uncertainty, debate, conjecture, and outright skepticism regarding the concept of human security, former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy responded assertively: 'The world had no idea what sovereignty and the security infrastructure would look like immediately following the signing of the treaty of Westphalia. Norms evolved through decades of debate, thought, action, conflict and compromise'(Axworthy, 2001b). **This is worth considering as we address the state and future of the concept of human security – knee-jerk dismissals are clearly premature. To many, there is little doubt that (in and of itself) the traditional state- based security paradigm is failing in its primary objective – to protect people. Millions a year are killed by communicable disease, civil war, environmental disasters, and famine, none of which fall under the mandate of current security thinking. This critique crosses ideological, disciplinary, religious, moral, and political divides.** The issues are immensely complex, and the theoretical, practical, and political solutions are far from obvious. The resulting dialogue is understandably confused. **The debate in this issue of Security Dialogue represents this complexity – broad versus narrow definitions, theoretical versus practical applications, and fundamental critiques. But it is also emblematic of the common under- standings shared by the proponents – and, in many cases, the critics – of human security on what it entails and its main objectives. As was the case with traditional security, consensus will only emerge through long-term theoretical debate and policy experimentation.**

In this brief colloquium summary, I will address the main issues and positions framed in the debate. I will then propose a threshold-based conceptualization of human security, one that attempts to bridge the broad-versus- narrow and analytically-useful-versus-conceptually-accurate divides. This will hopefully add a conciliatory element to what has for a decade been an unnecessarily fractious debate.

Perm solves: securitization of the environment allows different social constructions of security to arise

Trombetta 8 (Maria Julia - Teaching Fellow in Politics and Environment in the Department of International Studies at the University of Nottingham in China, "Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557570802452920#tabModule, JS)

Risk society challenges the logic of violence, antagonism and war suggested by securitization. This suggests a set of security practices—based on risk management and on prevention—which are rather different from those suggested by the Copenhagen School. Are appeals to security stuck in fixed problematic practices that the latter suggests? This article claims that **through the securitization of nontraditional sectors like the environment, different logics of security can be brought into being. Securitization—broadly understood as the social construction of an issue as a security issue—can be considered as a reflexive process that is not only 'rule-directed' but also 'rule altering'** (Beck 1997, 134). **Securitization is not about applying a fixed meaning of security as exceptionality that inscribes enemies in a context. Rather, it is 'an always** (situated and iterative) **process of generating meaning'** (Stritzel 2007, 366). **By securitizing nontraditional issues, the incongruence of a specific logic of security appears while different practices are applied. In this framework, the construction of both threats and rules by which security is carried out are open to a process of social construction and transformation.** The following sections explore this process, analysing the development of environmental security and climate security discourses.

Scientific knowledge good

Public Engagement/ Ocean Literacy

Exploration improves ocean literacy

NOAA 13 ("What Is Ocean Exploration and Why Is It Important? We have explored about five percent of Earth's ocean. "What does that mean?" "Who cares?" "What difference does it make?" "So what?"" http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/backmatter/whatisexploration.html National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Jan 7 2013)
Ocean exploration is about making new discoveries, searching for things that are unusual and unexpected.Although it involves the search for things yet unknown, **ocean exploration is disciplined and systematic. It includes rigorous observations and documentation of biological, chemical, physical, geological, and archaeological aspects of the ocean. Findings made through ocean exploration expand our fundamental scientific knowledge and understanding, helping to lay the foundation for more detailed, hypothesis-based scientific investigations.** While new discoveries are always exciting to scientists, **information from ocean exploration is important to everyone. Unlocking the mysteries of deep-sea ecosystems can reveal new sources for medical drugs, food, energy resources, and other products. Information** from deep-ocean exploration **can help predict earthquakes and tsunamis and help us understand how we are affecting and being affected by changes in Earth's climate and atmosphere. Expeditions to the unexplored ocean can help focus research into critical geographic and subject areas that are likely to produce tangible benefits. Ocean exploration can improve ocean literacy and inspire new generations of youth to seek careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.** The challenges of exploring the deep ocean can provide the basis for problem-solving instruction in technology and engineering that can be applied in other situations. Exploration leaves a legacy of new knowledge that can be used by those not yet born to answer questions not yet posed at the time of exploration.The Ocean Explorer website chronicles ocean explorations co-funded by the NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research, explains the tools and technology used during these explorations, and provides opportunities for people of all ages to expand their understanding of the ocean environment. Scientists, policy makers, and others interested in learning more about the "business" behind the science presented on this site are encouraged to visit the NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research website.

Intrinsic Knowledge

Intrinsic knowledge is good

ROZWADOWSKI 10 (HELEN M. ROZWADOWSKI, Environmental History, Vol. 15, No. 3 (JULY 2010), pp. 520-525. "Forest History Society and American Society for Environmental History" http://www.jstor.org/stable/25764467)

Tracklessness, opacity and vast scale are physical aspects of the ocean that are identified, to some degree, relative to human senses and scale. Especially based on my recent research into undersea exploration of the 1950s and 1960s, I have begun to understand that-for historians at least-consideration of extreme environments requires the context of human bodies (including their absence). **One characteristic** of the depths relative to land, which is also shared by the sea's surface, **is that voyagers leave no tracks in the water** (although they can, and do, leave traces in the sea). **This quality strongly shapes perception of the ocean and presents a challenge to efforts to tell ocean history. To a voyager gazing at the horizon, the sea appears the same at that moment as at all times in the past. Sailors often feel an affinity with each other and with sailors of past times. Storms likewise evoke universal reactions among mari ners (and sometimes nonmariners): terror, despair, and relief at their end. The sense of constancy conveys an impression of the sea as an a historic place**. Literature contributes to the idea of the ocean as apart from history. This perception is deeply and widely held, including by many historians, who treat the sea as a backdrop for human activities rather than as a place susceptible to, and involved in, historical change. **Just as the ocean seems outside history, it also seems unimaginably enormous relative to human scale. The sea's opacity forces the use of indirect methods to gain knowledge of its depths, such as deploying sounding gear or fishing nets to find the bottom contour or sample marine life. The vastness**, in all three dimensions, **impedes meaningful scientific knowledge based on direct, personal experience and demands, instead, systematic sampling using standardized instruments across large parts of the sea.** Both **the ocean's scale and its opacity mean that knowledge of the sea is mediated by technology and knowledge systems. These include** the gear and **knowledge of fishermen**, **navigators and others who work at sea as well as the tools and understanding of modern science.** Indeed, our knowledge of the ocean is so dependent on technology and knowledge systems that these can be understood as, to some extent, constituting the ocean.3 **As central as technology was, and remains, for knowing the ocean, motive is the critical precursor to technology. Cultural notions and political and economic intentions for using the ocean spurred efforts to probe the depths.** In the mid nineteenth century, expectations for a transatlantic submarine telegraph cable exerted a powerful influence on the interpretation of soundings along the proposed track of the cable. The resulting image of the sea floor as a plateau of mod erate depths, perfectly suited for submarine telegraphy, diverged from previous understanding of the ocean bottom as rugged and forbidding and, within two decades, gave way to the discovery of a major mid-ocean mountain chain. In the 1960s, promoters of ocean exploration described the sea as a "frontier" to evoke the wealth of living and non-living resources they believed possible to extract. **Perhaps the most striking evidence that culture-in the form of motive or desire-matters as much or more than technology comes with the recognition that the ability to reach great depths did not guarantee continued efforts to do so.** After the bathyscaphe Trieste reached the bottom of the Marianas Trench at the Challenger Deep, the deepest point of the ocean, in i960, no further efforts were made to revisit the deepest sea floor areas for over three decades. **The categories of imagination and desire are critical for the ocean.**4 **It may seem to some observers that actual human bodies were no longer relevant for the deep ocean by the mid- to late-twentieth century.** Strikingly unlike experimental rocket tests, for which unmanned shots preceded manned missions, the Trieste's first and only dive to the Challenger Deep was manned. **When exploration of the spot resumed in 1995, it was by robot. Despite the scientists and explorers who continue today to insist on the need for human presence underwater**, the debate is largely over. Remotely operated vehicles and, increasingly, autonomous underwater vehicles, appear to be the technology of choice for today's exploration of the great depths and much of the sea floor. **That does not, however, mean that historians should cease considering the ocean, even the depths, in terms of human physiology. While scientists define the ocean by fixed categories such as shelf, slope, and abyss, historians must, I believe, define zones of the sea differently-more fluidly, less geographically and, most of all, in ways that reflect the activities and desires of historical actors.** In the mid-nineteenth century, **for example, the functional depth of the "deep ocean" changed over time and depending on who defined it.** Hydrographers at the start of the century considered any depth beyond their 200-fathom sounding lines (1,200 feet) as deep, while dredgers defined the category in relation to the vessels and gear they used to collect samples. **People interested in the underwater realm in the 1950s and 1960s likewise defined "undersea" differently over time, always in reference to human ability to survive in an environment otherwise hostile to humans.** Generally speaking, the first thirty-three feet (to 1 atmosphere of pressure) underwater is the zone where ordinary people, both free divers and those using conventional scuba gear, are most comfortable, although beginning recreational diver training now extends to 120 feet. But human limits in the sea can change with technology. Adjustments to the mix of breathing gases can extend depth range, while the use of gear such as slides and lift assists can enable breath-holding free divers to achieve record depths of over 650 feet. Properly trained and outfitted

technical divers can operate to 180 feet; record dives with scuba gear have dipped below 980 feet. Time spent at depth need not be short. Experiments with saturation diving have demonstrated that humans can live at depths of 200 feet for 30 days, 328 feet for 22 days, and 980 feet for 14 days.5 **In short, parts of the ocean (defined by the intersection of human physiology and tech nology) can be viewed as an accessible environment.**

Science Good

Science should determine how environmental policy is made

Steel et al 3 (Brent – Director of the Public Policy Graduate Program at Oregon State University, Peter List, Denise Lach, Bruce Shindler, "The role of scientists in the environmental policy process: a case study from the American west", p. 3, *Elsevier*, http://and.lternet.edu/lter/pubs/pdf/pub4413.pdf, JS)

Many contemporary scientists would agree with scientist, Levien (1979) that **science and scientists can and should play an important and useful role in the environmental policy process.** Levien argues there are three ways that this can occur. **First, science and scientists can provide a clear understanding of the basic dimensions of environmental problems**, **identifying both what is known and what is uncertain. Second, science and scientists can then describe and identify options for the appropriate solution of those problems**, some of which might not be considered by political decision makers. **Finally, science can contribute to the resolution of environmental problems by estimating the economic, social, environmental and political consequences of proposed solutions through time and space, and across population groups** (Levien, 1979, pp. 47–48). Accordingly, scientists have been called upon by citizens, governments, and NGOs to predict the impact of human-caused activities on the world's climate, oceans, air, species, and other environmental components. Sarewitz and Pielke, (2000), p. 11 have described this situation as follows: Policy makers have called upon scientists to predict the occurrence, magnitude, and impacts of natural and human-induced environmental phenomena ranging from hurricanes and earthquakes to global climate change and the behaviour of hazardous waste. In the United States, billions of federal dollars are spent each year on such activities. These expenditures are justified in the large part by the belief that **scientific predictions are a valuable tool for crafting environmental and related policies.**

Silencing science damages public health and the environment

Kuehn 4 (Robert R. - Professor of Law at University of Alabama School of Law, "Suppression of Environmental Science", *American Journal of Law & Medicine*, http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/dissent/documents/Kuehn04.pdf, JS)

Environmental scientists have always had to answer questions about their methods, data, assumptions, and conclusions, and rightfully so, since it is the nature of science to exchange and question research results. 6 Because scientific research and judgments by scientists are not always free of outside influences, **a healthy scientific debate may** also include **inquiries about a researcher's motives, biases, and values.** 7 Not content with determining issues of environmental science through an open discussion over scientific methods and values, **some have gone beyond debate and sought to silence certain scientists or their scientific work.** 8 By attacking the scientist who brings a contrary message, these attackers seek to prevent the scientist's work or, at the very least, to delay or detract the scientist from focusing on the unwelcome research project, to reduce the credibility of the researcher and her work, or to send a warning signal to other scientists about the adverse consequences that may result if they engage in similar unwelcome work. **Suppression of environmental science raises serious concerns about scientific freedom and threatens public health and the environment. Because science, and the advancement of scientific issues and methods, depends on the free and open exchange of research and ideas, suppression of science may result in delays or wasteful repetition of research.** 9 Similarly, **where suppression of environmental science results in the failure or delay of scientists or government regulators to gain information about harmful activities, public health and the environment may be negatively impacted.** 10

Science is an important part of environmental policy debates

Kriebel et al 1 (David - Lowell Center for Sustainable Production, Joel Tickner, Paul Epstein, John Lemons, Richard Levins, Edward L. Loechler, Margaret Quinn, Ruthann Rudel, Ted Schettler, and Michael

Stoto, "The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science", *Environmental Health Perspectives*, September 2001, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1240435/pdf/ehp0109-000871.pdf, JS)

There are few pressing social issues that depend as heavily on scientific information as do environmental problems. Most scientists and policy makers agree on the importance of science in environmental policy debates, even when they can agree on almost nothing else about the health of the ecosphere. Thus, **environmental scientists play a key role in society's responses to environmental problems, and many of the studies performed by environmental scientists are intended ultimately to affect policy.** The precautionary principle has been proposed as a new guideline in making environmental policy (1,2). In this paper we examine the implications of the precautionary principle for environmental scientists. Specific objectives are to define the precautionary principle and illustrate it through three brief examples; identify aspects of conventional science that may inhibit precautionary policies; identify new directions for scientific research that would better inform precautionary policies; and promote dialogue among environmental scientists about the usefulness and potential applications of the precautionary principle.

Alt answers

alt = consumption

The alternative ensures warming—allows environmental catastrophe while paying lip service to industrial coal as the rational, sustainable center of coal production

Peeples et al 14 (*Jennifer, Associate Prof in the Department of Languages, Philosophy and Communication Studies @ Utah State Univ., **Pete Bsumek, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Co-Director of the Center for Health and Environmental Communication @ James Madison Univ., ***Steve Schwarze, Associate Prof and Chair in the Dept. of Communication Studies @ the Univ. of Montana, ****Jen Schneider, Associate Prof of Liberal Arts and International Studies @ the Colorado School of Mines, *Industrial Apocalyptic: Neoliberalism, Coal, and the Burlesque Frame*, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 17.2, Summer 2014, pgs 227-253)//mm

In the realm of environmental controversy **in the United States**, **apocalyptic rhetoric is consistently associated with environmentalist voices.** Examples of such labeling abound: an editorial in the Investor's Busi- ness Daily discussing clean air concludes, "Meanwhile, green groups froth with apocalyptic rhetoric."2 **Describing a case of ecotage, the editor of the Richmond Times Dispatch claims**, "**It is** mildly **tempting to blame main- stream environmentalists, with** their sometimes **apocalyptic rhetoric, for fostering an atmosphere upon which the lunatic fringe feeds**."3 And in a piece provocatively titled "No Reason to Fear the Environmental Bogeyman," Ben Eisen contends, "**For decades, the more radical elements of the** modern **environmental movement have employed** terrifying, **apocalyptic rhetoric** in an effort **to scare** citizens and **policymakers into enacting an agenda** that can go beyond common sense environmental policies."4 **But the** easy **association of environmentalism with apocalyptic rhetoric is inaccurate and politically misleading. When mass media identify environmentalism as apocalyptic, they mark environmentalism as radical, outside the mainstream, and unreasonable, which clears** a **space for industry voices to be perceived as the rational center, the common sense approach to environmental issues**.5 **This association also deflects attention from the apocalyptic rhetoric that comes from industry.** In his history of environmental politics, Samuel Hays problematizes the association of environmental discourse with the apocalypse, claiming that **historically "environmentalists were the purveyors of optimism** about the possibilities of human achievement **while administrative and technical leaders were the constant bearers of bad news**. **In the media the roles were reversed**: Environmentalists warned of impending catastrophe, while the technical leadership exuded optimism."6 **Rhetorical scholars who** continue to **identify apocalyptic rhetoric with environmentalism reinforce this distorted perception of the rhetoric of environmental controversies—a move that unnecessarily limits our understanding of apocalyptic rhetoric**. For example, although M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline Palmer acknowledge that "the enemies of environmentalism have regularly devised apocalyptic narratives of their own,"7 they also identify apocalyptic narrative as "a standard feature of environmentalist polemic"8 and focus primarily on environmentalist voices, while giving brief attention to only two examples of apocalyptic rhetoric from opponents of environmentalism: Monsanto's rejoinder to Silent Spring titled "The Desolate Year," and the rhetoric of former Interior Secretary James Watt.9 More recently, Christina R. Foust and William O. Murphy analyze apocalyptic framing in U.S. press coverage of climate change, yet those frames are almost exclusively built from quotations of pro-environmental sources.10In our view, **the scholarly and public focus on environmentalist uses of apocalyptic discourse has deflected attention away from the structure and function of apocalyptic rhetoric used by counter-movements to environmentalism**. This essay seeks to remedy that oversight**. We propose the concept of industrial apocalyptic as a** significant rhetorical **form in environmental controversy**, using texts in support of the U.S. coal industry as our examples. **We define industrial apocalyptic as narratives that constitute the** imminent **demise of a**

particular industry or a broader economic system **for the purpose of influencing** public opinion and **public policy**. This form of apocalyptic is consistent with the secular apocalyptic that Kurt Ritter and David Henry identify in the conservative rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, a rhetoric that, in James Arnt Aune's view, consistently seeks to manage the ideological tensions between free-market capitalism and patriotism.11 We **find that the industrial apocalyptic rhetoric used on behalf of the coal industry relies on a burlesque frame to disrupt** the categories of **establishment** and outsider **and to thwart environmental regulation**.12 Ultimately, **the industrial apocalyptic co-opts environmentalist appeals for radical change in** the service of **blocking such change and naturalizes neoliberal ideology as the common sense discourse of the center**. The essay proceeds by first reviewing scholarship on apocalyptic rhetoric and the burlesque frame to establish our theoretical framework. Then, it justifies our focus on the rhetoric supporting the coal industry before analyzing the apocalyptic and burlesque dimensions of that rhetoric. The latter portion of the essay draws out several implications that advance our understanding of those concepts as well as the role that industrial apocalyptic rhetoric plays in articulating neoliberal hegemony.

reps = activism

Only apocalyptic reps mobilize activism—prefer studies over claims and this ev is comparative and assumes their author

Veldman 12 (Robin Globus, PhD candidate @ the Univ. of Florida in Religion, *Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning among Environmental Activists*, Ethics & the Environment, Vol. 17.1, Spring 2012, pgs 1-23)//mm

As we saw in the introduction, **critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism**. **While it** certainly **does for some people**, in this section I will present evidence that **apocalypticism** also **often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence** of a connection between environ- mental apocalypticism and activism **comes from a national survey** that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony **Leiserowitz identified several "interpre- tive communities," which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception.** The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled "alarmists," described climate change using apocalyptic language, such as "Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation," "Heat waves, it's gonna kill the world," and "Death of the planet" (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism**. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with** moderate or **low levels of concern. To the contrary, however**, **Leise- rowitz found that alarmists "were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions"** (ibid.) **than respond- ents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat**. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minor- ity, **Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group** (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz's findings, in a separate national sur- vey conducted in 2008, **Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled "the Alarmed"** (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) **"are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming**. They are very convinced it is happening, human- caused, and a serious and urgent threat. **The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response**" (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in con- sumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that **"[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruc- tion of most life on the planet** (31%)" (2009, 31)—**a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe**, rather than some other motivation, **that encourages pro-environmental behavior.** Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence **that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice** some form of **activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation**. National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader pic- ture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior. When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, **many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable** (Taylor 1994). **At the**

same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowl- edged, the two are directly connected: "As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary" (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to pre- serve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging ac- tivism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as "monkeywrenching," or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional "paper monkeywrenching" (lobbying, engag- ing in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). **Ultimately, while there are disagree- ments over** what **strategies** will best achieve their desired goals, **for** most radical **environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together.** The connection between belief in impending disaster and environ- mental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting "dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration" (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia's impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). **As for material activism, Arthur notes that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior**: **images of immanent** [sic] **ecological crisis and apocalyptic change** often **were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview**; **for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through** a variety of practices, including **environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, com- posting**, and religious rituals; for learning **sustainable living skills**; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212) What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engag- ing in environmentally friendly behavior, **people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are** quite **likely to subscribe to** some form of **the apocalyptic narrative**. All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason peo- ple become activists. However, it is to say **that activism and apocalypticism are associated for** some **people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative.** Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. **Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it** also **fuels quite the opposite**—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. **It is also to ignore the movement's history. From Silent Spring** (Carson [1962] 2002) **to The Limits to Growth** (Meadows et al 1972) **to The End of Nature** (McKibben 1989), **apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature**, topping best-seller lists and **spreading the message far and wide** that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be ef- fective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further.

Realism Good

Realism seeks to combine politics with moral concepts, allowing for a realistic approach to idealism

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., *Reconstructing Realism,* Keele University Press, page 2 http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=UW0b6ABr9QEC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=reconstructing+realism&ots=7CbDyLzwp-&sig=B3P-qyJxvwAOOliVYVLolfIt1bg#v=onepage&q=reconstructing%20realism&f=false)

Consequently, **realism is portrayed by its opponents not only as being silent in the contemporary normative debate, but as being incapable of saying anything**. **Such a conception** of realism **is**, however**, fundamentally erroneous.** Realism arose in opposition to idealism; and, given that the locus of idealism was a concern with the moral, realism's genesis was oriented towards normative issues. Of course, it never sough to engage in the type of abstract philosophy held to be necessary to generate detailed, grounded conceptions of the good. Rather**, realism sought to bring idealism into a relationship with the realities of politics, to foster an awareness of the recalcitrance of these realities to abstract moral principles, and to introduce an awareness of the pervasive influence of power in the determination of political outcomes.** Yet, whilst this presupposed an intimate involvement with 'the facts as they really are', **the realist concern with the real was not exclusive, but rather a function of its desire to juxtapose it to the idea.** It sought **to interrelate morality and power in a viable synthesis, to generate a practical ethic which might prove more realistic, and more productive, than those which ignored the 'rules'' of international politics**. Realism ultimately represented a fundamentally practical tradition of thought, centrally concerned with the moral understandings of participants, which the productive application of these understandings, and with the task of generating some form of moral consensus in international relations which might support a stable international order. Whatever the merits of its solutions to these issues, it clearly was not a positivist, explanatory theory; it was profoundly concerned for normative issues, and in particular, for the articulation of a self-consciously political ethic.

Self-interest is inherent in every human being. Individuals place their survival first before others.

Thayer 2000 (Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota—Duluth, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics, The MIT Press, November 2, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v025/25.2.thayer.html)

According to evolutionary theory, human behavioral traits (the genetic causes of human behavior) evolve and genes that increase fitness spread though the population. By displaying these traits, an individual stands a better chance of surviving long enough to reproduce and of having her genes represented in the next generation. **This is the essence of the basic model of evolutionary theory upon which realism may build.**[40] The Origins of Egoism
Evolutionary theory offers two sufficient explanations for the trait of egoism. The first is a classic Darwinian argument: **In a hostile environment where resources are scarce and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others.[41] In times of danger or great stress, an organism usually places its life—its survival—before that of other members of its group**, be it pack, herd, or tribe. **For these reasons, egoistic behavior contributes to fitness.**

There are many reasons that states go to war, not just for security

Mearsheimer 06 (John J., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, *Structural Realism*, July 31, online: http://johnmearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf)

Structural realists recognize **that states can go to war for any number of reasons, which makes it impossible to come up with a simple theory that points to a single factor as the main cause of war.** There is no question that states sometimes start wars to gain power over a rival state and enhance their security. But **security is not always the principle driving force behind a state's decision for war. Ideology or economic considerations are sometimes paramount. For example, nationalism was the main reason Bismarck launched wars** against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–1). **The Prussian leader wanted to create a unified Germany.**

Security Good

Security is Not Survivalism - It is a Pre-requisite to Justice and Human Flourishing

Bellamy,and McDonald 2004

Alex J. Bellamy, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queenss, and Matt McDonald, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, '4 [Australian *Journal of Political Science* 39.2, "'Securing international society: towards an English school discourse of security," p. informaworld]

As noted, a pluralist conception of security can be read through the works of Hedley Bull and Robert Jackson. For Bull, the provision of international security (the absence of conflict between states, or negative peace) **was an important prerequisite for the pursuit of justice** (and hence security more broadly defined) within states. This was the normative aspect of Bull's conception of security. **There 'ought to be' an international society that allows a plurality of culturally diverse** political **communities to pursue their own conceptions of justice and security. The** 'five pillars' of international order that he identifies in The Anarchical Society reflect his concern with the 'what is' (Bull 1977, 101–232). In modernity, international order is provided by the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the great powers, with these pillars being historically contingent rather than timeless. Bull recognised the possibility of extending the boundaries of political community beyond states in international society,4 although was generally sceptical about the imminent possibility of such reform and even its desirability, seeing it as a move away from the pluralist ideal. Thus, as we noted earlier, Bull shared Carr's belief that the forceful articulation of political values would destabilise international order and make it harder for states to provide security for their citizens. Robert Jackson has taken up the idea of a pluralist conception of security more recently. According to Jackson (2000, 16), world politics is predicated on a global covenant that constitutes a pluralist society that sits somewhere between Machiavellian power politics and the Kantian 'community of mankind'. The global covenant consists of procedural and prudential norms that revolve around the mutual recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the foundational principle of non-intervention. Jackson follows Bull in using a communitarian conception of the moral community rather than a realist conception of the de facto ontological primacy of the state as the grounding for a pluralist idea of security whose subject matter is nevertheless very similar to that of realism. Lest there be any doubt about that, Jackson (2000, 185) echoes Carr's understanding of the political when he explains that, 'security is not only or even primarily an instrumental question … it is a moral question. Security is a foundation value of human relations'. Jackson (2000, 186) continues by echoing Bull in arguing that national security 'is a norm that often pre-empts other fundamental norms'. Here, he means that without national (read **state) security there can be no hope of meeting other aspirations of social life**, such as 'economic security' and 'environmental security'. Indeed, Jackson (2000, 195) argues that these are not security issues: 'an economic depression might threaten my personal welfare as well as the national welfare, but it is no threat to my safety or my country's security'. We should not think of these wider issues as security issues, therefore. Moreover, as there is no agreement in the world about what human rights, economic rights, environmental rights and the rest are, 'the consistent enforcement of human security around the world is impossible' (Jackson 2000, 214) and would create more disorder than 'security'.

AT: Security K - Cede Political

Desecuritization Cedes Security to the right - Political engagement is Necessary

Olav. F. **Knudsen**, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, '**1** [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization," p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers's billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use **are in no need of** such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such

sins in the past needs to **go back to the literature**. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly influence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state's limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that 'reality' of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European **security as it is** currently developing. That inevitably requires a more **consistent** interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the '**traditional' sector of security policymaking, unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.**

Arms Control With Russia Embrace Co-operation, Not Securitization

Benjamin **Berboth et. al**., Prof. of Poli. Sci @ Johann Wolfgang Goeth-University, **'7** [*Norface Seminar*, "Secur(itizing)ing the West: The Transformation of Western Order," http://www.soz.uni-frankfurt.de/hellmann/projekt/Draft_Final_West_DVPW_BISA_08.pdf] Hence, instances of a securitization of Russia and China can easily be found throughout the last decade in different sectors and at different points in time. Some Western policies, for example those demanding export controls of military goods, trade sanctions against China or neighborhood policies of the EU in Central Asia and the Caucasus should be interpreted as consequences of these practices. Despite of these instances of securitization and the according institutional transformations, it still seems quite uncertain whether Russia or China will eventually be perceived as a significant threat to the West comparable to the Eastern Bloc during the heydays of the bipolar era. Both states have undergone major changes that make them appear less different and less threatening than before. It can also be observed that **significant actors** in Europe and in the U.S. de-securitize relations towards China and Russia and refer to the West in a positive way as a community of universal values that former rivals should aspire to join. Rather than drawing dividing lines, **they underline the common ground** and **move issues off the security agenda.** A logic of equivalence would be characteristic of these discourses, in which positive references to the West make the creation of common institutions or the extension of traditional formal Western organizations possible. In the economic realm, for example, China is seen by both Europeans and Americans as an emerging competitor but not as a danger. Since the 1970s, China has followed a capitalist path and, by and large, played by the Western rules of free trade. It definitively approved those rules with its accession to the World Trade organization (WTO) in 2001. Despite all warnings of a rising China becoming a future threat to the U.S. and the West, there are still no signs of a serious security dilemma. In contrast, Sino-Western relations have been marked to a significant extent by a peaceful integration of China into the world economy, which is shaped by Western values of free trade. Equally, Russia's foreign policy under Boris Yeltsin and notably his Foreign Minister Kozyrev **was marked by a rapprochement** towards the European Union and the search for a strategic partnership with the West as a whole (Dobriansky 2000: 140; Mankoff 2007: 124). Although Russia was still far from being regarded as a part of the Western community (Baranovsky 2000), the signing of the START IT-treaty in 1993, the membership of Russia in NATO's Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and its incorporation in the Council of Europe in 1996 were the most visible institutional signs of a growing **accommodation and cooperation between** the West and the former enemy. Examples for a de-securitization of the relations towards Russia, as well as China **are abundant**. In the case of China, the incorporation into the WTO and the developing EU-China human rights dialogue since 1995 are the most visible institutional consequences that presumably may be traced back to practices of speaking security. Continuous institutional rapprochement of NATO and Russia, from the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 to the founding of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997 up to the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002, are examples of institutional consequences that question whether moves of de-securitization or (re-)securitization have occurred. Investigating such processes of securitization and de-securitization in detail, we seek to find out whether 'the West' is still granted an important role in the relations with China and Russia or if the 'nation state', 'Europe' or the 'democratic community' have become alternative referent objects striving for hegemony. In the case that the signifier West' has not vanished from these discourses, we will be able to understand which place, role and status actors in Europe and in North America. ascribe to it. It will be possible to identify the new identity markers for the West and the non-West, to reconstruct, whether

the West is divided in its different views towards a European East (Russia) and an American West (China) and to analyze to what extent processes of de-/securitization vary across the economic, the security and the societal sector.

2AC Security: Acting As If

Our Scenario Evaluations are Crucial For Ethically Responsible Politics - Purely Theoretical Kritik is Insufficient - We Need "As If" Stories to Offset the Worst International Violence

Williams 2005 [Michael Williams, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth, '5 [The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 165-7]

Moreover, the links between skeptical realism and prevalent postmodern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics.8° In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully characterized, to borrow Stephen White's illuminating contrast, as expressions of 'responsibility to otherness' which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with a 'responsibility to act'. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a 'responsibility to act'.81 Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that the wilful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring **together a responsibility to otherness** and a responsibility to act within a willfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculations is not just a consequence of a need to act - the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a **form of responsibility** to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by - at least initially - reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of **mutual intelligibility,** mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of limitation: a willful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited - both epistemically and politically - **in the name of a politics of toleration**: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of *mondus vivendi*. If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to skeptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. The issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann's incisive questions concerning postmodern construction of identity, action and responsibility. As Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities are indebted to otherness**, do not** in themselves **provide a foundation** for practice, particularly in situations where identities are 'sediment' and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice (and not just philosophical practice) the essential dynamics it confronts. Here, a responsibility to act must go beyond deconstruction to **consider viable alternatives and counter-practices**. To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward 'blackmail of the Enlightenment and a narrow 'modernist' vision of responsibility. While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essential stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and institutions) that might viably be mobilised in order to **offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary** identities**. It requires,** as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of **compelling 'as if' stories** around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Willful Realism, 1 submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such 'stories' within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they he limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dichotomies.

Extensions - Security: AS IF/AT: Ontology/Epist Prior

Their Prioritization of "International Reality" Reduces The Critic to a God Like Observor - Instead You Should Act "As if" Current Threats were True - This Provides *Practical Application* of Scholarship

Pouliot 2007 [Vincent Pouliot, PhD Candidate in Political Science @ Univ. of Toronto, '7 [International Studies Quarterly, ""Sobjectivism": Toward a Constructivist Methodology," p. wiley]
A principled refusal to assume Reality means that for postfoundationalist constructivism, there are no such things as ontological foundations of knowledge. A correspondence theory of truth would thus be a lure. Yet, postfoundationalism certainly does not embrace epistemological relativism either. Inside a style of reasoning, th**ere exist criteria for validity, which are not transcendental but intersubjective** (see the conclusion below). In this context, the way forward consists of building on the social facts that **are naturalized by social agents**. Already reified by agents, social facts provide constructivists with some sort of **"epistemic foundations**" (Adler 2005) that allow them to develop knowledge about social life while remaining agnostic about reality. The focus is on what it is that social agents, as opposed to analysts, take to be real. In this epistemological sense, social facts are "the essence of constructivism" (Pouliot 2004). They are knowledge that makes social worlds come into being. Ultimately, to know whether a social fact is "really real" **makes no analytical difference**; the whole point is to observe whether agents take it to be real and **to draw the social and political implications that follow.** In so doing, postfoundationalism steers a middle course between scientific realism (which rests on allegedly natural foundations) and antifoundationalism (which denies the possibility of foundations for knowledge altogether). Methodological Implications Three main methodological implications follow from characterizing the constructivist style of reasoning as postfoundationalist social science. First, induction is the primary mode of knowing because social facts constitute the essence of constructivism. Research must begin with what it is that social agents, as opposed to analysts, believe to be real. Second, interpretation constitutes the central methodological task as constructivism takes knowledge very seriously. To use Geertz's (1973:5) famous words, it is first and foremost a science "in search of meaning." And third, the constructivist style of reasoning is inherently historical for it "sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being" (Adler 2005:11). The dialectical constitution of knowledge and reality begs for a process-centered approach. An Inductive Methodology Inductive analysis—a research strategy that moves from the local to the general—is the necessary starting point for any constructivist inquiry. This is because theorization destroys meanings **as they exist for social agents**. Deductive theory, for instance, deliberately imposes scientific categories upon practical ones. Yet, it has been said that constructivism's foundations of knowledge rest not on a set of a priori assumptions but on agents' taken-for-granted realities. In order to recover such meanings, the analyst must avoid superseding them with theoretical constructs. In addition, as the construction of social reality hinges on the social construction of knowledge, analysts also need to refrain (within the realms of possibility) from imposing their own taken-for-granted world onto their object of study. In sociology, Glaser and Strauss (1967:226) famously dubbed this inductive enterprise "grounded theory." The premise is that "a firsthand immersion in a sphere of life and action—a social world—**different from one's own yields important dividends**. The field worker who has observed closely in this social world has had, in a profound sense, to live there. He has been sufficiently immersed in this world to know it, and at the same time has retained enough detachment to think theoretically about what he has seen and lived through." Induction allows constructivists to recover the meanings of the world as it exists for the actual agents of international politics.7 An inductive methodology acts as a safeguard against two especially harmful fallacies in social science. The first fallacy, well-known since Durkheim's (1950 [1894]) exhortation to fight against "prenotions," results from the socially constructed world inside of which the analyst happens to live, with all its taken-for-granted realities. Of course, it is impossible to fully evade one's world and its meanings. Because of the "Rashomon effect" (Heider 1988), different researchers never recover exactly the same practical meanings. But that does not mean it is not worth trying to be as faithful and accurate as possible. The second fallacy countered by induction, which is by far the most pernicious, is what Bourdieu called the **"scholastic bias" or the "intellectualist fallacy**" (cf. Bourdieu 1990 [1980], 2000 [1972], 2001, 2003 [1997]). Put simply, this bias entices social scientists "to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as **concrete problems to be solved practically**" (Wacquant 1992:39). Most social scientists have the reflex to take the point of view of an external spectator: not involved in the social situation under study, they try to stand back from it in order to grasp the larger picture. This god-like posture has huge epistemological consequences because the theoretical relation to the world is fundamentally different **from the practical one**, if only in the distance from which the action is played out. As Bourdieu's (1987:97–98) aphorism goes, a practice is logical up to the point where to be logical ceases to be practical.8 Thanks to induction, researchers avoid imposing a scholastic and alien logic on practices that are fundamentally defined by their **practical urgency and embeddedness in a social context.**

Security Alt =Blind Optimism

Their Blind Optimism is in the Face of Potential War is Disasterous - Attempts Ethical Responsibility is Irresponsibility in the Face of Material Power Relations

Jones 1999[Richard Wyn **Jones**, Prof. of International Politics @ Aberystywyth, **'99** [*Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory*, p. 120]

A close reading of Ole Waever also reveals similar concerns in his dis-cussion of the merits and demerits of securitizing arid desecuritizing issues as part of what seems to be, in the broadest sense of the word, a progressive political project. In a revealing, if slightly opaque, footnote, Waever agonizes:

For understandable but contingent institutional reasons, post- structuralists, have emerged on the academic scene with the political program of tearing down "givens," of opening up, making possible, freeing. This invites the reasonable question: opening up for what? Neo-nazis? War' How can the post- structuralist be sure that liberating minds" and "transcending limits" will necessarily lead to more peaceful conditions, unless one **makes an incredible enlightenment-** indebted "**harmony of interests" assumption**? For someone working in the negatively-driven field of security, a poststructuralist politics, of responsibility must turn out differently, with more will to power and less tie-naturalization. (Wtwer 1995: 86)

Leaders have an ethical responsibility to prevent nuclear war at all costs and to not gamble with their own people.

Küng 97 (Hans, President of the Foundation for a Global Ethic, *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics*, Oxford University Press, 1997, page 249, http://books.google.com/books?id=3Gz4U64EJcgC&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=nuclear+war+far+fetched&source=bl&ots=HFHWe-AMPu&sig=TW9syGDoAqXDMfJLjkp5GbcXuG4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SX7GU8-dBu3nsASLxIHQBw&ved=0CFgQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=nuclear%20war%20far%20fetched&f=false)

In his work on an ethic of responsibility Hans Jonas has rightly asked an even more radical question in connection with the apocalyptic potential of nuclear or genetic technology, and one with which ethics had not previously been confronted: whether and why in the future there should be a humanity, why its genetic heritage should be respected, indeed **why there should be life at all**. That he has ventured on **this root question** indicates that Jonas **is** a **truly radical** thinker. Here he openly concedes that **there is a philosophical need to provide a rational foundation even for the prime imperative of an ethic of survival:** 'that there be a mankind', that **for statesmen there should be the prohibition of a *vabanque* gamble with mankind**' and of a desire for an 'end' - possibly deserved - to mankind. **In view of** Adolf Hitler's feverish fantasies before his suicide of the 'deserved' destruction of the whole German people (who were not worthy of him) or in view of the possibilities for Saddam Hussein in the possession of nuclear weapons against Israel or a greater **nuclear war**, **such reflection are truly not far-fetched.**

It's try or die for the aff: studies show that even a regional nuclear conflict would create a global dark age.

Starr 2010 (Steven**,** Senior Scientist with Physicians for Social Responsibility, and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri, "Deadly Climate Change from Nuclear War: A threat to human existence" February 18, online: http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/deadly-climate-change-from-nuclear-war.pdf)

Nuclear detonations within urban and industrial areas would ignite immense firestorms which would burn everything imaginable and create millions of tons of thick, black smoke. Much of this smoke would rapidly be lofted above cloud level, into the stratosphere, where it **would block warming sunlight from reaching the lower atmosphere and surface of the Earth. Sunlight would then** markedly heat the upper atmosphere and **cause massive destruction of the protective ozone layer, while darkness below would produce average surface temperatures** on Earth characteristic of those **experienced during an Ice Age.** The darkness and global cooling predicted to result from nuclear war (along with massive radioactive fallout, pyrotoxins, and ozone depletion) was

first described in 1983 as "nuclear winter".[4] These initial studies estimated the smoke from nuclear firestorms would stay in the stratosphere for about a year. However **in 2006, researchers using modern computer models found the smoke would form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would last for ten years.** The longevity of such a smoke layer would allow much smaller quantities of smoke than first predicted in the 1980's to have a great impact upon both global climate and atmospheric ozone which blocks ultraviolet (UV) light. Thus **scientists predict that even a "regional" nuclear conflict could produce enough smoke to significantly cool average global surface temperatures, reduce precipitation, and vastly increase the amount of dangerous UV light reaching the surface of Earth.** In other words, a nuclear war fought between such nations as India and Pakistan would produce enough smoke to make the blue skies of Earth appear grey. Although the amount of sunlight blocked by this smoke would not produce the profound darkening of the Earth predicted in a nuclear winter (following a nuclear war fought with thousands of strategic nuclear weapons), the **regional conflict would likely have devastating global effects upon all human populations** through its negative influence upon agriculture.

Research show that nuclear war would not only cause millions of deaths in the war zone, but also a massive amount of death due to drastic climate change and starvation.

Starr 2010 (Steven**,** Senior Scientist with Physicians for Social Responsibility, and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri, "Deadly Climate Change from Nuclear War: A threat to human existence" February 18, online: http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/deadly-climate-change-from-nuclear-war.pdf)

In 2006, U.S. researchers used a NASA computer model (Model 1E, also used for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to predict global warming) **to evaluate the effects of a regional nuclear war** fought in the sub-tropics.[7] **50 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons** (15 kilotons per weapon) were detonated in the largest cities of each combatant nation (100 total detonations). **The studies predicted the nuclear explosions would kill 20 million people in the war zone**, the equivalent to half of all the people who died during World War II. **The conflict would also significantly disrupt global climate**. Up to 5 million tons of smoke from burning cities would quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, and within 2 weeks would form a global stratospheric smoke layer which would remain in place for about 10 years.[8] The computer models estimated **this smoke layer would block** 7–10% of **warming sunlight from reaching the surface of the Earth. Average surface temperatures beneath the smoke would become** colder than any experienced during the last 1000 years**. There would be a** corresponding **shortening of growing seasons by up to 30 days and** significant **reductions in average rainfall in many areas**, with a 40% decrease of precipitation in the Asian monsoon region.[9] **Such rapid and drastic climate change would have major impacts on global grain reserves, which already are at 50 year lows.[9] Grain exports would likely cease for several years from large exporting nations** like Canada.[10] **The 700 million people now living on the edge of starvation, along with those populations heavily dependent upon grain imports, would face mass starvation as grain reserves disappeared, prices skyrocketed and hoarding occurred. Global nuclear famine is the predicted result of this scenario. As many as one billion people could die during the years subsequent to the deadly climate change created by this level of nuclear conflict.**[11]

Scenario planning is good: allows for the best outcomes

Roxburgh 09 (Charles, director at McKinsey & Company's London office, "The use and abuse of scenarios", McKinsey Insights & Publications, November, online: http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/the_use_and_abuse_of_scenarios)

Scenarios are a powerful tool in the strategist's armory. They are particularly useful in developing strategies to navigate the kinds of extreme events we have recently seen in the world economy. Scenarios enable the strategist to steer a course between the false certainty of a single forecast and the confused paralysis that often strike in troubled times. When well executed, scenarios boast a range of advantages—but they can also set traps for the unwary.¶There is a significant amount of literature on scenarios: their origins in war games, their pioneering use by Shell, how to construct them, how to move from scenarios to decisions, and so on. Rather than attempt anything encyclopedic, which would require a book rather than a short article, I have put forward my personal convictions, based on experience in building scenarios over the past 25 years, about both the power and the dangers of scenarios, and how to sidestep those dangers. I close with some rules of thumb that help me—and will, I hope, help you—get the best out of scenarios.¶The power of scenarios¶Scenarios have three features that make them a particularly powerful tool for understanding uncertainty and developing strategy accordingly.¶**Scenarios expand your thinking¶You will think more broadly if you develop a range of possible outcomes, each backed by the sequence of events that would lead to them.** The exercise is particularly valuable because of a human quirk that leads us to expect that the future will resemble the past and that change will occur only gradually**. By demonstrating how—and why—things could quite quickly become much better or worse, we increase our readiness for the range of possibilities the future may hold.** You are obliged to ask yourself why the past might not be a helpful guide, and you may find some surprisingly compelling answers.¶This quirk, along with other factors, was most powerfully illustrated in the recent meltdown. Many financial modelers had used data going back only a few years and were therefore entirely unprepared for what we have since seen. If they had asked themselves why the recent past might not serve as a good guide to the future, they would have remembered the Asian collapse of the late 1990s, the real-estate slump of the early 1990s, the crash of October 1987, and so on. The very process of developing scenarios generates deeper insight into the underlying drivers of change. Scenarios force companies to ask, "What would have to be true for the following outcome to emerge?" As a result, they find themselves testing a wide range of hypotheses involving changes in all sorts of underlying drivers. They learn which drivers matter and which do not—and what will actually affect those that matter enough to change the scenario.¶**Scenarios uncover inevitable or near-inevitable futures¶A sufficiently broad scenario-building effort yields another valuable result. As the analysis underlying each scenario proceeds, you often identify some particularly powerful drivers of change. These drivers result in outcomes that are the inevitable consequence of events that have already happened, or of trends that are already well developed.** Shell, the pioneer in scenario planning, described these as "predetermined outcomes" and captured the essence of this idea with the saying, "It has rained in the mountains, so it will flood in the plains." In developing scenarios, companies should search for predetermined outcomes—particularly unexpected ones, which are often the most powerful source of new insight uncovered in the scenario-development process.¶Broadly speaking, there are four kinds of predetermined outcomes: demographic trends, economic action and reaction, the reversal of unsustainable trends, and scheduled events (which may be beyond the typical planning horizon).¶Demography is destiny. Changes in population size and structure are among the few highly predictable aspects of the future. Some uncertainties exist (potential increases in longevity, for example), but only at the margin. Sometimes, the effects of these trends are far off—as with Social Security in the United States today—so they are generally ignored. When these trends grow near, however, their effects can be powerful indeed, as when the baby boom generation is on the brink of leaving the workforce.¶"You canna change the laws of economics!" Just as Scotty the engineer could not change the laws of physics when Captain Kirk1 demanded more warp speed, so business leaders cannot assume away the laws of economics. If demand shoots up, prices will too—which will limit demand and drive increasing supply—with the result that demand, prices, or both will drop. Nothing increases in price forever, in real terms. We recently saw oil prices more than double and then sink back again by an equal amount. Price changes of this scale inevitably drive supply and demand reactions in every relevant value chain. As in physics, **every** economic **action has a predetermined reaction**. These reactions are often ignored in business strategy**. If uncovered through scenario planning**, however**, they can generate powerful insights.**¶"Trees don't grow to the sky." Business plans often extrapolate into the future trends that are clearly unsustainable. Economies are fundamentally cyclical, so beware of politicians bearing tales about the end of boom and bust. Equally, do not build a strategy based on the claim that the business cycle has been tamed. Often, optimistic projections are accompanied by bold claims of a new paradigm. Strategists need to be very cautious about alleged new paradigms. The appearance of even a genuine new paradigm almost always results in a speculative bubble. The "new economy" was a good example. More recently, securitization proved to be another sound idea that resulted in a speculative bubble. And in the past, many new, innovative technologies—railroads and radio, for example—were hailed as "new paradigms" and then promptly led to investment bubbles. A useful test is to project a trend at least 25 years out. Then ask how long can this trend really be sustained. Challenge yourself to try and prove why the shape of the future should be so fundamentally different from the more cyclical past. Chances are you won't be able to, and this will open your eyes to the possibility of a break in the trend.¶Scheduled events may fall beyond typical planning horizons. There is also a simpler kind of predetermined outcome that does not involve any unalterable laws:

scenarios must take into account scheduled events just beyond corporate planning horizons. A recent example, the results of which we have already seen, is reset dates on adjustable-rate mortgages. Well before the event, one could have predicted a spike in resets as mortgages sold in 2005 and 2006—the peak years—completed their low, three-year introductory rates. Something bad was going to happen to the economy in 2008. Right now, there is another important "timetable" to watch: the wave of large bond issues that has resulted from banks having to refinance hundreds of billions of dollars of maturing debt. Although these types of scheduled events ought to be common knowledge, they tend to be overlooked in planning exercises because they fall beyond the next 12 to 18 months. Scenarios should account for scheduled events that could have a big impact in the 24–60 month time frame.¶ While some errors can be avoided by recalling certain fundamental economic and demographic facts or scheduled events, problems of timing will continue to exist. Your company's strategic planners may know that a massive dollar value of mortgages is about to reset. But when will the market actually wake up to this reality? Financial services cannot grow as a percentage of GDP forever. But at what percentage will this stop? We didn't know before, and we still don't know today. Still, the realization that something must happen, even if it is not clear when, leads to the inclusion of at least one scenario in which, say, financial services stop growing sooner rather than later.¶ **Scenarios protect against 'groupthink'**¶ Often, the power structure within companies inhibits the free flow of debate**. People** in meetings **typically agree with whatever the most senior person in the room says.** In particularly hierarchical companies, employees will wait for the most senior executive to state an opinion before venturing their own—which then magically mirrors that of the senior person**. Scenarios** allow companies to break out of this trap by **provid**ing **a political "safe haven" for contrarian thinking.**¶ **Scenarios allow people to challenge conventional wisdom**¶ In large corporations**, there is typically a very strong status quo bias**. After all, **large sums of money**, and many senior executives' careers, **have been invested in the core assumptions underpinning the current strategy—which means that challenging these assumptions can be difficult. Scenarios provide a less threatening way to lay out alternative futures in which the these assumptions underpinning today's strategy may no longer be true.**